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REVIEW OF REVIEWS
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This article surveys the practice of dual nationality in the Western Hemisphere, particularly as it impacts the naturalization rates of immigrants in the United States. The article begins by looking at the extent and spread of dual nationality provisions and the pathways for its implementation. Next, the article turns to a discussion of the multiple (and at times conflicting) interests — of immigrants, sending states and receiving states — in dual nationality. While immigrants and sending countries are in general agreement on the positive benefits of dual nationality, commentators in receiving countries like the United States continue to express deep unease at the spread of dual nationality and its consequences for American citizenship. Are these concerns justified? Not according to U.S. naturalization rates. Data from 1965 to 1997 indicate that immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality average higher naturalization rates in the United States than countries that do not.

Dual nationality is a complex phenomenon, reflecting competing interests of receiving states, sending states and immigrants. As the recognition of dual nationality has spread among sending states, however, receiving states like the United States have begun to have second thoughts about its effect on naturalization and citizenship in their countries. This article seeks to explore the issue further: Is the practice of dual nationality really detrimental to receiving states? Specifically, does recognition of dual nationality by sending states negatively affect the naturalization of immigrants from those sending countries in the United States?

This article addresses these questions by surveying the practice of dual nationality in the Western Hemisphere, particularly as it impacts the naturalization rates of immigrants in the United States. In the first section, this article begins by looking at the extent and spread of dual nationality provisions and the pathways for its implementation. In the next section, it turns to a discussion of the multiple (and at times conflicting) interests — of immigrants, sending states and receiving states — in dual nationality. While immigrants and sending countries are in general agreement on the positive benefits of
dual nationality, commentators in receiving countries like the United States continue to express deep unease at the spread of dual nationality and its consequences for American citizenship. The question is whether these concerns are in fact justified. The sections that follow lay out the methods and data for answering this question and the findings of the study. Briefly, the article finds that immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality average higher naturalization rates in the United States than countries that do not. The conclusion outlines the implications these findings have for the debate around dual nationality.

**DUAL NATIONALITY AND ITS RECOGNITION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

‘Nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are often used interchangeably, but they have somewhat different meanings. Nationality refers to the formal legal status of state membership. Citizenship, on the other hand, delineates “the specific character of a member’s rights and duties within the national polity” (Feldblum and Klusmeyer, 1999). Dual nationality allows individuals to hold memberships in two (or more) states (see Spiro, 1998). However, as illustrated below, dual nationality does not necessarily entail access to all the rights and benefits of national citizenship, such as voting or the right to hold office.

Dual nationality has become much more visible recently and, being visible, has become increasingly controversial as well. The reason for this has much to do with recent debates in both sending countries (Mexico, India, South Korea and the Philippines, to name a few) and receiving countries (Germany and the United States, for instance) about whether to recognize or permit dual nationality for their citizens. In the United States, the discussion has resurfaced in response to the recognition of dual nationality by countries, many of them in Latin America, whose emigrants have settled in the United States.

At the time of this writing, 10 Latin American countries – Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay – recognize dual nationality. An additional number recognize a limited form of dual nationality shared only with treaty signatories – Guatemala, for instance, with other nations in Central America, and a number of countries with Spain. At least 10 Caribbean basin nations – among them Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St.

1'Latin America' in this context refers to Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries, as opposed to the former English, French and Dutch colonies of the Caribbean basin.
Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago—also recognize dual nationality, most of them since their independence (see Table 1). Although most of the attention here will be focused on dual nationality in Latin America—the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in the Western Hemisphere—the article returns to the Caribbean cases intermittently below.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dual Nationality</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spanish- and Portuguese-Speaking Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>recoverable if return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recoverable if return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>only with treaty nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>recoverable if return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Western Hemisphere Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>since independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
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Sources: Organización internacional para las migraciones (OIM), Centro de información sobre migraciones en América Latina (CIMAL), copies of national constitutions available at: http://www.reuna.cl/oim/constit/CONSTIT.html#a1 (February 2, 2000); phone interviews with embassies and consulates, January 17-February 2, 2000.
In Latin America there has been an acceleration of interest in dual nationality. Before 1991 only four Latin American countries – Uruguay (1919), Panama (1972), Peru (1980) and El Salvador (1983) – had opted to recognize dual nationality. Since then, between 1991 and 1998, an additional six countries have recognized dual nationality. One analytical difference, then, among countries which have recognized dual nationality is between ‘early adopters’ and ‘late adopters.’ A second difference among countries acknowledging dual nationality is between those which have followed ‘top-down’ policy decision-making paths, instigated by country of origin governments with little or no input by their emigrant communities abroad, and those responding to pressure from their overseas compatriots, referred to here as the ‘bottom-up’ approach (see Table 2).

**TABLE 2**

**Types of Dual Nationality Among Spanish- and Portuguese-Speaking Countries in the Western Hemisphere**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top-Down</th>
<th>Bottom-Up</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (1919)</td>
<td>Colombia (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama (1972)</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (1994)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Organización internacional para las migraciones (OIM); Centro de información sobre migraciones en América Latina (CIMAL); copies of national constitutions available at: http://www.reuna.cl/oim/constit/CONSTIT.html#a1 (February 2, 2000); phone interviews with embassies and consulates, January 17-February 2, 2000.

Decisions by early adopters to recognize dual nationality were by and large top-down state-driven policy decisions; late adopters, however, have split between top-down and bottom-up approaches.

In Uruguay, Panama and Peru, formal recognition of dual nationality is not a recent phenomenon. These countries have sanctioned membership claims of their dual nationals in other countries for decades. Uruguay has followed the model of *jus sanguinis*: nationality is acquired at birth and cannot be abrogated by other subsequent changes in allegiance or status. Nationals abroad retain rights, even if they naturalize in another country, and can retain the use of both passports. If they wish, they can participate in the elections of the home country upon their return (or in the case of Peru, participate in national elections through their country’s consulates abroad). Dual nationality allows immigrants to take on other political allegiances without jeopardizing their standing with their countries of origin. It may not allow them full
and equal political rights while residing abroad, but it usually allows immigrants to recover those rights if and when they return to their home countries.

Brazil and Costa Rica are more recent examples of this top-down approach, orchestrated from within the legislature as a kind of afterthought, with little concerted pressure from the immigrant community abroad (see Margolis, 1994). In seven months of attempting constitutional reform, Brazil’s Congress was largely ineffectual, passing only four minor changes. One of these was allowing Brazilians with foreign passports the right to dual citizenship. Likewise, Costa Rica passed its dual nationality amendment in response, not to pressure from abroad, but to public dismay that Arturo Chan, the first Costa Rican astronaut, was going into space as an American citizen, not as a Costa Rican. The Chan case propelled the Costa Rican Congress to pass a dual nationality amendment in 1995 (conversation with the Costa Rican Embassy to the United States, Feb. 1, 2000). El Salvador passed its dual nationality law in 1983, as the country was in the early stages of a 10-year civil war. By its end, one tenth of the Salvadoran population were refugees abroad, but the migrant flow followed, rather than triggered, the recognition of dual nationality in El Salvador.

In the Colombian, Ecuadorian and Dominican cases, the impetus for dual nationality came from the ‘bottom-up,’ reflecting lobbying efforts from among elements of these countries’ immigrant populations in the United States (particularly from New York City) and not from within these nations themselves. Immigrants repatriate hundreds of millions of dollars a year to their kin in Latin America, having a significant impact on local economies (Gurak and Kritz, 1984; Portes and Grosfoguel, 1994). Settlements of immigrants from all three countries have become important campaign stops for home-country politicians seeking to raise funds for political races in these countries. Immigrants have been able to translate this economic muscle into political leverage, winning concessions from political parties and legislatures in their countries of origin regularizing their status as citizens, allowing dual nationality, ownership of land and easy access when returning, among other things. In addition, the successes of some nationalities have inspired other immigrant groups in New York City to petition and lobby for similar benefits.

Colombian organizations in New York began lobbying in Colombia for dual nationality after meeting with a group of visiting Colombian senators in 1987. The timing was propitious. About one year later, with the process of constitutional reform underway in Colombia, they received notice that some legislators would work to see that changes would be introduced favoring
Colombian nationals abroad. A group of Colombians in New York immediately set up a committee — the *Comité Colombiano Pro-Reforma Institucional: Doble Nacionalidad y Circunscripción Electoral en el Exterior* — which, among other things, collected 5,000 signatures at the Colombian Festival held in Flushing Meadow Park that year in support of a petition in favor of dual nationality (conversation with the president of Colombian Charities in Queens, N.Y., May 13, 1992). The amended constitution was approved in Colombia on July 4, 1991, incorporating guarantees for Colombians overseas. Included were provisions that allowed Colombians overseas to become citizens of another country without losing their rights as Colombians, to elect a senator to represent them from abroad, and to vote directly in Colombia’s presidential elections (see flyer FEDOCOL, Segundo Foro Civico, June 9, 1991). The Colombian success was influential; it demonstrated to other Latin American immigrant groups in New York City that lobbying the home country for dual nationality provisions could in fact be effective.

The success of the Ecuadorian effort for dual nationality, for example, owes much to the Colombian achievement. Although Ecuadorian immigrant lobbying for dual nationality began as far back as 1967, when a group of Ecuadorian immigrants in New York petitioned for the right of citizens abroad to vote in Ecuador’s elections, the effort was more sporadic and faded with the indifference of the Ecuadorian government (a military regime at the time). In 1979, a group of Ecuadorian expatriates in Queens put together an organization to lobby for dual nationality (*Ecuatorianos por la Consecución y Conservación de la Doble Nacionalidad*) and submitted a formal proposal for dual nationality for Ecuadorians abroad. Again, there was no response from the Ecuadorian government (Garcia, 1991). In 1983, an Ecuadorian congressional committee proposed that citizens abroad should participate in Ecuadorian national elections from overseas consulates (following the Colombian model). The proposal, however, was shelved. The pace picked up after 1990, with concomitant proposals being discussed in Colombia: letters were sent from the immigrant community in New York and elsewhere to the legislature in Quito; the proposal was endorsed by the VI Congress of the Federation of Ecuadorian Organizations in 1991, and a delegation representing Ecuadorians in New York was sent to Ecuador to argue their case in March, 1992 (Hinojosa, 1992). Ecuadorians seemed close to succeeding that year, when an Extraordinary Congress was convened to amend the Ecuadorian constitution. The Congress, however, stalemated and was dissolved, throwing the future of the project into doubt (see Garcia, 1994a, 1994b,

The debate over dual nationality for Dominicans abroad also accelerated after 1990. A constitutional amendment for dual nationality had been debated in the Dominican Republic for at least 10 years (Georges, 1984:36). Both of the major political parties in the Dominican Republic supported some kind of dual nationality provision in theory, but legislation was never approved. The promise of dual nationality seemed to function as a convenient symbolic gesture made to placate the large immigrant community in the United States. In 1992, for instance, then-President Balaguer released a statement indicating he favored the idea, but there was no effort to actually see the idea through into law. The Dominican legislature passed legislation in 1994 establishing the principle of dual nationality for Dominicans abroad, but it was the presidential elections of 1996 that really demonstrated the shift in the official attitude toward Dominicans living abroad. In the 1996 presidential elections in the Dominican Republic, both candidates who made it to the final round said they favored legislation legalizing dual nationality and permitting Dominicans living abroad to vote wherever they live – perhaps at the closest consulate, rather than having to come to vote in the Dominican Republic (some observers noted this change would have had the effect of making the New York metropolitan area the second-largest concentration of potential voters in Dominican presidential elections, exceeded only by Santo Domingo, the capital). In his campaign, the newly elected president, Lionel Fernández Reyna, said he planned to establish a ‘Ministry of the Diaspora.’ Mr. Peña-Gomez, the defeated candidate, had promised to allow the election of congressional deputies to represent Dominicans living abroad (Rohter, 1996).

With the affirmation of the right to dual nationality for Dominican citizens abroad, three countries contributing some of the largest immigrant flows from Latin America to the United States have all successfully lobbied for their permanent inclusion as members of their home countries’ polities. Their success raises at least one question: Why should their home countries have paid them any attention? The likely answer is that immigrants have leverage with their countries of origin that they do not always have in the countries in which they reside. As noted above, migrants provide remittances to their families, which are major sources of small investment funds and foreign currency exchange for many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Basch et al., 1994:259). Political candidates routinely come to the United States to raise money for their campaigns in the home countries and build ties with the immigrant community abroad. As a consequence, immigrants have leverage with
these politicians, in both opposition and governing parties, in a way they do not (yet) with candidates and elected officials in American politics.

For example, for years Dominicans residing in New York have been an important source of contributions for political campaigns in the Dominican Republic. An official of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano estimated that in 1996, 75 percent of its cash contributions came from emigrants (de la Garza et al., 1998:29). Another source calculated that, overall, 15 percent of the campaign funds for Dominican general elections is raised among immigrants abroad (Graham, 1997:101) (see also Forero, 2000). Dominican politicians routinely make trips to the city to hold fund-raisers for their political campaigns back home, emphasizing the ties between the two communities. While running for president in 1996, for instance, Leonel Fernandez played up and capitalized his New York upbringing: “I am a product of New York City,” he proclaimed (Rohter, 1996). The importance of these campaign funds has only increased as the Dominican community in New York has gotten larger, more established and more prosperous. Incomes that, in absolute terms, are several times the norm for their compatriots in their country of origin, make Dominicans resident in New York significant potential campaign donors. Dominicans in New York raise amounts in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for Dominican politicians in Dominican election cycles, much of it raised at $150-a-head dinners in Washington Heights, Corona or the Bronx (Rohter, 1996). Peña-Gomez, one of the two front-runners in the 1996 presidential race, said the role that Dominicans in New York was “absolutely decisive.” For politicians in the home country, as a major source of political donations, the Dominican community is worth placating. Dominicans abroad have translated their contributions into political leverage on Dominican legislators. Like other Latin American immigrant communities in the United States, they have asked for and received pledges of changes that would regularize their membership status in their country of origin. However, these changes, recognizing the permanence of Dominican nationality, are relatively easy for Dominican politicians to pass—they are largely symbolic and hence relatively costless. Allowing Dominicans to vote in Dominican national elections from abroad and giving Dominicans in New York representation in the national assembly are much more controversial and costly and hence less likely to be implemented.2

The Mexican case, like the Dominican, is characterized not only by the growing presence and economic potential of their immigrants abroad, but

2Currently, to vote in a national election, Dominicans abroad must return to vote in their home country.
also by the central role played by party politics. By the time of the 1988 presidential elections in Mexico, California and Texas were well-established campaign stops for Mexican politicians in the opposition and, increasingly, for the governing party of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) as well. Governors of Mexican states met regularly with residents abroad for consultations, support and contributions (see Guttierez, 1993:229). For the first time, in the 1988 campaign, Mexican opposition parties were directly appealing to the emigrant vote by promising dual nationality and the ability to vote from Mexican consulates in the United States. The Frente Democrático Nacional (the forerunner of the current opposition party, the Partido Revolucionario Democrático or PRD) launched a petition drive to collect signatures from Mexican nationals in California supporting the voting rights of Mexicans in the United States (Dresser, 1993:100; see also Statewide Meeting of the PRD, 1991). The 1988 elections were a warning signal to the ruling PRI party that the Mexican expatriate electorate was up for grabs. It was only in the midst of the broader opening in Mexican politics in the summer of 1996 that the PRI, along with the opposition parties, agreed in principle to a series of political reforms—among them a commitment for a constitutional amendment which would give Mexican nationals residing abroad dual nationality and, perhaps, even the right to cast absentee ballots for president in the year 2000 (like Peruvians and Colombians in the United States) (Dillon, 1996a; 1996b). In 1996, the Mexican Congress began serious consideration of a constitutional amendment that would allow Mexicans abroad to retain a non-voting Mexican cultural ‘nationality’ while taking foreign citizenship, as well as exemption from certain restrictions to property rights (Mydans, 1995). A dual nationality provision was approved by the Mexican Congress in December of 1996, finally taking effect in March 1998 after ratification by two-thirds of Mexico’s states (Romero, 1996; Camacho, 1996).

‘Bottom-up’ immigrant lobbying of their home countries works best when the goal of the lobbying offers both a clear benefit and little cost to their country of origin’s government. Having some form of economic leverage—whether in terms of campaign contributions, remittances or possible future reinvestment in the home country—strengthens immigrants’ bargaining position. Finally, acquiring allies among opposition or governing parties (ready to harvest the support of emigrants for their own ends) can be key to getting proposals passed through the legislative maze in the home country. The bid for dual nationality by Latin American immigrants in the United States fits all of these conditions.
Differences between late and early adopters of dual nationality, and between countries coming to these policies via top-down or bottom-up decision-making pathways, are not irrelevant. As explained in more detail below, these differences may have significant effects on the naturalization rates of immigrants in the United States.

COMPETING INTERESTS IN DUAL NATIONALITY

Sending countries, receiving countries and immigrants all have their own, sometimes competing, interests on the dual nationality issue (see Table 3). Additionally, each of these sets of actors may diverge on their interpretation of their own group interests. This section briefly highlights the interests across and within each of these sets of actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>DUAL NATIONALITY</th>
<th>COMPETING INTERESTS OF STATES AND IMMIGRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pros</td>
<td>Cons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>Acquire rights as nationals of two or more countries</td>
<td>Take on obligations as nationals of two or more countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Receive acknowledgment of multiple memberships and loyalties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending States</td>
<td>Promote economic development</td>
<td>Permit undue influence of immigrants in domestic politics; immigrants as political loose cannon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a sympathetic lobby in receiving country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving States</td>
<td>Support foreign policy goals</td>
<td>Divide loyalties of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage the naturalization of immigrants</td>
<td>Delay immigrant adoption of citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognize realities of transnational allegiances</td>
<td>Devalue meaning of citizenship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigrants**

Immigrants have been supportive of their countries of origin’s recognition of dual nationality and, as noted earlier, have often been instrumental in securing its passage in their countries of origin. While some immigrant community leaders want dual nationality because they believe it will lower the costs of investing in, and eventually returning to, their countries of origin, others believe dual nationality will make it easier to remain in their new countries of residence by allowing immigrants to have legal rights as nationals in their countries of origin (such as the right to hold property and invest without restrictions) while exercising political rights in their new countries of residence. There is an on-going debate, for instance, within the Colombian com-
munity in the United States about which strategic goal of dual nationality immigrants should emphasize. On the one hand, there are elements of the Colombian immigrant community that wish to highlight dual nationality’s role in support of mobilization and participation in the United States. The president of Colombia’s Liberal Party organization in New York City stated, for example:

The Colombian community should have a presence in Colombian politics as well as American politics... Now that the law has been passed so that no Colombian... will lose their nationality, this will open a large political arena...the Colombian community will organize, and should organize in the United States (Interview with the president of the Partido Liberal Colombiano, New York City, August 9, 1991).

However, there are factions among Colombians pulling in other directions. Take, for example, the following exchange at a meeting of some of the leaders of Colombian organizations in New York City:

J: The important thing is to first solve our problems here.
S: Dual nationality opens the doors to enter into politics here...
F: If we live here, and have children, and pay taxes, then we should have a say... but we should also have the right to participate in Colombia, to vote in the presidential elections there. Many Colombians come here to save a little money, and then return to buy a house for their retirement.
J: That’s how we come here. But... people have children; they stay here for 25 years.
R: Many people go back to Colombia. Unfortunately, we haven’t done it ourselves.
J: It makes more sense to work in this country than over there.... We have to have priorities. I suggest we establish our priorities in the community here... to see how we can get involved in the political process here.
R: I think we should be involved in politics in Colombia (FEDOCOL meeting, July 11, 1991).

Whatever their disagreements, immigrant activists see dual nationality as enhancing long-term investment and participation, both in the home country and in the United States. Couched in general terms, dual nationality appeals both to those immigrants who wish to stay in the receiving country and those who wish to return to their countries of origin.

If there is a downside to dual nationality, it might be that dual nationals are expected to fulfill their obligations to two national governments, not only one. In theory, this might require dual military service or dual tax payments on investments and earnings. In practice, these difficulties have usually been resolved by bilateral treaties between the sending and receiving countries (for example, on military service see Legomsky, 2000:17). In addition, Yang (1994) believes that dual nationality might simply confuse immigrants, leading to lower rates of participation in all spheres.
Finally, there is the question of full political rights, or ‘dual citizenship,’ for immigrants in their countries of origin, rather than simply the retention of social rights under dual nationality. Immigrants abroad, though in most cases a relatively small fraction of the population, already have the capacity, because of their relative financial clout, to influence elections, or at least candidacies. So far, their political influence has been largely channeled through campaign contributions, with Los Angeles, New York and Miami now required campaign stops for politicians in national and even state and local campaigns across Latin America. Increasingly, there is talk of extending this influence to direct participation in national elections (see, for example, the series of articles by Raul Ross Pineda, Director of Mexican Affairs, Comité de Servicio de la Amigos, Chicago, La Jornada, 1998). Colombia and Peru have had a system of voting through their consulates for some time; Mexico and the Dominican Republic have talked of putting similar systems into place (see studies commissioned by the Federal Electoral Institute, available at http://www.ife.org.mx/). The consequence for domestic politics in sending countries is uncertain.

Sending Countries

For sending countries, the question of dual nationality has both domestic and international implications. The domestic goal of dual nationality policies has often been, implicitly or explicitly, to foster ties between expatriates and countries of origin. Policy makers hope these ties will pay off in terms of current remittances and future investments. The importance of maintaining these ties has increased over time as the number of immigrants abroad has increased as well. The United States, for example, received 4.5 million immigrants in the 1970s, 7.3 million in the 1980s and another 5 million from 1990 through 1995 (“Census: Immigrants at New High,” Associated Press, August 25, 1995). Almost half of those arriving were from Latin America; there are approximately 10 million first generation Latin American immigrants in the United States today. Of these immigrants, a significant number remit a portion of their income, in some cases, a substantial portion, back to their home countries.3

3In 1989, for example, Colombian immigrants in the United States were remitting an astonishing 17 percent of their incomes back to Colombia. The figures for other Latin American immigrant groups are equally impressive: Dominicans remitted 11 percent, Salvadorans 10 percent, Mexicans 8 percent and Guatemalans 6 percent of their annual incomes (see de la Garza et al., 1997:4, Table 4).
Because of the increasing numbers of immigrants in the United States, remittances today are almost eight times what they were in 1980. Flows just to Central America and Mexico increased from nearly $1 billion dollars in 1980, to $3.7 billion in 1990, to nearly $8 billion in 1998 (Orozco, 2000:1; Waller Meyers, 1998). Annual remittances in 1994 totaled over $4 billion for Mexico, $1 billion for El Salvador, about $400 million for the Dominican Republic, and over $200 million each for Colombia and Guatemala. While in dollar amounts remittances to Mexico are the greatest, as a percentage of the sending countries' exports remittances from immigrants abroad are more crucial for countries like El Salvador (over 100% the value of exports in 1993) and the Dominican Republic (over 70% of the value of exports), than for Mexico (over 10% the value of exports) (de la Garza et al., 1997).

Given the size of the flows, the potential impact of these remittances on sending countries' economic development is significant. For this reason, sending countries' governments are increasingly involved in actively maintaining ties to their expatriate communities. A number of Latin American governments, for example, have established programs to organize their immigrant communities in the United States. Of these, the most developed are the programs initiated by the Mexican government to encourage Mexican immigrants to form associations and prompting the membership of these organizations to remit funds and invest in their local communities of origin. Programs at the federal level include the Paisano program (see http://paisano.gob.mx/; see also McDonnell, 1995) and the Program for Mexican Communities Living Abroad (PMCLA).

The Paisano program is designed to improve the treatment that the returning migrants receive at the hands of Mexican officials by reducing corruption and abuse (Orozco, 2000:20). The PCMLA, established in 1990, provides a wide range of services to Mexican immigrants in the United States through the Mexican consular network and first-generation immigrant organizations sponsored by the consulates, as well as channeling remittances toward local development projects (González and Schumacher, 1998). As Orozco notes, hometown associations have served as platforms for matching fund schemes that pool remittance monies with government funds and expertise, and occasionally with private sector contributions, for locally focused economic development projects (Orozco, 2000:15).

There have been similar, though weaker, efforts on the part of other sending nations' governments as well. The Dominican Republic has begun a program of cooperation with Dominican immigrant organizations in the United States, helping to establish the Dominican American Roundtable in 1997 to
help coordinate and promote a common agenda for Dominicans in the United States (see Dominican American Roundtable at http://www.danr.org/register/register.html). El Salvador has also begun outreach to Salvadoran immigrant groups in the United States through its embassy and consulates. The Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y el Arte, the Salvadoran government agency that oversees the activities of Casas de la Cultura in El Salvador, is now working to open similar branches in the United States (Landolt, 1997:18). The Guatemalan embassy is considering initiating similar outreach efforts (Orozco, 2000:22). The Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations established the Program for the Promotion of Colombian Communities Abroad in 1996 (PPCCE), which was intended, at least initially, to survey the Colombian population abroad and its needs (Guarnizo, 1997:14). Most of these programs are still in their beginning stages.

Dual nationality has a foreign policy component for sending countries as well. A clear example are the policies pursued by the Mexican government. One of the goals of the Mexican organization effort among its expatriates in the United States is to mobilize Mexican-descent dual nationals as a lobbying group in the United States around issues of concern to Mexico. A prime example of this strategy was the Mexican lobbying effort during the negotiations surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement and its implementation. The Mexican government spent considerable resources to build cross-national interest groups around trade issues. While much of this effort has been focused on elites in Mexico and the United States, Mexican consulates in the United States have been encouraging Mexican nationals in the United States to naturalize as U.S. citizens, while keeping their nationality as Mexicans as well. The goal is to have a potentially significant swing group with ties and influence with both the United States and Mexico, serving as an important linchpin in relations between the two countries. Other Latin American and Caribbean immigrant groups have had some significant lobbying successes; Central American and Haitian immigrant groups in the United States, for instance, have successfully lobbied the U.S. government for stays of deportation and amnesties.

In general, sending states have been leery of extending political rights like voting and election to office for their nationals abroad (the Mexican government, for instance, draws a clear distinction between the recognition of dual nationality and dual citizenship – nationality plus political rights). While, as noted above, Colombia and Peru have allowed voting from their consulates overseas, other Latin American countries exploring the option of expatriate
voting have postponed making any commitments. Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, for instance, all of which had talked of allowing voting abroad at some point, seem to have shelved their plans indefinitely. Because immigrants are important sources of campaign contributions, political candidates and parties from sending countries will court them. By the same token, however, the independent power base that their financial resources allow them may be one of the reasons that sending country governments are reluctant to allow them full political citizenship. Sending countries may fear that immigrants may become political ‘loose cannons’ (see Anderson, 1994:27; Ahari, 1987; Watanabe, 1984).

There is no single logic to a state’s decision to allow dual nationality. All states see dual nationality as a way to maintain ties with their citizens or ex-citizens abroad. But what consequences states think this will have differs: some states believe this may encourage continuing or renewed political attachment to immigrants’ countries of origin and an increased possibility of return immigration. Others may simply wish for economic re-investment through immigrant remittances. Others may wish to see their nationals abroad naturalize as citizens of their receiving countries so they can function as effective immigrant lobbies. Some countries, like Mexico, may want all of the above. However, the most powerful incentives for sending countries to maintain ties with their emigrants abroad are almost certainly economic rather than political.

Receiving Countries

While sending countries have been open to the suggestion of dual nationality, actively encouraging expatriates’ ties to the home country, historically receiving countries have been more suspicious. Dual nationality has been thought to undermine the notion of national sovereignty and singular loyalty to the sovereign nation. In addition, dual nationality poses thorny ques-

*Mexican proposals for allowing voting from abroad are stalled in the Mexican Congress, though the Mexican Congress did approve an amendment in 1996 which removed a requirement that Mexicans travel to their hometowns to register to vote, which for decades effectively barred emigrants in the United States from taking part in Mexican elections. Since 1994, the Dominican Republic has allowed immigrants to vote in Dominican elections, but still required them to return to the island to vote, though apparently the main parties have begun setting aside at least some spots on their parties’ electoral slates for Dominicans overseas (Guarnizo, 1997:10). Although Haitians abroad were referred to as the ‘Tenth Department’ by President Aristide when he was in exile in the United States in the early 1990s (Basch et al., 1994:146–147), after the departure of the military government, Haiti has not implemented dual nationality, much less voting abroad.
tions around issues of political rights, conscription, taxation and property rights and extradition. For these reasons, many countries have sought to avoid dual nationality. Since 1795, for example, the United States has required immigrants who wish to naturalize to take an oath of allegiance, in which they pledge to set aside any previous loyalties. The oath which immigrants are required to swear today on becoming naturalized citizens of the United States, reads, in rather archaic and high-sounding formal language: "I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen." In other words, new citizens are expected, at least in theory, to have one, and only one, loyalty of any kind — to the United States of America.

Increasingly, however, both U.S. and international law have evolved in the direction of increased ambiguity or outright tolerance in favor of dual nationality. For example, while an American citizen cannot take on or claim a formal attachment to another country, a citizen from another country may, upon taking on American citizenship, passively retain citizenship rights in that country if that other country does not recognize, or is indifferent to, the new attachment formed in the United States (see Section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1481]). Formally, then, the United States discourages dual nationality, while in practice pursuing a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy. As an INS spokesman noted, “I’m not sure we particularly like dual citizenship or approve of it, but we recognize it” (Miller, 1998).

Increasing tolerance of de facto dual nationality has allowed an opening that permits immigrants to become citizens in their countries of residence without losing all their rights as nationals in their countries of origin.

The increasing prevalence of dual nationality has consequences for both foreign and domestic policy. For receiving countries like the United States, toleration of dual nationality might be seen as contributing to an overall strategy of using immigration policy to achieve foreign policy objectives. For instance, in Central America the United States has adjusted immigration policy (including dual nationality, but also taking into account deportation pol-

5The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that dual nationality is “A status long recognized in the law” and that “a person may have and exercise the rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not . . . mean that he renounced the other” Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952). The Court reaffirmed this position in the 1967 case Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) and in Vance v. Terrazas, 44 U.S. 252, 261 (1980) in which it ruled that to lose American citizenship an individual must explicitly disavow it; loss cannot come about passively or implicitly. For a comprehensive overview, see Spiro, 1997.
icy, remittances and temporary stays) to foster the broader goals of democratic regimes and economic development in the region (see de la Garza et al., 1997; Levitt, 1998). Just as sending countries see remittances as a tool for economic development, the United States may recognize it as a form of foreign aid (indeed, far outweighing formal U.S. aid, say, to Central America). In this view, by tolerating dual nationality and sending countries' efforts to encourage remittances, the United States promotes stability in sending country regions. Of course, the counter-argument might be that encouraging remittances actually undermines democracy in these regions by encouraging the more active and entrepreneurially-minded to leave, and the more isolationist-minded might see all this as another example of the pernicious effects of foreign entanglements.

Disagreements on the consequences of dual nationality persist on the domestic side as well. Some commentators have dwelt on the possible negative consequences of dual nationality, arguing that:

Citizenship, like marriage and religion, requires a strong sense of commitment. Similarly, citizenship in the United States requires more than just a willingness to abide by a new political system; it calls for a change in one's sense of self and membership.... Dual citizenship, in which individuals belong to two 'peoples,' is inconsistent with the moral and philosophical foundation of American constitutional democracy (Pickus, 1998:25).

The existence of competing multiple allegiances robs citizenship of any substance, critics fear (Fritz, 1998). If citizenship is like marriage, holding dual loyalties under dual nationality, writes columnist Georgie Anne Geyer (cited in Spiro, 1998:9), is "akin to bigamy." Dual nationality encourages immigrants to retain their ties to their home countries at the expense of deepening their new ties to the country in which they now reside. In addition, some commentators are quite adamant that dual nationality devalues American citizenship. As Pickus relates the sense of the debate in a recent conference on American citizenship, opponents of dual nationality felt that:

As a person's affection and commitment are divided among different interests, as is likely to happen with dual citizenship, that affection and commitment will also weaken. Dual citizens will have less time for civic participation in American public life, since they have allegiances (even if secondary) elsewhere. In terms of commitment and obligation, dual citizens are cheating their fellow 'single' citizens in both countries (Pickus, 1998:24).

In this view, at the very least the alienation of affection caused by dual nationality may create new constraints on American foreign policy, exempli-
fied by the Irish, Jewish, Cuban, Greek and Turkish cases (see Ahari, 1987; Watanabe, 1984). At worst, it could mean the meddling of other countries in the domestic affairs of the United States. The remarks of the Mexican consul in Los Angeles in which he said, commenting on dual nationality, "Even though I am saying this part serious and part joking, I think we are practicing \textit{la reconquista} in California," (Verhovek, 1998:A12) were only fuel on the fire of detractors’ fears of the consequences of these policies.

On the other hand, proponents for the recognition of dual nationality have made two kinds of arguments. The first is practical: In an increasingly mobile and interdependent world, the strict policing of the demarcations of national membership seem increasingly futile and counterproductive (Schuck, 1997; Spiro, 1998). Dual nationality is simply the recognition of a changing world. Proponents have also argued, however, that dual nationality should be not only tolerated, but actively embraced. Dual nationality, here, is seen as congruent with membership in the American polity. The argument goes as follows: receiving countries like the United States have an interest in seeing to it that new immigrants become full members of the polity, since their political, economic and social marginality weakens democratic institutions. Since for immigrants dual nationality can be a means to reconcile memberships in both their countries of residence and of origin, dual nationality is likely to lead to higher naturalization rates in the United States. To the extent that dual nationality facilitates the incorporation of new immigrants, then it can be seen as strengthening, rather than weakening the practice of American citizenship (Jones-Correa, 1998).

Of the three sets of competing interests described above, two – those of immigrants and sending countries – are more clearly disposed toward favoring dual nationality. The interests of receiving countries are much more mixed. There are still significant reservations, for instance, among American commentators and policymakers toward dual nationality. Are these reservations justified? One approach is to examine if there is evidence that dual nationality has detrimental effects for American citizenship, and specifically, for the naturalization of immigrants.

\textbf{DATA}

The debate around dual nationality and naturalization in sending countries like the United States has taken place largely in the absence of empirical data supporting the arguments one way or the other. In the only piece that
attempts any analysis of this sort (Yang, 1994), the author found that dual nationality discouraged naturalization in the United States. The odds of naturalization of immigrants from countries that recognize dual nationality, he calculated, were about 20 percent lower than those from countries without provisions for dual nationality. Yang speculates that this may have been due to immigrants' confusion about their rights under dual nationality or to perceptions that dual nationality, rather than protecting rights, merely adds additional responsibilities (Yang, 1994:473–474). On the other side of the debate, Jones-Correa and Spiro have both argued that dual nationality, by reducing the costs immigrants face in becoming naturalized citizens in the United States, is likely to increase naturalization rates (Jones-Correa, 1998:Ch. 8 and 10; Spiro, 1998). However, in these pieces, both pro and con, positions are often asserted rather than demonstrated. Methodology is underdeveloped and analyses are based on one-time readings of data, rather than observations across time. The data presented below are meant as a first step in testing the hypotheses.

Ideally, a review of the hypotheses on the impact of the recognition of dual nationality in sending countries on naturalization rates of immigrants from those countries in the United States could rely on data on the naturalization rates of immigrants in the United States, by country, over time. These data do not exist. At best, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the United States disseminates limited cohort data—publishing, say, the naturalization rate of the immigrant cohort entering in 1977 seen 20 years later, in 1997, and then only for selected countries (INS, 1997:141, Tables K, L).

Given that these data are unavailable, this article relies on a calculation of immigrant naturalization rates in the United States based on available data from the INS and the Census Bureau. The rate of naturalization is estimated by dividing the number of a sending country's immigrants naturalizing in the United States in a given year by the number of immigrants arriving from the sending country seven years earlier. Since permanent residents must wait five years before becoming eligible for U.S. citizenship, applying at the earliest in their sixth year and receiving citizenship in their seventh year, it seems reasonable to use a seven year period between year of immigration and year of naturalization to estimate immigrants' naturalization rates. For instance, in 1997, 5,898 immigrants from Peru naturalized as American citizens, while in 1990, 15,726 Peruvians entered as legal immigrants to the United States. The naturalization rate for Peruvians in the United States in 1997—the ratio of naturalized citizens to new immigrants—would be .38. While this calculation of naturalized citizens in a given year (x) to new immigrants to seven years
earlier (x-7) is an imperfect estimate of actual naturalization rates of immigrants in the United States, the breadth of the data – yearly immigration and naturalization data from 1965 to 1997 – and the range of countries – 20 Latin American countries and another 14 from the Caribbean – allows us to draw conclusions to test the proposition of whether the recognition of dual nationality by sending countries might have positive or negative effects on the naturalization of immigrants from those countries in the United States.

**EFFECTS ON NATURALIZATION BEFORE AND AFTER RECOGNITION OF DUAL NATIONALITY**

The examination of the impact of the recognition of dual nationality on naturalization rates in the United States begins here with a comparison of immigrants' naturalization rates as U.S. citizens, before and after their country of origin's decision to acknowledge dual nationality. The data collected run from 1965 to 1997; in this time period, nine Latin American countries – Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru – changed their constitutions or passed legislation recognizing dual nationality.

For each of these countries, the naturalization rates of their emigrants in the United States increased in the period after recognition of dual nationality. These increases ranged from 22 percent for Peru (which recognized dual nationality in 1980) to 300 percent for Ecuador (1995). Overall, naturalization rates in the United States increased by an average of 105 percent in the aftermath of the recognition of dual nationality by the sending country (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Date of Recognition</th>
<th>Naturalization Rate Before Recognition</th>
<th>Naturalization Rate After Recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, 1996</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia, 1991</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica, 1995</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic, 1994</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador, 1995</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador, 1983</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico, 1998</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>NA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama, 1972</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru, 1980</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Table 1; Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS 1969, Tables 14 and 39; INS 1978, Tables 14 and 39; INS 1988, Tables 3 and 51; INS 1997, Tables 3 and 47). aMexican dual nationality went into effect in March of 1998. Naturalization data for 1998 and onward has not yet been released as of the time of this writing.
Note that immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality as the result of a ‘top-down’ state-driven decision-making process (Panama, El Salvador, Peru, Costa Rica and Brazil) saw less dramatic increases in the naturalization rates of their immigrants in the United States than immigrants from countries which recognized dual nationality via a process of consultation with and lobbying from their immigrants abroad (Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Mexico). Immigrants from countries which instituted dual nationality at least partly in response to pressure from their immigrant communities abroad increased their naturalization rates as American citizens by an average of 141 percent. Immigrants from countries where dual nationality was extended solely on the initiative of the sending state increased their naturalization rates by an average of ‘only’ 72 percent.

This finding should be interpreted with some caution. The difference in the effects of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches might be simply reflecting the differences between early adopters of dual nationality like Panama (1972), Peru (1980) and El Salvador (1983) and late adopters. The key difference might be time period, rather than the pathway by which dual nationality was adopted. Perhaps immigrants from late adopter nations benefited from the increasing acceptance of dual national status both in their countries of origin and in the United States, or some other factor affecting naturalization rates. However, if we compare the changes in naturalization rates between late-adopter nations (those adopting dual nationality after 1991, excluding Mexico) making ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ decisions to recognize dual nationality, there is still a difference of 56 percentage points between the two. This lends some support to the credence that the choice of ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approaches to dual nationality has real effects in outcomes for immigrant naturalization in the United States.

The question of timing, however, brings up another issue. The high rates of naturalization of immigrants from countries that are both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘late’ adopters of dual nationality – which is to say, all those in the ‘bottom-up’ group – may be unduly affected by the propinquity of their dual nationality amendments to increase in naturalization following the anti-immigrant backlash in California and the passage of the Welfare Reform Act by the U.S. Congress in 1996. The 1996 welfare legislation in particular seems to have played a major role in nudging legal permanent residents to naturalize as U.S. citizens (Singer and Gilbertson, 2000). This legislation was designed not only to keep undocumented immigrants from accessing federal public benefit programs but, more drastically, also barring permanent legal residents from par-
ticipation in Social Security and food stamp programs and in banning all new resident noncitizens from federal means-tested programs like AFDC (Aid for Dependent Children). Social services, the reasoning went, were not intended for noncitizens, even if these individuals resided permanently in the United States. Immigrants were meant to contribute to the well-being of the nation and not be a burden on the taxpayer. In addition, cutting immigrants from federal social programs would supposedly save the U.S. government tens of billions of dollars a year, a not insignificant amount in the atmosphere of budgetary constraint that pervaded Congress at the time.

The introduction by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Green Card Replacement Program in 1992 and of the ‘Citizenship USA’ program in 1995 also probably had a positive effect on naturalization rates. The Green Card Replacement Program required that long-term permanent residents replace their resident cards with new cards; many immigrants chose to naturalize rather than apply for new cards (INS, 1997). The Citizenship USA program was designed to encourage naturalization and reduce the backlog in the naturalization process. However, as various scholars have concluded, neither of these programs sufficiently explains the increase in naturalization among immigrants in the United States following 1994 (Jones-Correa 2000; Johnson et al., 1999: http://www.ppic.org/publications/PPIC123.ch5.html #fn0).

The combination of these domestic policy factors accelerated naturalization rates across all immigrant groups, not only those recognizing dual nationality. Between 1994 and 1996, rates of naturalization increased threefold across all immigrant groups in the United States (see Figures I and II) (for a further discussion of the impact of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act on the naturalization and voting rates of immigrants, see Jones-Correa, 2000).

It may be, therefore, that the increased ‘before and after’ naturalization rates we see for the ‘bottom-up’ adapters like Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Mexico may be the result, not of the recognition of dual nationality, but of policy changes in the United States like the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.

**EFFECTS ON NATURALIZATION BY PERIOD**

The effects of the introduction of policies like the 1996 Welfare Reform Act can be taken into account by breaking down naturalization rates by time period. The naturalization data for immigrants from Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries from 1965 to 1997 is split into two periods – before and
Figure I  Naturalization Rates of Selected Latin American Immigrants in the U.S., 1965-1997

- Argentina
- Brazil
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Guatemala
- Honduras
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
Figure II  Naturalization Rates of Selected Caribbean Immigrants in the U.S., 1965-1997

![Graph showing naturalization rates of selected Caribbean immigrants in the U.S., 1965-1997.](image-url)
after 1991. This year seems a natural breakpoint, marking the beginning of the recent spate of recognition of dual nationality among sending countries in Latin America (see Table 1) and of policies in the United States which might have had an effect on naturalization rates. The comparison made in each of these time periods is between the average naturalization rate of countries recognizing dual nationality and the average rate of those that do not.

In the 1965–1990 period, the naturalization rate for immigrants from Latin American countries recognizing dual nationality (at the time these consisted of only El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) was 42 percent versus 35 percent for immigrants from those countries not recognizing dual nationality (these calculations exclude Cuba). Thus, in this earlier period, immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality naturalized at a rate only four percentage points greater than immigrants from countries that did not. In the 1991–1997 period, immigrants from countries acknowledging dual nationality (El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay again, with the addition of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Mexico) naturalized at a rate of 68 percent versus a rate of 61 percent for those countries not recognizing dual nationality. Even taking into account ‘period effects’ – i.e., the impact of domestic policy events like the 1996 Welfare Reform Act – the recognition of dual nationality by their sending countries gives immigrants in the United States an edge of seven percentage points in naturalizing as U.S. citizens.

It is interesting to note that recognition of dual nationality by sending countries seems to have had a much greater impact on the naturalization rates of immigrants from the former English, French and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean than it has on immigrants from Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in the hemisphere. Based on U.S. immigration and naturalization data from 1988 to 1997, immigrants from those Caribbean basin countries acknowledging dual nationality have rates of naturalization in the United States 32 percent greater from those not recognizing dual nationality (.7 to .53). This difference is significantly greater than the parallel difference among Latin American nations, as noted above. Given that these former colonies by and large recognized dual nationality at independence (see Table 1), it does not seem they did so because of lobbying from their immigrants abroad. These were ‘top-down,’ state-driven decisions. In contrast to the evidence presented above for Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries, state-driven decision-making by these Caribbean nations does not seem to diminish the
impact of dual nationality on the naturalization rates of their immigrants as U.S. citizens.

**SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

Several observations can be drawn from the data presented above.

The recognition of dual nationality among sending countries in the Western Hemisphere is widespread and, indeed, increased substantially in the 1990s. Four Latin American countries recognized dual nationality before 1991, six more have since then. An additional 10 Caribbean basin nations recognize dual nationality, most since their independence.

Though the analysis of the effects of the recognition of dual nationality on immigrants' naturalization in the United States is hampered by the availability of data and obscured somewhat by the concurrent effects of other contributing factors to naturalization (such as the 1996 Welfare Reform Act), the data do indicate that recognition of dual nationality by a sending country has a positive effect on naturalization of immigrants from that country in the United States.

For Latin American countries, these increases appear to be greater for 'bottom-up' dual nationality policies than for 'top-down' state-led policies. One possible explanation is that 'bottom-up' lobbying efforts by immigrants abroad means that when dual nationality is recognized by their countries of origin there is a constituency in place that is ready to take advantage of the policy shift. For 'top-down' decisions, this constituency develops more gradually over time. A second, related explanation is that the recognition of dual nationality through the 'bottom-up' process is seen as more legitimate than if it were imposed by the state. Greater legitimacy would translate into higher rates of adoption of citizenship in receiving countries.

The increases in naturalization rates in the United States following sending country recognition of dual nationality are greater for former French, English and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean basin than for Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries on the continent. This is in spite of the fact that the decisions to implement dual nationality in these Caribbean basin nations were implemented by 'top-down' state-driven policies, rather than as the result of immigrant lobbying from abroad. These findings seem to run counter to the results reported for Latin American dual nationality cases. However, all these Caribbean basin nations had long histories of migration abroad prior to independence, and most were already included (after 1949) under British dual nationality policies. In any event, the constituencies for
dual nationality among immigrants abroad was in place before nationhood. The constitutions adopted at independence by these nations simply formalized these prior claims and ties. Again, the key point here is that dual nationality policies have greater effects when they are seen as legitimate rather than imposed.

Although dual nationality policies seem to have independent effects on the naturalization rates of immigrants, the dramatic rise of naturalization rates in the United States in response to the passage of the 1996 Welfare Act and other domestic policies, relative to their movement in response to the recognition of dual nationality by countries of origin, indicates that immigrants are still much more sensitive to changes in the policies of receiving countries than to changes in sending country policies. The importance of receiving state policies appears, at the very least, to temper arguments that the state is being eclipsed by the rise of transnational practices (Rouse, 1995; Bamyeh, 1993), or that policies like dual nationality simply re-inscribe immigrants within the political sphere of the sending state (Guarnizo, 1997; Landolt, 1997).

**CONCLUSION**

Dual nationality, as noted at the beginning of this article, is a complex phenomenon. It lies somewhat awkwardly at the intersection of the interests of immigrants, sending states and receiving states. Immigrants and their sending states, while their interests are not identical, can agree, on the whole, that dual nationality is a positive development. Receiving nations have historically held mixed feelings on the issue. This article suggests that at least some concerns among critics in the United States on the issue of dual nationality are overstated. Immigrants from countries recognizing dual nationality are more, not less, likely to seek out American citizenship. Dual nationality has relatively small, but positive, effects on immigrants’ naturalization as U.S. citizens. This implies that dual nationality is unlikely to threaten American citizenship and, on the contrary, may encourage the incorporation of new immigrants into the American polity.

Dual nationality may also have much smaller effects than originally calculated for sending countries. In 1998, for instance, the Mexican government calculated that of the several million Mexican-born residents in the United States who were permanent, legal U.S. residents, 2.5 million had naturalized as U.S. citizens (Fineman, 1996). These U.S. citizens had at least 3 million children, who would also be eligible for dual nationality. This meant that
there were at least 5.5 million Mexican-origin residents of the United States who were eligible to apply for Mexican nationality before 2003, when the application period ends. According to an informal estimate from the Mexican Embassy (telephone conversation, October 1999), through April 2000 only about 25,000 applications for dual nationality had been filed—a response rate of less than .5 percent. While the response rate will surely increase as the deadline approaches, the lack of interest implies that dual nationality policies have less of an impact than sending countries may wish for and than receiving countries may fear.

The same applies to proposals for voting abroad. Mexican proposals for allowing their citizens the right to vote from abroad were greeted in the United States with alarm, as American policymakers suddenly envisioned one million or more Mexican-origin residents taking part in another country’s election. These concerns are almost certainly overblown. While the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) conducted a poll indicating that up to 83 percent of respondents wish to have some say in the selection of the Mexican president, most also indicated that they could spare little time to register or cast ballots (Dillon, 1998). If the Colombian case is any indication, there will always be a significant gap between the numbers of residents a country has abroad and the numbers of those who register, and again between the numbers registering and those voting. For example, although in 1990 there were over 200,000 Colombians residing in the New York metropolitan region, barely 3,000 turned out to vote in that country’s 1990 presidential elections. Again, while 10,000 Colombian immigrants were registered to vote in Colombia’s 1998 Senate elections (in which immigrants had a direct stake, since they were electing a Senator who would represent the Colombian community abroad), estimates of the number who voted ranged from 800 to 1,800—a tiny fraction of the Colombian community in the United States (Fritz, 1998).

For these reasons, while increasing numbers of countries will likely recognize the existence of dual nationality, it is unlikely to have a decisive impact on the political processes of either sending or receiving polities. This does not mean that the dual nationality debate will disappear; on the contrary, it is likely to remain a controversial topic in receiving countries. Individual cases like that of the New Jersey city councilman who ran for the Colombian senate in 1998 are likely to continue to raise critics’ hackles (Miller, 1998), and there still will be accusations that dual nationality, by encouraging multiple allegiances, undermines and devalues American citizenship. Concern will
still be expressed that dual nationals may choose U.S. citizenship instrumentally and, because their attention is divided, do not devote the same energies to American citizenship as do those without a dual nationality option. The analysis presented above does not try to address all these issues, but should help keep them in perspective.

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The worldwide movement of highly skilled workers (cadres) in transnational corporations has long been known to literature in the field, yet has not been thoroughly researched. The mechanisms governing their international circulation are, in themselves, somewhat specific. The fact that they use an organizational "channel" for migration means that the constraints differ from those that act on "independent" economic migrants with either low or high levels of skill (the so-called brain drain). This article focuses on some of the manifestations of this mobility. Its dependence on a set of variables can be considerable: the firm's development phase, investment target choice, leading activity (manufacturing or services), form of technology, type of firm (using greenfield or brownfield investment), whether a firm acquired is healthy or undergoing an economic crisis, and nationality or corporate culture. The occupational insertion of cadres leads to further constraints: while the strictly "technical" assignments generally stem from skill shortages, the general "management" appointments mainly result from questions arising from control and trust. As a whole, the flows of highly skilled workers seem to be related to multiple variables – either social, organizational or individual – which make it difficult to predict future trends.

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In the field of migration literature, relatively few studies have been made of the relationship between transnational corporations (TNCs) and the international mobility of highly skilled workers (cadres). There are two main reasons for this: the small size of the flows and the apparent difficulty in ascribing a discipline to the subject. The first aspect, i.e., the small amount, in absolute terms, of highly skilled worker movements when compared with the volumes registered by habitual "labor" migratory movements of migrants with low or average skills explains why, in the field of migration studies, this has never been a topic of great concern. The relative shortage of references on skilled migration may be found at two different levels. On the one hand, in the case of international labor migrations, this movement is rarely focused on or simply forgotten (see, for example, Castles and Miller, 1993). The frequent assumption that "human capital" flows cannot be addressed in the same terms as "labor" flows (Massey et al., 1993) does not, we feel, justify their exclusion. On the other hand, when highly skilled labor flows are considered, movements such as the brain drain or its reverse process are often emphasized. However, few references are to be found on organizational international flows, including migration of corporate cadres (see, for example, Gaillard and Gaillard, 1998). If to this reduced volume we add the absence of concomitant "social problems" (problems as perceived by public opinion or adverse government reaction) or the transitory nature of many of the stays (short and medium-length duration), complementary reasons emerge to account for the virtually "invisible" nature of these flows (Salt, 1992).

Second, the difficulty encountered in ascribing a discipline to the subject has no doubt impaired its development. The study of the international intra-company mobility of highly skilled workers embraces wide-ranging disciplines: the sociology of migrations, human geography, the theory of organizations, international economics and human resources management. This obstacle and subsequent dispersal of literature are both a risk and one of the driving motives underlying the current study. In this field, we consider that the application of mixed theoretical perspectives, such as economic sociology (see Granovetter, 1985; Smelser and Swedberg, 1994; and, for its application to migration, Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; and Portes, 1995), may overcome some research obstacles.

Yet there are many reasons for studying this topic in greater depth. First, it may be argued nowadays that the hiring and circulation of skilled workers within transnational companies make an increasing contribution to international migratory flows (Salt, 1992, 1994). It has even been emphasized that
this increase contrasts with the progressive decline (or at least the harsher constraints) in “mass” economic flows, made up of lower-skilled workers (Salt and Ford, 1993). Beyond this, we must add that their quantitative weight tells us nothing about the major role they play in international labor and capital movements. Appleyard (1995:5), for instance, writes that professional transients are in many ways the “forgotten migrants” of the 1990s, and yet they play crucial roles in the globalization of technologies and markets.

Moreover, the mechanisms governing the international circulation of cadres are of singular importance. The fact that they use an organizational channel for migration signifies that the constraints differ from those that apply to independent economic migrants who are either lowly or highly skilled (the brain drain) (Salt, 1983/1984; Salt and Findlay, 1989; Findlay, 1990). Therefore, the cadres seem far less subject than other migrants to the classical economic push-pull factors which are commonly used to account for migration. They also appear to be relatively exempt from the political determinants that continue to prevail in this area. These include migration policies (Morris, 1997) besides diploma recognition policies (Pertek, 1992; for further development, see Peixoto, 1998 and 1999).

From another standpoint, by integrating the macro (economic and social) and micro (individual) facets, the analysis of intraorganizational transfers lies at a crucial theoretical level. In the first place, economic logic leads to investment and resource assignment decisions. Secondly, the specifically organizational criteria are used to build structures (internal labor markets and organizational careers) and define strategies in human resources issues. Thirdly, the individual agents react to – or affect – the collective career courses by accepting – or otherwise – certain types of recruitment and career paths within companies. The combining of economic options, policies regarding associated movements of personnel and their individual attitudes, give rise to many of the top echelon movements.

This article contains the main results of research conducted in 1995–1997 on the movements of highly skilled workers in a Southern European country – Portugal. It focuses on the main features and factors that explain the entry of foreign personnel into TNCs operating therein (see, for the complete study, Peixoto, 1998, 1999). From the theoretical generalization standpoint, our study of the Portuguese case involves particular advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, Portugal is clearly a net recipient of foreign investment and thus of international personnel. Although highest investment
was recorded, particularly following the country's EEC membership in 1986, since the 1960s its volume has been significant and its features (sector, strategy, country of origin, etc.) are varied. From this stance, Portugal seems to be a fine laboratory for analysis in view of the variety of situations to be found. On the other hand, the small market and investment size, besides the country's semi-peripheral status, cause it to be regarded in a special way. As a result, investments and associated personnel movements may be biased in view of the country's less central position. Given the variety of situations, allied to the fact that much of the evidence gathered proved to be identical for other contexts, we believe that the last-mentioned feature does not prevent us from making a number of generalizations.

In our research, we chose a methodology that consisted of acquiring an initial extremely broad perspective of the highly skilled movements. This was subsequently used to obtain a more in-depth understanding of its features. For the broader approach, an extensive analysis of general statistical data and other available sources produced a panorama of highly skilled international flows in Portugal. Among other variables, this general framework considered the main phases of migration, the country of origin (or host country, in the case of out-migration) and occupational categories, including, whenever possible, the distinction between independent and organizational flows. With a view to obtaining in-depth data, exploratory contacts were made with knowledgeable area informants and case studies were undertaken of foreign TNCs operating in Portugal. Besides the analysis of documentary sources, the TNCs' human resource managers were approached so as to obtain a comprehensive view of the principal migration mechanisms. At this stage of our research a direct survey of international personnel – essential for a more complete approach to the theme – was not undertaken. However, some of the area informants and managers interviewed were, or have been, international expatriates or assignees themselves.

The criteria used to select companies for the case studies involved a concern for variety, designed to produce a rough sample of foreign investment in Portugal and to provide some interesting combinations. As a result, 19 foreign companies were chosen on the following bases: year established, branch of activity, investment orientation, nationality of capital and of top management. The purpose was to differentiate old from recent investments, manufacturing from service industries, export-led from market-oriented investments, different countries of origin, and foreign from Portuguese management. Furthermore, all the firms concerned were among the leading foreign
companies operating in Portugal. In each company, the author conducted a semi-directive interview with human resource managers. This was complemented by reference to available documents. So as not to discourage any more critical statements, the interviews were not taped. This required a more topic-oriented discourse analysis. The methodological problems encountered, including the degree of validity of evidence obtained and the technical troubles of observation, are typical of the case studies' approach (for other details on the methodology, see Peixoto, 1998).

The following section analyzes the volume and duration of movements of the target group. This includes managers and other professional and technical workers, many with a higher education or tertiary level diploma, in possession of foreign citizenship, entering Portugal within the framework of a TNC. As to duration of stay, we will address either expatriations or assignments ranging from some years to a few months, excluding short business trips. The article then assesses the main causal factors determining such movements. In this field, both macro factors (technical criteria and social variables – trust and control, among others) and micro factors (careers, incentives and social integration) will be reviewed. On the result of the evidence obtained, a tentative typology of migrations will be established. The aim is to identify the principal variables that create different “types” of movements in this area. Finally, a conclusion focuses on the most significant comments and paths for future research.

**VOLUME AND DURATION OF MOVEMENTS**

One of the main difficulties found in a study of the international mobility of highly skilled workers in Portugal is the limited number of flows. Some of the human resource managers we contacted went as far as to tell us they thought it normal that such an analysis should only be performed now, in view of the small amount and recent nature of many of the movements. Despite this reservation – which, along with the peculiarities of the Portuguese economy, hampers comparison with movements in other countries – case studies have

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*The field work for this research project was undertaken in 1996. The transnational firms that constituted case studies were the following: Andersen Consulting, AutoEuropa (joint-venture Ford-Volkswagen, now owned by Volkswagen), Banco de Comércio e Indústria (now Banco Santander), Bento Pedroso Construções (owned by Odebrecht), Bertrand Faure, BP, Cablesa (now Delphi – Packard Electric Systems, owned by General Motors), Ecco’Let, Ericsson, Ernst & Young, Fiandeira (owned by Chargeurs), Fiat, Ford, IBM, Procter & Gamble, Renault, Siemens, Unilever and Vulcano (owned by Bosch).*
detected a certain regularity in the mobility standards. Most cases confirmed that inflows of foreign cadres are occasional and that rotation among personnel is slow. Indeed, at particular moments in time (plant start-up, the introduction of new work processes or new technologies, for example), the number of expatriates and other international personnel – irrespective of the length of stay\textsuperscript{3} – tends to increase. In general, this number rarely exceeds more than 10 individuals per firm. However, at times entries can be substantially higher: the highest numbers registered belonged to companies with as many as 90, 150 or a maximum exceeding 400 foreign personnel at a given moment in time.

Two variation factors can be introduced regarding this entry figure. The first is of a chronological nature. Movements before 1974 – the year that heralded the country’s political democratization – seem, on the whole, to have been very scant. In hindsight, respondents are inclined to downsize the volume of past movements; in some older companies, the mobility pattern during previous decades was not even described or figures were recorded with great difficulty. Notwithstanding this limitation, it is certain that most such movements were small. Despite the opening up process of the 1960s following EFTA membership, a number of factors curbed foreign investment in Portugal. The restrictions on external trade, the need to produce for the domestic market alone, and the reduction of operations to activities of distribution and commercialization, explain why a handful of foreign cadres was sufficient to instill and, when required, uphold company know-how and culture. Following 1974, and especially after 1986, with admission to the European Union, something changed. The few recognized cases of massive influx of personnel are all to be found after these dates. At that time, the increase in foreign investment and the larger scale of operations seem to have been the main causes for the arrival of larger groups of foreign professionals, mostly white collar workers (for foreign investment in Portugal, see Simões, 1989; Ferrão, 1994).

The second factor refers to the type of company activity. Cases in which the entry of foreigners was more significant occur, on the one hand, when there are grass-root investments, such as the building of factories or other types of economic structures and the complete installation of new manufac-

\textsuperscript{3}The concepts used by TNCs to describe the various types of international movements are manifold. To facilitate our explanation, we shall generally use the terms “expatriates” or “international personnel” to describe them. Differences between the movements, mainly those based on the duration of stays, will be introduced when appropriate.
turing processes and technologies. As confirmed at the interviews, in such situations, immigration of technical personnel is required to "get the machines working and train the Portuguese." On the other hand, numerous entries occurred, particularly in the industrial area. The development of large-scale operations, focusing as much on exports as, periodically, on the domestic market, obliged companies to transfer large numbers of their personnel. If we evaluate the amount of entries in terms of relative weight compared to the number of local cadres, another type of massive entry may nevertheless occur. Some operations designed for the Portuguese market – especially services – began with a high ratio of foreign cadres (albeit small in absolute number) within a restricted group of personnel. The typical greenfield investment thus involves a huge intake of top managers and intermediate production staff, whereas the recruitment of Portuguese is usually restricted to young graduates and manual workers.

The average length of time of cadres' stay in the country is inclined to vary. The main variation factors recorded in the case studies concerned the individual's position within the organization's hierarchic structure and the type of work performed. Although there are many differences between companies, it was commonly found that in the different managerial posts, stays tended to be longer; in the most important technical posts, stays were of an intermediate length; and in the case of specific projects or training, stays tended to be short. The duration of managing directors' or other administrators' stays may last the longest. In some of the companies we contacted, the holders of such positions remained in the country from six to eight years. What is significant is that the longest stays mainly occurred in newly established companies or following the take-over of already existing ones. If we broaden our outlook to include the remaining top-level positions, the "normal" period for management positions – when separated from other technical posts – was a little less: between three and five years. These periods may, however, extend beyond expectations. The prolonged duration of management's stays clearly reflects the key nature of such positions and the importance that long stays and the associated direct physical presence continue to represent. The fact that the highest figures are found among companies that are either new or already established in the start-up phase also seems to confirm the hypothesis that the greater the managerial responsibility, with the necessary command of multiple variables, the longer the stay will be.

The shortest stays may be due to the exercise of certain managerial positions, the performance of specific, technical tasks or the acquisition of train-
ing. In some of the companies studied, a regular pattern of assignments of two to three years’ duration was mentioned – a period of time that international literature has highlighted as being the most common in contemporary movements (see Salt, 1992, among others). In these companies, stays refer as much to managerial posts as to the arrival of more technical staff. In other firms, the value was somewhat different – between 1.5 to 2.5 years and 1.5 to five years. If we were to study only the most strictly “technical” stays or positions related to training, the time involved tends to drop. Stays of one year, months or a few weeks are also common, but here technical contacts clearly prevail. In this case, the movements can be variable: movements such as start-up are characterized by a wide range of stay times, and, in the particular case of training, the longest stays mentioned included both “long” three month stays or stays of up to six months.

The tendency to replace long stays by short stays (with an accompanying possibility of increasing the number of incoming cadres) was not always confirmed by empirical evidence in our work. A number of contrasting situations were detected in this regard. Some companies emphasized that, following periods with many short stays, few long entries were recorded. In others, the contrary was the case: progression from many, long stays (expatriation of the classical type) to few, short movements (incorporation of local personnel and short assignments for foreigners). These statements seem to reveal, above all, a cross-referencing of variables that must always be unraveled: the start-up of new operations or the entry into new business deals involve movement “disturbances” that prevent any linear analysis. But there may indeed be some fall in the average expatriate length of stay. For instance, the widespread increase of movements ought to lead to a progressive reduction in lengths of stay.

Furthermore, increasing business travel and, from a broader standpoint, improved means of communication that lead to forms of “virtual mobility” may contribute to a greater complexity of mobility patterns (see Salt and Ford, 1993; Salt, 1994; Peixoto, 1998). Although neither was the focus of our research, available evidence did show that these trends did not ostensibly displace the standard movements that often. The continuous need for prolonged contacts – to ensure a better grasp of the business environments and to make the stays profitable – is a key argument against the spread of these new forms of mobility. The importance of the physical presence as a necessary resource to secure confidence and control is a second factor in support of the classical migration patterns.
CAUSAL MIGRATION FACTORS
The Macro Factors: Technical and Social Criteria

When the company’s standpoint was addressed during the case studies, the most commonly mentioned factors determining cadre migration were of a technical nature. In a stricter sense, these may include questions related to specific skills or know-how in certain areas. In the majority of the companies surveyed, such motives were given to account for various movements. As mentioned above, these types of entries may occur at various stages in the company’s life: during start-up (where numbers are higher), at the beginning of the manufacturing process or commercialization of new products, or when new technologies or work processes are introduced (including the overall processes of standardization). Among others, our case study inquiries prompted the following responses: “We must look for skills where they are available;” “we must assign some experts to pass on the knowledge;” “we must provide expertise and transfer knowledge;” or, simply, assignments are necessary “to get the machines running and train the Portuguese.” The aims of staff admission are threefold: to allow the national branch to begin new processes by transferring knowledge required for the operation, to train local professionals to ensure future productive output, and to avoid reliance on external factors, including those related to the acquisition of skills in other ways (taking on already-trained professionals or resorting to outside training). Since it is impossible for a workforce to be entirely mobile but possible to rapidly train local workers, the placement of knowledge via specialist operational groups is a must.

In a broader sense, if we take technical causes of entry to include the area of management also, our case studies provided further evidence. Management entries into top-level administrative posts can indeed be included under this heading. Such posts are linked to the knowledge and dissemination of the company’s mechanics and the pursuance of the company’s culture—which is generically referred to as company “know-how.” The best summary of this broad type of argument was provided by one of the survey’s respondents. He stated that the main cause of movements was provided by one of the survey’s respondents. He stated that the main cause of movements was the fact that “the expatriate brings technology and management with him,” in other words, technical and business security (see Franko, 1973; Galbraith and Edström, 1976; Edström and Galbraith, 1977). If we adopt a simple skills shortage approach, we may, however, argue that this broader reasoning is debatable. Indeed, in the field of management, where power relations prevail, the need for technical immi-
gration is, to some extent, more relative, which is not the case in other productive fields.

Some entries were also regarded — albeit to a lesser extent — in the survey as peculiar to other types of causal factors. Career development and the gaining of international experience were among entry motives mentioned by several of the companies addressed. This type of factor naturally prevails in those companies whose personnel policies include well-structured individual career plans. Respondents were of the opinion that what is required is to rotate staff, to promote an international perspective or give high-potential employees a broader knowledge of both market and business — even if this includes getting to know such modest branches as those in Portugal (see Galbraith and Edström, 1976; Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Brewster, 1988; Atkinson, 1989). Other types of entry causes were rarely cited. The idea of bringing in trustworthy personnel — an undeniably important factor — was mentioned in one case only. The existence of global difficulties for the TNC, including a restructuring process and the closing of some plants, was not explicitly mentioned either. We do know that in two of the TNCs studied various placements in Portugal resulted from such circumstance.

Indeed, discussion of the motives for expatriation in Portugal should really go beyond the factors acknowledged in the interviews — a common sociological principle that is also adopted by Galbraith and Edström (1976, 1977). Examination of top-level TNC assignments by operational area — an issue discovered in our case studies — provides some insight into this domain. On the one hand, admission of foreign professionals to production and sales positions is clearly due to the stricter technical motives invoked. It is a fact that the company has know-how in different locations. When unable or unwilling to make use of local resources, personnel displacement is stimulated. Despite human resistance to migration, everything occurs as if this were merely a question of material placement. Just as one may install a production tool, the displacement of the human factor should also be encouraged whenever circumstances demand it.

On the other hand, the placement of expatriates at the senior management level seems to result from a different rationale. Movements to positions such as top administration and financial management proved to be strategically crucial in the companies surveyed. In such cases, the expatriate cadres are totally conversant with the company mechanics and are imbued with its organizational culture; in this sense, the existence of a direct link between headquarters and subsidiaries (assured by those with skills in this area) will
always be technically justifiable. The important question has to do with the priority given to those specific key managerial posts. Clearly, the attraction of the financial area cannot be justified by an argument on the grounds that it is ideally suited to the diffusion of organization culture. It may be regarded as an exclusive zone where control and trust have a role to play. These variables, which lie outside the technical range, therefore appear to be an important motive for flows (as for control, see Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Brewster, 1988; regarding trust, see Granovetter, 1985).4

The distinction of activities between manufacturing industry and services is also of importance. We may say that in manufacturing the work environment is more artificial and technical, and conditions can be reproduced in a wide variety of locations. It is therefore possible to forecast that an expatriate’s performance in this area can attain high levels of efficiency and that the profitability of his or her placement will be highest if we exclude poor personal adaptation factors. However, the situation in services is different: they demand control of a greater number of variables, as they deal with the day-to-day local particularities and the social and economic environments. Knowledge of the language, tastes and customs is usually regarded as fundamental to the performing of different functions in this area, such as business contacts, marketing, consultancy, training and financial mediation, among others. In these activities, the language can often be a serious barrier to the professional activity. If we bear in mind factors involving consumer preferences, then we have another reason to agree that in these activities “local philosophy is what matters” (as we were told at one interview). In short, we consider that – as was also stated – “there are key functions, related to the market, which ought to be attributed to local staff.”5

The development phase of companies is another variable to be considered. The maturity of local operations over time leads to a series of effects that literature has systematically highlighted (see Franko, 1973; Atkinson, 1989; 1994).

4 From this point of view, the existence of international movements is, at times, awkward to interpret. For instance, a substantial volume of investments and a small displacement of staff between two neighboring developed countries (see, for example, Boyle et al., 1994) can either be explained by the presence of skills in the two contexts or by a “high trust” situation.

5 Case studies also demonstrated the additional factor that more stable processes and technologies seem to predominate in manufacturing industries, while in services there is a higher rate of innovation. The former trend is compatible with the import of more standardized expertise, while the latter calls for a more flexible approach. The particular case of consulting business was stressed in our research. It makes no sense to advise clients to follow a philosophy of “responsible autonomy,” if the consulting firm itself is not autonomous, but dependent on processes (and professionals) from abroad.
Salt, 1992; Scullion, 1995; Tzeng, 1995, for example). Mention should be made of the progressive training and career advancement of local personnel, the creation of bonds of trust between subsidiary and head office, the financial burden of movement and provisions made for expatriates, the difficulties mentioned regarding moving and the effect of the increasing number of dual-career households, the negative reaction by the host country to colonization of the company’s top positions and the difficulties in reconciling a cadre circulation strategy with maximum performance of local resources. For several reasons, it is easy to see that the older the organization the less specific the cause to attract international personnel. Our research also discovered strong empirical evidence here: in almost all the cases analyzed, there was a fall in entries over time.

The fact that the TNC entered the operation at the outset or acquired a pre-established company had further significant effects on mobility. The need to build and train everything and everybody from scratch will probably lead a TNC to arrange for a “massive” temporary intake of personnel. This will be accompanied by a number of exits for training purposes. Entry, permanence and rotation of personnel thus reach a peak. When an operating company is acquired, the aim is to make use of good local cadres. A situation such as this will be enhanced if the company’s economic position is favorable. In such circumstances, the entry of international personnel can be reduced.

The Micro Factors: Careers, Incentives and Social Integration

The various macro conditioners we have listed could not exist without appropriate micro counterparts. In other words, the organizational criteria for movements – of a technical or nontechnical nature – could not subsist without the right personnel motivation. In our case studies, when the individuals’ standpoints were addressed – as witnessed by human resource managers – career prospects proved to be the main reason for such migrations. They were to provide the real opportunity of promotion within the company and the attainment of important functional positions. In some cases, the hierarchic advancement may not be automatic; some lateral movements in this area were mentioned in the case studies, where migration does not directly result in promotion. However, the career fringe benefits to be derived from the moves act as an indirect motivating resource which allows staff to envisage future professional improvement (for the importance of careers, see Salt, 1983/1984; Salt and Findlay, 1989; Ford, 1992). Along with these factors, the various incentives provided by companies to “lubricate” the migratory movements
make a considerable contribution to the existence of such displacements (as also stated by Salt, 1983/1984; Salt and Findlay, 1989). Our research confirmed that relocation packages are generous and a complement to the mere prospect of a professional benefit. The incentives offered include financial benefit as well as other supports designed to help the expatriate and family to settle in. This assistance includes housing, children's education, home leave and, at times, spouse employment (on this point, see also Atkinson, 1989; Salt and Findlay, 1989; William Mercer/CBI, n.d. [1992]; for a revision of literature, see Scullion, 1995).

As a rule, the degree of motivation of international personnel seems high. It is certain, as stated in one of the companies contacted, that the attitude of TNCs' personnel towards international careers varies. Yet this haziness disperses once we introduce the issue of hierarchy into the organization. The professionals involved in top-level management are truly attracted to international careers, as they are "interested in the work;" thus their commitment may even increase with the number of international moves. In short – as one respondent added – "top management is always motivated." This motivational level may spread to other professionals, even if their benefits are smaller. For example, one of the prerequisites currently quoted in recruitment contests includes the successful candidate's actual availability for geographic mobility. However, some obstacles regarding mobility arose during the interviews. Individuals did not think that organizational generosity always compensated for the inherent difficulties in the decisions to move. Personal displacements, the break with the social space of origin, difficulties in children's schooling or spouse employment (mainly in the cases of double careers) are some of the most common problems that expatriates normally encounter (see also Atkinson, 1989; Ford, 1992).

The type of existing social integration and even the innate cultural habits facilitate movements, especially those of a longer duration. In our research, some evidence was gathered in these fields. On the one hand, we noted that a life spent in enclaves, with the restriction of personal relationships to other expatriates and attendance at international schools or associations enables cadres to avoid any radical change to their lifestyles – or not to feel that they have completely changed country. If, in the case of professional performance within the company, the expatriate fails to perceive the extent of migratory change, in social and family terms, such enclaves facilitate adaptation to the new social space and act as a channel for moves (see Salt and Findlay, 1989). On the other hand – as emphasized in certain interviews – some types of cultural attitudes may ease or hamper such movements. The relative proximity
between original and host countries' cultures is the first catalyst of flows. Some attitudes vis-à-vis the family (a greater "detachment" regarding the broader family) and the attitude of women towards the labor market (greater inactivity or increased part-time work) also fit in nicely with the expatriate lifestyle. They both cultivate the conditions for an easier dissolution of local ties and an increased commitment to the international organizational channels.

**MIGRATION TYPOLOGY**

Given the evidence obtained through the case studies and the causal factors described above, it is possible to outline a typology of cadre migration in keeping with the most significant variables (see Table 1). This form of typology reveals a number of limitations. Among them we may find the particular nature of the Portuguese economy and foreign investment in the country, the fact that our sample is not representative insofar as it is a case studies approach, the restriction of the intensity of movements to very general characteristics ("strong" and "weak" degrees of mobility), and the restricted number of explanatory factors. We were able to identify some variables that are not usually focused upon in international literature on personnel migration within the TNCs' framework – and which may lead to a more thorough knowledge of the phenomenon.

The age of the operation, or its phase of development, is one of the two single variables to have been mainly developed in international literature (the other being the nationality/company culture). Its effects on personnel mobil-

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Level of Cadre Migration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Age of operation</td>
<td>I.a. Old Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Development phase of the firm</td>
<td>I.b. New Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Installation strategy</td>
<td>II.a. Domestic market Weak</td>
</tr>
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<td>IV. Investment orientation</td>
<td>II.b. Export Strong</td>
</tr>
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<td>III. Main activity</td>
<td>III.a. Manufacturing Strong</td>
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<td>IV. Type of technology</td>
<td>III.b. Services Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. New or pre-existing firm</td>
<td>IV.a. Traditional Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV.b. New Strong</td>
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<td></td>
<td>V.a. New (greenfield site) Strong</td>
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<td></td>
<td>V.b. Pre-existing (brownfield site)</td>
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<td>VI. Crisis or success (pre-existing firms)</td>
<td>VI.a. Crisis Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII. Nationality / Company culture</td>
<td>VI.b. Success Weak</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VII.a. European Variable</td>
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<td>VII.b. USA Variable</td>
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<td>VII.c. Other Variable</td>
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ity are well founded by existing empirical evidence (Franko, 1973; Ford, 1992; Salt, 1992). In short, what is known is that the more advanced the TNCs’ operations in a country, the greater the likelihood of their being directed by local personnel. Available studies demonstrate that mobility follows an almost linear progression. In an initial phase, where the distribution of products manufactured abroad prevails, movements are few and normally very brief (movements increase in volume and duration when the firm in question evolves beyond the foreign representative phase to become a distribution branch). If the scope of activity increases or the company decides to manufacture products locally, mobility may reach a peak. In this case, the local company must rapidly receive parent company know-how and movements of external cadres prevail. In the final, mature phase, trained, local personnel tend to ensure the smooth running of operations. The progressive indigenization of personnel (replacement of foreign by national cadres) is the logical corollary of this progression. This sequence was confirmed in our research.

A TNC installation strategy or its investment orientation is a second meaningful variable. As previously mentioned, a domestic market perspective usually implies greater use of local personnel, whereas an export strategy – increasingly common among investments in Portugal – usually implies greater expatriation (entry) of international personnel. On the one hand, this situation arises from the size of operations and, on the other hand, from the nature of the activities involved. Indeed, the main type of activity is the third important variable. Manufacturing industrial activity – often export-oriented – is thus characterized by greater admission of external personnel, while services – usually market-oriented – are more often supported by local resources. The fourth variable to be mentioned is the type of technology used. While traditional or previously known technological resources are compatible with a higher incorporation of local personnel and knowledge, new technologies will, to a greater degree, imply foreign professionals. It is true that these variables can be cross-referenced, and a multi-varied analysis will always be necessary. Thus, for example, a manufacturing investment based on traditional technologies may incorporate more local personnel, who already possess the know-how, while another supported by new technologies requires a massive import of experts. Nonetheless, as there is a certain specificity for the variables in question, one may accept their independent effects on mobility.

The fact that a company is new or already established – a greenfield or brownfield investment – and, in the latter case, that an acquired company is in a state of crisis or enjoys economic health – are two further important vari-
ables. In the case of a new company, whose means of production and massive work contracting has started from scratch, mobility tends to be maximal. This results from the need to input company know-how during the start-up phase and to gradually pass it on to local professionals. In absolute terms, the figure for entries will be that much greater if, as we have seen, it is tied to investment in manufacturing, supported by new technologies and export-oriented. However, when a multinational service begins activity, a similar pressure is placed on entry, even if the quantitative expatriate figure is smaller. In already established companies, the situation is variable. These are newly acquired companies whose productive means and human resources are readily available. The resources involve some cadres with significant business knowledge. It is likely—as our empirical research discovered—that the expatriation figure for personnel is lower in the case of healthy companies and higher in crisis-ridden companies.

However, some particular conditioning factors are related to this last variable—as suggested by a degree of diversity in our case studies. First, total acquisition of a company's capital, or the creation of a joint venture between the TNC and the national company, may lead to a variation in the volume of expatriates. Entries in the former should increase, in view of the minor powers granted to the local—Portuguese—personnel. However, in the latter case, the incorporation of local cadres at the top will be greater. The distribution of positions will also be more balanced if there were business negotiations prior to acquisition, whereby posts held by Portuguese are safeguarded. Second, in a healthy company where there has been a change of branch or introduction of new activity guidelines, the volume of entries will once again tend to rise due to the need for specialists in the new operations. Third, a critical situation may occur in existing local TNC branches and not only in newly acquired companies. This latter case, which represents a clearer “retrocession” situation, involves a downturn in national branch autonomy and a return to tighter foreign supervision (see also Scullion, 1995). Here, the need to change the course of events leads the headquarters to want to directly control operations. The only difference lies in the number of entries: whereas in new operations there is a tendency towards mass expatriate entries, in old branches only one or two key positions are occupied, such as that of financial management.

The influence of nationality or, from a more rigorous standpoint, company culture on personnel mobility is our last variable—and the second pointed out by international literature on the subject (Franko, 1973; Brewe ster, 1988; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Scullion, 1995; Tzeng, 1995). The
relationship between nationality and company culture is far from being directly equivalent. If we deny the perspective of Hofstede (1985), there may, in fact, co-exist various organizational cultures within the same mother-company nationality. Despite this, some parallel is usually drawn between the attributes. Since literature has confirmed some association between company nationality – especially North American, European and Japanese – and the personnel mobility pattern, the variables’ link is logical. Thus, one usually expects North American TNCs to be characterized by polycentric strategies – to use the typology of Perlmutter (1969) – i.e., they often rely on local personnel in their foreign operations. As for European firms, although internally diverse, they are usually more keen to maintain stronger control over their external activities. Here, international cadres prevail and share the nationality of their mother-company. Finally, Japanese firms are characterized by a strategy involving very tight control of external operations and represent the most ethnocentric approach to internationalization.

As for the nationality aspect, the results obtained in our case studies were insufficient. This may be due to the small size of the company sample – and its cross-referencing with other equally (or more) important variables – or simply due to the lesser relevance of nationality as a mobility factor. The only results that indicate regularities in this area were those showing that, in the majority of cases, cadres pertaining to the nationality of origin exert a direct control over companies. This explains why they are predominant among expatriates (as was also recalled by Brewster, 1988 or Tzeng, 1995). Over and above this, there are TNCs whose situations differ within the same mother-company nationality and others with “anomalous” results, where individual companies deviate from the normal pattern of their counterparts. Furthermore, we found evidence that, rather than place their own nationals in Portugal, companies of American origin assigned top-level positions to European (non-Portuguese) cadres. This may reflect the reluctance of American professionals to move outside their country, or alternatively, this nationality’s disinterest in less central European operations, while using European nationals as an intermediate source of control.

Further development of the typology hitherto presented calls for more extensive research. One of the aspects that assumes increasing focal interest is the differentiation between types of multinational enterprises, based on their structure and internationalization strategy (see, for example, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Scullion, 1995). The main interest of a classification of this kind is to create new independent variables that may explain the pattern of
international flows. We may acknowledge that some common features exist in different classifications despite different terminologies. Therefore, a frequent distinction is agreed among traditional multinational enterprises that reproduce the original structure and products in the host countries, multidomestic enterprises that grant considerable autonomy to their branches, and the global type enterprises that combine the world advantages arising from scale with local circumstances. The first, the traditional type (an almost colonial one), is one where companies reproduce the organizational structure of the headquarters in its subsidiaries abroad. The tendency is to send structures, products, ideas, managers and technicians from the “center” (headquarters) to the “periphery” (subsidiaries). The second, the multi-domestic type, grants a large autonomy to the subsidiaries. These tend to be responsible for their own structure and management, due to local specificities. The international “circulation” of personnel tends to diminish, and the managers and technicians of each branch have the same nationality of the country where it is located (at the most, the circulation is used as a training mechanism, with the aim of returning to the original location). The third, the global type (which is advocated by Bartlett and Ghoshal, although with a different terminology the “transnational solution”), tends to have neither centers nor peripheries. Here, products, ideas, managers and technicians tend to circulate irrespective of their nationality. The coordination mechanisms are very complex, and the structure acquires a network-like configuration. Mobility of cadres tends to be high, with no predominant geographical direction (there are multiple “centers”/nodes in the network). Some consensus exists as to the fact that, with globalization, an organizational behavior of the latter type tends to spread. Moreover, the increasing number of companies with global strategies often resort to alliances and strategic partnerships. In recent years, complex coordinating mechanisms are becoming common. As a result, the target countries are becoming more central and operations more network-like.

These various facts, in themselves, account for different changes in the international mobility of personnel. On the one hand, we tend to find an increase in the world circulation of highly skilled agents, along with a greater variety and multilateral range of movements. Along with the classical, ethnocentric type of movement, what seems to have become more common is the polycentric type of strategy or, in the extreme version proclaimed by Perlmutter (1969) and corroborated by Franko (1973), the geocentric type. In other words, the predominance of personnel from the country of origin may
potentially be followed by a greater use of local personnel and, soon afterwards, by an abundant circulation based on skills rather than nationality. On the other hand, those facts favor a reduction in the duration of international stays. Traditional expatriations will become increasingly replaced by modern short assignments and business travels (Atkinson, 1989; Salt and Ford, 1993). Against some simpler forecasts, at this point, we argue that a structural difference among companies persists — according to the actual businesses and internationalization strategies.

In our research, we were unable to classify the companies in accordance with these TNCs typologies. This would call for a more searching inquiry of the company's form of management and strategic options. The classification we were able to obtain was, at the most, a posteriori — in other words, after we had noted the real behavior of personnel movement. The most interesting fact seems to be that our variables apparently cut across the TNCs traditional, multi-domestic and global types. That is, we detected some conditioning factors of a structural nature that are directly tied to a specific circulation of personnel. We may acknowledge that, irrespective of the company's strategic orientations, certain features are directly linked to a certain form of personnel migration. For instance, a manufacturing enterprise that is opting for new technologies will tend to displace personnel from headquarters to the branches, regardless of the fact that its strategy is ethnocentric or polycentric. Only subsequent research can reveal more complex links among variables, thus demonstrating the extent to which differences between types of companies are significant, at least from a diachronic approach, as a means of accounting for the movements.

**CONCLUSION**

The existence of a global circuit of skilled personnel (cadres) employed by transnational companies has long been recognized by the international literature, though its features have yet to be more thoroughly investigated. The particularity of this movement results not only from its lesser volume and social visibility, when compared with other migratory movements, but also from its direct link with movements of capital and the temporary strategies it frequently employs. By their very nature, the mechanisms of international personnel circulation display a certain specificity. The fact that they use an organizational channel for movement (Salt and Findlay, 1989; Findlay, 1990) removes many of the constraints that act upon independent labor migrants, whether they have low or high (brain drain) qualifications. As the organiza-
tional cadres circulate in an internal labor market that is already settled, they enjoy an ease of migration that is unfamiliar to other migrants. As this personnel not only stands for itself but also embodies the capital with which it is associated, it is regarded by host societies in a different way to that of independent migrants.

In this article, we were able to clarify some of the facets of the organizational mobility of cadres. Rather than assuming that there is some general or linear trend in this field, we sought to find concrete variables that could lead to different patterns of international movements. Special mention should be made to the fact that they are determined by a combination of variables: the age of the operation or phase of company development, the installation strategy or investment orientation (export or domestic market), the main type of activity (manufacturing or services), the type of technology (traditional or new), whether it is a new or an already established operation (greenfield or brownfield investment), whether an acquired company is in a state of crisis or economic health, and the nationality or culture of the company. These conditions will determine the volume of the movement and the lesser or greater degree of resistance to indigenization of cadres (replacement of foreign by local personnel). For instance, investments in new export-led manufacturing industries are typically related to international flows of cadres, while investments in long-operating domestic services often rely on local personnel.

Following a less structural approach, other types of causality also create particular constraints. On the one hand, more specifically technical movements result, above all, from the dearth of qualifications, i.e., from skills' shortages, either absolute or relative to training costs. They can therefore be explained by pure economic reasoning. The use of scarce skills in the broad international framework of a TNC calls for the movement of specialists across local companies. On the other hand, more managerial flows are subordinate to a different level of needs. Here what the organization seeks are mechanisms that provide stability, and these are often based on the creation of control and trust. The need for the latter may require direct physical presence or, on the contrary, may be based on long-distance contacts with local personnel. As it is difficult to ensure the presence of such variables in intraorganizational relationships, the process of expatriation and indigenization of cadres seems to be a social as well as conflicting one.

The future of personnel movements will therefore encounter a series of crossroads. In other words, the volume and modes of cadre migration depend on the answer to a number of concrete questions. First, we must know what
foreign investment intentions actually are and the paths they will follow. Second, we should also be aware of the aspects of the investments – the sector, market and technology, among others. Third, we must study the international channels created by internal labor markets – organizational careers – and the associated personnel policies. Fourth, we must know the attitude of personnel towards potential migrations (which may depend, for instance, on the particular stage of its life cycle and on the family environment) and of domestic personnel faced with the entry of foreign cadres. Fifth, we should also bear in mind interpersonal relations between external and local cadres, including power relations and mutual trust. Finally, we should investigate the relationship between classical forms of mobility and short-term contacts (business travels), as well as their articulation with the virtual forms of mobility made possible by new communication technologies. The conjugation of all these attributes – social, organizational and individual – will determine the concrete flows of skilled migrations.

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Migration in Namibia: Combining Macro and Micro Approaches to Research Design and Analysis

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In adopting a framework that applies both macro and micro variables to the study of migration in Namibia, the analysis of the findings of the Namibia Migration Project emphasizes the utility of combining different scales and methods of data collection in terms of explaining migration dynamics and extending trends and patterns to future scenarios. It is argued that the contextual and explanatory macro factors such as political history, poverty, population, environment, epidemics and culture are crucial to the understanding and interpretation of the micro data collected through the standardized questionnaire survey and the case study material. Equally important is the iterative relationship that the macro/micro approach fosters in the research design and in the analysis of the data between the macro and micro scales of investigation.

Classification of migration usually has been based on origin and destination criteria such as rural-urban, urban-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural and cross-border (international) migration (Aina, 1995:48; Pomutu and Tvedten, 1998:4; McDonald, 2000). However, this classification falls short of providing a pragmatic method for analyzing research results from migration studies. While such classifications are important, readily provide a means by which to categorize migration data into patterns and trends, and allow for a consideration of mul-

1The authors would like to thank the following people for valuable comments made on the project report (Pendleton and Frayne 1998) and a draft paper at a seminar held at Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in August 1999: Arne Tostensen, Stephen Devereux, Lazarus Hungula, Marian Sinclair, Henning Melber, Dirk Hansohm, Arni Wiig, and Inge Tvedten. Jonathan Crush and John Gay made valuable comments about the original migration project design. Armando Miranda participated in the fieldwork and commented on the draft report. A special thanks to Christa Schier for supervising data entry and writing some of the analysis programs. Over 30 Namibians worked on the project conducting fieldwork and doing data entry. Selma Nangulah and Clementina Katzao worked on all aspects of the project and provided many valuable comments. The Urban Research and Development Program of the Social Science Division (SSD) of the Multi-Disciplinary Research Centre (MRC) at the University of Namibia sponsored the project under a grant from NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy (Windhoek).
Multiple factors in the migration process, it remains problematic to marry those factors that influence migration which lie beyond the realm of the individual and those factors which are the responsibility of the migrant and his or her immediate context. In other words, for a migration study to be able to incorporate in its analysis, at least to some degree, the complexity and multivariate nature of the migration phenomenon as called for by the literature, it is required that migration be understood in terms of causes and motivations at both the macro and micro levels of practice (Baker and Aina, 1995:11–25; Becker et al., 1994:87–134; Achanfuo-Yeboah, 1993:215–217). These macro processes or causes include, but are not limited to, political history, poverty, population and environment, epidemics, culture, and macroeconomic dynamics. Motivations refer to those micro processes that influence an individual’s context and circumstances and which have an impact on decisions to migrate and the likelihood of migration, including life histories of migration and a range of other motivational and/or opportunistic factors.

This article seeks to examine the validity of employing this macro and micro conceptual framework as a research and analytical methodology for better understanding the multivariate nature of migration within the African context. The Namibian Migration Project (NMP) was designed to gather data from migrants (and nonmigrants for comparative scope) according to this conceptual framework. A direct attempt has been made to use “flexible and open-ended models that recognize the complexity of factors that permit the insertion of cultural, environmental/ecological and gender elements into the analysis” (Aina and Baker, 1995:24). The analysis has also been broadly guided by Kemper’s suggestion that future migration studies should try to cross the ‘frontier’ between historical-structuralist and cultural models of migration (1979:10).

This introduction follows with a brief summary of urbanization and migration research in Namibia, and an outline of the methodology used in the NMP. Thereafter, the analysis considers the macro causes of the migration experience in Namibia, which is proceeded by the analysis of the micro factors revealed by the study. The macro/micro debate is then developed in terms of what the data and information from the NMP indicates, and the theoretical and methodological implications of these findings are addressed.

**OVERVIEW OF MIGRATION RESEARCH AND URBANIZATION IN NAMIBIA**

With the new political dispensation in Namibia, migration dynamics appear to have changed considerably since independence from South Africa in 1990.
Yet, little information is available about the patterns of migration within the country or the dynamics of the process (see Tvedten and Mupotola, 1995; Melber, 1996). Some information exists for the capital city of Windhoek (Frayne, 1992; Pendleton, 1996; City of Windhoek, 1996a, 1996b), but detailed current information about the rest of the country is negligible (Arowolo, 1994:78; Pomuti and Tvedten, 1998). The importance of filling this gap was identified as a major research priority for Namibia, and the Namibian Migration Project (NMP) was conceived. The NMP aimed to provide current information about migration in Namibia, both as basic research and as applied social science. The project was designed to uncover both macro and micro information on migration patterns and trends in Namibia, as well as to provide information for policy and planning purposes.

Notwithstanding this paucity of data, urbanization in Namibia is clearly set to continue over the coming decades. The percentage of rural people has declined over the last ten years from about 70 percent in 1990 to a figure approaching 65 percent (Central Statistics Office, 1996). This trend is not surprising and follows international patterns in this regard. Moreover, the population of Namibia is growing rapidly, with a doubling time of about 21 years (Frayne, 1993; Arowolo, 1994:103). High natural population growth and an increasing urban population are central dynamics in the social and economic development of Namibia.

**MIGRATION SURVEY METHODOLOGY**

In order to collect both macro and micro information, the study necessitated the use of multiple methodologies. At the macro level, a review of local and international literature on migration was conducted, and a series of interviews were carried out with senior government officials within the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Planning Commission of Namibia. In addition, senior staff of the municipalities of Windhoek, Keetmanshoop, Lüderitz, Walvis Bay, Oshakati and Ondangwa were interviewed. Previous research available on migration in Namibia and other selected countries was consulted, and a wide number of sector reports were examined as a means of understanding the macro dimensions implicated in the migration process in Namibia.

At the micro level, a standardized questionnaire survey was implemented across Namibia. The survey interviewed both migrants and nonmigrants, included all types of migration, collected migration histories and likelihood
of migration, and collected data in both sending and receiving areas of migration. In addition to the survey, case studies of individual migrants were also collected. Seven fieldwork teams were selected and trained reflecting the diverse ethnic and linguistic situation in Namibia. Data was collected from 900 households and 2,700 people; the unit of analysis for this study is the individual data. The NMP questionnaire was developed to capture the complexity of migration choices and strategies, as well as the social and spatial diversity of migrants in the Namibian context. However, not all migration issues have been covered. Data on absent household members was not collected, as the aim was to base the data analysis on who was present at the time of the survey. Absent household members are, however, an important issue since it relates to the theme of ‘split’ households where some members of a household migrate, for example to work, while others remain behind to look after the rural communal farm. The most effective method for including ‘both’ households in this study would have been achieved by tracing apparent links between households, but this was beyond the scope of this project.

For the purposes of this study, the definition of migration was made intentionally broad to cover all types of moves (excluding short-term visits). The sampling strategy was based on the selection of respondents from four categories of place within the country, namely the rural north, rural central, urban communal, and urban central (Figure I). These four areas were defined in order to sample all types of internal migration within the country: rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-urban, urban-rural, and cross-border migration. In addition, people from various ethnic groups, who have different experiences of migration, occupy these four categories of place. The commercial farms were not surveyed due to cost and time constraints; however, data about migration in the commercial farming areas are reported from a recent survey of commercial farmworkers (Devereux et al., 1996). Clusters of rural households were randomly selected from lists of enumeration areas provided by the Central Statistics Office of Namibia. Urban households were selected using a systematic stratified selection method. In order to make the data set nationally representative, it was weighted. A more detailed discussion of the methodology of the NMP survey is presented in Pendleton and Frayne (1998).

**ANALYSIS OF THE MACRO FACTORS INFLUENCING MIGRATION IN NAMIBIA**

In terms of the conceptual framework outlined above, this section discusses
Figure I  Communal Areas, Towns, and Regions in Namibia
the macro factors of political history, poverty, environment, demography, epidemics, and culture in relation to the migration experience in Namibia.

Political History

After the initial German colonial occupation of Namibia in 1890, wars with the Herero in 1904 and the Nama in 1906 had significant demographic consequences for the country. About 80 percent of the Nama and 35 percent of the Herero died in these wars (Bley, 1971:150–51; Pool, 1991:278–80), and many Herero who survived went into exile in Botswana where they and their descendants lived. Only after 1995 did some Herero who wanted to be repatriated to Namibia have the chance to return. The subsequent dispossession of communal lands resulted in the first migration to the settler towns and the settler-owned farms to work. Urban migration to towns in central Namibia, especially Windhoek, was an early experience for the Herero and Damara, and records of Windhoek show a growing urban population of both groups (Pendleton, 1996:26).

South Africa’s administration (1915–1990) of the former South West Africa was very similar to that of South Africa. In effect, a province of South Africa, policies and laws were introduced to the country that were virtually identical to those in force in South Africa. Significant numbers of white South Africans migrated to Namibia and contributed, together with the German settlers, to the establishment of the commercial farming sector which accounts for some 40 percent of the country (Werner and Adams, 1990). In contrast, rural black Namibians were designated residential and farming rights in the communal areas off the commercial farmland. These communal areas received virtually no development, and movement from the communal areas to the towns and commercial farming area was limited and controlled. The area north of the commercial farming area was closed to white occupation, and a ‘veterinary’ cordon fence was established along this boundary which prevented cattle and people from crossing (Tapscott, 1990). Figure I shows the location of these areas: the rural north, rural central, commercial farming, urban communal, and urban central; throughout this article, these areas will be referred to by these designations.

Labor migration from the north was controlled until 1976 by the South West African Native Labour Association (SWANLA), which provided contract employment in the towns, mines, and farms primarily for Owambo people from north-central Namibia (Bauer, 1998). When the contract was finished, they were required to return to the north. Limited labor migration
took place from the Kavango to South Africa for work on the mines, but this ended more than 20 years ago. The presence of many Owambo migrants in the urban central towns of Namibia, especially Windhoek, dates from this early experience of rural-urban migration.

During the 23 years spanning the Namibian War of Liberation fought between the South African Defence Force (with the South West African Territorial Force) and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia of the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), significant displacement of people occurred. Many people were required to move by the military forces, and the effects on the rural population were often devastating. A further 40,000 Namibians went into exile primarily in Angola, Zambia, Europe, Cuba and North America. Most who went into exile returned to Namibia after independence (Preston et al., 1993; Ya-Otto, 1981).

The cumulative effect of the above historical events has strongly influenced the direction and volume of migration flows. The colonial occupation, including wars with both the German and South African armies, and the implementation of a capitalistic economy, established radical inequalities in development (regional inequalities) which still exist today in spite of modest rural development since independence. In addition, the rural communal areas lack income-producing activities, and crop and livestock production methods are at the basic subsistence level (for example, see Yaron et al., 1992 for the Kavango; Couch and Pendleton, 1998 for the Eastern and Southern communal areas).

**Poverty**

At US$1,960, Namibia has a relatively high Gross National Income (GNI) for a developing country (NEPRU, 1996:6). However, this masks the fact that many households live in poverty. The Lorenz Curve for individual income based on the 1993–1994 household income and expenditure study by the Central Statistics Office (1996:143–144) reports a Gini coefficient of 0.70, reflecting the highest skewed income distribution reported worldwide (UNDP, 1997:9). Ten percent of households (about 5% of the population) account for about 44 percent of total private consumption while the remaining 90 percent of households (about 95% of the population) account for the remaining 56 percent of total private consumption (Central Statistics Office, 1996:15). Annual per capita income for the rural north is below US$200, for the rural central areas is about US$200, for the commercial farming areas is under US$300, and for the towns it is estimated to be US$1275 (Central Sta-
Hansohm et al., (1998:8) identify the following poverty characteristics for Namibia:

1. Based on household income, some language groups are overrepresented in the poor category. Poor households often rely on government pension payments.
2. The poor are primarily rural.
3. Female-centered households are overrepresented among poor households.
4. Rural households spend a higher percentage of their total household consumption on food, which is an indicator of poverty.
5. The poor have less access to health facilities.
6. The poor are less educated.

This situation of gross inequalities in income distribution and access to services in Namibia suggests that poverty is a key macro factor influencing migration within the Namibian context. In relation to the characteristics of poverty described above, the United Nations Human Development Report for 1997 confirms the first issue raised above by describing major differences in poverty and development by regions and language groups. The rural communal areas are characterized by the highest levels of poverty and the lowest levels of human development. The San (Bushmen), Owambo, Caprivi, and Kavango people have the highest poverty scores (UNDP, 1997:8–26). This situation is confirmed by the results of the NMP survey, although the link between migration and poverty is not a direct one, with political and historical factors being important macro variables.

The Living Standards Measure (LSM) obtained from the NMP data further supports these poverty characteristics put forward by Hansohm et al., (1998:8). The purpose of including the LSM variables in the NMP was to allow migration data to be linked to socioeconomic variables to better understand the migration process, particularly in relation to issues of poverty and individual socioeconomic mobility strategies. In summary, there are eight different levels to the LSM that reflect the socioeconomic stratification of Namibian society, with the scores obtained by the rural population surveyed in the NMP occupying the lowest three LSM levels. In contrast, the urban population occupies the higher LSM levels (five to eight). The NMP further indicates that people who migrate from rural to urban areas increase their prospects of improving their standard of living. In contrast with those people
who remain in the rural north where the LSM does not change for the average, the mean household score for people who are born in the rural north but who migrate to the urban communal areas increases to LSM level five. Similarly, for those who migrate from the rural north to the urban central areas, the mean household score increases to LSM level six. Although the urban LSM scores for those who are born in the urban north are lower than the average for the urban areas, they do show a significant improvement over the rural LSM scores.

The same pattern is evident from the NMP data for people who are born in the rural central area: a move from the rural central to urban communal areas increases the LSM score from level four to level five, and a move to the urban central towns sees an increase to LSM level seven. As expected, those who are born in the urban communal and central areas have LSM scores that are similar to the mean for those areas. This demonstrates that rural-urban migrants are able to improve their standard of living significantly, and this would help to explain their urban migration. However, urban-urban migration does not appear to increase LSM scores significantly, and other reasons for migration involving personal choices must be involved.

**Population and Environment**

Given that it is impossible to consider the impact of environmental factors on migration separately from the population dynamic, these two interacting macro factors are discussed congruently. The relatively small Namibian population of 1.6 million (UNDP, 1997:20) has an estimated doubling time of 21 years (Arowolo, 1994:103) and is not evenly distributed as a result of regional inequalities in both environmental conditions and political history. The rural north is home to about 60 percent, rural central 6 percent, commercial farms 9 percent, and towns 25 percent of the national population. Within the rural north, the Owambo in north-central Namibia account for 45 percent of the national population but occupy only about 8 percent of the land (Frayne *et al.*, 1993). Most of the urban population is concentrated in the central area of the country, with Windhoek accounting for about 38 percent of the total urban population.

The rural central land is widely recognized as marginal due to poor rainfall and low carrying capacities. Drought is endemic to Namibia and is the primary macro environmental factor that impacts migration. The data from the NMP clearly reveal that people move because of the negative impacts of
drought on their livelihoods (approximately 2% of first moves are for environmental reasons, and this figure rises to 10% by the fourth move). This finding is supported by a major study undertaken in Namibia in 1992 on the impacts of drought, where migration as a result of drought included a wide range of permutations, from individuals, to households, and even to entire rural communities opting to relocate (Naeraa et al., 1993:96, 100, 107–110). Devereux and Naeraa (1996:433) further report that the migration of household members to urban areas and the sending of children to other relatives in rural and urban areas are common coping responses at the household level to the macro influence of drought in Namibia.

While the complexity of Namibia’s demographics is heightened by the interplay of geographical factors, the current distribution of the population helps to provide further insight to the past and possible future migration dynamics of the country. The NMP data indicate that the strongest migration flows are from one rural area to another and between rural and urban areas, and this reflects the population density distribution across the country (Figure 11). However, these trends are intimately tied to a wide range of other macro factors and cannot on their own be considered significant predictors of future patterns.

**Epidemics (HIV/AIDS)**

While epidemics of various kinds are implicated as a macro factor influencing migration, the current rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Namibia poses what may be the single most important factor in this regard. Namibia has one of the highest prevalence rates for HIV infection in the world estimated at about 30 percent of the adult population (UNDP, 1997:34). However, the study reveals that less than 2 percent of migrants move for reasons of health care (with the exception of people who have moved at least four times, where the figure rises to more than 5%). This may reflect a number of issues, not least of which is the social stigma attached to the disease in Namibia and possible underreporting by respondents. In addition, full-blown AIDS is not yet significant in the population, despite the high infection rates.

Although the data suggest that health issues are as yet not a key macro factor in determining migration in Namibia, the implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic for migration are significant. In addition to the negative impact on hard-won gains in reductions in infant mortality, it is estimated that life expectancy at birth will drop from 60 years to 40 years almost
Figure II  Namibian Migration Patterns: 1998
exclusively due to HIV/AIDS (Jakobsen, 1998:10). The impact on GDP growth may also be considerable. High mortality among the highly skilled and semi-skilled sectors of the workforce will have a significant impact on agriculture, mining, fishing, and the government (UNDP, 1997:49–50). Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with making demographic projections in relation to HIV/AIDS, a scenario based on current infection rates suggests that rather than a doubling of the national population in 21 years from now, it might in fact not rise much above its current level of 1.6 million by the year 2020 (Jakobsen, 1998). This projection, albeit speculative, implies that the demographic profile of the country is likely to look quite different than the current picture, with increased dependency ratios and a smaller economically active cohort.

The effect of AIDS mortality on migration is difficult to assess. HIV/AIDS is often characterized as an urban problem with urban areas generally having higher prevalence rates than rural areas (Way, 1994:435), with truck routes and transport depots also being places of high HIV/AIDS incidence. However, when urban dwellers become symptomatic, they may return to rural areas where they will eventually die. As a result, the rural areas could become the focus of AIDS care that would add an additional burden to the already poorest households in the country. Presently, the Namibian Health Services do not offer AIDS care beyond diagnosis, limited symptomatic drug therapy, and counselling. Urban dwellers periodically visit the rural areas and may infect rural dwellers with HIV/AIDS acquired in town. Possible effects on migration may be an increase in urban migration by the rural poor trying to make money to provide for the care of rural kinsmen who have AIDS and to replace the lost remittances that the AIDS patients were contributing to rural household income. The rural areas may experience a decline in rural productivity due to rural AIDS deaths and rural-urban migration of the rural work force that could result in increased rural food shortages. While this remains speculative, and although HIV/AIDS as a variable of the migration equation remains poorly researched and poorly understood, this disease may yet prove to be one of the most influential macro dynamics over the decades to come.

**Culture**

Cultural factors are increasingly being recognized as an important macro variable in understanding migration dynamics. With at least ten major language groups that reflect the ethnic diversity of Namibians, this is important in
Namibia. The NMP data show that while culture is important across ethnic groups and locations, it also related to the migration patterns that the study revealed for the country (Figure 11). The cultural and value orientations about rural-urban migration which show up as patterns of migration in the data are reflected in various terms and concepts found in Namibian languages.

Among Oshiwambo-speaking people, someone who has moved from a rural area and stays in town is referred to as *Ombwiti*. If you frequently visit your rural area, then you will not be called *Ombwiti*. People who do not visit have broken their ties and are *Ombwiti*; they have lost their roots. People who are born in town and stay there are called *Ondakwatwa*. The root *twa* is a common Bantu root for foreigner or stranger. Someone who goes to town for the first time is called *Kashuku*.

Going to town to look for work is a little like an initiation ritual for young people. Going to any town to look for work is called *Uushimba* (Oshiwambo). However, the term does not apply to Ondangwa, Oshakati, Rundu or Katima Mulilo, the urban communal towns of the north. These places are not seen as 'foreign' towns; they are considered local towns and are different sorts of places. This may be to a large extent because the ethnic and sociocultural make-up of such places is both relatively familiar and homogeneous. For example, 85 percent of the inhabitants of Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi were born either in the locality itself or in the surrounding district (Republic of Namibia, 1993). In

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2Use of ethnicity and ethnic group categories is informed by the extensive literature on 'tribalism' and ethnicity in the global and African context (e.g., Hannerz 1980:119–162; Southall 1997). We have used 'ethnic' rather than 'tribal' because of the many valid criticisms in the literature for 'tribe' and 'tribal'; ethnic group also denotes a situation where one group or subculture is in contact with other groups, which is the situation in Namibia. With the possible exception of some San and Himba groups living in remote areas of the country, all ethnic groups in Namibia are part of the larger social system (both urban and rural) involving other groups as well as the national economy. The major ethnic categories (and language usually associated with the category) used in this study are: Ovambo (Oshiwambo), Herero (including Himba-Otjiherero), Nama (Nama), Damara (Nama), Afrikaner (Afrikaans), German (German), and Coloured which refers to people of both African and European ancestry (Afrikaans). The situation for the Kavango and Caprivi regions is more complicated and people from these areas are generally called by the area from which they come (when they are outside these areas elsewhere in Namibia) because of the complicated ethnic/language situation of these areas. Major ethnic groups of the Caprivi are the Mafwe and Basubia who also speak Lozi. Thus, some ethnic terms used in this article refer to specific subcultures such as the Damara, while others are geographical areas such as Kavango, and others are collective terms for several related subcultures such as Ovambo. The terms used in this article are those in general use at the national/macro level, and they are used by the people themselves and by others. Categorical ethnic stereotyping has been studied in Windhoek by LeBeau (1991) and Pendleton (1996) and in the Caprivi by Fosse (1996).
Rundu, the proportion was 77 percent. In Oshakati and Ondangwa, the proportions of ‘local people’ were somewhat lower, but still around two thirds of each town’s population (Republic of Namibia, 1993).

Rukwangali speakers (Kavango) have a similar term, Bwiti, to refer to people who go to town and stay. They refer to people who stay and work in town and also return to the rural place as Vahunguli (those who went, were successful and returned). To Rukwangali speakers, Bwiti are people who are losing their culture because of the different lifestyle they experience in the towns, and this term has a negative connotation. Although it may seem contradictory, among rural Rukwangali-speaking people, Bwiti has a connotation of higher social status.

In Lozi, someone who has left the rural area and lives in town is called Siconi. Those who are called Siconi by rural people are thought to be losing their culture and their roots. Townspeople who visit the rural area often and keep in contact with kinsmen will not be called Siconi; this reflects the very widespread attitude that visiting is very important. People who are born in town are called baba (mwa) bukuwa (children of the cities). Those who are born outside Caprivi are not called Siconi because it was not their fault. Another term for those who are born outside Caprivi is bana ba njanji (children of the railways), reflecting the fact that they were born in some distant place where the railway line goes. Prior to independence, few Caprivi people visited central Namibia, to a large extent because of the distance and the need for travel/work permits.

Damara/Nama speakers refer to townspeople as gai !a-//in (town dwellers), and it has a higher status than, for example, farm //in (farm dwellers). The other terms such as those found in Oshiwambo are not found in Damara/Nama and reflect the very different history these people have experienced in central Namibia, especially the longer exposure to urban life and greater cultural change. About half of the Damara/Nama and Otjiherero speakers are urban dwellers, while the vast majority of Oshiwambo speakers are in the rural areas; it is therefore not surprising that the two groups would have different appreciations of urban people and urban life in general.

The Herero have an expression for townspeople, tate ngo owozondwa (look at the person who is living in town like a ‘civilized’ person), which contrasts with farm people ovozofarama (farm people). However, the Herero, Damara and Nama do not have terms like Siconi and Ombwiti, which possibly reflect their long experiences with town life in the central part of Namibia.
The words and the meanings attached to them in the examples above suggest conflicting attitudes about the experience of rural-urban migration and the phenomenon of urbanization. For example, the towns are perceived to offer opportunities for alternative lifestyles that simply do not exist in the rural areas. From this perspective, towns appear desirable, and people who have done well there are admired. However, the process of becoming urban also represents a threat to traditional values and to kinship relations, particularly perhaps in those urban areas where ethnic heterogeneity is the greatest. When this aspect is emphasized, the connotations of the urban phenomenon are negative, and migrants are seen as people at risk of alienation. While all communities probably share this ambivalence towards change, material advancement and modernity, the evidence suggests that ethnic groups that are predominantly urban tend to emphasize the positive aspects of the urbanization process, while more rural-based communities such as those in the rural north view town life and townspeople with greater scepticism. The historical and cultural information described above also provides a qualitative rationale for separating the northern areas from the central areas for the purposes of data collection; they represent culturally and historically different types of places.

**ANALYSIS OF THE MICRO FACTORS INFLUENCING MIGRATION IN NAMIBIA**

The dominant micro factors that influence migration in Namibia were revealed through the migration histories that were collected in the NMP survey. This section focuses on the resulting patterns of migration evident from the data and respondent reports on the likelihood of migration. Percentages are broadly nationally representative because of the weighting of the data set.

**Migration History**

Comparing migrants with nonmigrants, it is noteworthy that about 63 percent of the sample have moved from their place of birth. The rural central and urban communal towns are the places where larger percentages of people live who have migrated (86% and 85%, respectively). The profile of migrants are people who are older (cc=.25), employed (cc=.23), and have higher personal

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3Migration histories were collected from respondents in order to look in detail at the number of moves made, where people moved, why they moved, and the age at each move. Types of moves are classified according to where the respondent said they were going: rural-rural (from one rural communal area to another and moves with the same communal area), rural-urban,
income (cc=.26). All ethnic groups have high percentages of migrants, with the Caprivi having the highest percentage of people who have moved from their place of birth (89%). Looking at individual income for nonmigrants, the category with no income has the highest percentage of nonmigrants (48%). Education, household type and gender have little influence on whether or not people migrate. However, while men and women move for similar reasons, the importance of reasons is not the same. Economic issues dominate men's reasons while family, economic and health care are of relative equal importance for women. Men have moved more than women have, which is consistent with migration literature. However, when asked about possible future moves, there was no difference in the likelihood of future migration by men and women, which may signal a change in the migration patterns of women.

Five major patterns of migration are revealed from the analysis of migration histories, again highlighting the importance of micro factors in the study of migration. Figure II shows the major migration patterns to and from the rural communal areas and the major towns. Table 1 provides a summary of the data by type of move and number of moves, and Table 2 provides data on reasons given by migrants for undertaking different moves.

**Pattern One: Rural-Rural Migration**

An important finding of the NMP is that rural-rural migration is consistently important in migration history. It accounts for 50 percent of lifetime migration and between 26 percent and 34 percent of first through fourth moves. While it is of major importance for Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi people living in the rural north, it is of minor importance for people living in the rural central (Damara, Herero and Nama). For the rural north, family reasons are the major causes for migration for all moves (55% for first moves), although declining in percentage of importance with subsequent moves. Moves for educational purposes are second in rank for first and second moves

urban-urban, urban-rural, cross border migration (leaving Namibia and returning to Namibia). People could identify up to two reasons why they migrated from a list of 30 possible choices. It was decided to recode all 'reason' variables into seven categories representing the major concept areas the individual questions covered. These concept areas are: environmental issues (land for grazing/crop production, water for drinking/livestock, drought); economic issues (food/hunger, jobs, treatment by employer, trade opportunities, military service); living conditions (housing, attraction of the city, overall living conditions, safety of myself and family, crime, freedom-democracy, peace, exile); family reasons (marriage, death, to stay with grandparents or other relatives, sent to family under age 16, moved with family under age 16); health care (health care, illness); education (education, schools); and other reasons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Migration</th>
<th>1st Move (%)</th>
<th>2nd Move (%)</th>
<th>3rd Move (%)</th>
<th>4th Move (%)</th>
<th>Life Time (%)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pattern One: Rural-Rural</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Most important type of migration. More important for people in the Rural North. Urban central towns important destinations for all except Kavango and Caprivi people. Windhoek is a major destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern Two: Rural-Urban</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Urban central towns important destinations for all except Kavango and Caprivi people. Windhoek is a major destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern Three: Urban-Urban</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Moves between urban central towns especially important for Damara, Nama, and Herero.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern Four: Urban-Rural</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>More important in later moves. Evidence for circular migration - some are born in the rural north, move to urban areas, and return to the rural north Includes some who went into exile before independence to Angola and Zambia primarily from Rural North. Primarily Afrikaners and Coloured people from urban central went to South Africa. Includes some who returned to Namibia from exile after independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern Five: Cross Border Out of Namibia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern Six: Cross Border Into Namibia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (columns)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Age at Move:                      | Mean/Median  |               |              |              |               |                                                                 |
|---                                 |              |              |              |              |               |                                                                 |
| Total (columns)                   | 20/18        | 21/24        | 26/23        | 31/29        |               |                                                                 |

| Years between Moves:              | Mean/Median  |               |              |              |               |                                                                 |
|---                                 |              |              |              |              |               |                                                                 |
| Total (columns)                   | 11/16        | 8/5          | 8/4          | 6/3          |               |                                                                 |

| Percent Making the Move:          | 38           | 27           | 15           | 10           |               |                                                                 |

Notes:

- Dash (-) indicates values of less than 0.5%
- Totals approximate 100% due to weighting and rounding of values
- Percents in row do not total 100 because they only include the first four moves. 10.4% made five moves or more.
### TABLE 2
**TYPES OF MIGRATION BY REASONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Moving</th>
<th>Types of Moves</th>
<th>Move 1</th>
<th>Move 2</th>
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<td>Rural-Urban (%)</td>
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**Move 2**

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Notes:

<sup>a</sup> Dash (-) indicates values of less than 0.5%

<sup>b</sup> Totals approximate 100% due to weighting and rounding of values
but decline in importance with later moves. Economic reasons increase in importance between first and third moves and rank about third in overall importance. Living conditions as a cause of migration steadily increases in importance from a low of 6 percent for first moves to a high of 27 percent for fourth moves. Environmental issues have an overall rank of about fifth in importance, and health care is the least important reason for rural migration. Another type of rural-rural migration is within the commercial farm area. Devereux et al. (1996:41–42) report that almost 70 percent of farmworkers are recruited from within the commercial farm area; they are typically recruited from neighbor’s farms, grew up on the farm, or are referred by farm owners. The marginal economic situation and social isolation of farmworkers makes rural-urban migration difficult.

**Pattern Two: Rural-Urban Migration**

Rural-urban migration accounts for about 15 percent of lifetime migration and 24 percent of first moves, declining in importance for subsequent moves to a low of 7 percent for fourth moves. Rural-urban migration occurs between the rural areas and the urban communal towns and the urban central towns; urban central towns are more popular with first and second moves, and urban communal towns become more important destinations with third and fourth moves. For people in the Kavango and Caprivi, urban moves are within the communal areas to the urban communal towns, Rundu and Katima Mulilo, with a small migration pattern of Kavango people going to Grootfontein, a town in the urban central area. For the Owambo, moves to urban communal towns like Oshakati and Ondangwa are important but rank second to moves to urban central towns, especially Windhoek. However, significant development is taking place in the communal towns of north central, especially regarding cross-border trade with Angola, which may increase urban communal destinations for rural-urban migration for the Owambo.

Windhoek is also an important destination for Herero from the rural central communal areas. Moves to urban central towns are major destinations for the Damara and Nama but, in addition to Windhoek, towns in the south (e.g., Keetmanshoop and Mariental) and west (e.g., Usakos and Karibib) are also popular destinations. Economic issues (rank one/first move, 40%), family reasons (rank one/third move, 35%), and education (rank one/second move, 29%) are all major reasons for urban migration; their relative rank changes depending on which move is the unit of analysis, but they are consistently the top three reasons for urban moves. Living conditions as a reason is
less important but consistently increases in importance from a low of 6 percent for first moves to a high of 12 percent for fourth moves. Likewise, environmental issues become increasingly important as a reason to make the urban move, increasing from a low of 2 percent for first moves to a high of 10 percent for fourth moves. Health care is the least important issue for urban migration.

The case study of a 21-year-old Owambo man provides a typical example of rural-urban migrants. The possibility of migration to Windhoek (Katutura) from the rural north was discussed with family and friends, and when he arrived, he stayed with his brother who is employed. He emphasized that getting a job was the major reason for migration, but later also identified health care, education and "a better place to stay" as other reasons. Three years after arriving in the city, he was still unemployed, but he remained optimistic, planning to take courses, get married and have a family. In the meantime, he was working as a hawker in the informal sector.

Pattern Three: Urban-Urban Migration

Urban-urban migration makes up 20 percent of lifetime migration and increases from 20 percent of first moves to 28 percent for fourth moves. Within the urban central area Windhoek is the most popular destination, accounting for between a third and a quarter of all urban destinations depending on which move is being examined, followed by other major towns and small towns. For the Damara/Nama, the most important type of first move is urban-urban between urban central towns in the south and the west, and it remains an important type of move through their migration histories. For subsequent moves after the first move, urban-urban moves between urban central towns are also very important for the Owambo. Although the Herero have the highest percentage of first moves to rural areas (urban-rural), for later moves urban-urban is very important. For Afrikaners and Coloured people, urban-urban moves are the major type of move made throughout their migration histories. Economic reasons increase in importance from 36 percent for first moves to 60 percent for moves three and four. Family reasons and education decline in importance from moves one to four. Living conditions shows a modest increase in importance for later moves, reaching a high of 7 percent. The least important reason for urban-urban moves is health care.

The case study of a young Damara man from Omaruru, a small town in the urban central area, describes coming to Windhoek to visit and to look for a job. He has been in town about a year, lives with his grandfather and has worked occasionally. Economics is the major reason for his migration, but he is
not optimistic about remaining in Windhoek because he says the cost of everything is so high that you never have enough money to get by.

**Pattern Four: Urban-Rural Migration**

Accounting for 9 percent of lifetime migration and increasing from a low of 8 percent for first moves to a high of 24 percent for fourth moves, returning to the rural area is also an important migration type. For people from the north, returning to the rural north becomes more important in later moves as they age. However, for many Herero urban-rural moves are the most frequent type of migration for first moves (39%), reflecting the fact that town-born Herero will often live their younger years in the Eastern Communal areas, often growing up with relatives other than the birth parents. In support of this finding, Poewe (1985:217–218) reports that 60 percent of Herero children are not raised by their birth mothers.

Cyclical migration occurs in Namibia and is reflected in the small but significant percentage of people who return to rural areas after living in town. Family reasons decline from a high of 67 percent for first moves to a low of 18 percent for fourth moves. Economic reasons increase in importance, accounting for about one third of all reasons for second, third and fourth moves; and health care, for the first time, is a more important reason for migration, increasing from a low of 3 percent for first moves to a high of 11 percent for fourth moves.

More people migrate to urban areas than leave these areas to return to rural life. However, that does not mean that all who come will stay or are satisfied with town life. The case study of a 23-year-old Owambo man ends with the statement, “I want to make one thing clear and that is I am not planning to live permanently in Windhoek.” He comments that, in spite of being employed as a security guard and living with his brother, he is not happy in town. He says that communication and interaction with people are unlike that of the rural north, and he misses the communication and interaction he had with others while living there.

**Pattern 5: Cross-Border Migration**

From the migration history data, cross-border migration to Namibia (10% of first moves and 4% of fourth moves) is about twice as important as cross-border migration from Namibia (about 4% for the first three moves and 8% for fourth moves). The greater importance of cross-border migration to Namibia has captured many ‘returnees’; that is, people who returned to Namibia
from exile after independence. The major cross-border migration patterns are urban central Afrikaners and Coloured people migrating to South Africa and rural north communal dwellers migrating to Angola and Zambia. Family reasons are the major cause for first moves outside Namibia, with economic reasons increasing in importance with later moves. Economic issues, living conditions and family reasons are all important reasons for returning to Namibia (for more details on cross-border migration to South Africa, see Frayne and Pendleton, 1998; 1999; McDonald, 2000).

**Likelihood of Migration**

Approximately 16 percent of the respondents in the survey said they might migrate in the near future. The probability of migration is about the same for all areas, and men and women have about the same likelihood of migration. Urban central towns are the major destination for all ethnic groups except the Kavango and Caprivi people, who are much more likely to migrate within the rural communal area or to urban communal towns. However, in addition to Windhoek as a primary destination, other major towns as well as smaller towns are popular destinations. Those living in the urban central towns are likely to move to other urban central towns.

When people migrate they usually stay with family, except for those who migrate between the urban central towns and those who may stay on their own. Family reasons are the single most important cause for migration. Other reasons, in order of importance, are economic issues, living conditions, education and health care. Although female-centered households have less household income than other household types, people in female-centered households are no more likely to migrate than people in other types of households.

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4People were asked about the likelihood of leaving their present household during the next 12 months. Respondents could choose between five possible answers ranging from 'strongly unlikely' to 'strongly likely.' For the purposes of the data analysis, the positive categories for likelihood of moving were recorded into a 'yes' category resulting in 16 percent who said they might migrate. Those most likely to migrate live in the rural areas and the urban communal areas (about 19%); those living in the urban central areas are less likely to migrate (13%). However, the difference between areas and likelihood of migration is not very significant (cc=.06). Younger people are more likely to migrate than older people, and certain ethnic groups such as those living in the Caprivi have a higher percentage of respondents who say they will migrate (cc=.23). Migrants are more likely to move again than are nonmigrants. However, the values for most variables do not vary significantly. For example, although more men than women say they may migrate, the difference is not statistically significant. In other words, it is as likely that people with low incomes will migrate as people with higher incomes, and the unemployed are as likely to migrate as the employed.
with greater income. Sex, language group and age make a difference in the relative importance of migration reasons. A majority of respondents say that others will join them if they migrate and that most people make the decision to migrate on their own, except for younger people whose parents will make the decision. The major source of information about where to move is ‘word of mouth.’

Based on the sample being representative of the national population, it is estimated that about 150,000 people may be on the move in the near future. For people living in the rural north, the major destination (50%) is the rural north, which would represent moves within the same communal areas. However, the second major migration destination is urban central towns (32%), which would represent 32,506 people making rural-urban moves from the rural north. For rural central migrants, 65 percent say they would go to urban central towns, accounting for 7,454 rural-urban migrants from the rural central areas. Those living in the urban communal towns also designate urban central towns as their top migration destination, which would amount to 5,109 people. Looking at the overall picture, the urban central towns would receive 45,069 rural-urban and urban (communal)-urban migrants, urban communal areas would receive 21,981 rural-urban and urban-urban migrants, the rural north would receive 5,298 urban-rural migrants, and the rural central would receive 1,622 urban-rural migrants (excluded from these calculations are moves within the same area such as rural north to rural north and so forth for each sample area).

Given a 1996 estimated urban central population of 245,687 (16 years of age and older), the migration of 45,069 people to these towns would result in a population increase of almost 20 percent within 12 months due to migration. Windhoek and Walvis Bay account for about 50 percent of the urban central town destinations, thus it would be safe to assume that these towns would receive substantially more migrants than other towns. Since the above scenario is based on grouping possible and very likely migration within 12 months together, it may represent an overestimate. However, over half of the respondents indicate others will join them if they migrate. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that migration destinations such as Windhoek and Walvis Bay will receive significant population growth due to migration in the near future, which supports the recent and projected urbanization trends from these two cities.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MIGRATION THEORY AND THE MACRO/MICRO APPROACH

The introduction to this article makes a clear case, based on the trend identified in the literature, for a multidisciplinary and multivariate approach to the study and analysis of migration. The NMP sought to meet this challenge for a more complex investigative methodology to the subject in Namibia. The key question, therefore, concerns the extent to which the methodology employed – which included the study of a wide range of key macro factors and multiple micro factors through both a quantitative survey and individual case studies – has contributed to the analysis and understanding of the migration dynamic in Namibia.

The analyses at both the macro and micro levels convincingly illustrate the importance of both scales of investigation in making sense of the data collected. However, it is noteworthy that a substantial cross reference is made in the analysis between various macro factors and again between the macro factors and the micro factors. The interpenetration of the explanatory and motivational factors in migration at both the macro and micro levels, and between macro and individual scales, confirms the importance of such an approach to the study of migration. For example, the analysis highlights the extreme nature of poverty in Namibia and, at the macro level, makes a clear case for the link between poverty and migration behavior. Yet at the micro level, the data show that for first moves, family reasons are more important than economic reasons, while for subsequent moves, economic reasons are ranked first. Simply understanding the macro issue of poverty is therefore not enough to either understand or predict migration – the micro issues need to be understood simultaneously in order to build the picture. By extension then, poverty may play an important role in the ability (or not) of households to withstand the economic shock brought on by episodic drought (environmental factors), with the decision to migrate for economic reasons of survival at the individual or household level being elucidated by the micro data, but understood within the larger macro socioeconomic and environmental contexts. This iterative method of data collection and analysis, which crosses between the macro and micro levels, facilitates identification of the points of intersection between both causal and motivational factors in the migration dynamic.

This macro/micro approach to the question of migration has made it possible to generalize certain patterns of behavior in relation to a range of factors. In the analysis, the macro factors: political history, poverty, population
and environment, epidemics and culture suggest a context to the migration observed that appears to explain rural-urban migration well. Moreover, the analysis also makes possible some generalized explanation of urban-rural migration and, to a lesser extent, urban-rural trends. The analysis shows that migration in Namibia is influenced by at least the combination of the following macro factors:

1. Migration as a disaster mitigation strategy: environmental and anthropogenic disasters such as droughts and wars;
2. Migration as an economic strategy: poverty, unequal development and regional inequalities, and lack of income-generating activities due in part to capitalist modernization and colonialism resulting in regional inequalities of economic development and incomes;
3. Migration due to poor rural productivity: environmental constraints and inadequate crop and livestock production for the maintenance of rural households, together with inadequate local off-farm income-generating opportunities;
4. Migration due to population issues: high population density, population growth, and unavailability of land to accommodate the expanding population;
5. Migration as a social and economic coping strategy: epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, migration to seek health care and/or socioeconomic support; and
6. Migration as a lifestyle issue: attraction of urban areas as major migration destinations, as places of real and perceived opportunities such as education, trade, crime, safety, jobs, health facilities, social amenities, alternative lifestyles, and modernization or, conversely, the attraction of rural areas which offer the support of kinsmen, a more traditional lifestyle, and greater safety and less stress.

Notwithstanding the usefulness of the macro/micro approach as illustrated above, the data show an important anomaly that requires further attention, and that is the predominance of rural-rural migration patterns. Rural-rural migration remains the major type of population movement in Namibia in spite of all the macro factors that would seem to drive people off the rural land. From an analytical point of view, it is noteworthy that rural-rural migration is far more important in the rural north than in the rural central areas, and this points to the importance of macro political-historical and cultural
factors in the migration process, at both the societal scale and the individual level of decision-making. Rural-urban migration is seen in the north as losing contact with one's traditions and kinsmen and is met with skepticism, although rural-urban migration to the communal urban towns in the Kavango and Caprivi is seen as less threatening. The micro level data validate this pattern. However, the Owambo, who migrate to communal towns in north-central Namibia, also make the big move out of the north to urban central towns. This is in part because of established communities of Owambo people in urban central towns who came as migrant workers (or their descendants) and remained and their ability to act as hosts for new migrants. An increasingly important factor might also be population pressure, greater in the north-central regions, which is forcing people to consider rural-urban migration as a coping strategy. Rural-urban and urban-urban migration is far more important for central Namibian people who have a different experience of urban life.

While this macro/micro approach to migration has indeed improved current understanding of the causes and motivations in the migration process in Namibia, it has also thrown up the difficulty of modeling the complexities of the process that the approach necessitates. However, this multidisciplinary and multilevel methodology should not be underestimated because it lacks a certain elegance implicit and possible in other more narrowly defined methodologies. Notwithstanding the flexible and complex approach adopted for the NMP, the analysis has proven to hold both explanatory and predictive scope, and it has shown to be a useful way of conceptualizing the study of migration. In sacrificing elegance, the approach has fostered diversity and depth in its data and its analysis.

CONCLUSION

Until this decade, the methodological approach to studying and understanding migration has tended to reflect the modus operandi of the discipline of the researcher. The macroeconomic models of Todaro (1969; 1995), the urban bias model of Lipton (1977; 1982), the Marxists and neo-Marxists who focus on structure, history and agency (Althusser and Balibar, 1975; Shrestha, 1988), and the anthropologists with their focus on individual migrants' decision-making processes and coping strategies (Gmelch, 1996:189; Speigel et al., 1996) are just some examples which illustrate the dominant disciplinary approach to conceptualizing, researching and theorizing migration. None has adopted the kind of multidisciplinary approach for which Baker and Aina (1995) and Weeks (1994) make a powerful case.
In response to this challenge, the research methodology applied the macro/micro framework to the study of migration in Namibia. The analysis of the findings of the Namibian Migration Project presented emphasizes the utility of combining different scales and methods of data collection in terms of explaining migration dynamics and extending trends and patterns to future scenarios. The contextual and explanatory macro factors such as political history, poverty, population, environment, epidemics and culture are crucial to the understanding and interpretation of the micro data collected through the standardized questionnaire survey and the case study material. Equally important is the iterative relationship that the macro/micro approach fosters in the analysis of the data between the macro and micro scales of investigation, which is partly a function of the multivariate and multidisciplinary approach adopted to the study of migration and partly a reflection of the complexity of the migration phenomenon itself within the African context.

These conclusions suggest that a similar methodology applied to migration studies in other parts of the continent should assist in promoting a multidisciplinary approach to the research and analysis of migration, thus furthering both the theoretical and applied dimensions of the research endeavor. Moreover, given the similarities in the development challenges posed by migration between many regions of the world, scope exists to extend the methodological implications suggested by the Namibian experience to migration research elsewhere outside the African continent and to include the macro/micro framework in both the research design and the data analysis.

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From War Refugees to Immigrants: The Case of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in Northern Thailand

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The KMT (Kuomintang) Yunnanese Chinese in Northern Thailand have a complex migration history spread over different generations and places. It not only reflects political entanglements involving different power entities, but also illustrates the dynamic reaction of the people to the complications. The article focuses on the interactions between the political powers and the people. The process highlights that the Yunnanese are not mere objects controlled by external policies or conditions. After a few decades of hard life, they have been transforming themselves from refugee warriors to immigrants.

Malkki (1995) correctly points out that although the existence of refugees is a recurrent phenomenon in human history, the issue of refugee management only gained its global prominence after World War II because of a large scale of refugees that resulted from the war. International organizations were established to handle refugee resettlement and relevant questions. Standardizing and globalizing processes of pursuing the refugee issue began to take place. However, this development did not reflect in academic research immediately, though some historical records and books with reference to refugees did start to appear. The "systematization of the study of refugees" only founded its academic recognition in the 1980s (Malkki, 1995:507). The deepening of complex international scenarios and the rapid increase in the number of refugees each year stimulated this belated academic interest and concern. To give a brief picture, in the mid 1970s, wars spread in different corners of the world (e.g., Latin America, Indochina and Africa), which subsequently caused refugees to throng into foreign countries. The concerned international organizations were confronted with great challenges to cope with refugee prob-

The fieldwork was conducted primarily in 25 Yunnanese refugee villages in Northern Thailand (among them, 22 are KMT villages, i.e., founded by the KMT troops and were under their protection and control), secondarily in Chiang Mai, Bangkok and Taiwan, from November 1994 until August 1996, and a two-month visit in Northern Thailand and Taiwan in 1999. I am greatly indebted to Professor Johan Leman, the director of Migration and Ethnicity Research Institute, Brussels, for his patient and intellectual guidance of my research.

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lems. This situation was not alleviated following the termination of the cold war period. On the contrary, there was creation of new waves of refugees in Eastern Europe in the wake of the collapse of the communist regimes and accompanying social, economic and political chaos, and also in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, due to political struggles, religious conflicts, ethnic insurgencies and so forth (Loescher, 1992:9–27).

In response to the intensification of refugee problems, the issue of transnational migration and security concerns has emerged as an important subject in refugee studies. Myron Weiner (1985, 1993), Aristide R. Zolberg et al., (1986; 1989) and Gil Loescher (1989), among others, have provided research insights. A common emphasis underlying their studies is that refugee problems should be located in dynamic contexts in order to explore the interactions between refugees, their native governments, the host governments, and international powers involved. This emphasis is comparable to systems approaches in migration studies, which purport to study the interrelations between migrants (at the micro-level), their migration networks (at the intermediate level) and complex international factors (at the macro-level).  

In the present case study of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese, who fled their homeland after the Communist takeover in China in 1949, I attempt to relocate their migration and resettlement in historical contexts and analyze the interaction process between the people and different political entities involved. The attempt is also a response to Malkki’s suggestion to anthropologists that international relations should be incorporated into the research framework while viewing refugee movements (1995:505). By doing so, I hope to highlight the people’s dynamics in different periods and to illustrate the transformation of migration pattern undertaken by the younger generation.  

WAR REFUGEES ON A POLITICAL CHESS BOARD (1949–1961)

The year 1949 is a landmark in modern Chinese history. The Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) government led by Chiang Kai-Shek lost the civil war against the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong. The former then

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2 The concept of a migration systems approach was first proposed by Mabogunje (1970), and later developed by Fawcett and Arnold (1987), Portes and Borocz (1989), Boyd (1989) and Kritz, Zlotnik and Lim (1992).

3 Two excellent publications on the dynamics of refugees are Involuntary Migration and Resettlement, Hansen and Oliver-Smith, eds. (1982), and Refugees, Khan and Talal (1986).
withdrew to Taiwan with a number of his followers. Yunnan was the last province taken over by the Communist regime. Hundreds and thousands of refugees fled southwestward to Burma. They deemed the Chinese Communists as the devil who caused them to flee from their homeland and carried out persecutions against their near and dear ones left behind in the country. Among the refugees, there were remaining corps from the Nationalist army and local self-defense guards. Some of them quickly rallied together and organized themselves into KMT guerrilla forces. They managed to restore connection with the Nationalist government in Taiwan and consequently gained official recognition and obtained material supplies. The guerrillas were entitled “The Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army” in January 1951. Military instructors were sent from Taiwan to organize training programs. Furthermore, the troops also sought support from the United States, which held the leadership of the alliance against the spread of communist power during the cold war period. On account of ideological solidarity of anti-communism, these KMT guerrillas were considered both by Taiwan and the United States as serving the strategic function of preventing Communist China’s expansion to Southeast Asia. Chiang Kai-Shek even envisioned that some day these troops would help contain the Chinese Communists from the southwest of the mainland while the Nationalist army was advancing from Taiwan to the southeast coast of the mainland to recover the lost country.

Beside Taiwan and the United States, Thailand also took part in facilitating the KMT guerrillas. Weapons and other goods were often transferred with the help of Thailand to their military bases in the Shan states in Burma. After World War II, Thailand sided with the anti-Communist bloc, the international alignment directed by the United States. Thailand was an important ally to the United States in Southeast Asia. They worked together closely to stem the infiltration by communists in the region (Girling, 1981:236).

Against the harsh living conditions in Burma, anti-communism became the ideological means of survival for the KMT. Their hope of returning to Yunnan was strengthened by this ideology and ongoing military operations. A series of guerrilla wars were launched in Yunnan in the 1950s. Though unable to sustain themselves long in Yunnan each time, they succeeded in

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4They included civilians and soldiers. The number of escapees from mainland China to Taiwan was about 1.5 million to 2 million between 1949 and 1950 (Zhang Maogui, 1993:241).
5From the 1950s through the mid 1970s, Thailand provided several military bases to the United States in order to prevent the influence of Communist China southward and to facilitate American participation in the Indochinese warfare. In return, Thailand received significant military and economic aid from the United States, e.g., between 1951 and 1971, the aid amounted to $935.9 million (Girling, 1982:236).
inciting more fellowmen to follow them. In spite of the fact that not all KMT troops were equally well-organized (some were said to abuse their power and take advantage of local people and civilian refugees), the guerrilla forces as a whole represented the Yunnanese refugee warrior community, which provided the incentives of cohesion and economic rewards to many fellow nationals in the foreign land. Fellow refugees were welcomed to join the guerrilla troops. Those who came with a few men and weapons were entitled to be small troop leaders. The guerrilla forces expanded rapidly and became the core part of the Yunnanese military. Such a phenomenon confirms Zolberg's theory on the development of the refugee warrior community. He points out:

> Once established, refugee-warrior communities tend to grow because they provide opportunities and even incentives for others to become politically active. Individuals in exile may find that the most socially meaningful and economically rewarding activity is to join the warriors, and consequently move from the category of mere displaced persons into that of politically active and conscious (Zolberg et al., 1986:166).

By the end of 1951, the total number of soldiers had reached about 14,000 (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964:17). A great majority of them consisted of Yunnanese Han (Yunnanese Chinese); only about 30 percent were made up of other ethnic minorities from Yunnan or Burma.

However, newly independent Burma was not pleased with the existence of the KMT guerrillas. It was flanked by Communist China in the north and America-supported Thailand in the southeast. A neutral policy was considered the best strategy to cope with the two conflicting ideological blocs (Young, 1970; Taylor, 1973). The existence of the KMT forces was perceived as a threat to its territorial integrity as their presence could trigger a possible invasion by Communist China (Ministry of Information, the Union of Burma, 1953). The alignment between the KMT and some ethnic rebel groups especially irritated the Burmese regime, which had been trying to quell ethnic insurgencies in the country since its independence in 1948. The ethnic structure and politics in Burma are very complicated. Many ethnic minorities had never really conformed to external polities either before or during the British colonial period. With the establishment of Burma, ethnic insurgencies began to intensify. In short, the KMT was a menace to its national security (for further understanding of Burmese ethnic composition and riots, see Smith, 1991 and Lintner, 1994). Fighting between the KMT and the Burmese army thus took place frequently. Failing to drive out the KMT itself and not being able to persuade the United States to apply pres-
sure on Taiwan for the evacuation of the guerrillas, it finally filed an appeal in the UN on March 25, 1953, accusing the KMT armies of infiltration and subordination to the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Under international pressure, Taiwan was forced to evacuate these troops. The evacuation took place from November 7, 1953 to June 3, 1954. Prior to the evacuation, the number of guerrillas was 16,068 (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964: Illustration 6). Yet, the number of evacuees totaled only 6,750, including both soldiers and civilians (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964: 60-82, 364-371).

After the evacuation, the Nationalist government announced that it had tried its best in the evacuation effort; it had nothing to do with those who stayed behind and would cease all assistance to the remaining troops (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964: 372, 373). Nevertheless, three months later it regained command over the remnant forces, renewed supplies and appointed another chief commander to lead the guerrillas. Conflicts between the Burmese army and the guerrillas ensued. In November of 1960, the Burmese government allied with the Chinese Communist army to fight against the KMT. They achieved their mission and successfully compelled Taiwan to carry out the second evacuation which took place from March 17, 1961, until April 30, 1961. Evacuated to Taiwan were 4,406 people consisting of soldiers and civilians (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964: 100-101). Prior to the evacuation, the number of the KMT guerrillas had reached nearly 10,000 (Ministry of Defense, Taiwan, 1964: 91, 97, 229). Though this evacuation had ended the organization of the KMT guerrillas in Burma, the majority of the troops were not willing to be evacuated. Many soldiers either remained in Burma or gradually entered Laos or Northern Thailand. Some were absorbed by other rebel forces.

Examining the activities of the KMT guerrillas in Burma during the 1950s reveals involvement of several political entities: China, Taiwan, Burma, Thailand and the United States. They all acted on the basis of national security or power concerns. For China and Burma, the existence of the KMT guerrillas posed a dangerous threat that needed to be removed. Yet for Taiwan and the United States, these troops meant extension of their powers and a strategic means to contain China's development southward. The international relations (Weiner, 1985; Loescher, 1992) between these two opposing sides were thus strained. With regard to Thailand, from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the successive governments under the leadership of Phibun, Sarit and Thanom maintained a radical anti-Communist stance. The primary concern of the governments was to guard the country against external communist
invasion and to suppress internal development of communism. The station-
ing of the KMT in Burma was seen as serving the function of curbing the 
Chinese Communist infiltration through Burma into its country. Moreover,
there was a “common interest” between the KMT guerrillas and the Thai rul-
ing class. Several high-ranking Thai officers and generals were said to have
been involved in the contraband of drug trafficking (McCoy, 1991:361).
Judging from appearance, the KMT guerrillas seemed to be an unimportant
pawn on a chess board, its movement decided by other major pieces. How-
ever, if we look into the interaction, we see that besides the external push and
pull factors induced by the political entities concerned, the KMT guerrillas as
a warrior community played an active role in its development. In contrast to
Kunz’s theory (1973), which emphasizes the overwhelming push factor in
involuntary migration and asserts refugees’ movement as “kinetic,” the case of
the KMT guerrillas attests that they were political actors who mobilized avail-
able resources for their survival in the face of complex circumstances (see Allen
and Hiller, 1985:448). The following three points further explain this fact.

First, the establishment of the KMT and their connections with Taiwan,
the United States and Thailand indicate their application of strategies of
empowerment. They exploited the ethnic divisions in Burma and allied with
some local ethnic groups in order to gain a foothold. Besides obtaining sup-
plies from Taiwan and the United States, they also received aid from Chinese
immigrants in Burma and Thailand. The chief commander of the guerrilla
forces, General Li Mi, and several other guerrilla leaders maintained good
relationships with Thai generals (e.g., the Thai Police Commander, General
Prao) so as to facilitate the transference of supplies through Thailand (McCoy,
1991:361). Moreover, they engaged in narcotics trade and extorted taxes from
other drug traffickers and local people to supplement their incomes. Regard-
ing human resources, they recruited fellow refugees and local people. Accord-
ingly, the KMT guerrillas exercised network functions and extended ties and
association in two directions, i.e., the fellow refugees (at the micro-level) and
external powers (at the macro-level). In the face of complex situations, they
strove to provide the sense of belonging and basic material needs.

Second, while coping with orders from Taiwan to launch guerrilla wars
in Yunnan, guerrilla leaders tried to expand their individual corps. Some even
exploited their military strength for personal aggrandizement. Not all troops
had faith in the officers who were sent from Taiwan. Factions and struggles
existed among the KMT guerrillas, especially after the first evacuation.
Although internal divisions affected the unity of the KMT guerrillas as a
whole, this phenomenon was a demonstration of empowerment at the lower
level. These divisions also reflected the different responses of refugees as actors to external conditions.

Third, the guerrillas did not totally comply with the requests of any of the political powers. Their development was a direct challenge to the Burmese regime. Their internal divisions showed defiance of the leadership of officers sent from Taiwan. Despite the decision regarding the first evacuation reached in the discussions among Taiwan, the United States, Thailand and Burma, there was strong disagreement on the part of the guerrillas. The number of soldiers evacuated was actually very small. The same result occurred again in the second evacuation. Informants recalled that most people were unwilling to take part in the evacuations. Taiwan was a poor and strange island for them at that time. They could hardly imagine living there. Burma was next to their homeland, Yunnan. It would be more convenient for them to return to Yunnan from Burma or other neighboring countries than from Taiwan. A former military instructor analyzed the situation: “Taiwan is a small island. There is no place to run. Here [Southeast Asia] is a big land. People can stay in Burma, or go to Laos or Thailand, if a situation becomes bad.” Their refusal to be part of the evacuations manifests the dynamics of their transnational involuntary migration. There was an ongoing interaction between the policy-making of the international forces and the decision-making on the part of these refugee warriors (Zolberg et al., 1989:277–278).

RESETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN THAILAND SINCE THE 1960s

Among the remnant forces after the second evacuation, General Li and General Duan were able to maintain their troops, code-named the Third and Fifth Armies, respectively, numbering about 3,200 in total according to informants and relevant data. They brought about 2,600 soldiers to Northern Thailand in 1961 (Development Center of Civil Servants in Chiang Mai Province, 1994) and gradually established their military posts along the northern Thai-Burmese border areas.6 In order to maintain their troops, Li and Duan stationed a part of their armies in Burma to facilitate the caravan trade back and forth between Thailand and Burma. Drug trafficking and trade in precious stones were the two major sources of income (Lamour, 1982 [1975]:173–203; McCoy, 1991:349–355; Lintner, 1994:239–271).

6After the first evacuation, there had been about 2,000 refugees, who were led by KMT officers appointed by the headquarters, and entered Northern Thailand and resettled in three villages.
The Thai government was aware of the entry of these KMT troops, but it was sympathetic towards these anti-Communist forces and, in fact, it had no thorough effective control over its border in the north at that time. There were also other Burmese rebel groups and Thai and Miao Communists scattered along the border areas. In addition, several Thai generals and officers had maintained a good relationship since the days when the latter were stationed in Burma, owing to their “common interests” as mentioned above. The Thai government tacitly permitted temporary stay to the forces of General Li and General Duan along the border areas. The conditions were that the troops would not bring in any weapons or engage in military activities within the country. The Thai government later informed Li and Duan that it would negotiate with the Taiwanese government on the issue of their evacuation.

Several negotiations between the Taiwanese and Thai governments, General Li and General Duan took place in the 1960s. However, they proved to be nugatory. In the last meeting in 1970, the Nationalist government proposed that Thailand and Taiwan cooperate for intelligence work and that Li and Duan should go to Taiwan and let other officers from Taiwan take over their armies (Prakatwutthisan, 1995:53–55). But the proposal was rejected by Li and Duan. They were unwilling to give up their forces with whom they had undergone many hardships. Furthermore, they did not envision a future in Taiwan where they had no networks. These negotiations and the negative result consequently engendered an ambivalent relationship between Taiwan and Li and Duan in the 1960s and 1970s. The latter were perceived as disobedient by the Taiwanese government.

In order to establish their footholds in Thailand, General Li and General Duan requested the Thai government to allow them to stay in Thailand as refugees. They submitted a five-point letter to the government. First, they pleaded with the Thai government to grant legal status and to allow them to bring their troops stationed in Burma along with their dependents to Thailand. Second, they promised to observe Thai laws and customs. Third, they agreed to surrender their arms to the government. They requested permission to keep a few weapons for the purpose of self-defense. Fourth, they requested the government to grant them land for resettlement and to help them develop living skills. Fifth, they expressed willingness to help the government combat the Thai Communists (Prakatwutthisan, 1995:56–57).

In response to their request, the Thai government asked the KMT forces to help suppress the Communists inside its country and promised to provide partial supplies to their armies. Perceiving this request as an opportunity to
establish legal resettlement in Thailand, Li and Duan accepted it. In the
1970s and the early 1980s, they won several important battles that not only
enabled them to get legal status for the troops, but also assisted the resettle-
ment of a great number of Yunnanese refugees (Bo, 1982:143–178;

In the early 1960s, most dependents of the troops and other Yunnanese
refugees still stayed in Burma but, following the aggravation of the sociopoliti-
cal situation in Burma on account of the military coup in 1962 and a series
of economic reforms thereafter, many were compelled to flee to Northern Thai-
land. According to ex-officers of the KMT armies, during the 1960s and 1970s
the troops of Li and Duan escorted an estimated number of 10,000 refugees
from Burma to Northern Thailand. They consisted primarily of dependents of
the troops and secondarily of civilian followers. The troops helped to found vil-
lages to accommodate the refugees. Due to their victories in the mission of
fighting against communist forces, the Thai government conferred on them
places for the resettlement of the inflow of Yunnanese refugees and also recog-
nized many other Yunnanese villages which had been founded earlier. Mean-
while, a complicated procedure of granting legal status was undertaken.

Most of these Yunnanese refugee villages are in Chiang Mai and Chiang
Rai provinces. They formed two de facto sociopolitical groupings, belonging
to the power domains of Li or Duan. These villages have been commonly
known as the KMT villages. The majority population in these villages is Yun-
nanese Han. They have not only accommodated the refugees brought in by
the troops of Li and Duan, but have also functioned as havens for other Yun-
nanese who arrived themselves, especially since the 1980s.7 The establish-
ment of the villages, on the one hand, has mitigated the trauma of flight experi-
enced by the refugees and, on the other hand, enabled the continuity of Yun-
nanese traditions in the immigrant society. The KMT armies thus played a
crucial role with respect to the migration and resettlement of most Yunnanese
refugees in Northern Thailand, either directly or indirectly. In practice, they

7 Based on my field research and data released by the FCRA Service Group in Northern Thai-
land (a semi-official organization sent from Taiwan in 1982, see the following section), there
had been more than 40 Yunnanese refugee villages in the early 1970s. Among them, 29 could
be classified as KMT villages. The number of villages continued to increase following repeated
inflows of Yunnanese refugees from Burma. In 1994, the FCRA Service Group counted 77
villages inhabited by Yunnanese. The total population in these villages was 89,018. The Yun-
nanese Han accounted for about 60 percent (around 54,000); the rest was accounted for by
other ethnic minorities from Yunnan or Burma. A rough estimation of the number of KMT
villages is around 35. In other villages, many Yunnanese inhabitants were not directly related
to the armies of Li and Duan, but were stragglers from other guerrilla groups or their relatives.
continued the network functions of the KMT guerrillas during the 1950s. They strove to provide stability and cohesion to the fellowmen in the host society. Seen from migration systems approaches, the migration of the people was institutionalized (Boyd, 1989:645). It consisted of a dynamic process initiated by the KMT armies. Informants often emphasize the significance of the armies. An elderly Yunnanese informant pointed out: “Without the troops, we Yunnanese would have all become Kuolo.” Another one asserted: “It would have been impossible to live without the troops. It was because of their protection that there have been [Yunnanese] Chinese villages.” In short, the troops had helped to galvanize the community force. In comparison, their migration experiences and process of resettlement are very different from those of the earlier Chinese immigrants, who in most cases came to Thailand alone or in small groups by sea and dispersed mainly into urban areas (Skinner, 1957).

Looking into the interaction between the Thai government and the armies of Li and Duan, we find that the pattern is rather dissimilar to that between the Burmese government and the KMT guerrillas. The Thai government was aware of the entry of these refugee warriors. Though they might be an uncertain factor affecting its national stability, they were also perceived as a potential force to bolster security in Northern Thailand, since both sides shared the same anti-Communist stance. In addition, the government apprehended that they could not be easily expelled. Instead of having conflicts with them, the government integrated the troops and stationed them in the

In Chiang Mai, there are also many Yunnanese settlers; most of them are traders. While the armies of Li and Duan engaged actively in caravan trade back and forth between Burma and Thailand, these traders had close trading connections with the armies (Chang, 1999b:92-104).

8“Kuolo” is a pejorative term used by the Yunnanese Han for northern Thai people.
9The major influxes of Chinese immigrants from the southeast coastal provinces to Thailand by sea took place between the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Main groups included Teochiu, Hokkiens, Hakka, and Hainanese. The immigrants either undertook trade or labor work. Their economic contribution has been prominently recognized (Skinner, 1957:4). Their descendants have integrated very well into Thai society. They have become a very significant ethnic group in the country, and are often known as Sino-Thai. Nevertheless, during the period when anti-communism was the supreme ideological order enforced by the government, ethnic Chinese were subjected to restrictions with respect to Chinese education, press, economic engagement and Chinese associations. This was due to the fact that after the Second World War, the political affiliation of the people was split into pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist. The bulk of the Communist Party of Thailand consisted of ethnic Chinese. The implementation of laws imposing restrictions on ethnic Chinese was done to dampen the pro-Communist activities among the members (Coughlin 1960; Wyatt 1984:266-275).
northern border areas to prevent infiltration of the communist forces from the neighboring countries. As a result, this integration policy assured a positive interrelationship.10

NEW CHANGES AND MIGRATIONS SINCE THE 1980s

As time passed, the KMT armies gradually entered their late stage in the 1980s. Many soldiers had retired, and it became more and more difficult to recruit young people. The earlier ideological means of survival, anti-communism, was weakening. The goal of recovering their homeland had become remote and had been replaced by the objective of resettlement in Thailand. Fragmentation slowly stalked the armies (Chang, 2002). Furthermore, the communist forces had gradually been subdued, and the Thai government was able to control the border areas more efficiently. Naturally, it would have liked to disarm these foreign troops. The financial supply to the armies was annually curtailed from 1984 and finally terminated in 1989 (Prakatwuthisan, 1995:32). The Fifth Army was disbanded in 1987 and the Third Army in 1989. The military period of the KMT came to an end.

Looking at the village life, it becomes evident that the Yunnanese have been working hard to rebuild their home in this immigrant country. The Thai government allows them to lead their own lifestyle. Each village has a self-governing committee, responsible for the care of communal affairs, such as the construction of the infrastructure system, communication with relevant Thai authorities, the mediation of disputes between villagers, and the organization of communal rituals. It is the locus of sociopolitical power in the village and was the extension of the power of the army (Li's or Duan's) in the village during the military period.

Generally speaking, General Li and General Duan oversaw the villages in an indirect way. They appointed or acknowledged the chairmen of the self-governing committees, but they seldom intervened in village affairs. Local Thai government officials also respected General Li’s and General Duan’s power domains and only came to KMT villages when necessary. Therefore, each village enjoyed autonomy. Following the disbandment of the armies, the KMT villages have been gradually integrated into the local Thai administrative system, but villagers still retain the freedom to organize their daily lives.

10 The factor of “common interest” may have continued to play a role. It was estimated that by 1970, Li's and Duan's armies had controlled 90 percent of Burma's opium trade (McCoy 1991:349). Informants acknowledged that their engagement had been facilitated by the Thai authorities.
based on their own traditions. In most KMT villages, distinctive Yunnanese Han traditions persist, although the fact of cultural transformation cannot be denied. After entering any of the villages, an outsider can quickly observe various Yunnanese Han characteristics, reflected in the language, food, dwelling arrangement, and existence of the Chinese school, the Guanyin temple and the cemetery. Informants often mention that their villages are like small Chinese societies. At the early stage of their stay, a return to the familiar lifestyle enabled the refugees to connect their past with the present and to plan for a better future. After undergoing frequent interruptions from previous flights, there emerged a new sense of continuity, which facilitated their resettlement. Such a process corresponds to Knudsen's resettlement theory which emphasizes the continuity of refugees' lives based on the tying together of past, present and future (Knudsen, 1988; see also Chang, 1999b).

For the older generation, these villages are their final resting places. Such a mentality is distinctively different from that of the earlier Chinese immigrants who came by sea and wished to be buried in the mainland. (Concerning the issue of ethnic identification with reference to the continuous migrations of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese over different generation categories and places, see Chang, 1999a.) They have built their homes with bare hands and raised their children here. Though the interaction with Thai people is not devoid of conflicts, the Yunnanese in general appreciate the Thai government's acceptance of their stay. They often remark that Thailand is a fertile country and its Buddhist belief, which they consider very similar to Chinese Buddhism, has facilitated their resettlement.

Regarding the younger generation, a better future prospect does not exist in the villages for most of the members. Like many rural Thai youngsters, they see cities as more promising. Migration to cities (mostly to Bangkok and Chiang Mai) offers the possibilities to pursue better lives and also to discard their refugee status. The outflow of youth population has taken place from the 1980s onward. In many KMT villages, about 90 percent of the young people belonging to families of early settlers (i.e., arriving in the villages before 1980) have left the villages. Therefore, many houses only have the old parent(s), or the old parent(s) with one or more grandchildren whose parents are working in Thai cities (or Taiwan), or the parent(s) and one married son, his wife, and a few grandchildren. The aging phenomenon in the villages is obvious.

The majority of young Yunnanese, migrating from villages to Thai cities, work in factories, especially in Bangkok. But those with some capital mostly
engage in buying and selling farm produce or in jade stone business. The latter is a unique trade especially among Yunnanese in Chiang Mai (Hill, 1998). Urban Yunnanese in general adapt well to the Thai way of life in the public sphere, but most try to maintain some essential Yunnanese Chinese traditions at home, especially with respect to food, language and ancestor worship, and transmit them to the next generation. In order to strengthen the knowledge of Chinese culture in the next generation, many parents who can afford it send their children to learn Chinese during the weekends. Nevertheless, Yunnanese Chinese normally do not reveal their Yunnanese origin in public and prefer to be seen as descendants of earlier Chinese immigrants who came by sea. Their concealment of Yunnanese background is attributed to a prevalent negative Thai perception of the KMT Yunnanese in association with their former military activities and drug trafficking. This negative perception is reflected in the term *jin-ho*, used by the Thai people when referring to the KMT Yunnanese Chinese. *jin* means Chinese in Thai language, but the origin of *ho* is no longer certain (Mote, 1967:492–493; Hill, 1998:68–73). With regard to its present usage, the term *jin-ho* contains pejorative meanings, ascribing the KMT Yunnanese to being violent and backward and engaging in illegal trade (Hill, 1998:18). By moving away from the KMT villages, the younger generation transform themselves from the status of refugees and *ho* to that of migrants or ethnic Chinese in general. Their movement can be seen as spiraling for upward social mobility and also as escape from village life and resistance to refugee status and being *ho* (see Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson, 1998:208–216).

Apart from migration to Thai cities, Taiwan is another desired destination for migration because of the people's political affiliation with the Nationalist government in Taiwan since the 1950s and Taiwan's rapid economic development in the last two decades. After the first evacuation undertaken in 1953–1954, the Free China Relief Association (FCRA), a semi-official organization that works closely with the Nationalist party in Taiwan, started to

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11 With respect to the origin of *ho* (or *haw*), Hill has made a summary of different speculations (Hill, 1998:68-73). Among them, the speculation by Li Fuyi, a Chinese scholar on Tai studies, appears more convincing to me. He advocates that *ho* was the term used by the Baiyi (the Tai people in Sipsongpanna, Yunnan) to address the ruling group of Nanzhao (AD 741-902) and their offspring in Yunnan. The meaning of *ho* is "grant" or "heaven" in the Baiyi language. The capital of Nanzhao was called *Tai ho* (grand town), and Nanzhao was referred to as *Mong ho* (the grand kingdom). But following the influx of Han Chinese into Yunnan since the 14th century and the accompanying process of sinicization, *ho* was used by different Tai peoples to refer to Yunnanese Chinese both in Yunnan and its neighboring countries (Li, 1976:31-32).
deliver small amounts of relief to Yunnanese refugees in Northern Thailand. Though the relationship between the KMT troops and Taiwan in the 1960s and the 1970s was ambivalent, irregular aid from the FCRA to Yunnanese refugee villages continued. But, in 1975, Thailand severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established new ties with Communist China. The bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Thailand became strained, and aid from Taiwan to Yunnanese Chinese refugees in Northern Thailand stopped. This situation did not improve until the late 1970s. Following the amelioration of the bilateral relationship, FCRA set up a service group in Chiang Mai in 1982 in order to provide aid programs to the Yunnanese Chinese (Free China Relief Association, 1984, 1988). The group consisted of a number of experts in agriculture, education, medical care and handicrafts. Its relief work has greatly improved the living conditions of the people.

Among the aid projects, assistance in Chinese education has particular importance. Many KMT villages established a Chinese school a few years after their founding. The schools are not officially recognized by the Thai government. The lessons can only be taught before and after the hours of study at the Thai school. In other words, students receive Chinese lessons in the early morning and evening in the Chinese schools, but go to Thai schools during the day. In most villages, the Chinese lessons are only up to the primary level, but a few provide learning until the junior high level. They use the curricula followed in Taiwan and receive shipments of textbooks from there. After the arrival of the service group, more funds have been given for promotion of Chinese education. More Chinese schools have been established, and scholarships for further studies in Taiwan were offered each year until 1991. In their learning, the political idea of Taiwan as the fatherland has been emphasized, especially prior to the 1990s. Going to Taiwan for further studies is considered as returning to their fatherland by the students. By doing so, they would become full Chinese and would no longer be refugees. Moreover, the economic development in Taiwan holds a strong appeal. Apart from studying in Taiwan, a great number of youngsters have gone there for work. Taiwan has had a shortage of labor due to its

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12FCRA was set up to provide aid to Chinese refugees in different parts of the world soon after the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. Besides humanitarian considerations, the assistance was intended to garner political support of Chinese refugees abroad and overseas Chinese in general.

13Thailand has still retained diplomatic relations with China, but communication with Taiwan in non-political areas has been normalized.

14From 1968 onwards, the FCRA had started to offer grants, but only to a very small number of students and not every year. Regular scholarship began in 1979. The number of students granted scholarships was different each year. It ranged from around 50 to more than 100.
rapid industrial development since the 1980s.¹⁵

Many Yunnanese who have been to Taiwan for study or work have applied for permanent stay in the country. The applications were granted easily prior to 1994; but since then, applications have been reviewed strictly.¹⁶ Many of those who have succeeded in obtaining permanent residential status have also submitted applications in order to bring in other family members. There is no census showing the total number of Yunnanese Chinese from Northern Thailand in Taiwan, but in several KMT villages almost every family has at least one member who is in Taiwan or has been there. Following in the footsteps of their grandparents and parents, the Yunnanese youngsters in Taiwan have undertaken a new transnational migration. But in contrast to the involuntary migrations of the older generations, the migration being carried out by the younger generation is voluntary. Furthermore, the former’s migrations were a series of flights away from their homeland, but the latter’s is a return to their political fatherland for both emotional and economic reasons. The repeated transnational migration experiences undertaken by the different generations have formed an interesting pattern: from involuntary migrations by land to voluntary migration by sea, and from physical homeland to ideological fatherland.

With regard to the Yunnanese from Northern Thailand in Taiwan, they have been quickly assimilated into this industrialized society. Like the urban Yunnanese in Thailand who have merged with descendants of the earlier Chinese immigrants, the Yunnanese from Thailand in Taiwan have merged with the “multiprovincial mainlanders,” i.e., those who came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek from different provinces of the mainland and their offspring who were born in Taiwan. There is no well-functioning over-arching Yunnanese organization, but networks based on kinship are maintained for communication among relatives and friends in Taiwan and with those in Thailand.

There have also been some young people who went to Japan as guest-workers. This labor migration route is not as popular as the one to Taiwan, for Japan is more difficult to enter and, besides economic attraction, the country does not induce any emotional attachment among the Yunnanese. A few informants who have returned from Japan related that most people apply for tourist visas to go to Japan. After arriving in the country, they work illegally. In most

¹⁵Though the Taiwanese government only passed a law in 1992 allowing foreign guest workers from Southeast Asian countries to enter Taiwan to work for a fixed term, illegal guest workers have existed since the 1980s.

¹⁶This is essentially due to the sociopolitical changes in Taiwan from the second half of the 1980s onward, which have resulted in the change in its policies concerning overseas Chinese. The major political concern of Taiwan has shifted from anti-communism and recovery of China to winning international recognition of its de facto independent status. This prosperous and overcrowded island still welcomes outstanding overseas Chinese in different fields to return to Taiwan and contribute to the society, but not so much overseas Chinese in general.
cases, those who go earlier help the newcomers (usually their friends or relatives) find accommodations and jobs. Most people work in Chinese restaurants. Their intention is to stay temporarily in order to make money. They work 12 hours a day and six to seven days a week. Most people work for three to five years and then report at the immigration office in order to return to Thailand. There are also Yunnanese who went to Taiwan first, and from Taiwan to Japan. Two informants related that they applied for further studies in Japan with Taiwanese passports. They said that the number of Yunnanese who have resorted to this indirect migration route is small. A few did complete a couple of years of study in Japan, but more seem to have dropped out and worked illegally. Further research is required to learn about the migration network and the living conditions of the Yunnanese who have migrated from Thailand to Japan. What is noteworthy from the present information is that there is a strong migration motivation among Yunnanese youngsters to undertake whatever strategies they can in order to realize their goal of social mobility through migration.

Given the above analysis, the new trend in migration undertaken by young Yunnanese people has further complicated the phenomenon of the very dispersed location of family members in various places/countries. The old parents who stay in the villages of Northern Thailand may have their parents, siblings and some of their children left behind in Yunnan and/or Burma, and the children they raised in the villages may be dispersed in Thai cities, Taiwan and Japan. Several cases I happened to know in my recent trip to Thailand (2000) indicate that some families even have members who migrated to the west. Mostly, they achieved this goal via migrating to Taiwan first. The new migration can be seen as part of the international trend of labor migration. As a result, this outward migration from the villages has affected their social structure, the maintenance, transmission and transformation of Yunnanese traditions, and the people’s sense of identification.

In contrast to the outflow of youth migration from the KMT villages, there have been continuous inflows of Yunnanese refugees from Burma since the 1980s. The arrival of the new immigrants is attributed to the sociopolitical instability in Burma, especially in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the industrialization in Thailand which has created many job opportunities. The KMT villages have functioned as havens to these new immigrants. Though

17Even the Thai economic crisis, starting in July 1997, has not affected the inflow of refugees from Burma. The number of illegal migrants from Burma increased from 733,640 in February 1996 to 943,745 in October 1997. Chalamwong gives five reasons as explanation: better pay in Thailand than its neighboring countries, the lack of work opportunities in these countries, organized network for the arrangement of illegal migrant employment, the difficulty in controlling illegal entry along the very long Thai border, and the inefficiency of the Thai government and the corruption of the local authorities (Chalamwong 1998:17).
most are very mobile, especially those who have arrived since the late 1980s, they have compensated for the outflow of the youth population to a great extent. In many villages, the new immigrants account for one third to one half or even more of the total population of the villages. In practice, they have exerted a conservative influence in the continuity of Yunnanese lifestyle in these villages.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the migration experiences of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in Northern Thailand spread over different generations and places are complex. Irrespective of voluntary or involuntary migrations, we constantly see interactions between the subjects concerned and the external conditions they confront. In the process, migration networks have played the fundamental role. From the 1950s to 1970s, the KMT guerrillas and the armies of Li and Duan served their network functions as analyzed in the text. After that, networks based on families and relatives have gradually replaced those of the armies. Though on a much smaller scale, these new networks have continued to facilitate migration flows by application of different strategies to cope with new constraints laid by external conditions.

Following the disbandment of the armies, the KMT villages have slowly cast off their military legacies. In comparison with neighboring Thai villages, many KMT villages even look more prosperous. The aid projects initiated by the service group have provided significant assistance in the construction of the infrastructure system. The former refugee warriors have been transforming into immigrants.

In conclusion, the KMT case provides us a temporal dimension to study the dynamics of its migration history over different generations. The case confirms the emphasis given by Zolberg, Weiner, Loescher and others and those advocating migration systems approaches that both internal and external forces and the global political and economic trends have to be incorporated into the research framework. The transformation of the migration pattern of the KMT case is closely linked to the change of international scenarios from the cold war confrontation between the communist and democratic blocs to the global trend of labor migration. Instead of being led by the global trends, the people exert themselves while participating in the process. As the migration of the Yunnanese Chinese is still continuing – from Thailand to other countries and from Burma to Thailand – the dynamics of the people deserve further study.
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Immigrants' Propensity to Self-Employment: Evidence from Canada

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University of Saskatchewan

Despite the appeal of the "enclave thesis" and the "blocked mobility thesis," there are other relevant factors that help to explain why some immigrants engage in self-employment. Using the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base in Canada for 1980 to 1995, this study identifies characteristics of immigrants that yield a higher or lower propensity to self-employment. Descriptive statistics show that immigrants often use self-employment to supplement employment income and that the intensity and extensity of self-employment vary among immigrant entry cohorts, depending on gender, the year of immigration, and duration of stay in Canada. A logistic model predicting self-employment indicates that arrival in better economic years, longer residence in Canada, higher educational levels, older immigrants, and immigrants selected for human capital have higher odds of self-employment. These findings suggest that even though immigrants may be attracted or driven to self-employment, better-equipped immigrants are more inclined to engage in self-employment.

Despite a cumulating literature on immigrant entrepreneurship, there are only preliminary answers as to why some immigrants engage in self-employment and others do not. Research thus far has stressed blocked mobility in the open market or the attraction of the immigrant enclave in explaining the development of immigrant entrepreneurship. The blocked mobility argument suggests that due to restricted opportunity in the open market, some immigrants engage in business undertakings as a means of self-preservation. The enclave explanation focuses on the opportunities which the immigrant enclave offers to ethnic entrepreneurs who are attracted to the sheltered con-

1The author wishes to thank Citizenship and Immigration Canada for developing and providing the data for this analysis. The author is solely responsible for the use and interpretation of the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB) and whatever error and omission may remain in the article. This article is based on research supported by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration. The helpful comments of Craig Dougherty, Sammy Abaidoo, Li Zong and four anonymous reviewers are kindly acknowledged. The author also wishes to thank Elizabeth Ruddick and Claude Langlois of Citizenship and Immigration Canada for the opportunity to work with IMDB.

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sumer and labor markets of immigrants. But whether immigrants are driven or attracted to business, it is necessary to further specify the types of attributes which enable some immigrants to engage in self-employment and not others.

This analysis uses the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB) in Canada to show the pattern of self-employment in various entry cohorts of immigrants between 1980 and 1995 and to develop a model to predict immigrants’ propensity to self-employment based on known attributes. In particular, the analysis seeks to assess whether immigrants with less human capital, assessed accordingly for immigration selection, are more inclined towards self-employment.

**EXPLAINING IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT**

Several arguments have emerged to explain why some immigrant groups are more likely to engage in entrepreneurship or self-employment. A dominant theme suggests that some immigrants engage in self-employment and ethnic business as a means of self-preservation when faced with unfavorable competition in the open market, and that those who are culturally more endowed with certain cultural values and organizational capacities are more likely to succeed (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Cummings, 1980; Goldberg, 1985; Li, 1982, 1998; Light, 1972; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Light and Rosenstein, 1995; Waldinger et al., 1990; Ward and Jenkins, 1984). Research on immigrant enclaves further suggests that ecological factors such as growth in immigrant population and urban ethnic concentration have prompted the expansion of the immigrant enclave economy, which offers a protected market for immigrant entrepreneurs to engage in ethnic business and self-employment and, in turn, provides them economic returns which are equivalent to or better than that received by their counterparts in the open market (Evans, 1989; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes and Jensen, 1989; Portes and Zhou, 1996; Langlois and Razin, 1995a, 1995b; Razin and Langlois, 1996; Sanders and Nee, 1987, 1996; Wilson and Portes, 1980; Zhou, 1992).

It can be seen that the enclave thesis is appealing in accounting for differences in entrepreneurship among different immigrant or ethnic groups. However, the enclave thesis has its limitations. For example, researchers have now recognized the increased diversity and heterogeneity among immigrant populations in North America that have produced what Sanders and Nee (1996:233) described as “porous ethnic boundaries and greater variation in
identities within a given ethnic group." Such diversity is evident in the multiplicity of ethnic enterprises within an immigrant community, some of which are related to the enclave economy while others are not (Li, 1993); as well, immigrants are known to have participated in job transitions in a mixed economy (Nee, Sanders and Sernau, 1994). Furthermore, the notion of "ethnic enclave economy" is insufficient to cover the array of activities within the "ethnic economy" (Light, et al., 1994). In short, not all immigrants who engage in self-employment necessarily do so in the immigrant enclave, as they can be independent professionals or service and goods providers to the general market rather than the specialized immigrant community.

Notwithstanding the appeal of the enclave thesis and the blocked mobility thesis, there are sufficient variations in immigrant entrepreneurship both within the same immigrant group and between different immigrant groups to warrant further exploration of the question of immigrant self-employment. Simply put, why do some immigrants in the same ethnic immigrant group engage in self-employment and others not, even though they are exposed to the same enclave? In other words, despite the relevance of structural factors such as metropolitan characteristics (Razin and Langlois, 1996) and urban market size and labor pool (Evans, 1989) to immigrant entrepreneurship, only some immigrants within a given ethnic group engage in self-employment, even though they may be exposed to similar structural conditions. Alternatively, why do some immigrants in ethnic groups which are not known to have developed immigrant enclaves engage in self-employment? These questions suggest that there are individual attributes which should be taken into account in explaining why immigrants engage in self-employment.

Data and Method

The Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB), developed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Statistics Canada, contains income tax data and data from landing records for immigrants who landed in Canada between 1980 to 1995 and who filed at least one income tax return during the same period. The data file has data on 1.5 million of the 2.6 million immigrants who landed in Canada between 1980 and 1995, covering about 69 percent of all immigrants between the working ages of 20 and 64 (Langlois and Dougherty, 1997). The data are available only in aggregated forms which show various types of mean earnings of immigrants, such as employment and self-employment earnings, in given groups as defined by such attributes as age, gender, educational qualification, and class of admission.
The present analysis first uses descriptive statistics to show how immigrants' propensity to self-employment changes by entry cohort and over time. Further descriptive statistics are used to show how the rate or extensity of self-employment changes according to given characteristics of immigrants after landing, at intervals of one year, three years and five years since being admitted as immigrants. Finally, a logistic regression model is developed to assess what immigrant attributes can be used to predict the likelihood of engagement in self-employment in the 1995 tax year, the most recent tax year in the data file.

The IMDB contains data on self-employment earnings and employment earnings, with which immigrants can be classified as having or not having received income from these sources in a given tax year. Furthermore, immigrants who received income from either source in a given tax year can be considered as having participated in the Canadian labor market. For those immigrants who participated in the Canadian labor market, they can be further classified as having or not having received self-employment earnings in a given tax year, which indicates whether they have engaged or not engaged in self-employment activities.

The literature has identified two ways of measuring self-employment, either by respondents' self-identification or by income source (Light and Rosenstein, 1995:41–53). After reviewing substantial data from the U.S. census, Light and Rosentein (1995:49) came to the conclusion that income-defined self-employment tends to be more inclusive and accurate as it includes those who worked full-time as self-employed as well as those who used self-employment to supplement their employment income.

In this study, self-employment is defined as a form of labor market participation by which a person derives some income by engaging in a business or economic activities as a self-employed person. The present definition of self-employment includes persons who may be full-time or part-time self-employed and who may or may not also have income from employment. Self-employment and employment are not defined as mutually exclusive activities in the sense that participation in one does not preclude participation in the other. Thus, the two discrete groups of immigrants used in the analysis are 1) immigrants in the labor market who were not self-employed, that is, immigrants who received only employment income; and 2) immigrants who were self-employed, that is, immigrants who received self-employment income exclusively or as a supplement to employment income. Operationally, the IMDB defines immigrants as having engaged in self-employment activities in
a given tax year if they reported in that year a gross earning from the sum of
the following five sources which is greater than $200: 1) gross business
income; 2) gross professional income; 3) gross commission income; 4) gross
farming income; and 5) gross fishing income (Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, 1998). In the aggregated data released, the net self-employment
income – that is, earnings after expenses are deducted but before personal
income taxes are calculated – is reported. Thus, self-employed immigrants
can be defined as those who have self-employment income in a given tax year,
as opposed to those not self-employed who do not receive any income from
self-employment in the same period.

All aggregate tables in the data file, known as Compendium Tables, have
information on landing year, tax year, age, gender and province of destination
or residence, as well as one additional variable such as education at landing,
class of admission, country of origin and language ability (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 1998). However, these tables are limited in that only
gender, age, province of residence and one other variable can be used simulta-
neously as independent variables. In order to expand the analysis to simulta-
neously include such key variables as education, class of admission and
country of origin, a custom tabulation was prepared. However, due to confi-
dentiality, finer breakdowns pertaining to province of residence and language
capacity cannot be included along with other variables requested. Conse-
quently, all the variables that can be included in the custom table are: land-
ing year, tax year, age at landing, gender, class of admission, country of ori-
gin, and education at landing. An additional variable, the number of years
since landing in Canada, can be derived from the data. For each of these
cross-classifications, data on mean employment earnings, mean self-employ-
ment earnings, mean total labor market earnings (employment and self-
employment earnings), as well as the number of immigrants with self-
employment and without self-employment earnings are reported. All vari-
ables provided are categorical ones. For the purpose of this analysis, only
immigrants whose age was 15 years old and over when they landed in Cana-

2The definition of self-employment income adopted in IMDB essentially follows the income
tax definition as used in income tax forms. For confidentiality, finer breakdowns of types of
self-employment income are not available to researchers. Although there are five sources of
self-employed income, immigrants – especially recent ones – are not likely to engage in two
of the sources pertaining to farming and fishing. Thus, the self-employed income reported in
IMDB can be practically treated as derived from three sources: gross business income; gross
professional income; and gross commission income.

3The compendium tables use the term “country of origin” to refer to country of last perma-
nent residence. For consistency, the term “country of origin” is retained in this analysis.
da are included, since the primary focus is on those who participated in the labor market.  

**PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT**

The extensity of immigrants’ engagement in self-employment can be conceptualized as the extent to which immigrants who participate in the labor market engage in any form of self-employment, and it can be operationalized as the percentage of immigrant tax-filers with labor market income who reported self-employment income in a given year. Thus, the larger the percentage of immigrant tax-filers with labor market income reported having self-employment income for a given year, the more extensive self-employment activities can be inferred to have occurred in such a group within the same period.

Table 1 provides the percentages showing the extensity of self-employment for immigrant cohorts who entered Canada between 1980 and 1994. Since immigrants arrived in different months of a year, the table only includes earnings of immigrants at least one year after arrival to remove the potential distortion of immigrants having more or less time in the year of arrival to participate in the Canadian labor market due to differences in arrival date. The data indicate that for each entry cohort, the rate of self-employment is relatively low in the initial years, but increases progressively in subsequent tax years. For example, only about 5 to 8 percent of immigrants of the 1980 landing cohort engaged in some form of self-employment during the first three years after landing, but by the fifth year (1985 tax year), the rate increased to 10 percent, and it continued to climb to over 14 percent in the seventh year (1987 tax year) and to over 16 percent after 10 years. A similar pattern is evident in almost every entry cohort. The data clearly show that the extensity of self-employment among cohorts of immigrants is a function of their duration in Canada after arrival, with those who had been in Canada longer showing a higher tendency towards self-employment. Thus, for each tax year, immigrant cohorts who landed in Canada earlier had a higher rate of self-employment.

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*No upper age limit is applied to the selection of immigrants included in this analysis since the age of “retirement” may vary from case to case. However, the inclusion of only those immigrants with employment income or self-employment income means that only those immigrants who received income from labor market activities are included in the analysis. Consequently, immigrants over 50 years of age who did not have employment or self-employment income, or those who can be operationally defined as having “retired,” would not be excluded. The variable “total labor market income” is used to calculate the rate of self-employment among immigrants with labor market income.*
### TABLE 1
**Percent Immigrants with Self-Employment Income Among All Immigrant Tax Filers in the Canadian Labor Market, by Tax Year and by Landing Year, 1980-95**

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Source: Compiled from Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PLI104S9
For immigrants in various entry cohorts who engaged in self-employment, the engagement may vary in intensity, that is, in the relative weight of self-employment in relationship to employment and self-employment activities. The mean earnings from self-employment for those who engaged in some form of self-employment in a given entry cohort for a given tax year can be expressed as a percentage of their mean total labor market income (self-employment earnings plus employment earnings) to roughly indicate the intensity of self-employment activities in the group.\(^5\) Table 2 shows that mean self-employment income accounted for about one-third to one-half of the mean labor market earnings of those who engaged in self-employment, depending on the landing year and duration of stay in Canada. The data suggest that some immigrants probably use self-employment as a means to supplement their employment earnings, and that engagement in self-employment does not necessarily imply a disengagement from employment.

Table 2 also shows that for those who engaged in self-employment, such engagement brought a stable component of their labor market earnings over time. For more recent entry cohorts, such as those who landed in Canada between 1987 and 1994, the percentage of mean income deriving from self-employment varies only marginally from the initial years to later years. But for earlier cohorts, the proportion of mean self-employment income tends to be higher in later tax years than earlier ones, thus suggesting that over time immigrants not only are more inclined towards self-employment (Table 1), but for those who do engage in self-employment, there is a tendency to earn a progressively larger proportion of their labor market income from self-employment the longer they stay in Canada. In short, the duration of residence in Canada increases the extensity and intensity of self-employment for all immigrant cohorts. Furthermore, the data also show that the extensity and intensity of self-employment for the entry year tend to vary, depending on the period of landing, thus suggesting that the economic conditions of Canada at the time of landing may also influence immigrants’ entry into self-employment.

Male and female immigrants differ in the likelihood of engaging in self-employment. Tables 3 and 4 recalculate the rate, or extensity, of self-employ-

\(^{5}\)Given that individual data are not available in IMDB, this calculation can only be obtained by expressing the mean self-employment income of a given group (i.e., a given landing cohort for a given tax year) to the mean total labor market income of that group. This is, at best, a rough indication of the intensity of self-employment activities in a group. It is different from the average across the members of the group of self-employment income as a percentage of the total labor market income.
TABLE 3
PERCENT IMMIGRANTS WITH SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME AMONG MALE IMMIGRANT TAX FILERS IN THE CANADIAN LABOR MARKET, BY TAX YEAR AND BY LANDING YEAR, 1980-95

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Source: Compiled from Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PLI104S9
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Source: Compiled from Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PLI104S9
ment in Table 1 for male and female immigrants, respectively. The data show that male immigrants had a higher tendency to engage in self-employment than female immigrants for the same entry cohort and tax year. However, the pattern of increasing extensity in self-employment over time still holds true for male and female immigrants.

Tables 3 and 4 also indicate that immigrants in more recent cohorts, such as those who entered Canada between 1987 and 1994, tend to have a slightly higher level of engagement in self-employment in the initial years of arrival than those who landed in Canada earlier. For example, for men, the average rate of self-employment for those who landed between 1980 and 1987 was under 10 percent one year after arrival, but for later cohorts the average rate was 9 to 13 percent (Table 3, diagonal). Despite such intercohort differences, earlier cohorts in the same tax year, that is, cohorts which had been in Canada longer, still had a higher rate of self-employment.

The foregoing tables suggest that gender, the entry period of immigrants, and the years in Canada since landing affect the tendency towards self-employment. Such differences, as well as those produced by other characteristics, are further examined in the following tables.

Tables 5 and 6 show the percent or extent of male and female immigrant tax filers, respectively, who engaged in self-employment in three points in time – one year, three years and five years after landing. The findings are calculated for three cohorts of immigrants who entered Canada in 1980, 1985 and 1990, taking into account the following variables one at a time: country of last permanent residence, education at landing, class of admission, and age at landing.\(^6\)

The data in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that both male and female immigrants who entered Canada in 1980, 1985 and 1990 were involved more extensively in self-employment five years after landing than the first year or third year, even taking into account country of origin, education, class of admission or age, one at a time.\(^7\) In other words, the level of engagement in self-employment tends to be higher for the same entry cohort in later tax years than earlier ones even after controlling for gender and one other vari-

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\(^6\)Although the data permit examining the effects of each variable on self-employment beyond five years for the 1980 and 1985 cohorts, the intent here is to see how different cohorts perform in self-employment for the same duration in Canada. A multivariate model is used later (Table 7) to examine how the variation in residence in Canada (from 1 year to 15 years) affects the propensity to self-employment.

\(^7\)The percentages for "Total" in Tables 5 and 6 vary slightly in the magnitude of 0.3 percent, due to some variations in the number of missing cases for each variable.
### TABLE 5
PERCENT IMMIGRANTS WITH SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME AMONG MALE IMMIGRANT TAX FILERS IN THE LABOR MARKET, FOR 1980, 1985 AND 1990 LANDING COHORTS, ONE YEAR, THREE YEARS AND FIVE YEARS AFTER LANDING, BY SELECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

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Source: Compiled from Longitudinal Data Base (IMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PLI104S9
able. At the same time, male immigrant cohorts tend to show a higher level of engagement in self-employment than female cohorts for every level of the control variable. For example, well over 20 percent of male immigrants with university degrees were engaged in self-employment five years after landing for all three cohorts, but less than 20 percent of female immigrants with university degrees did so for the same cohorts and time frame.

The country of origin affects the likelihood of engagement in self-employment. Table 5 shows that male immigrants from the United Kingdom, West Europe, except the United Kingdom, East Europe, West Asia and the United States were more likely to engage in self-employment one year after landing than those from South Europe, Africa, South Asia, Hong Kong, and South and Central America. This differential likelihood basically persisted five years later. The same pattern is not as apparent among female immigrants (Table 6), but those from West Europe, except the United Kingdom, and from the United States showed a higher degree of involvement in self-employment initially and five years later.

The level of education at the time of entry also affects the likelihood of involvement in self-employment positively, in that those with a higher level of education were more inclined towards self-employment for both male and female immigrants in all three cohorts.

Those who were admitted as principal applicants under the economic class of admission, and therefore likely to have been selected on the basis of human capital and other labor market qualifications, tend to be more inclined to engage in self-employment initially and over time for male immigrants (Table 5). However, the difference among the various classes of admission is less apparent among female immigrants (Table 6).

Finally, the age of immigrants at the time of landing also influences the likelihood of self-employment, with older immigrants being more inclined towards self-employment, except for those 50 years of age and over. The same pattern generally holds true for both male and female immigrants, albeit female immigrants tend to be less involved in self-employment than their male counterparts.

**PREDICTING IMMIGRANTS' PROPENSITY TO SELF-EMPLOYMENT**

On the basis of the above findings, a logistic regression is used to predict the propensity of self-employment of immigrants in the 1995 tax year. The model can be specified as follows:
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Source: Compiled from Longitudinal Data Base (IMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PLI104S9
\[
\log\left(\frac{P(Y)}{P(\text{No Y})}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \ldots + \beta_i X_i
\]

where \(P(Y)\) is the probability of engagement in self-employment; \(P(\text{No Y})\) is the probability of no engagement in self-employment; \(\beta_0\) is the intercept; and \(\beta_i\) is the change in log odds or logits of \(Y\) for every unit change in the dependent variable \(X_i\), after differences in other variables have been taken into account. Thus, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the probability of self-employment to the probability of not in self-employment. The independent variables in the equation include “years in Canada since landing” (interval variable), “period of landing” (3 categories), “age at landing” (4 categories), “education at landing” (3 categories), “class of admission” (5 categories), and “country of last permanent residence” (13 categories). One of the categories of each categorical variable is treated as a reference category and coded as zero. The model is first applied to male and female immigrants as a group, and then separate regressions are estimated for men and women. Table 7 gives the results of the logistic estimation. One way to interpret the logits is to see if they are positive or negative, which indicate whether the category or variable increases or decreases, respectively, the odds of self-employment.

Table 7 shows that for every year in Canada since landing, the odds of self-employment is increased by about 1.07 for male and female immigrants in all three models, despite adjusting for variations in other variables. This coefficient is statistically significant in all three models, and it probably suggests the importance of Canadian experience in Canada to the propensity to self-employment. However, the variable “years in Canada since landing” may also reflect difficulties immigrants encounter in the job market in that the longer immigrants are unable to find satisfactory employment, the greater the tendency to engage in self-employment as a means to supplement employment earnings. The coefficients for the variable “period of landing” indicate that immigrants who entered Canada in the latter part of the 1980s are more inclined toward self-employment than those who came in the earlier part of the same decade. This finding is statistically significant for the male and female model, as well as for the male model, but the coefficient associated with the period 1980–84 is not significant for female immigrants.

With respect to the variable “age at landing,” Table 7 indicates that the older the age of immigrants at the time of entry to Canada, the higher are the...
TABLE 7
LOGISTIC REGRESSION SHOWING LOGITS AND ODDS RATIO OF HAVING OR NOT HAVING SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, FOR MALE AND FEMALE IMMIGRANTS WHO LANDED IN CANADA BETWEEN 1980 AND 1994 AND WHO REPORTED SELF-EMPLOYMENT OR EMPLOYMENT INCOME IN THE 1995 TAX YEAR

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<td>Education at Landing</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than high schoolb</td>
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<td>0.2852*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.8851</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherb</td>
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<td>-0.2033*</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Europe</td>
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<td>Oceania, Australia, and Otherb</td>
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<td>Model Chi Square</td>
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</table>

Source: Calculated from Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (LIMDB), 1980-95, special tabulation, Table PL104S9
Notes: *Significance level <0.01
bReference category, coded as 0

odds of self-employment. However, being in the age category 35 to 49 years seems to bring the largest change in odds for male immigrants as compared to being in other age categories; but for women, the odds of self-employment are increased progressively the higher the age category.9

9The results of the multivariate analysis for age are slightly different from the results in the univariate analysis. This has to do with the fact that only three cohorts are examined in Tables 5 and 6, whereas in Table 7, all the cohorts in the 1995 tax years are included. Furthermore,
The multivariate analysis here confirms the findings of the univariate analyses earlier with respect to education: the odds of self-employment are increased for immigrants with higher educational qualifications. Again, this pattern holds for the separate models for men and women, as well as in the aggregate model.

The class under which the immigrant is admitted also affects the odds of self-employment. In general, the odds of self-employment are improved when immigrants are admitted to Canada as principal applicants of the economic class; otherwise, the odds are decreased in other classes. This relationship holds true for the male and female model, as well as the male model, but not for the female model, in which all admission categories reduce the odds of self-employment.

With respect to the country of origin, Table 7 shows that the odds of self-employment are increased for those immigrants from West Europe, except the United Kingdom, East Europe, West Asia, and the United States, and decreased for those from other countries. For example, the odds of self-employment are improved by 1.2 for those male immigrants from the United States and from East Europe, 1.5 for those from West Europe, and 1.4 for those from West Asia. However, for female immigrants the odds of self-employment are only increased for those from West Europe except the United Kingdom and from the United States.

Several theoretical points can be developed about the empirical relations revealed in Table 7. First, cohorts of immigrants appear to use self-employment not necessarily as an exclusive mode of participating in the Canadian labor market, but as a means to supplement their labor market income, and their ability to do so depends in part on their level of Canadian experience and other resources needed in operating a self-employed business in Canada. This explains why immigrants who have been in Canada longer have a higher tendency towards self-employment, since they have more opportunities to acquire the necessary knowledge, capital and resources to start the entrepreneurial venture.

Second, past research has indicated that various structural conditions of the receiving country affect the likelihood of self-employment for immigrants (Boyd, 1990; Evans, 1989; Langlois and Razin, 1995a; Razin and Langlois, 1996). One of those conditions would have to do with the economy of the

the dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is the logarithm of the probability of self-employment to that of not in self-employment, and the effect of "age" reflects the net influence of age categories after variations in other variables have been taken into account.
receiving country at the time of immigration. If the period of landing employed in the model is treated as a proxy indicator of the economic conditions of Canada, then it explains why those who came to Canada in the latter half of the 1980s when the economic conditions were improving have a higher likelihood of self-employment than those who came in the earlier part of the decade, since better economic times provide more opportunities for business development and self-employment.

Third, higher human capital has been shown to increase the odds of self-employment for those in white-collar industries, but to decrease such odds for others in blue-collar and distribution industries (see Langlois and Razin, 1995b). The present finding of higher human capital being associated with higher odds of self-employment, as well as the finding that those selected for human capital as immigrants (principal applicants, economic admission class) are more likely to be self-employed, may suggest the tendency of immigrants to engage in self-employment in those industries which recognize human capital. However, the present data do not permit a finer analysis in this direction. Nevertheless, if self-employment is viewed as a form of social mobility, as many immigrants seem to value it (Sanders and Nee, 1996; Nee, Sanders and Sernau, 1994), then it can be easily understood that those with more human capital are more likely to be upwardly mobile than others with less human capital. Furthermore, some evidence from the United States suggests that even though foreign degrees may be undervalued in the open market, some immigrants managed to use this type of human capital successfully to develop business ownership (Sanders and Nee, 1996). In short, the literature in both Canada and the United States suggests that human capital is useful to immigrants in increasing their capacity in engage in self-employment or business ventures.

Fourth, why immigrants from certain regions of last permanent residence are more inclined toward self-employment than those from other regions is difficult to answer. Langlois and Razin (1995b:351) have suggested that even though the foreign-born in Canada had a higher propensity to self-employment than the native-born, those of European origins were what they called "the most entrepreneurial ethnic minorities in Canada." The present findings show that immigrants who immigrated from certain European regions

10There has been little research comparing self-employment rate between the immigrant population and the native-born population in Canada. The 1996 Census of Canada indicates that 15% of immigrants and 12% of native-born Canadians were self-employed when self-employment is measured by the self-identification method. However, using the income method of measuring self-employment, 11% of immigrants, as compared with 10.3% native-born Cana-
are more inclined towards self-employment, but male immigrants from West Asia also have a high propensity to self-employment. Since immigrants from Europe and the United States are not known to have developed immigrant enclaves to the same extent as immigrants from Asia and Latin America, and that European and American immigrants are likely to be white, the findings would suggest that there are conditions which are conducive to self-employment besides the “enclave effect” and “blocked mobility effect.” Since self-employment requires financial and other resources, such as experience, investment capital and human capital, recent immigrants from Europe and the United States to Canada probably have a higher propensity to self-employment than recent immigrants from most of Asia, Latin America and Africa because of their advantages in human capital and resources, including better knowledge of how the institutions and market operate in Canada due to the proximity to what they know about their home countries.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of data from the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base suggests that the engagement in self-employment is often a matter of degree and not necessarily a discrete mode of participation in the labor market and that immigrant cohorts frequently engage in self-employment as a source to supplement their labor market income. The data on various cohorts over time show that the likelihood of engagement in self-employment is increased the longer immigrants have been in Canada.

Male immigrants are more likely than female immigrants to be self-employed. Those with higher human capital as well as those selected for admission on the basis of human capital are also more inclined toward self-employment. Finally, immigrants from certain regions of last permanent residence show a higher tendency of self-employment.

The logistic regression analysis shows that when other differences in other variables are taken into account, each year in Canada increases the odds of self-employment for immigrants. Entering Canada at better economic times, coming with higher educational qualification, as well as being selected to enter Canada on human capital also improve the odds of self-employment.

Statistics Canada, 1999).
In all, the findings suggest that immigrants with more human capital and those with more time to acquire Canadian experiences are more inclined toward self-employment, possibly because these immigrants have greater access to capital and other resources, as well as more exposure to business experiences. The findings essentially suggest that immigrants with more resources and qualifications are more inclined to engage in self-employment.

Finally, the fact recent immigrants from Europe and the United States tend to have a higher propensity to self-employment than those from most of Asia, Latin America and Africa suggests that there are other factors besides the "enclave effect" and the "blocked mobility effect" which have to be taken into account. The objective of the study is not to test the effect of "enclave" or "blocked mobility." The analysis shows that whether immigrants are attracted or driven to self-employment, immigrants who have better qualifications and means are more likely to actually manage to enter into self-employment.

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Zhou, M.  
Immigrants and 'New Poverty': 
The Case of Canada

Abdolmohammed Kazemipur

University of Lethbridge

Shiva S. Halli

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Studies of the economic status of recent immigrants to the United States have questioned the generalizability of some earlier findings based on assimilation theory. In Canada, however, little research has been done on this issue, and that has left mixed results. The present study attempts to address the economic performance of immigrants in Canada through an examination of their poverty status. This is particularly important now because, since the late 1980s, many industrial nations including Canada have been subjected to an unexpected surge of poverty known as 'new poverty.' The findings indicate that immigrants in Canada are consistently overrepresented among the poor; that their poverty rates are particularly high in larger cities, which have larger concentrations of immigrants; and that among immigrants, the poverty rates are higher for visible minorities, who are mostly recent immigrants. One particularly surprising finding was that the second-generation immigrants, who were expected to outperform their parents, had higher poverty rates. A series of logistic regression models are developed to shed some light on the possible reasons behind these trends. Of the three sets of potential contributors – human capital, assimilation and structural factors – the first two were found more relevant. The models also revealed that the human capital factors were less rewarding for immigrants than natives.

Until the early 1990s, assimilation theory had shaped and informed the bulk of research on the economic experiences of immigrants in host countries. According to this theory, with longer stay in the host countries, immigrants manage to diminish the language and cultural barriers, improve their occupational skills, enter into the present job-finding networks or build up those of their own and, as a result, start their upward mobility. Although immi-

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grants’ earnings are lower than those of natives at the time of arrival, they tend to equalize within 10 to 15 years. Researchers have attributed this trend to immigrants’ personal qualities such as being highly motivated, ambitious and ready to work longer and harder than nonimmigrants (Carliner, 1980). Second-generation immigrants are believed to follow this path at even a faster pace because they do not face such hardships as language barriers and educational mismatch with which their parents had to struggle. In other words, assimilation theory implied that the socioeconomic status of immigrants would be positively correlated with the length of time in their host country and negatively with their age at arrival.

In recent studies of the economics of immigration in the United States, however, the validity of this implication of assimilation theory has come under attack. Borjas (1994:1713), for example, pointed out that “[the] stylized facts that long dominated the discussion over the costs and benefits of immigration were radically altered during the 1980s, and a number of new questions, issues, and perceptions replaced them.” Some of the new perceptions and issues that the new research established, according to Borjas, were: “[the] relative skills of successive immigrant waves declined over much of the post-war period; it is unlikely that recent immigrants will reach parity with the earnings of natives during their working lives; … the new immigration may have an adverse fiscal impact because recent waves participate in welfare programs more intensively than earlier waves; … there exists a strong correlation between the skills of immigrants and the skills of second-generation Americans, so that the huge skill differentials observed among today’s foreign-born groups become tomorrow’s differences among American-born ethnic groups” (p. 1513).

A host of other studies produced similar results, further questioned the generalizability of findings based on assimilation theory, and offered some explanations for the failure of this theory to deal with the new realities cited earlier. Gans (1992:174), for example, points out that assimilation theory was first developed “in connection with the southern and eastern European immigration [to the U.S.] of about 1880 to 1925,” and “during a time in which the economy was growing more or less continuously, especially with the employment of immigrant physical labor.” This situation no longer exists, as the economy is now facing serious problems, and immigrants are coming mostly from non-European countries, with visibly distinct appearances. Sanchez (1997), on the other hand, argues that the economic insecurity felt by Americans has led to the rise of a ‘racialized nativism’ directed at recent
immigrants. On the same point, Huber and Espenshade (1997:1037) argue that “the tolerance for immigrants has waned in the last two decades.” These developments, undoubtedly, do have the potential to limit opportunities available to recent immigrants, making their paths deviate from the classic path assimilation theory would have predicted. Such deviation is well reflected in the topics of recent interest among researchers: ‘segmented assimilation’ (Zhou, 1997), ‘second-generation decline,’ and ‘bumpy-line assimilation’ (Gans, 1992).

To what extent do these findings apply to Canada? The research on this issue in Canada is scarce, and the findings are mixed. Some studies in late 1987 found assimilation theory to still be relevant to the Canadian context. They found that the earnings of foreign-born households surpass those of nonimmigrant households, though with a lag (Chiswick and Miller, 1988; Meng, 1987; and Akbari, 1987). Later, in the early 1990s, several studies disputed these findings (Coulson and DeVoretz, 1993; Akbar and DeVoretz, 1993; Abbott and Beach, 1993; Beach and Worswick, 1993). Most recently, in a study of the economic performance of second generation immigrants, Boyd (1998) found the implications of the American studies irrelevant for the experience of Canadian immigrants. According to her, “the second generation with two foreign-born parents are particularly noteworthy in their success” (p. 869). These mixed results have hindered the development of a comprehensive image of the social and economic experiences of recent immigrants in Canada. The use of small and biased samples in many of these studies does further question the reliability of their findings. A few studies that have used more reliable sets of data have treated immigrants as a homogeneous subpopulation. Therefore, they have failed to examine the possibility of diverse assimilation trends for immigrants of different ethnic origin, those who arrived at different periods and different ages (see Li 1998; Basavarajappa and Halli, 1997).

Another problem with the studies just cited is their different positions on what constitutes economic success. They have employed a variety of measures such as income, occupation, education, welfare dependency, etc. The simultaneous use of these measures in some of the studies has resulted in some composite indices of economic performance, making the interpretation of results unnecessarily complicated.

The present study attempts to transcend these complications in at least two ways: the use of more representative data and the employment of a less complicated measure of economic performance. First, the data that have been
used in this study are the 1991 Canadian Census data (3% sample) on individuals. This provides a far larger sample of immigrant/nonimmigrant cases than those in previous studies. Second, poverty status is used as an indicator of economic performance. Not only does the poverty status indicator summarize and reflect the collective contributions of education, income and occupation, it is also very easy to interpret as it accepts only two values of 'below poverty line' and 'above poverty line'. This has made the comparisons of immigrants and natives, as well as immigrants of different ethnic origins, residents of different cities, and members of different generations, incredibly easy and straightforward. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, poverty status, has also allowed for the use of the logistic regression as a robust and easy-to-interpret statistical technique.

In this article, a conceptual framework to understand and explain the poverty of immigrants is introduced. Then, the nature of the data and the methods adopted are explained. Finally, the findings of the study are discussed.

**WHY POVERTY OCCURS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Poverty is too diverse and complicated a phenomenon to be adequately explained by a unidimensional theory. It varies, for example, from one city to another; from one ethnic group to another; from one segment of population (e.g., immigrants) to another; and, even within each segment, it varies from one generation to another. Some studies have suggested that there are also different types of poor: working poor, new poor, disadvantaged poor, truly needy, and so on (Jenkins and Miller, 1987). The persistent differences in variations and types of poverty indicate that the corresponding causes may also be different. The explanation of poverty, therefore, calls for a more comprehensive approach incorporating all the major relevant factors.

The factors relevant to poverty can be classified under three titles, each corresponding to a particular approach in explaining poverty: assimilation factors, human capital factors, and structural factors. The first set of factors is concerned with the poverty of immigrants. According to this approach, immigrants face a harsher poverty situation due to their being newcomers and also because of the disadvantages associated with their immigration adventure, e.g., language barriers, incompatibility of educational credentials, limited transferability of job skills, unfamiliarity with the market demands in the new home, and lack of access to job-hunting informal networks. One logical derivation of this view is that the problem is ameliorated as immigrants stay longer in their new homes. The second approach tries to explain poverty by
using individual qualifications such as education and job training. Based on this approach, the occurrence of poverty is an individual event and needs to be dealt with accordingly. The third approach holds the economic structure responsible for the poverty of a country’s citizenry; macro changes in the technological and economic make-up of society have the potential to unleash the poverty-generating forces. The structural approach holds that poverty is social rather than individual, and so is the remedy. While researchers of different theoretical persuasions have shown interest in one or another of these theories, the present authors have tried to incorporate all three in an empirical model. This provides an opportunity to test the validity of alternative explanations.

Assimilation Approach

Assimilation is among the few powerful notions that have influenced immigration research; it once was, according to Alba and Nee (1997:826), “the unquestioned organizing concept in sociological studies of ethnic relations.” Although, as mentioned earlier, the validity of the concept has recently come into question, it still is a helpful tool in understanding many of the social processes immigrants go through in the host societies.

In the works of the Chicago School scholars, assimilation was primarily understood as a cultural process. Park and Burgess (1924:735), for example, defined assimilation as “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” For them, the process of assimilation was “of a psychological nature” (p. 741), a process that involved the wiping out of “immigrant’s memory of his past” (p. 740). As a result, they believed language acquisition and culture to be the important means through which assimilation would take place. Their emphasis on assimilation as a cultural process was well reflected in their suggestion that assimilation meant for historical peoples what acculturation meant for primitive peoples (p. 771).

The next major effort to conceptualize the notion of assimilation was made by Gordon (1964). His main contribution was to propose a ‘structural’ dimension of the assimilation process, as a supplement to the ‘cultural’ dimension suggested by Chicago School scholars. By ‘structural assimilation’ he meant “large scale entrances into cliques, clubs, and institutions of host society, on primary group level” (Gordon 1964:70). The assimilation then proceeds, according to Gordon, to more advanced phases such as marital, identificational, attitude
receptional, behavior receptional and civic assimilation. What Gordon added to the initial formulation of the assimilation concept was, indeed, a social dimension to its previously well-defined cultural dimension.

Surprisingly enough, Gordon's multidimensional formulation overlooked important aspects of assimilation, such as occupational mobility and economic assimilation (Alba and Nee, 1997). An increasing number of researchers have attempted to incorporate these neglected dimensions of assimilation into their research on immigration (see, for instance, Portes, 1997; Zolberg, 1989; Zolberg et al., 1986; Li, 1998; Huber and Espenshade, 1997; Gans, 1992; Borjas, 1994; Sanchez, 1997).

The use of the assimilation concept to explain the economic performance of immigrants involves an examination of the impacts of some factors such as immigrants' time of arrival in the host society, their age at the time of migration, and their language proficiency. The assimilationists would hypothesize that over time immigrants produce better economic records as they become increasingly familiar with their new environments, develop better communicational skills, and become more realistic in their expectations. In other words, in their early years after arrival immigrants face the harshest situation. However, this harshness subsides as the time allows for more assimilation to take place. The situation is even more favorable for the second generation of immigrants. For them, the assimilation process starts from childhood and even from birth. As far as poverty is concerned, the most vulnerable immigrants, that is, those with a high risk of poverty, are to be found among those in their early years of arrival, those with no or little knowledge of the official languages, and those who migrated at an older age.

We should note, however, that immigrants do not arrive with absolutely no commonality with the culture of the host country. Many have been exposed to modern values, for example, by virtue of their education. Through education, they sometimes manage to secure their positions in the host society, even with a low level of assimilation. This suggests that the effect of assimilation can sometimes be detoured by other factors such as education, which is a human capital factor.

**Human Capital Factors**

Human capital refers to qualities such as education, age, work experience, health and migration that directly affect one's economic status. When people think about how to improve their socioeconomic status or to increase the marketability of their skills, they often consider human capital as an area of
investment (Schultz, 1993). This is to say that a poor socioeconomic status can result from a low level of human capital stock, *i.e.*, low education, low job skills, old age, poor health and low geographical mobility; a low education, for example, can suppress one’s chance of admission into well-paid jobs that demand a highly skilled labor force; an old age can be detrimental when the successful performance in a job requires mastery of modern technology; a low geographical mobility, both nationally and internationally, tends to deprive one from the job opportunities available elsewhere.

The human capital factors are not quite independent of each other. Youth, for instance, is strongly associated with higher education, better health conditions, and more geographical mobility. Being older, on the other hand, is likely to produce a better work experience. Among all these, age, education and migration provide better explanatory power due to their impact on other variables. Also, there is more reliable data for these variables.

Can immigrants’ poverty be a result of the low level of their human capital stock? The evidence is mixed. Some studies have answered the question affirmatively, arguing that the lower level of economic achievement of recent, as opposed to ‘old’ immigrants’ is due to the fact that most recent immigrants to North America have come from developing countries with low levels of educational qualification and occupational skills (Borjas, 1994). Others, on the other hand, have argued that the lower economic achievement of the recent immigrants is not attributable to their lower level of human capital stock but to the diminishing returns for it. This, in turn, has suppressed the motivations of second generation immigrants to attain more education. Comparing the educational attainments of immigrants and natives, Gordon (1995:530) argues that “[against] a background of environmental disadvantages, institutional racism, and doubts about the likely rewards for qualifications, educational attainments have been uneven.” The present study attempts to empirically examine the relative validity of these opposing views about the impacts of human capital factors on the poverty of immigrants through simultaneous examination of age, education and migration status.

The argument that the human capital factors are not as rewarding for immigrants as they are for nonimmigrants is further corroborated by the mismatch between immigrants’ qualifications and the jobs in which they are involved. Basran and Zong (1998), for example, show that large proportions of immigrants in Canada have occupations inferior to those for which they are trained (in terms of both prestige and financial gains). Others believe that this is far from accidental, being partly due to the dual structure of the labor
market in industrial countries and partly due to the fact that immigrants are systematically directed into the segment with ‘unstable, poorly paid jobs and few mobility prospects’ (Massey et al., 1994:716). This points to the relevance of structural factors in explaining the poverty of immigrants.

**Structural Factors**

In the early 1970s, Edwards et al. (1973) suggested the notion of ‘labor market segmentation’ in reference to the bifurcated structure of the American economy in the twentieth century. They described the process of bifurcation in the following way:

Between 1890 and 1920 the American economy experienced a critical transition from a more or less open, competitive, local-market-oriented, laissez-faire, entrepreneurial capitalism dominated by giant corporate enterprises. In this system of monopoly capitalism, the giant oligopolistic corporations that dominated the economy coexisted with a surviving peripheral competitive capitalist sector. The two sectors developed according to quite different laws of motion. A consequence of the dualist industrial structure was a corollary dualism in labor markets: jobs in the capitalist sector became increasingly dissimilar, and labor markets became increasingly segmented (p. xi-xii).

One key characteristic of this dualism is the superior-inferior type of relationship between the two segments, with more stable and high-paid jobs and those with better mobility prospects tending to concentrate in the superior segment (Massey et al., 1994). Another important characteristic is that it interacts with preexisting divisions by race and sex (Edwards et al., 1973).

There are at least two examples of such a segmentation process in the history of the contemporary industrial economies: industrialization in the early decades of this century, and computerization in the post-WWII era. In the first, the manufacturing sector replaced the agriculture sector as the engine of economy. In the second, the service industry grew out of manufacturing. The former shifted a large portion of the labor force off the farms and into factories, the latter moved them into offices (Rifkin, 1995).

Each time it was hoped that the jobs lost in the old sector would be compensated for by those created in the new sector. This hope was even stronger with regard to the second development as the service sector expanded the employment outlook extensively. Part of the reason for such an expansion was the wide application of computer technology in the service sector. Many new jobs were needed to make computers an integral part of office work. By the early 1980s, Alvin Toffler (1980) argued that there was only one thing to be concerned about: computer illiteracy. The remedy: massive job retraining.
The highly paid jobs in the computer industry, flexible working conditions, dispensed geographical binding to the office, and many other features all indicated that a Brave New World was about to be born.

But the optimism did not last long. A large number of the jobs that were lost in the manufacturing sector and were supposed to appear in the service sector appeared in the developing countries. It was in the late 1960s that the large companies discovered the advantages of moving the labor-intensive sections of their production offshore to underdeveloped regions. According to Marchak (1991:72),

The global assembly line was selectively established in countries that had strategic geopolitical positions as well as cheap labor, mostly in former colonies where English was spoken, and in regions that seemed most likely to sustain what was called 'a secure atmosphere for investment.'

The optimism that computerization would create more jobs was further shattered as computers extended their territory from service to manufacturing: an increasing number of manufacturing jobs were taken away from the human labor force and given to machines. What made such a transference easier was that more than 75 percent of the manufacturing tasks were very simple and repetitive in nature. Hence, the tasks could be easily done by machines. As Rifkin (1995:5) remarked, "[automated] machinery, robots, and increasingly sophisticated computers can perform many if not most of these jobs." This, indeed, happened during the 1980s and 1990s, to a large extent. Machines became, Rifkin warned, "the new proletariat" (p. 7).

Instead of the high-paid, full-time and permanent jobs vanishing from the manufacturing sector, many new low-paid, part-time, and temporary positions emerged. Such jobs did not provide a family wage, that is, an income sufficient to support a family. Depending on whether or not they were employed, and if they were for how many hours per week, people began falling in and out of the poverty zone. In general, however, there were more people falling into than out of poverty.

How do such segmented labor markets affect immigrants? Some immigration researchers hold that employers in the developed societies seek to recruit immigrants to fill secondary sector positions rejected by natives, that is, the jobs typified by instability, low pay, limited benefits and unpleasant or hazardous working conditions (Massey et al., 1994:715). In a study of European countries' immigration policy, Gordon (1995:527) argues that this was a deliberate policy adopted by employers and government:

The initiation of long-distance movements of workers from cheap-labor economies was in large part the outcome of recruitment activities of major employers respond-
ing to specific labor problems and of governments acting on their behalf. The original needs of employers related to sets of jobs that were being abandoned by an increasingly educated indigenous labor force. The problems with these jobs might be that they were dirty, dangerous, stressful, and/or poorly paid, but it was also crucial that employers could neither solve this labor problem at that time by transferring the activities concerned to cheap-labor area (because the goods or services were untransportable), nor by mechanization, rationalization, or paying higher wages.

The living conditions and primary concerns of immigrants upon arrival also facilitate their employment in the secondary labor market. As Isajiw (1999:117) writes, one big concern of such immigrants is “getting a job, any job, as soon as possible upon arrival.” But, the jobs in the secondary labor market are often the ones “most readily available to them, especially in periods of economic slumps.” In a study of the position of Chinese, blacks, and Italians in the social structure of Windsor, for instance, Helling (1965) has documented some of the mechanisms through which the wages are kept low for immigrants. The first mechanism is the wage-split, in which the employers pay the workers a wage lower than what they record in their books and contracts with the implicit assurance that workers would not file complaints against them. The second mechanism, called sweetheart agreement, involves an agreement between the employer and a union official to not enforce the collective agreements. The third, padrone system, is used by employers when they import their workers from abroad and manage to keep them quiet about the working conditions, in return for accommodation and passage costs paid by the employer.

The research on this issue has often faced the difficulty, however, of how to operationalize the concept sector of economy. Lack of a consensus about the nature of jobs in each sector as well as the inadequacy of available data have left much room for speculation. The present study, unfortunately, is not exempt from this difficulty. In the absence of a better measure of economic sectors, we have adopted two variables to operationalize the primary/secondary sectors: the standard classification of jobs in the Canadian census and the full-time or part-time nature of the job. If the dual labor market theory holds true, we should expect to see a clear aggravating effect of employment in the secondary sector on the poverty of individuals.

**DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES**

Previous studies in Canada have suffered from the use of small and nonrepresentative samples. Most recently, for instance, Boyd (1998) identified the inadequacy of variables and the small size of the General Social Survey sam-
ple as a major handicap. With the exception of Li (1998), the bulk of research on this issue has relied heavily on small-size, custom-tailored samples of data.

In this article, we have used the Individual Public Use Micro File (PUMF) of Canada's 1991 census. Being a 3 percent sample, the data set contains more than 800,000 cases. To avoid artificially significant coefficients, which may result from the large sample size, we have reduced the sample size by taking a 10 percent random sample out of the original sample. This left us with more than 80,000 cases, which makes the significance of the results fairly reliable.

The multivariate technique used in this study is logistic regression. This technique, useful for identifying group membership, has been recognized as an “alternative to discriminant analysis, particularly when the assumption of a normal distribution is not appropriate” (Halli and Rao, 1992:103). Logistic regression estimates the probability of an event occurring (Norusis, 1990:B-39). Two main reasons justify the use of logistic regression in the present study. First, it is a very robust and flexible technique which requires no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables. This means that in logistic regression predictors do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related, or of equal variance within each group (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996:575). Second, among different variations of regression technique, logistic regression is most appropriate for use when the dependent variable is dichotomous, e.g., group membership. What logistic regression can tell us is the probability of a particular outcome for each case and the extent to which a particular predictor increases or decreases the odds of that outcome. In the present study, the dependent variable, poverty status, is of such a dichotomous nature.

Halli and Rao (1992) have extensively discussed the mathematical properties of logistic regression. Briefly, the logistic regression technique operates on individual or microlevel, rather than aggregated data, and it is analogous to linear regression in that a continuous response variable is modeled as a linear function of a set of continuous predictors. The technique assumes that each member of the population has some underlying probability of falling in the category of interest in the dependent variable, as a function of a given independent variable. Therefore, in the population, each member with a given set of characteristics has a $P$ chance of being in the category of interest in the dependent variable (here, being poor) and $1-P$ chance of being in the opposite category (non-poor).
Let $P_i$ be the probability that the $i$th person in the sample is in the category of interest (being poor) on a dichotomous dependent variable, and $(1-P_i)$ be the probability that he or she is in the opposite category (not poor). Clearly, $P_i/(1-P_i)$ equals the odds of being in the category of interest in the $i$th individual. Now $\log(P_i/(1-P_i))$, the log of the odds of being in the category of interest, is a continuous variable that theoretically can take on any value in the range $(-\infty, +\infty)$. Also, let $X_{i1}, X_{i2}, \ldots, X_{iK}$ be a set of $K$ continuous predictor variables measured on the $i$th individual in the sample. Then the logistic regression model for the log odds, given a particular vector of scores on the $K$ predictor variables, is

\begin{equation}
\frac{P_i}{1-P_i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_k X_{ik}
\end{equation}

And the corresponding multiplicative model for the odds is

\begin{equation}
\frac{P_i}{1-P_i} = e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_k X_{ik}}
\end{equation}

Estimates of the betas, or regression coefficients, in Eq. (1) and (2) are obtained by the method of maximum likelihood. These coefficients are then used to estimate the relative contribution of each independent variable. There are a couple of alternative ways to interpret the output produced by logistic regression. The one adopted here relies on the magnitude of $\text{Exp}(B)$. The magnitude of $\text{Exp}(B)$ in our model determines the contribution of each variable in the increase or decrease of the odds of being poor. The values smaller than 1 indicate a negative impact, while the values greater than 1 indicate a positive one.

Another necessary methodological clarification here involves the notion of poverty and the way it is defined. Most discussions of poverty in Canada during the last 25 years have relied on a measure of poverty suggested by Statistics Canada: Low Income Cut-Offs (LICO). According to Krahn (1995:2.18), the data obtained from the annual Survey of Consumer Finances have indicated that the average Canadian family spends about 36 percent of (pre-tax) income on the basic necessities (food, shelter, and clothing); to establish the LICO line, Statistics Canada adds 20 percent to this figure. Hence, any family spending more than 56 percent of gross income on the basic necessities is considered poor. The low-income lines are then calcu-
lated for communities and for families of various sizes within those communities. Table 1 contains the poverty lines for families and communities of different sizes for the census year 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Size</th>
<th>500,000 or more</th>
<th>100,000 to 499,999</th>
<th>30,000 to 99,999</th>
<th>Small Urban Areas</th>
<th>Rural Areas (Farm and Nonfarm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14,155</td>
<td>12,433</td>
<td>12,146</td>
<td>11,072</td>
<td>9,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19,187</td>
<td>16,854</td>
<td>16,464</td>
<td>15,008</td>
<td>13,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24,389</td>
<td>21,662</td>
<td>20,926</td>
<td>19,076</td>
<td>16,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>28,081</td>
<td>24,662</td>
<td>24,094</td>
<td>21,964</td>
<td>19,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30,680</td>
<td>26,946</td>
<td>26,324</td>
<td>23,997</td>
<td>20,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>33,303</td>
<td>29,248</td>
<td>28,573</td>
<td>26,047</td>
<td>22,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 or more</td>
<td>35,818</td>
<td>31,460</td>
<td>30,734</td>
<td>28,017</td>
<td>24,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the present article, we have used the LICOs-based poverty status indicator, contained in 1991 census data. It is important to note that not all the researchers agree upon the legitimacy of using LICOs as poverty status indicators. An examination of the debates surrounding this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

**FINDINGS**

**Poverty of Immigrants: A Profile**

The overall poverty rate in Canada (15.6%) is not equally reflected among immigrant and nonimmigrant subpopulations; the former has a poverty rate higher than the national rate while the latter's rate is lower (19.2% and 14.8%, respectively). To explore the regional dimension of immigrants' poverty, Table 2 is generated, consisting of the poverty rates of immigrants and nonimmigrants in Canada's major CMAs. The cities are ranked on a descending order by the values in the last column, i.e., the difference between values of the first two columns. The cities with positive numbers in the last column are those in which immigrants have a poverty rate higher than that of nonimmigrants.

There are a number of observations one can make from this table. First, immigrants tend to have higher poverty rates in all but six cities. Second, even in those six cities, the values of the last column are very small (all less than 0.5), indicating that immigrants are not significantly better off compared to
TABLE 2
POVERTY RATES, BY IMMIGRANT STATUS AND CMA, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMA</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Difference Between Immigrants and Nonimmigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montréal</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa-Hull</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherbrooke and Trois-Rivières</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchener</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina and Saskatoon</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catharines - Niagara</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshawa</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudbury and Thunder Bay</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nonimmigrants. Third, these six cities are all of small to middle size (populations ranging from 120,000 to 353,000) and do not have large immigrant populations. The reasons behind the lower poverty rates of immigrants in smaller cities are not quite known. We may speculate that one reason for this is the limited range of job opportunities in small cities, which does not allow the concentration of immigrants in low-paying jobs. It may also have to do with the pattern of internal migration of immigrants. It is known that in Canada the geographically mobile individuals, including immigrants, tend to move to large cities such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver in search of better job opportunities. These three cities are also known as the most desirable destinations for immigrants to Canada (McVey and Kalbach, 1995). Therefore, one may speculate that those immigrants who, despite this general pattern, choose to reside and stay in smaller cities are those who have reasonably successful careers and satisfactory living conditions, hence their lower poverty rates. Finally, Table 2 also reveals a regional dimension: the top seven cities, that is, those in which immigrants fare worst compared to nonimmigrants, are located exclusively in either Quebec or the Prairie Provinces.

In addition to city and region, language also seems to make some contribution to immigrants’ high poverty. Their poverty is the highest in three cities that are French speaking, either predominantly (such as Montreal and Que-
bec City) or partially (Ottawa-Hull). Given that English is the language of choice for large proportions of immigrants, even in French-speaking cities such as Montreal where 40 percent of immigrants are English speaking, this may imply that in such environments, immigrants are further disadvantaged by the mismatch between their language skills and their environments’ language requirements.

### TABLE 3
**Poverty Rates, by Immigrant Status and Ethnicity, 1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Origin</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Non-immigrants</th>
<th>Difference Between Immigrants and Non-immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other East and South East Asian</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asian</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian (Magyar)</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western European</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin, Central and South American</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch (Netherlands)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/Caribbean</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 

1. Includes those of Burmese, Cambodian, Laotian, Thai, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, and Malay origins.
2. Includes those of Afghan, Armenian, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish, and Turk origins.
3. Includes those of Finnish, Scandinavian, Baltic, Byelorussian, Czech and Slovak, Romanian, Russian, Cypriot, Maltese, and Basque origins.
4. Includes those of Albanian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, Slovenian, and Yugoslav origins.
5. Includes those of Bengali, Punjabi, Singhalese, Tamil, Bangladeshi, East Indian, and Pakistani, and Sri Lankan origins.
6. Includes those of Austrian, Belgian, Flemish, Luxembourg, and Swiss origins.
7. Includes those of Argentinian, Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Guatemalan, Hispanic, Mexican, Nicaraguan, Peruvian, Salvadoran, and Uruguayan origins.
8. Includes those of Black, Ghanaian, African Black, Barbadian, Cuban, Guyanese, Haitian, Jamaican, Trinidadian and Tobagonian, and West Indian origins.
The effect of language on immigrants' poverty points to another related, but larger, factor: ethnicity. Due to the magnitude of ethnic inequality in Canada, there is a possibility that poverty is more severe for immigrants of certain ethnic origins. The racialization of poverty noticed in the United States becomes, in Canada, ethnicization of poverty. Table 3, representing the poverty rates of immigrants/nonimmigrants by their ethnic origin, allows us to examine the validity of such an argument.

The last column of Table 3, likewise, shows the difference between poverty rates of immigrants and nonimmigrants of each ethnic origin. One striking feature in this table is that immigrants of certain ethnic origins, such as West Asians, Arabs, Vietnamese, Latin/Central/South Americans and Spanish, have poverty rates about three times the national rate. There are only five ethnic groups at the lower end of the table that do not follow this pattern, three of which are non-European immigrants (Latin/Central/South American, Spanish, and black/Caribbean). This, however, does not necessarily indicate that these three groups have had successful economic integration in Canada, since the small magnitude of the values in the last column for them results from the high poverty rates of nonimmigrants of the same ethnic origins, rather than the low poverty rates of immigrants. In other words, the nonimmigrants of these ethnic origins have such unusually high levels of poverty (39.5%, 38.6%, and 36.1%, respectively) that being immigrant can hardly aggravate the situation.

The poverty of immigrants does not merely have spatial and ethnic dimension; it also has a temporal dimension. Of all immigrants to Canada, those who arrived in the 1960s have the lowest poverty rates (11%). For those who arrived in the 1970s, the rate is slightly higher (15%). A noticeable increase in poverty, however, occurs among those who migrated during the 1980s (from 15% to 31%). This increase resulted not only from the immigrants' lack of qualifications, but also from the economic downturn in Canada since the mid-70s (Philips, 1990). In this period, economic growth slowed down, recessions occurred more frequently, and the welfare state began to disintegrate. The recent immigrants, therefore, were impoverished because of their immigrant status, their ethnic affiliation, their city of residence, and the poor timing of their arrival.

If the higher poverty rate of recent immigrants is due to their lower level of assimilation into Canadian society, one should expect that the second generation of immigrants (those who arrived in Canada at an early age) should have lower poverty levels. The breakdown of poverty by age at immigration
in Table 4 does not support this argument. Comparing the poverty rates for the arrival age groups 0–4 and 5–9 years (17.2% and 18.7%, respectively) with those of the 20–24 and 25–29 years (15.6% and 16.7%, respectively) indicates that the second generation of immigrants is more likely to be poor. Two points need to be mentioned here in regard to this surprising finding. First, the poverty rate of the second generation is higher than the first one only with a narrow margin, which is likely to be statistically insignificant. It therefore would be premature to jump into any far-reaching conclusion about the poverty of immigrants based on these rates. Second, despite the narrow margin, the direction of difference is unexpected and thus noteworthy. This is to say that even if the difference between the poverty rates of the two generations is negligible, it is still against our expectation based on the assimilation theory that the poverty rate should be significantly lower for second generation immigrants. Moreover, there are some other economic trends which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Arrival</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4 years</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 years</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 years</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24 years</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29 years</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34 years</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39 years</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44 years</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49 years</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54 years</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59 years</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64 years</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term second generation is used here rather loosely, referring to the offspring of immigrants who were born outside but migrated to Canada before the age of 10. Strictly speaking, however, a second generation immigrant refers only to those born in the host country (see, for instance, Boyd, 1998). The particular definition of second generation we have used here is a product of two things: first, a practical limitation in the census data - which do not specify the birth place of the immigrants' children; second, a theoretical belief of ours that when it comes to the economic performance of those born inside Canada and those born outside but migrated at an early age, the experiences of the two groups should not be drastically different. Compared to their parents, for instance, both groups have better mastery of the language, have received their education in the host society, and enjoy access to social networks that may help them in their job-finding adventures. We found this as the only possible way to get a sense of the situation of second generation immigrants, in the absence of more directly measured data on second generation.
point to a direction similar to this finding. For example, the second generation immigrants also have lower employment rates (45% and 50%, compared to the ones in the 50–60% range, which was that of their parents' generation) and lower levels of full-time employment (40.5% and 56.9%, compared to 65.6% and 62.7%). If nothing else, these findings call for a more rigorous examination of the economic performance of immigrants along generational lines.

These findings, if corroborated by other studies, would clearly challenge the expectation based on the long-established assimilation perspective that better proficiency in language, a more compatible educational background, easily recognizable credentials, and fewer cultural barriers should result in better social and economic performance by second-generation immigrants. This may mean that the effect of assimilation is intercepted, to some extent, by the influence of other factors – human capital and structural. For this reason, in the multivariate models developed here, we have included all three sets of factors, simultaneously.

Poverty of Immigrants: An Explanation

To examine the relative significance of the three alternative explanations of poverty discussed earlier, a logistic regression model is developed, with the poverty status of individuals as the dependent variable. The independent variables cluster around three sets of factors, each corresponding to one of the aforementioned modes of explanation: human capital, structural and assimilation. Human capital factors include age, education, immigration and migration. Structural factors include the impacts of full-time/part-time work, as well as the sector of economy in which one is employed. The assimilation factors contain variables particularly related to, but not confined to, immigrants, i.e., period of immigration, age at the time of immigration, and knowledge of the official languages. Since there is a possibility that these factors affect immigrants and nonimmigrants differently, separate models are designed for each group, in addition to one for the total population. This enabled us to identify some drastically different patterns. Table 5 shows the results of the logistic models. The variables with Exp(B) values less than 1 lower the odds of living in poverty while those with values greater than 1 raise them. The findings are discussed in the order of the factors included.

Human Capital Factors. Except for the variable 'migration,' the effects of other human capital variables such as age, education and immigration status are consistent with the hypothesis outlined earlier. Chance of poverty decreas-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Exp (B)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Capital Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.97*</td>
<td>0.9804*</td>
<td>0.9722*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Years of Schooling</td>
<td>0.8302*</td>
<td>0.8387*</td>
<td>0.8851*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Status (Being Immigrant)</td>
<td>1.0962*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration (between 1986 and 1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the same neighborhood</td>
<td>2.1412*</td>
<td>2.2837*</td>
<td>1.7731*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-provincial (within the same CD)</td>
<td>1.7488*</td>
<td>1.8383*</td>
<td>1.4986*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-provincial (Between CDs)</td>
<td>2.244*</td>
<td>2.5565*</td>
<td>1.3777*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Provinces</td>
<td>2.8825*</td>
<td>2.5517*</td>
<td>2.257*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Outside Canada</td>
<td>6.8017*</td>
<td>3.9539*</td>
<td>3.9752*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time Work</td>
<td>1.3994*</td>
<td>1.5851*</td>
<td>1.2293*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Primary Industries</td>
<td>0.486*</td>
<td>0.3963*</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.4181*</td>
<td>0.3583*</td>
<td>0.6964*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.5539*</td>
<td>0.5179*</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Storage</td>
<td>0.4581*</td>
<td>0.4207*</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and other Utilities</td>
<td>0.3516*</td>
<td>0.2831*</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>0.4507*</td>
<td>0.4135*</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>0.5349*</td>
<td>0.5183*</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance and Real Estate</td>
<td>0.368*</td>
<td>0.3374*</td>
<td>0.6219*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Services</td>
<td>0.5203*</td>
<td>0.4531*</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Services (Federal)</td>
<td>0.3549*</td>
<td>0.241*</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Services (Other)</td>
<td>0.4836*</td>
<td>0.3895*</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>0.5148*</td>
<td>0.4002*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Services</td>
<td>0.5532*</td>
<td>0.4617*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation, Food and Beverage Services</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.8461*</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Significant at .05 Level

...s in all three models as age increases. This finding is consistent with those of research on the recent surge of poverty in industrial nations indicating that younger adults and children are more severely hit by the recent surge of poverty (McFate, 1995). However, as mentioned earlier, age matters because it provides opportunities for education, acquiring job skills, and long-term employment. This means that if the effects of those associated variables are taken into account, age by itself should not be a very strong predictor. This justifies the fact that the values of Exp(B) for age are only slightly lower than 1 (.98, .98, and .97 for the three models).
Unlike age, education has a more pronounced effect on reducing the chances of poverty, given the Exp(B) values in the range of .80. One thing to note here is the differential impact of education for immigrants and nonimmigrants (.86 and .84, respectively). This difference indicates that while education reduces the chances of poverty for both groups, it benefits nonimmigrants more than immigrants. In other words, immigrants cannot fully translate their education into income and socioeconomic status. One may speculate that this may result from the fact that immigrants tend to work in the jobs for which they are overqualified (see Basran and Li, 1998).

Being an immigrant has a negative bearing on one's poverty status, as it increases the odds of being poor by 10 percent. This inferential statistic, corroborating the earlier finding that immigrants are overrepresented among the poor, indicates that even after controlling for all the relevant variables, the aggravating impact of immigration on poverty does not disappear.

The impact of migration on poverty is puzzling. We expected migration, as a human capital investment, to lower the chances of poverty. The findings, however, indicate otherwise. While this calls for further research on migration patterns, two possibilities can be mentioned here. First, census data record the mobility status of respondents in the past five years. This period may not necessarily be enough for the migrated individual/family to settle in the new environment and establish a solid socioeconomic status. The search for a suitable job and adjustment to the new skills may take longer than five years to produce any definite result. Second, the available data do not reveal the pre-migration poverty status of internal migrants. It is possible that most of these individuals or families have been poor before migration and they have simply carried over their poverty to their new locations. The examination of the validity of these two possibilities requires further investigation with more detailed data on pre- and post-migration status of individuals and/or families.

**Structural Factors.** The variables associated with the structural make-up of society, full-time/part-time work and the economic sector in which one is employed support the hypothesized relationship, though with some modification. Concurrent with our expectation, part-time work has a consistently aggravating effect on one's poverty status. In contrast to our expectation, however, all the significant values of Exp(B) for economic sector are less than unity, indicating that they lower the chances of poverty. This is perhaps an indication of employment rather than economic sector, since all those registered for one sector or another have some sort of employment, which cer-
tainly reduces the likelihood of poverty.

The findings, however, give us some insights into the effect of particular economic sectors. Let us take, for example, the values of $\exp(B)$ for manufacturing and communication (0.42 and 0.35, respectively), as representatives of the traditional industrial sector and the computer-based information sector. While employment in either sector lowers the chances of poverty, such an impact is stronger for communication than for manufacturing. For the former, the lowering impact on poverty is even as strong as employment in federal governmental services (0.35). This suggests that, compared to manufacturing, the information sector is more rewarding economically. The table shows, however, that this is not typical of all the jobs in the service sector, as the magnitude of effect is a lot lower for those in health, social, educational, and business services. In sum, the findings suggest that while employment in the service sector is not as promising as it is for the manufacturing sector, those service jobs related to information technology provide the strongest shield against poverty.

Interestingly enough, the structural factors are not significant in explaining the poverty of immigrants: only two out of the fifteen types of jobs – manufacturing and finance, insurance and real estate – are statistically significant. While employment in both sectors reduces the chances of poverty, such an effect is stronger for nonimmigrants. In other words, even after controlling for all other variables, immigrants do not enjoy the same advantages as do their nonimmigrant counterparts in the same economic sector. Nevertheless, the fact that the impacts of most other sectors are not statistically significant for immigrants implies that their poverty may be better explained by their particular immigration status. The examination of assimilation factors will reveal this.

**Assimilation Factors.** Two of the variables included under this category – year of immigration and age at immigration – are exclusively related to immigrants; the third – knowledge of official language – is relevant for nonimmigrants as well. The effects of the first two variables are consistent with the hypothesis that the recent as well as first generation immigrants tend to have higher poverty rates, compared to old and second generation immigrants. The magnitude of impacts (1.03 and 0.99, respectively), however, is small. This is because these variables partly act through education and employment. Controlling for those variables minimizes the effect of recency of migration and that of generation.
The relationship between knowledge of official languages and poverty has a rather complicated pattern. Some previous researches have also found the relationship between language skills and the socioeconomic status of immigrants puzzling. One puzzling aspect is that while the chance of poverty declines as a result of having knowledge of only English and only French (though to a lesser degree), it rises with the knowledge of both languages. Two things may have contributed to this peculiar pattern. First, the census data do specify only the language of which one has more knowledge, but they do not tell the extent of one’s knowledge of it. Not all those who consider themselves bilingual are necessarily proficient in both languages. Second, about 60 percent of those who are bilingual live in Montreal, a city with one of the highest poverty rates; hence, the higher poverty rates of bilinguals may be due to their exposure to poverty-generating forces in their surrounding environment, rather than their language skills.

For immigrants, only knowledge of English is helpful, and knowledge of only French and knowledge of both English and French raise their poverty levels. The hypothesis suggested in the previous paragraph may be more pertinent in the case of immigrants. Obviously, many immigrants come with mother tongues different from English and French. In some cases, they even need to speak a number of dialects, in addition to the official languages of the countries from which they have come. This makes English and French, at least, their second and third languages. The number of languages they have to learn may well suppress the extent of their knowledge of, and proficiency in, English and French. This suggests that in the case of immigrants a knowledge of both English and French may simply mean a poor knowledge of both English and French, which can pose serious limits to the extent of their economic success in both French- and English-speaking environments.

SUMMARY

Three logistic regression models are used in an attempt to unravel the mechanism of poverty generation for the whole Canadian population, as well as immigrant and nonimmigrant subpopulations. The models include variables related to three modes of explanation, revolving around human capital, structural and assimilation factors. The effects of human capital factors tend to be significant and compatible with what the literature on poverty suggests. The only exception was migration. Although against the expectation derived from the literature, the effect of migration was in the same direction as that of immigration. This suggests that our conceptual understanding of poverty
may be improved by treating the two variables of migration and immigration similarly.

The structural factors left mixed results. The results supported, to a certain extent, the hypotheses suggested in the literature. The aggravating impact of part-time work on poverty, for example, did invalidate some arguments that the recent increase of part-time jobs is due to the voluntary choice of workers. The findings also showed that while, in general, employment in the service sector raises the chances of poverty, the trend is opposite for the jobs in information technology. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the structural factors tend not to be significant in explaining immigrants' poverty. This is in contrast to the findings of some studies on immigrants in Europe, especially those proposing the dual-labor market theory.

The assimilation factors revealed that the risk of poverty was more serious for recent immigrants. This corroborates the argument of some studies of immigrants in the United States that recent immigrants are much more subject to economic hardship than the old immigrants. We also found that the risk of poverty is higher for the younger generation of immigrants despite their higher levels of assimilation. This is a very important and particularly disturbing phenomenon which needs to be cross-checked using larger and more complete samples as well as the data of other census years. In future research on economic performance of immigrants in Canada special attention also needs to be given to what Borjas (1994) called 'cohort effect', an interaction effect of age at the time of migration and years since arrival. All findings also need to be reported separately for different ethnic groups, for previous research as well as the present one have clearly shown the differential experiences of immigrants of various ethnic origins.

A word on the limitations of this study may also have some implications for the direction of future research in this area. The studies of employment status of immigrants in the labor market, including the present one, are still in need of more refined indicators of sectors of economy, part-time employment (whether voluntary or otherwise), and the jobs that should be listed under information technology. A second set of limitations stem from the problems inherent in census data. Despite their significantly larger size and their thoroughness, the census data suffer from their predominantly subjective nature, a problem they share with all other survey data. What the responses to the census questionnaire reflect is, indeed, the realities as perceived by respondents, rather than the realities per se. This, in some occasions, becomes a serious handicap.
One example is the question on ethnic origin, which asks respondents to specify the ethnic or cultural group(s) to which their ancestors belonged. To answer this question, many respondents may not necessarily refer to what they are, as far as their ethnicity is concerned. Rather, they may answer with what they would like to be considered. This possibility is well reflected in the incredible rise in the number of respondents who have chosen Canadian as their ethnic origin. According to Krotki (1997:72):

In most Canadian censuses there were some 50,000 or 100,000 sturdy individuals who insisted on reporting themselves as Canadians. [they] did so not in the citizenship question, which would cause no problem, but under ethnicity.... By 1996 over 5 million reported themselves in ethnicity as single 'Canadians', that is in addition and apart from the three and half million reporting 'Canadian' as one of their multietnicities.

Among those who reported Canadian as their ethnic origin in 1991, surprisingly enough, some were immigrants (2.6% of all 'Canadians'). Given that immigrants, as defined by census authorities, are those “who were not Canadian citizens by birth” (Statistics Canada, 1991), this is a clear contradiction that those born outside Canada and to non-Canadian parents consider Canadian as their ethnic origin. Although this may be an interesting target subpopulation for further research (as it may represent those most highly assimilated among immigrants, for example), it somewhat blurs the relationship between objective ethnic origin and other social variables (here, poverty).

A recent joint attempt by Canadian Immigration and Citizenship (CIC) and Statistics Canada to generate a data set, linking the immigrant records with the tax return files (called IMDB data set), has many potential promises for future research on the economic performance of immigrants. As IMDB is gradually becoming available, the hope rises that the findings of the present study can be triangulated using other data sets, more directly related to immigrants.

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Return and Onwards Migration in Canada and Australia: Evidence From Fixed Interval Data

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The University of Queensland

Analysis of return and onwards migration flows has typically relied upon lifetime migration definitions. Both Canada and Australia have collected data on usual place of residence both one and five years prior to the census, which provide a richer source of information on return and onwards moves. Utilizing data drawn from complementary sources, this article examines the incidence, composition and spatial patterning of return and onwards migration at the state and provincial level in Canada and Australia over the period of 1986–1990–1991. Results indicate a high degree of symmetry in these processes between the two countries. While many of the findings are consistent with those derived from analysis of lifetime data, we find that one quarter to one third of return moves were to the original (1986) dwelling, indicating a planned return rather than the failed migration as previous literature has often assumed.

Although it has long been recognized that migration is a repetitive event, research into the temporal dimension of population movements has been slow to evolve and remains fragmented. Two main lines of inquiry can be identified, stemming, respectively, from the pioneering work of Goldstein (1954, 1964) and Eldridge (1965). These are differentiated both by their source of data, their unit of analysis and their analytic techniques. On the one hand is a body of work in the microtheoretic tradition that has focused on the migration sequences of individuals using data from residential histories or longitudinal data sets. This can be traced through the empirical work of DaVanzo (1976, 1978, 1983) on repeat and return migration in a human capital framework to the notion of migration careers (Davies, 1991, Davies and Flowerdew, 1992), the life course perspective (Warnes, 1992), and the development of tools for event history analysis (Courgeau and Lelievre, 1991). On the other hand lies a sequence of macroscale analyses in a direct line of descent from Eldridge (1965) that have sought to introduce a tempo-
ral dimension from Census aggregates (Lee, 1974; Long, 1988; Liaw, 1990, Newbold and Liaw 1990, 1994; Newbold 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Rogers and Belanger, 1990). The basis for this strand of research is that the Censuses in both Canada and the United States, where the bulk of this work has been conducted, collect information on place of birth, as well as place of residence at the Census and five years previously. This provides a measure of lifetime return and onwards migration. These two lines of research represent complementary, rather than competing, perspectives (Massey, 1990). Microdata generally offer greater temporal depth, while Census aggregates provide more robust spatial information. Both literatures attest to the selective nature of chronic migration, its demographic impacts and its significance as a component of interregional migration streams.

This article seeks to contribute further to the understanding of chronic migration – repeated or multiple migrations occurring within a defined period – and hence to elucidate the dynamics of migration in general, through a variant of the macroanalytic tradition. In effect, this involves simply replacing information on place of birth with data on place of residence five years prior to the Census. While most countries collect data on usual residence either one or five years prior to the Census, a select few, including Canada and Australia, collect both. The rationale is that one year transition data offer a more accurate measure of migration events and migrant characteristics while data for a five year interval provide a clearer picture of the spatial impacts of migration, uncluttered by repetitive moves. A byproduct of this collection strategy is the facility to compare place of residence at three fixed points in time (the Census, one year and five years previously), which opens an alternative window on the temporal dimension of mobility.

Although these data have been collected for many years (since 1976 in Australia and 1991 in Canada), they have attracted only limited attention to date (Bell, 1995, 1996). This is surprising because fixed interval measures offer a number of empirical and theoretical advantages over lifetime data. These derive, first, from the shorter time intervals over which migration is being measured (one year and four years, rather than one year and previous lifetime) and, second, from the greater spatial detail which is available. One of the problems inherent in the use of birthplace data is that individuals may have made several intervening moves prior to the return or onwards migration captured in the Census. Moreover, the scope for such moves varies according to the age of the respondent. Birthplace is therefore a poor surrogate for the concept of a ‘home region’ since location-specific capital is more
likely to be embedded where an individual grew up, attended school, recently resided, lived his or her adult life, vacationed or has immediate family connections. Shorter intervals of fixed duration reduce the confounding effect of these multiple moves and are more likely to capture 'rapid' returns (DaVanzo, 1976, 1978; Morrison, 1971). In addition, personal attributes that change over time, such as marital status or labor force characteristics, are less likely to have altered since the migration event and can therefore be linked more reliably to spatial choices (Liaw, 1990).

Spatial resolution is enhanced in two ways in the fixed interval data. First, place of residence one and five years prior to the Census is generally coded to the regional and local levels, whereas place of birth is usually reported only at state or provincial level. Secondly, it is possible to distinguish people who returned to occupy their previous dwelling from others who returned to another location elsewhere in the region of origin.

Coupling data on place of residence at the Census with that one and five years previously therefore provides a far richer source of information on return and onwards migration than can be obtained from lifetime data. Furthermore, it has the potential to contribute to the extension and generalization of migration theory, especially in regard to chronic mobility. This study employs data from the 1991 Australian and Canadian Censuses with precisely these ends in mind. Specifically, we aim to examine the incidence, composition and spatial patterning of return and onwards migration in the two countries over the period 1986–1990–1991 and to relate these findings to previous research in the micro- and macroanalytic traditions. The following section provides a brief summary of literature in the field. Next, we review issues in the cross-national comparison of internal migration and compare the Canadian and Australian settings. Data sources and methods are outlined. The substantive analysis then proceeds in three main sections focusing on the intensity of chronic migration, the characteristics of return and onward migrants, and the spatial impacts of these movements. We conclude by summarizing the main contributions to be derived from the fixed interval data and identifying avenues for further research.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

For more than a century since Ravenstein (1889), researchers have been impressed with the large volume of ‘counterstream’ migration. Since then, research on return and onwards migration has assumed a specialized niche within the migration literature, both within developing countries (Guilmote,
1998; Huntoon, 1995; Lin et al., 1998) where it intersects with research on circulation (Chapman and Prothero, 1983; Prothero and Chapman, 1984) and in the developed world (DaVanzo, 1976, 1983; Eldridge, 1965; Goldstein, 1954, 1964; Zelinsky, 1971). In combination, this work has charted the key dimensions of this type of movement: their spatial patterns, the characteristics of the migrants, and the reasons associated with return and onwards migration, underlining the significance of chronic migration, its selective nature and demographic impacts (see, for example, DaVanzo, 1978; Lee, 1974; Long, 1988; Newbold and Liaw, 1990, 1994; Rogers and Belanger, 1990).

Lifetime data indicate that return migration represents approximately 20 to 30 percent of all moves and tends to work counter to the net-redistributive effects of primary migration (Newbold and Liaw, 1990). Results demonstrate that the incidence of return migration is largely dependent upon economic conditions, increasing in importance during periods of economic decline (Newbold and Liaw, 1994). For example, return moves contribute a particularly large proportion of the migration stream into economically depressed areas such as Canada's Atlantic provinces that offer relatively few attractions to 'new' migrants, with important redistributive effects (Long, 1988; Newbold and Liaw, 1990, 1994). Prior work has also revealed that return migrants display somewhat different profiles with respect to age and other personal characteristics, relative to primary and onward migrants. Return flows among labor force aged migrants have generally been characterized as 'failed' migrations, including a high proportion of those motivated by a disappointing initial move. Return migration facilitates access to location specific capital, family and friends, and known employment opportunities, all of which lessen the costs and risks of the migration (DaVanzo, 1976; Yezer and Thurston, 1976; Grant and Vanderkamp, 1986). However, return migration may also represent a preplanned event following extended absences related to education, health care, retirement (Longino, 1979; Longino and Serow, 1992) or an employment transfer. Periodic postings away from home are a common route to promotion in large, nationwide organizations, both in the private sector and in the public domain. Federal government employees, in particular, are susceptible to such postings (McKay and Whitelaw, 1977), and these are typically selective of the more upwardly mobile groups. In a similar vein, onward migrants, also variously known within the literature as secondary or repeat migrants, are typically better educated and employed (DaVanzo, 1978; Long, 1988; Newbold and Liaw, 1990), pointing to upwards mobility and the pur-
suit of better job opportunities as a key motive for migration among this group.

While this work has provided important insights into the nature of chronic mobility, several outstanding issues cannot be addressed adequately using lifetime data. For example, multivariate analysis of lifetime return migration has reinforced the ‘failure’ hypothesis, with return migrants being negatively selected in terms of education and skills (Newbold and Liaw, 1994; Newbold, 1996). But as suggested above, return migration may also be a preplanned event. Lifetime migration statistics lack the detailed information on location specific capital such as a return to an original dwelling that would elucidate this phenomenon. This raises a second and related issue, which is the disparity between place of birth and previous place of residence as markers in the return migration decision. As previously noted, place of birth may be a poor proxy for the ‘home region’, whereas previous place of residence may better reflect location specific capital and ties to place. Do these two definitions of home region produce consistent results over time and space, and can the results be utilized to produce general principles of chronic mobility? A third uncertainty is the nature and extent of chronic migration over shorter intervals. How important is return migration relative to the redistributive effects on the population over the short term?

**COMPARING INTERNAL MIGRATION IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA**

Cross-national comparisons of internal migration have a number of potential benefits. First, analyses for individual countries become more meaningful when placed in an international context. Second, they may provide new insights into the dynamics of migration, as unusual results may only come to light once comparisons are made. Third, by revealing similarities and differences, such comparisons provide a more rigorous test bed for migration theory. In practice, comparative research on internal migration is often hampered by problems of compatibility. These include differences in how migration is measured (events or transitions) in the reference period (one or five years), in the definition of a migrant, in population coverage, in data quality, and in the physical, human and statistical geography of the subject countries (Long and Bortlein, 1976; Rees et al., 2000).

In the case of Australia and Canada, these problems are largely averted. Both countries measure migration as a transition over one and five year intervals, employ parallel definitions of migration, and have comparable levels of
underenumeration (around 2%). Moreover, they share similar geographies, settlement histories and institutional structures. Both have relatively small populations set within countries of large territorial extent, and both are highly urbanized. In 1991, Canada's population totaled 27.3 million, 77 percent of which was defined as urban (Ley and Bourne, 1993). In comparison, Australia's 1991 population was 16.9 million and 85.1 urbanized (Hugo, 1996). Both also have similar federal systems of government, resulting in a high degree of urban primacy at the state/provincial level, and geographies which concentrate the majority of settlement in a relatively narrow, habitable zone. The Australian population is clustered in the east, southeast and southwest coastal zones (Hugo, 1996), while a large proportion of the Canadian population is found within approximately 200 miles of the United States border. Industrial production and finance is also concentrated in a handful of centers, namely the Windsor-Toronto-Montreal-Quebec City axis in Canada and the Sydney-Melbourne-Adelaide axis in Australia. In both countries, the remnant nonmetropolitan population is distributed across large, sparsely populated areas, dotted with isolated settlements linked to specialized forms of economic activity, such as mining and other resource extraction industries.

These parallels are reflected in comparable levels of overall migration intensity (van Imhoff and Keilman, 1991). Both Canadians and Australians are highly mobile (Long, 1991), with large proportions of their populations changing residence every year. Between 1986 and 1991, 45 percent of the Canadian population moved compared with 40.4 percent of Australians.

Despite these similarities, migration patterns in the two countries are unlikely to be identical. Variations can be expected to result from inherent structural differences, such as the cultural influences on the Canadian migration system which constrain the spatial choices available to French- and English-speaking migrants (Liaw, 1990; Newbold and Liaw, 1994). Similarly, there are stark differences in the spatial patterning of amenities, exemplified by the sunbelt migration to Queensland from southeastern Australia. Although Canada’s ‘sunbelt’ lies south of the border in the United States, resulting in ‘snow-birding’ which can be interpreted as a form of return migration, British Columbia is frequently associated with amenity-led migration within Canada. These structural differences will inevitably engender spatial biases in the migration streams and counterstreams in the two countries and in their demographic composition. These, in turn, should be reflected in the associated patterns of return and onwards migration.
DATA AND METHODS

The analysis presented here utilizes data from comparable Australian and Canadian 1991 census sources. The Canadian data are drawn from the 3 percent Public Use Microdata File (PUMF), with the results weighted to reflect the total population. The Australian data are based on customized cross-classified tables. Each dataset contains information on people's place of usual residence at three points in time: that is, at the time of the Census, one year prior to the Census (1990) and five years prior to the Census (1986). Migrants and migrations are therefore defined by reference to changes of usual residence over the 1986–90 and 1990–91 intervals.¹

There are some restrictions on the geographic detail available in these files. Although both the Canadian and Australian Censuses collect and code usual residence to the local level, the Canadian PUMF restricts information on previous residence to the provincial level. Similarly, in a rare departure from previous practice, the 1991 Australian Census only collected data on usual residence one year ago at the state level. For the purposes of this analysis, we therefore confine attention to movements that crossed state or provincial boundaries. In 1991, there were six states and two territories in Australia, while in Canada there were ten provinces and two territories. For the Canadian analysis, however, the two territories have been combined with Prince Edward Island.² In addition, to simplify the analysis, we exclude people who were aged under five at the time of the Census, together with those who were overseas or did not report a place of residence at any of the three points in time (1986, 1990 and 1991).

This enables five distinct groups to be identified:

- People who did not migrate (people whose state or province of residence was the same at all three points in time);
- People who made an interstate/interprovincial move between 1986 and 1990 but not between 1990 and 1991;

¹The definitions of migration used within this article are limited in the following two ways: 1) by missing rapid return migration in the initial four-year period and 2) by missing return migrations associated with longer durations than available through fixed interval data. Amenity-led retirement migration, with the original migration made at the time of retirement, may not result in a return migration for 15 or 20 years, meaning that fixed interval measures will underestimate the significance of return migration.

²The two Canadian Territories and Prince Edward Island were aggregated into one unit due to small numbers. Although this unit makes little geographical sense, Statistics Canada frequently makes this aggregate.
• People whose state or province of residence was unchanged between 1986 and 1990 but who did migrate to another state or province between 1990 and 1991;
• People who migrated between 1986 and 1990 but returned to their previous (1986) state or province of residence by 1991;
• People who made an interstate/interprovincial migration between 1986 and 1990 and again (to a different state or province) between 1990 and 1991.

The fourth group can be defined as return migrants and the fifth group as onward migrants. Because both Censuses collect data at the address level, we can further distinguish among return migrants between 1) those who returned to their original (start of census interval) dwelling and 2) those who returned to another dwelling in their state or province of origin.

Since the intent of this study is to focus on chronic mobility, no attempt is made here to reconcile overall variations in migration intensity or to take account of differences in population structure or in the spatial distribution of opportunities available to an individual. Instead, mobility is measured simply by reference to the population ‘at-risk’ of making a return or onwards move: that is, the population who moved over the 1986–90 migration interval.

RESULTS
Counting Migrants and Migrations

Table 1 sets out details of interprovincial and interstate migration in the two countries between 1986 and 1991, disaggregated by the type of migration and the timing of the move. An important feature in the analysis of chronic migration is the distinction between the number of movers (migrants) and the number of moves (migrations). The former refers to the number of individuals who made one or more moves during the observation intervals, while the latter counts the aggregate number of moves recorded. Because some people move more than once, the number of movers is invariably smaller than the number of moves. Thus, combining data for the 1986–90 and 1990–91 intervals, Table 1 reveals a total of 940,155 and 1,166,367 interstate/interprovincial migrations in Australia and Canada, respectively. However, some of these moves represent people who migrated in both the 1986–90 and 1990–91 intervals. The total number of migrants is therefore determined by subtracting all return and onward moves, leaving 835,356 migrants in Australia and 1,047,990 in Canada. If the data were limited solely to transitions
occurring between 1986 and 1991, with no information on place of usual residence in 1990, the total number of movers (and moves) would be further reduced to 760,378 and 962,466 for Australia and Canada, respectively, since none of the return moves (or movers) would be identified.

Table 1 also illustrates the classic one year/five year problem in migration analysis (Kitsul and Philipov, 1981). This stems from the observation that the number of moves recorded over a five year transition interval is significantly

### Table 1

**INTERSTATE AND INTERPROVINCIAL RETURN AND ONWARD MIGRATION: AUSTRALIA AND CANADA, 1986-90-91**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Type of migration</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>1990-91</th>
<th>1986-90</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not migrate interstate</td>
<td>12,979,437</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated both 1986-90 and 1990-91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to same state:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To same dwelling</td>
<td>27,188</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elsewhere same state</td>
<td>47,790</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total returned to same state</td>
<td>74,978</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated onward</td>
<td>29,821</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total repeat migrants</td>
<td>104,799</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated 1990-91 only</td>
<td>156,370</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All 1990-91 migrants</td>
<td>261,169</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated 1986-90 only</td>
<td>574,187</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All 1986-90 migrants</td>
<td>678,986</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total migrations</td>
<td>940,155</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total migrants</td>
<td>104,799</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recorded migrants 1986-91</td>
<td>760,378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>13,814,793</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Type of migration</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did not migrate interprovincial</td>
<td>22,889,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated both 1986-90 and 1990-91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to same province:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To same dwelling</td>
<td>22,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elsewhere same province</td>
<td>63,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total returned to same province</td>
<td>85,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated onward</td>
<td>33,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total repeat migrants</td>
<td>118,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated 1990-91 only</td>
<td>164,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All 1990-91 migrants</td>
<td>283,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrated 1986-90 only</td>
<td>764,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All 1986-90 migrants</td>
<td>883,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total migrations</td>
<td>1,166,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total migrants</td>
<td>1,047,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recorded migrants 1986-91</td>
<td>962,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>23,960,509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
less than five times the number recorded over one year. In the case of Canada, 454,204 moves (5*283,334–962,466) are effectively ‘lost’ in the five year data, representing almost one third (32% = 454,204/1,416,670) of implied annual moves. For Australia, the number of moves lost is even higher: 545,467 representing 42 percent of the implied total. Rogerson (1990) concludes that there is no straightforward, algebraic solution to comparing one year and five year migration rates because the data are affected by population heterogeneity. However, Long and Bortlein (1981) demonstrate that if the underlying propensity to move remains unchanged over the five year interval, the difference between the two figures is equal to the number of onwards moves plus twice the number of return moves. Ceteris paribus, and notwithstanding their lower overall level of migration intensity, this suggests that chronic mobility is somewhat higher among Australians than among their Canadian counterparts.

The Intensity of Chronic Migration

Of the more than one million people who moved between the Canadian provinces over the 1986–90–91 period, 11.3 percent (118,467) made an interprovincial move in both the 1986–90 and 1990–91 intervals (see Table 1). Of these, 85,434 (72%) returned to their 1986 province of origin, while the remaining 33,033 migrated onward to a third province. Framed in terms of the population at risk, that is the 883,033 Canadians who migrated between the provinces between 1986 and 1990, these figures represent rates of 9.7 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively.

As anticipated above, the incidence of repeat migration in Australia was slightly higher than that observed in Canada. Of the 835,356 Australians who migrated interstate during the 1986–90–91 period, 12.5 percent (104,799) made an interstate move in both intervals. However, the composition of these moves was identical to the Canadian case, with 72 percent returning to their state or territory of origin and 28 percent moving onward to a third destination by 1991. Coupled with the slightly higher overall incidence of repeat movement, this delivers propensities to undertake an interstate return (11%) or onwards (4.4%) move, which were marginally higher than among Canadians.

The significance of return and onwards migration is even more pronounced when viewed as a component of the 1990–91 flows. Of those who relocated across state or provincial borders between 1990 and 1991, more than 40 percent had made a previous interstate or interprovincial move.
between 1986 and 1990. Fully three in ten of all 1990–91 migrants were returning to the state or province in which they resided in 1986, while more than one in ten was moving on to live in their third state or province in five years.

While these data underline the significance of chronic mobility in both countries, Table 1 also sheds new light on the process of return migration. Return moves have typically been viewed as a response to a disappointing, or failed, initial migration. Returns to the region of origin have thus been seen as a means to facilitate resettlement, enabling the migrant to draw on prior contacts and local knowledge, thereby reducing search times and minimizing the costs of relocation. In practice, however, more than a third (36%) of all 1990–91 interstate returns in Australia and a quarter (26%) of interprovincial returns in Canada were to the same dwelling occupied in 1986. The fact that this location-specific capital was not disposed of before the first migration suggests that these return moves were planned events rather than responses to failure.

Planned, medium-term absences from home may occur for a variety of reasons and involve a range of population groups. Possible examples include students attending college or university away from home, employees in large, multilocal firms who are posted to another state or province for a fixed period as part of the career development process, and older retirees perhaps engaged in seasonal migration or who undertake an extended post-retirement trip. One useful means of distinguishing this group from other return migrants, and from those who made an onwards move, is by analysis of their personal characteristics.

The Characteristics of Return and Onward Migrants

If return and onward migrants vary in their motives, these differences should be reflected in personal characteristics. Prior research suggests that return migrants tend to be negatively selected in terms of education and skills, whereas onward migrants are typically better educated and employed (Newbold, 1996). Table 2 sets out rates of return and onwards migration in Canada and Australia for a range of population characteristics and further differentiates return movers into the two categories identified above. Although some variations between the two countries are apparent, the data reveal clear and persistent differences between the three groups of chronic migrants.

Mobility rates typically peak among young adults, but this peak is accentuated among chronic migrants. Compared with the population average
(15.4%), Australians aged 15–24 who moved interstate between 1986 and 1990 (21.7%) were 41 percent more likely to make a second interstate move over the subsequent year. For Canadians, the comparable figure was 69 percent. At ages above 35 and below 15, the probability of making a second move drops sharply in both countries to around 13 percent and 10 percent in Australia and Canada, respectively. As Table 2 shows, however, this profile conceals marked variations in age composition according to the type of move. Onwards migrants in both countries exhibit a slightly older peak, dominated by people aged 25–34 but with very small proportions aged 60 and over. In contrast, return migration to the dwelling occupied in 1986 was more strongly selective of 15–24-year-olds but also included a significant contingent of retirees, especially in Australia. Returns to another dwelling elsewhere in the state or province of origin display intermediate profiles that are similar for both countries and more closely match the average for all chronic migrants. Sex variations are also apparent. Males predominated in all three groups but were especially prominent among onwards migrants and among those returning to their earlier dwelling.

Coupled with the other characteristics set out in Table 2, these age-sex profiles provide a number of clues as to the underlying causes of secondary migration. Among teenagers and young adults in their early twenties, returns to a previous dwelling are probably to the parental home and are most likely associated with study at college or university, brief periods of independent living, or extended recreational travel. Long distance travel to attend university is less common in Australia and Canada than in countries such as Britain or the United States. Nevertheless, full-time Canadian students, at least, display relatively high rates of return. Since student status is measured at the end of the intercensal period, however, this suggests that the return aimed to facilitate study rather than occurring on completion. Young (1989, 1996) has shown that leaving home is a protracted process rather than the clean break envisaged by the traditional lifecycle model, often involving two or more returns over a period of several years. As Table 2 confirms, it is also more common among young men than among young women. For young adults, then, returns to the dwelling occupied five years previously are perhaps best characterized as retreats to safety and security.

Among those of older working age, returns to the same dwelling seem more likely to be planned in advance, the 1990 absence representing a temporary move away from home. Most such returns, both in Canada and Australia, were to owner-occupied dwellings rather than to rental accommoda-
TABLE 2
RETURN AND ONWARD MIGRATION BY PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES: AUSTRALIA AND CANADA, 1986-90-91

Australia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>Percent of 1986-90 movers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return to same dwelling</td>
<td>Other return move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-14 years</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 years</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59 years</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Status:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not attending</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time student</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time student</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree or higher</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate Diploma</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Diploma</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled vocational</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic vocational</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No post-secondary quals</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Status:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labor force</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and professionals</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para-professionals and tradespersons</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks and sales workers</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant operators and laborers</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tion. For those in the workforce, extended absences from home are sometimes an integral part of the job. The stereotypical image is of highly qualified, peripatetic professionals. However, as Table 2 shows, professionals displayed the lowest rates of return of all occupational groups, and there is little evidence of
TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

RETURN AND ONWARD MIGRATION BY PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES: AUSTRALIA AND CANADA, 1986-90-91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Return to same dwelling</th>
<th>Other return move</th>
<th>Onward move</th>
<th>Return to same dwelling</th>
<th>Other return move</th>
<th>Onward move</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-14 years</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 years</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59 years</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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...a high skill profile: half of all Canadians and two thirds of Australians aged 15 and over who returned to their 1986 dwelling had no post-secondary qualifications. More prominent among those in the labor force returning to their 1986 residence is the large contingent of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, such as tradespeople, clerks, sales and manual workers. For these groups, planned medium-term absences from home are most likely explained by the nature of their work. Tradespeople in the construction sector, for
example, are often impelled to move away from home for lengthy periods to follow shifting worksites. At the same time, it is important to recognize that not all moves, even among those employed at the time of the Census, were necessarily work-related. Short-term migration may also be triggered by consumption-related motives, such as extended vacations, with the 'walkabout' phenomenon alive and well, and by no means confined to Australia's indigenous population. Moves of this type almost certainly contribute substantially to interstate return migration among those of retirement age. This group is especially prominent in the Australian data where they reflect a growing predilection for extended 'round Australia trips' upon retirement (Bell and Ward, 1998).

People returning to a different dwelling elsewhere in their state or province of origin display a somewhat different profile, characterized by a slightly older age at the peak but a smaller representation of retirees and more balanced sex ratios. For this group, Table 2 provides qualified support for the notion that return migration represents a response to an unsuccessful initial migration (DaVanzo, 1976). Rates of return were highest for the unemployed, for those without tertiary qualifications, and for people in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Moreover, around two thirds were living in rental accommodation following their return moves. In the face of a disappointing employment or income experience, a return to the region of origin often provides a secure retreat, with prior knowledge of the home region reducing the costs and uncertainty associated with alternative destinations and providing access to the support of family and former friends (DaVanzo, 1976). For others, however, such returns may simply represent another step in a sequence of moves aimed at upward mobility in their occupational careers. Large, multi-locational firms often require junior employees to spend periods in head or branch offices to gain experience as part of the career development process (McKay and Whitelaw, 1977). Such postings are also common in the defense forces and the federal public service in both Australia and Canada. Moves of this type almost certainly account for the substantial representation of more highly skilled occupational groups among migrants returning to another dwelling in their home state or province.

Overall, the rates of return at older ages revealed in Table 2 appear comparatively low, but this is almost certainly an artifact of the period covered by our fixed interval data. Return migration following an earlier retirement move is a common pattern at older ages. Such returns may be precipitated by the need for health care, the death of a spouse, or a variety of other circumstances. However, few such returns are likely to occur within five years of the initial
migration, and such moves are therefore undetected by the fixed interval data examined here.

Turning to onwards migrants, Table 2 suggests that as for some groups of return migrants career aspirations are again important. The profile for this group was strongly dominated by people in the 25–44 age group, especially males. Two thirds of the Canadian contingent and 60 percent of the Australians were in the employed workforce at the time of the Census. Compared with return migrants, they were also more highly qualified and more likely to be working in professional or managerial jobs. Whether these moves were contractual or speculative is uncertain, but the overall picture that emerges is clearly one of people moving in search of alternative employment opportunities. The nature of these moves is further reflected in their choice of destinations.

Patterns of Return Migration

The similarities in chronic migration between Australia and Canada also extend to the spatial dimension. Table 3 sets out rates of return migration viewed from either the state or province of origin and from the corresponding destination. The former indicates the ability of individual states or provinces to retain in-migrants, the latter their ability to regain former out-migrants. On average, the Australian states and territories lost 11 percent of their 1986–90 inflow through return migration, which was marginally higher than the Canadian average of 9.7 percent. In both countries, however, there was substantial variation around the mean, and these differences reflect clear structural similarities in the two space-economies. For example, British Columbia, which is known for its attractive climate and physical amenity, and which experienced strong economic growth through the late 1980s and into the mid-1990s, attracted over 203,000 in-migrants between 1986 and 1990. Only 7 percent made a return migration in the following year. In the past, it has been referred to as the ‘end of the line’ owing to its strong ability to retain in-migrants. In Australia, the high growth sunbelt destination of Queensland is British Columbia’s equivalent, with only 8.8 percent of the 206,000 1986–90 in-migrants returning in the following year. High rates of retention here are partly a product of relative economic performance, but they also reflect the significance of retirees in the primary flows and the fact (as noted above) that return moves among this group occur over a longer time frame that is captured using fixed interval data.
### Table 3

**Interstate and Interprovincial Return Migration: Australia and Canada, 1986-90-91**

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At the other end of the scale, Australia's Northern Territory displayed a very weak retention rate, with over 19 percent of the 28,000 1986–90 in-migrants returning to their state of origin between 1990 and 1991. In a similar way, the combined Territories/PEI region gained some 20,900 in-migrants between 1986–90, but 15 percent returned to other parts of Canada the following year. Both regions are characterized by similar economic structures, including a heavy reliance on resource extraction and exploration with high labor turnover and the movement of Federal and Territorial government employees on contract postings. Younger workers who are seduced to the economic peripheries by attractive employment opportunities and high wages therefore dominate the primary flows but only remain for a limited time (Bell, 1995). In these cases, return migration therefore represents part of a career sequence rather than a response to failure.

Missing from the Australian migration system is a state or territory similar to Quebec. As Canada's largest French-speaking province, Quebec has experienced substantial net out-migration since the mid-1970s, particularly
of English speakers among whom the dominance of the French language and restrictive language rights has had a strong push-effect. Based on lifetime migration statistics, Newbold and Liaw (1994), for instance, demonstrated that French speakers were much more likely to return to Quebec than all other groups. At the same time, the province has a relatively strong ability to retain its in-migrants, with less than 9 percent of the 1986–90 in-migrants returning to their origin province over the following year. In all probability, the remaining 91 percent are mainly Francophones attracted to the province by the very same factors that appear to be partly responsible for the exodus of English speakers.

Return migration can also be considered in terms of a region’s ability to regain its previous out-migrants. Again, a number of parallels are apparent. For example, both Newfoundland and Tasmania displayed an above average ability to regain former out-migrants (15.9% and 12.4%, respectively). Both are largely dependent on primary production and are economically depressed. In the case of Newfoundland, high rates of return most likely represent a series of planned migrations for employment outside the province. Similarly, in Tasmania, there is a long established pattern whereby school-leavers move to the mainland to pursue further education and training, to search for work, or are simply attracted by the ‘bright lights’ of Melbourne or Sydney, but often return to marry (Farmer, 1980). This is a common pattern in the predominantly rural areas of Australia (Bell, 1995).

Paralleling their strong ability to retain in-migrants, both British Columbia and Queensland also exhibited high rates of success in regaining former out-migrants (12.4% and 14.5%, respectively). Both Quebec and New Brunswick also performed well in regaining migrants, probably related to the language issues discussed above. In contrast, both the Australian Territories fared poorly in this respect, as did the combined Territories/PEI region of Canada. For these regions, low rates of return are readily explained by the fact that most out-migrants are themselves former in-migrants who arrived for a limited stay.

**Patterns of Onwards Migration**

While many multiple moves were return migrations, a large number (29,833 in Australia and 33,033 in Canada) were onwards migrations to a different state or province. Turning to Table 4, out-migrants from the Canadian provinces of Ontario or Quebec were less likely to make a second, nonreturn migration than out-migrants from other provinces. Conversely, individuals
from the west and east coasts, as well as the interior Prairie provinces, were more likely to make an onwards migration. In Australia, those who left the smaller states or territories, such as Tasmania, South Australia and the Northern Territories, were more likely to make an onwards migration. Although relatively small in terms of absolute numbers, the large population turnover in both the Australian Northern Territory and the Canadian Territories is likely attributable to their remote location, frontier character and resource-based economies and the significance of government transfers, implying that the people leaving these areas are highly mobile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Onward Interstate and Interprovincial Migration: Australia and Canada, 1986-90-91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada Province</th>
<th>Percent of 1986-90 migrants who made an onward migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Of out-migrants from this province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nfld</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NB</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ON</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AB</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BC</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terr. and PEI</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Onwards migrations can also be expressed as a percentage of former in-migrants to each state or province, interpreted as the differential ability to retain migrants. Queensland and British Columbia both recorded high reten-
tion rates, with less than 3 percent of their 1986–90 in-migrants leaving for a third province or state. Ontario, Alberta and New South Wales also had strong retention rates. Not surprisingly, the more economically depressed or remote areas, such as the Northern Territory, the Canadian Territories/PEI, and the Atlantic provinces, displayed a very limited capacity to retain earlier in-migrants.

The Spatial Impacts of Chronic Migration

Chronic migration exerts significant impacts on the migration and settlement system. Return moves typically reduce the extent of population redistribution arising from the primary flows (Table 5). Return moves, for example, generally reduced the gains in those states or provinces with net in-migration, including Queensland, Western Australia, Ontario and British Columbia, while partly offsetting the losses from provinces and states such as Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Onward moves typically exerted a smaller numerical impact (except in Alberta and British Columbia). They were also less consis-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
<th>NET GAINS AND LOSSES FROM RETURN AND ONWARD MIGRATION FLOWS: AUSTRALIA AND CANADA, 1986-90-91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Net migration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>-79,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>-31,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>98,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>-4,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>17,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>-432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>-2,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Canada Province** | **Net migration** | **Net migration 1990-91** |
| | 1986-90 | From return migration | From onward migration | From single migration | Total |
| Nfld | -11,667 | 3,066 | -200 | -1,833 | 1,033 |
| NS | -1,733 | -34 | 233 | -200 | 1 |
| NB | -4,367 | 1,134 | -467 | 600 | 1,267 |
| PQ | -15,133 | 3,500 | -1,100 | -10,734 | -8,334 |
| ON | 47,533 | -8,367 | -2,667 | -9,800 | -20,834 |
| MB | -33,700 | 1,334 | -33 | 5,567 | -4,266 |
| SA | -44,933 | 1,700 | -1,133 | -10,833 | -10,267 |
| AB | -25,600 | -134 | 2,200 | 7,200 | 9,266 |
| BC | 93,600 | -867 | 3,367 | 29,500 | 32,000 |
| Terr. and PEI | -4,000 | -1,333 | -200 | 1,667 | 134 |
tent in direction. For example, onward moves contributed to the gains in Queensland and British Columbia but reduced the net inflows to Ontario and Western Australia.

Chronic moves assume particular significance when viewed in relation to other migrations during the 1990–91 interval. In Newfoundland, South Australia and Tasmania, for instance, return and onwards migration reversed the losses from nonrepeat flows, resulting in a modest net population gain for the 1990–91 period. In Western Australia and the Northern Territory, the opposite effect occurred, with the net outflow between 1990 and 1991 due entirely to a loss of chronic migrants. Other states and provinces display similar patterns but in varying degrees. Thus, in New Brunswick, gains from chronic migration more than doubled the net inflow due to nonrepeat moves; in Alberta, they contributed 22 percent of the 1990–91 total and in British Columbia 8 percent. Conversely, in Quebec and Manitoba, the gains from return and onwards migration offset almost one quarter of the losses from nonrepeat moves, and in New South Wales, the figure was one third. In Ontario, on the other hand, losses from chronic migration more than doubled the one year outflow.

These effects derive in part from the character of individual states and provinces, as discussed above, but they also reflect marked annual fluctuations in the level, and even the direction, of the net migration balance. For instance, Ontario’s 1986–90 net gain of 47,500 people reversed to a net loss of 20,800 between 1990 and 1991. Conversely, Alberta recorded a significant loss (-25,600) during the 1986–90 interval but a substantial gain (+9,300) over the subsequent year. The discrepancies in the Australian data are less stark, but the 1990–91 figures rarely match the average of the preceding four years in either country. These temporal fluctuations in net migration can generally be traced to the impact of particular events and circumstances in individual states and provinces, especially their relative economic performance. For example, sharply accelerating losses from Victoria at the end of the 1980s were largely due to the stringent economic policies introduced by the incoming state government in an effort to reduce public debt (Bell, 1995). A similar fall in Ontario is associated with that province’s economic decline at the start of the early 1990s recession.

Return migration appears to play a key role in these annual shifts. In regions such as South Australia and Newfoundland, for example, the shift from an overall 1986–90 loss to a 1990–91 gain was partly a product of improved economic performance but was further contributed to by net gains from returns
consequent on the higher loss in the earlier period. Similarly, in Western Australia and Ontario, high inflows at the start of the 1986–90 interval triggered returns that accentuated the 1990–91 losses. What this then suggests is that periodic peaks and troughs in the primary flows triggered by economic events engender feedback loops through return movements that act either to dampen or accentuate the aggregate level of net migration in subsequent years. The precise nature of these effects will depend on the periodicity of the primary flows and the lag between primary and return migration (Bell, 1996).

**CONCLUSIONS**

This article has compared and contrasted return and onwards migration at the state and provincial level in Australia and Canada using fixed interval data from the 1991 round of Censuses. Despite the ever-present difficulty of comparing migration statistics across countries, the results point to a high degree of symmetry in the migration processes in the two countries, with similar proportions making return or onward moves, a close match in terms of the characteristics of chronic migrants, and comparable spatial patterns. In combination, the results confirm and extend the findings of previous research based on lifetime migration data and residential history analysis.

Our results indicate that a little over 40 percent of people who moved between the Australian states or the Canadian provinces between 1990 and 1991 had made a previous interstate move between 1986 and 1990. Framed in terms of the population at risk (all 1986–90 interstate or interprovincial migrants), this represents a probability of around 13 (Canada) to 15 percent (Australia) that an interstate or interprovincial migration during a four year period will be followed by a second such move in the following year. Some 72 percent of these moves in both countries comprised returns to the 1986 state or province of origin, while the remaining 28 percent took the form of onwards migrations to a third destination. Of the former, one quarter (Canada) to one third (Australia) were returns to the dwelling occupied in 1986. This form of return movement has not been previously identified in the specialized literature on chronic migration, although it has long been recognized as a key element in circular mobility.

The significance of these moves lies in the implication that a large proportion of return migrations are planned in advance rather than representing involuntary retreats in the face of failed initial migrations, as they have generally been painted. Although there is inevitably considerable overlap, clear distinctions were found between the composition of the three groups of
chronic migrants, implying markedly different motives. Two thirds of those returning to their 1986 dwelling were owner-occupiers rather than renters. They included a significant contingent of young adults, most likely retreating to the safety of their parental home, and a substantial representation of less skilled workers, probably returning after job-related absences. In Australia, another important group were people aged 60 and over, possibly returning after an extended post-retirement recreational trip. It appears to be this group, not evident in the Canadian data, who account for the higher overall incidence of return moves in Australia. However, the results presented here almost certainly understate the significance of return migration at older ages in both countries, simply because such returns occur over a longer time frame than is captured by the fixed interval data.

Compared with those returning to their earlier residences, people returning to another dwelling elsewhere in their state or province of origin tended to be slightly older, less-skilled, less well educated, more likely to be unemployed and to be living in rental accommodations. This profile is not inconsistent with the stereotype of failed migrations, but there was also a significant contingent of more highly skilled workers which points to pre-planned, contractual moves associated with career development. Overall, our results suggest that the stereotype of return migration as moves triggered by failure has been overstated: a large proportion appear instead to be pre-planned, many of these as part of a process of career development. However, it is among onwards movers that career advancement emerges as the most significant motive: compared with return migrants this group tended to be older, male, more highly qualified and more likely to be working in a professional or managerial occupation. The picture is clearly one of people moving in pursuit of greener employment pastures.

The identification of chronic migrants is important for demographic accounting because it is the distinction between moves and movers that explains the difference between mobility rates measured over intervals of differing lengths (Long and Boertlein, 1981; Rogerson, 1990). Residential histories or population registers are needed to establish the precise role of repeated migration events in transitions measured over a given interval. Such analysis would be particularly useful in establishing the cumulative rates of return and onward movement from a cohort of primary moves. What is evident from the analysis presented here, however, is that the incidence of chronic mobility is also mediated by the characteristics of individual regions and the role they perform in the space-economy, along with shifts in the relative
attractiveness of those regions over time, consequent upon economic performance and local events. For example, it has been demonstrated that low rates of retention and return are key factors in the high population turnover characteristic of specialized economic regions (such as the resource-dependent Territories in both countries). Similarly, fast growing regions, such as Queensland and British Columbia, tend to both retain incoming migrants and have a strong ability to regain former out-migrants. At the same time, the evidence also suggests that oscillations in the strength of primary migration flows tend to be offset by feedback loops of return migration from earlier peaks and troughs.

In general, the results from this analysis are consistent with those derived from residential histories and from analyses of lifetime return and onwards migration. The spatial patterns of chronic mobility, the weakening effect of return movements on the magnitude of the primary flows, and similar profiles with respect to age and other personal characteristics suggest that the phenomena of return and onwards migration are relatively consistent across time and space. This, in turn, should provide a basis from which to synthesize some general principles of chronic mobility and the potential for more integral links with mainstream migration theory.

Fixed interval data of the type examined here offer a number of further avenues by which to elaborate such theory. One requirement is for more sophisticated analysis of the characteristics of chronic migrants. While the descriptive analysis presented here points to a high degree of selectivity and some variation in population composition according to the type of secondary move, there is substantial overlap in the composition of the three groups of chronic migrants. Multivariate procedures are needed to tease out the key attributes that differentiate these groups, including an analysis of the role of government transfers and fiscal policy and the further investigation of return migrants themselves. Another avenue for extension is through application of a finer spatial mesh to allow identification of return and onward moves at the substate or subprovincial level. Such analysis would not only provide further evidence of the incidence of such moves, the attributes of the movers, and the effect of regional characteristics, but also enable the influence of other factors such as migration distance to be assessed. A finer grid should also enable a more detailed assessment of the relationship between migration and the role of individual regions within the national space-economy. Suitable data are available from both the Canadian and Australian Censuses of 1996 and will be considered in a further study.
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Farmer, R. S. J.  

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Immigrant Trip Duration: The Case of Immigrants from Western Mexico

Belinda I. Reyes
Public Policy Institute of California

This article uses data from the Mexican Migration Project to determine the factors that affect how long Mexican immigrants stay in the United States. Based on the estimates of a discrete-time hazard model, the most important predictors of duration are the economic opportunities for immigrants in the United States, the household resources before migration, and the opportunities available at the immigrant’s community of origin. The article also finds longer trip duration after the Immigration Reform and Control Act than in previous years and important differences between male and female migrants.

Most Mexican immigrants do not settle permanently in the United States (Bean, Telles and Lowell, 1987; Cornelius, 1976, 1978; Hugo, 1981; Jenkins, 1977; Jones, 1982a, 1982b; Massey et al., 1987; Mines and de Janvry, 1982; Ranney and Kossoudji, 1983; White, Bean and Espenshade, 1990; Reyes, 1997). Some move with the intention to settle permanently but make mistakes and have to return to correct their errors, while others move planning to return to their countries of origin. Length of stay in the United States depends not only on the opportunities available to immigrants in the United States, but also on the opportunities available in the home community and the economic needs of the household. Most of the econometric work on trip duration examines the effect of opportunities at home and abroad (Lindstrom, 1996; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Reyes, 1997). But it generally does not take into account the economic needs of the household. Households from particular regions are assumed to have similar incentives, and no differentiation is made between households with more or less resources, except for labor supply and migration experience. This is the first study to take into account not only the economic opportunities available to immigrants at home and abroad, but also the immigrant’s household resources at the time of migration.

I am indebted to Robert Plotnick, Maz Neiman, Douglas Massey, Jon Sonstelie, Julie DaVanzo, Hans Johnson, and Laura Mameesh for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also would like to thank the two referees and the editor of this journal for their constructive comments and suggestions.

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Furthermore, most of the work on trip duration ignores female migration. Mexican women are generally assumed to move in order to meet other family members in the United States (Durand and Massey, 1992). Independent migrant women remain relatively understudied (Cohen, 1995), even though women have been a part of the migration process since the Bracero Program, and the proportion of migrant females has been increasing over time (Marcelli and Cornelius, 1999). This article examines male and female migration in order to disentangle differences in migration behavior by gender.

RETURN MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

As argued by Julie DaVanzo (1974), “return migration may occur following a move that was impermanent by intent or after disappointment at destination.” The latter explanation has come to be called the disappointment hypothesis. It maintains that people move with the intention of settling in the location that provides them with the highest expected lifetime earnings. However, immigrants have incomplete information about income and job prospects before migration and may miscalculate the benefits of that migration. Those who make costly miscalculations migrate again to correct their errors (DaVanzo, 1981; DaVanzo and Morrison, 1982; Herzog and Schlottmann, 1982; Grant and Vanderkamp, 1985).

But there are also immigrants who move with the intention of returning to their countries of origin (see Bailey and Hane, 1995). The circular migration hypothesis assumes that workers strongly prefer to remain in their home communities, but they must resort to temporary migration because of limited income opportunities at home. These workers prefer to spend as little time as possible away from home and yet accumulate enough savings from foreign earnings to reach a particular level of net lifetime earnings. Migrants move as target earners and only stay for as long as it takes to save or remit money equal to some pre-determined amount (Berg, 1961; Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Hill, 1987; Lindstrom, 1996). The targeted level of income and the length of time immigrants stay in the destination depend on wage rates at origin and destination, the households’ income needs, the cost of migration, and economic opportunities at the communities of origin (Berg, 1961; Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Hill, 1987; Lindstrom, 1996).

Ethnographic research of communities in Mexico find that most immigrants do not intend to permanently settle in the United States (Bean, Telles and Lowell, 1987; Cornelius, 1976, 1978; Hugo, 1981; Jenkins, 1977; Jones, 1982a, 1982b; Massey et al., 1987; Mines and de Janvry, 1982; Ranney and
Kossoudji, 1983; White, Bean and Espenshade, 1990). This has been confirmed by the econometric analysis on trip duration (Lindstrom, 1996; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Reyes, 1997). However, most of the econometric research examines only the migration of males, especially heads of household. Little is known about Mexican female migration. Beyond size and the household migration experience, no other characteristics enter the duration models. This article expands on previous research by considering a wide range of household resources not previously examined, by considering the migration of both men and women, and by allowing the effect of the variables in the model to vary over time. This provides a more accurate modeling of the effect of individual, household and community characteristics on trip duration.

DATA AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

The Mexican Migration Project Data

The analysis in this study is based on data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) (for more on the sample, see Massey and Singer, 1995; Lindstrom and Massey, 1994; for a detailed examination of the limitations of the sample, see Reyes, 1997). The data were collected in 30 Mexican communities between 1982 and 1993. Two to five communities were surveyed in successive years (see Table 1). A random sample of households was generated from each community. There were 5,652 households interviewed in Mexico and 410 in the United States. This generates a total sample of 42,686 people, including 11,751 who have lived in the United States at some point in their lives. The sample is restricted to people who were at least 11 years old at the time of their migration, since most of these migrants are not moving independently of their parents. Many immigrants moved more than once to the United States and thus are counted twice when modeling the choice to return to Mexico: once for the first entry and again for the last entry into the United States. This generates a sample of 14,450 entries that was used to model return migration.

Definition of Variables

Table 2 presents the variables used in the analysis. Utilizing the information gathered on every year an immigrant has spent in the United States for the

2Households include everyone who lives in the house, whether or not they are relatives of the household head and all children of household head, whether or not they still live in the sampled house.

3This sample was weighted to generate an accurate number of immigrants from each community. A detailed explanation of the weighting scheme is explained in Reyes, 1997.
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEXICAN COMMUNITIES SAMPLED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1990 Population</th>
<th>Year Surveyed</th>
<th>Mexican Sample Frame of hh</th>
<th>Mexican Sample (number of hh)</th>
<th>U.S. Sample (number of hh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>2,870,417</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>867,920</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>492,901</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3578</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>362,915</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>217,068</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Metro Area</td>
<td>74,068</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>52,231</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>780</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33,123</td>
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<td>2761</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>32,474</td>
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<td>6776</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>1776</td>
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<td>23,726</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<td>19,645</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>2723</td>
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<td>11,546</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>364</td>
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<td>7,437</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>6,429</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>4,760</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>5,785</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

first and last U.S. trip, I use the probability that immigrant i returns to Mexico at year t as the dependent variable. Although the study controlled for many factors, there are three sets of independent variables of special interest: those that capture the opportunities available in the United States, those that capture the household resources, and those that capture the economic opportunities at the home community. In addition to these variables, the model controls personal characteristics (age, education and household status) and migration-related variables (duration, documentation status, prior migration-related variables).
tion experience, year of migration, and place of destination in the United States).6

The economic opportunities in the United States are captured with dummies for occupation, employment in agriculture, and wages in the United States.7 Immigrants who fare better in the United States are expected to stay longer than those who earn low wages or those who work as unskilled workers. On the other hand, employment in agriculture is seasonal (Massey et al., 1987); hence, I expected shorter duration for those employed in this sector.

A number of variables describe the resources of the household in Mexico. It is hypothesized that the greater the household’s resources, the longer the length of stay for immigrants in the United States. For example, the household’s migration experience provides potential immigrants with information and networks in the United States, increasing the chances for success and therefore their length of stay in the United States. But the household resources also determine the motives for migration. Households with limited resources may rely on migration to satisfy immediate income needs, while a more resourceful household may use migration as an investment mechanism. Household resources are captured with the household’s migration experience; the ratio of people employed to people in the household, having no assets (a home, communal or private land, a business, or a car), having either a home or land, and having a combination of assets (for example, a house and land, or a house and a business).

A set of variables captures the opportunities at the sending location. Lindstrom (1996) maintains that the better the opportunities in the sending community, the longer immigrants stay in the United States because they move to accumulate income for investment rather than to meet immediate income needs. However, location-specific capital may also lead to differences.

The year of migration is included as a proxy for the effect of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on migration and settlement. IRCA came into effect in 1986 and had three main policy changes: 1) it increased border enforcement; 2) it began instituting employer sanctions; and 3) it gave amnesty to a large number of previously unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Some researchers argue that since IRCA there has been a change in the incentive to return and that as a result immigrants stay longer in the United States (Alarcon, 1995a, 1995b; Chavez, 1988; Cornelius, 1991, 1992; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Vernez and Ronfeldt, 1991).

The destination dummies are included so as to capture distinctions in the cost of migration, social networks, and opportunities for immigrants in different U.S. destinations (Reyes and Mameesh, 2001).

I use the log of the wage in the United States. Wages are corrected for inflation using the Consumer Price Index.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>1 if the person returns to Mexico at year t, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities in the United States</td>
<td>The logarithm of the hourly wage while in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1 if the person was employed in agriculture while in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>1 if the person was employed as a skilled worker, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>1 if the person was employed as an unskilled worker, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowork</td>
<td>1 if the person was unemployed or out of the labor force while in the United States, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents</td>
<td>The total number of people in the household over the total number of people in the labor force in the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mig History</td>
<td>1 if a friend or a family member has been in the United States before the person's migration, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>1 if the household had no assets before migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>1 if the household owned their house or had communal or private land before migration, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>1 if the household owns a combination of assets (car, land, business, house) before migration, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Community Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1 if the home community has electricity, lighting, telephone and access to a freeway in a particular year, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Total population in the origin location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male in Ag</td>
<td>Percent of the male labor force employed in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
<td>Percent of the labor force earning twice the minimum wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labor</td>
<td>Percent of the women in the labor force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Proportion of the Population who are employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>1 if the person originated from the state of Nayarit, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>1 if the person originated from the state of Guanajuato, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>1 if the person originated from the state of Michoacan, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>1 if the person originated from the state of Jalisco, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age at the time of migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agesq</td>
<td>Age at migration squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Education at the time of the survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educsq</td>
<td>Education squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>1 if person is the household head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 if the person has been in the United States for 2 years, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Continuous variable for duration longer than 3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rdSQ</td>
<td>Continuous variable for duration longer than 3 years squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documented</td>
<td>1 if the person entered the United States legally, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips</td>
<td>Number of trips to the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before IRCA</td>
<td>1 if the person moved before IRCA, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to the California Coast (Salinas-Monterey, Ventura, Santa Barbara, Napa-Sonoma, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to the California Central Valley (Imperial, San Joaquin, Sacramento, Rio Vista, Lake Tahoe), otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to San Diego or Riverside-San Bernardino, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to San Francisco or San Jose Counties, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to Los Angeles or Orange County, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to Texas, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of United States</td>
<td>1 if the person moved to any other location in the United States, otherwise=0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in duration in the United States and not necessarily perceived investment opportunities. People may stay longer in the United States because they are “better” qualified to succeed in the United States. They may have more experience with institutions similar to those available in the United States (e.g., banks, trains, newspapers, etc.), giving them an advantage over those from less dynamic communities. In order to capture differences in economic opportunities across Mexican communities, I examined the percentage of the economically active population earning more than twice the minimum wage, female labor force participation rate, and the percent of people in the labor force who are employers at the time of migration and every year thereafter. More prosperous communities are those with a greater proportion of employers, people earning more than twice the minimum wage, and greater female participation in the labor force (see Lindstrom, 1996 and Massey and Espinosa, 1997 for a similar use of these variables). Also utilized is the percentage of men employed in agriculture to determine the economic base of the origin community. Prosperous communities could be both agricultural and nonagricultural. However, communities with strong agriculture may only have short-term migrants if immigrants need to return to the home communities to care for the land at the time of harvest. The level of modernity of the origin location may also affect duration, as argued by Berg (1961). To capture this, a dummy variable was examined for having electric, water, public lighting, telephone service, and a paved road from the community to the highway at the time of migration. Finally, I control for the state of origin of Mexican immigrants. People from Michoacan, for example, may have more developed social networks than immigrants from other parts of the country.

**STATISTICAL MODEL**

A discrete-time hazard model of return migration was estimated in order to determine the probability that an immigrant \( i \) will return to Mexico given that she has been in the United States for \( t \) years (for more on discrete hazard

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8In February 1996, there were 3 minimum wage levels in Mexico — $2.67 a day in Mexico City and other high cost areas, $2.48 a day in medium cost areas such as Guadalajara, and $2.25 a day in most states and rural areas (at an exchange rate of 7.55 per dollar).

9Finally, a number of interactions test the settlement intention of immigrants and how they change with improved economic opportunities in the United States. The proxies for economic opportunities (percentage employers, percentage earning twice the minimum wage, and the percentage of females in the labor force) are interacted with wages in the United States. From these interactions, I can capture the responsiveness of migrants from different sending communities to increasing opportunities in the host country.
models, see Heckman, and Singer, 1984; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980; Lancaster, 1990). The model assumes that the probability of return is a function of time in the United States along with other independent variables. This model is similar to a logit model in that it is assumed that is an underlying response variable \( Y_{it} \) defined by the relationship

\[
Y_{it} = b_0 + b_1 X_i + b_2 U_i + b_3 N_i + b_4 C_{it} + b_5 X_i^{2nd} + b_6 X_i^{3rd} + b_7 X_i^{3rd SQ} + b_8 U_i^{2nd} + b_9 U_i^{3rd} + b_{10} U_i^{3rd SQ} + b_{11} N_i^{2nd} + b_{12} N_i^{3rd} + b_{13} N_i^{3rd SQ} + b_{14} C_{it}^{2nd} + b_{15} C_{it}^{3rd} + b_{16} C_{it}^{3rd SQ} + b_{17} 2^{nd} + b_{18} 3^{rd} + b_{19} 3^{rd SQ} + e_{it}
\]

where \( X_i \) are personal characteristics and measures of migration experience, \( U_i \) are the opportunities for immigrant \( i \) in the United States, \( N_i \) are the household resources, and \( C_{it} \) are the characteristics of the community of origin. Since most people return within the first two years after migration, I use a dummy for duration less than a year (1st), one for duration between one and two years (2nd), and a continuous variable (3rd) with a square term (3rd SQ) for duration longer than three years (1st is the omitted category). I also allowed the effect of the independent variables to vary with U.S. duration by interacting a number of independent variables with the dummies for duration.\(^{10}\) The model was run separately for men and women (see Reyes, 1997 for details on the likelihood function).

**RESULTS**

As shown in Figure I, most of the immigrants in the sample return to Mexico within five years; men return quicker than women, and undocumented immigrants return sooner than documented immigrants. Close to half of the immigrants in the sample are undocumented males who return soon after migration, with 55 percent returning within the first year after migration.

Female migrants stay longer in the United States than male migrants. Even undocumented female migrants stay, on average, about as long as documented

\(^{10}\) I interact the duration variables with age at the time of migration, education, place of origin and destination dummies, occupation while in the United States, status in the household, wages, year of immigration, and the characteristics of the origin location.
immigrant men. This could be due to differences in the characteristics of female migrants or due to differences in the motives for migration. As shown in Table 3, female migrants are slightly more educated, a greater proportion are documented, slightly more moved after IRCA, and they originated from households with more assets and from communities with better opportunities than did men. All these variables have been found to increase duration in the United States (Reyes, 1997). But the motives for female migration may also differ from that of men. While some female migrants may move to join other family members already in the United States and stay longer in the United States, others may move for investment purposes. As seen in Table 3, more women than men moved with other family members and less of them were employed while in the United States, suggesting that many of the women in the sample moved for family reunification. However, the majority of the women in the sample moved independently and were employed while in the United States, suggesting substantial economically motivated migration. Female migrants who move because of economic incentives may stay longer in the United States than men if families use female migration differently than that of male migrants. They may use female migration to supplement income or for investment purposes, rather than to meet immediate income needs of the household. This is examined in the following pages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agesq</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educsq</td>
<td>34.81</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td>35.79</td>
<td>53.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documented</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bef_IRCA</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowork</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>$3.25</td>
<td>$2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valley</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Area</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of United States</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependents</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mig History</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>35.935</td>
<td>38.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRMLFP</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINWAGE</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMLABOR</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNER</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions with Documentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in US documented</td>
<td>43.15</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in US undocumented</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowork documented</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowork undocumented</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample (weighted)</td>
<td>100,036</td>
<td>24,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample (unweighted)</td>
<td>11,746</td>
<td>2,714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 shows simulations of the probability of return for the most
important variables in the model. Although there are some differences by
gender and immigration status, duration in the United States increases with
wages, family resources and opportunities at the home community.

The opportunities available play an important role in determining how
long immigrants stay in the United States. High wage earners stay longer than
low wage earners with otherwise similar characteristics. And skilled workers
stay longer in the United States than unskilled workers, with the exception of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities in the US</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin Community Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male in Ag low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male in Ag high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labor low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labor high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Charact. And Migration Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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|TABLE 4
SIMULATIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF STAY OVER TIME
(PERCENT STILL IN THE US IN A PARTICULAR YEAR) |

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Male in Ag high</td>
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<td>Personal Charact. And Migration Experience</td>
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<td>Heads</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Before IRCA</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>After IRCA</td>
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11These simulations were estimated using the beta coefficients generated in the discrete-time
hazard model (Appendix A) and the average of all the independent variables (Table 3).
documented female migrants. However, only 10 percent of the men and 9 percent of the women in the sample were employed as skilled workers. Being employed in the agricultural sector, regardless of the level of skill, makes immigrants return sooner to the home community than those out of agriculture. A substantial proportion of the immigrants in the sample were employed in agriculture (30%).

Household assets are an important predictor of duration. Duration increases with household assets, especially for undocumented immigrants. Immigrants from households who own a combination of assets (car, house, land, and/or a business) stay the longest in the United States, while those with no assets return soon after migration. If a household is not doing well in the home community and there is a need to rely on migration for income, members move to the United States for short periods of time. On the other hand, if the household is doing relatively well in the home community, members move on a permanent or semipermanent basis, for investment purposes or for personal reasons. Most households in the sample owned some assets: close to 61 percent of immigrants originated from households with at least a home or land.

The household's labor supply, as measured by the number of workers per dependents, and the household's migration experience have small effects on duration (see Appendix A). They are only significant for female migrants. The greater the ratio of workers to dependents, the longer female migrants stay in the United States. On the other hand, originating from a household with a migration history increases the probability of return. This may indicate a reliance of the family on migration as a source of income.

The opportunities available at the origin location are another important determinant of duration. Immigrants from communities with better economic opportunities stay longer in the United States than those from communities with poor economic opportunities, as seen by the simulations in Table 4. The greater the proportion of the population in the origin location who earns twice the minimum wage, the greater the percent of the labor force who are employers; the greater the female labor force participation, the longer immigrants stay in the United States. As suggested by Lindstrom (1997), immigrants from more dynamic regions may stay longer in the United States than immigrants from less dynamic communities because they are saving money to invest at home, holding constant for family resources and other characteristics. However, immigrants from more dynamic regions may also be better prepared for employment in the United States. They may be more suc-
cessful in the United States and stay longer than immigrants from less dynamic regions because they are better qualified to succeed in the United States.

Although it is difficult to disentangle these two effects, our interactions provide support for the investment hypothesis for women, but not for men. If immigrants are moving for investment, an increase in U.S. earnings should cause a quicker return to Mexico, since they would be able to achieve the targeted levels of income sooner than expected. However, our estimates reveal the opposite response. As wages increase in the United States, males remain longer especially those from more dynamic communities. This suggests that immigrants are more willing to adjust their expectations and stay longer in the United States as conditions improve.

However, the same is not true for females. Documented females from more dynamic regions are not as responsive to changes in wages, and undocumented crossers are more likely to return if they earn higher wages in the United States, supporting Lindstrom's argument about investment. This may be because families from these regions may use female migration strategically. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women are better savers and therefore may be more reliable to send when families need money for investment purposes. Further research is needed in order to explore this hypothesis.

However, on average, communities in Mexico are not very prosperous, as shown in Table 3. The average proportion of people earning twice the minimum wage is 24 percent for men and 27 percent for women. Only about 16 percent of the women were in the labor force (on average) and only about 5 percent of the origin location labor force were employers. Close to half of the origin location's males were employed in agriculture, which highlights the importance of circular migration among the immigrants in this sample.

Of the control variables, the most important determinants of trip duration are the immigrant's status in the household and the year of migration. Forty percent of the male migrants in the sample are heads of household and they return quicker to Mexico than other members of the household. Therefore, using data exclusively on heads of household would over-estimate the extent of short-term migration among Mexican immigrants.

Alarcon (1995a), Cornelius (1992) and others argue that there has been a transformation in the settlement process in recent years. Immigrants who otherwise would have returned to Mexico are now staying longer in the United States as a result of IRCA and recent immigrant legislation. Thirty-seven percent of the men and 41 percent of the women in the sample moved after the Immigration Reform and Control Act, and they stay longer in the Unit-
ed States than those who moved in previous periods, especially if they are undocumented. Prior to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, only 32 percent of the men and 10 percent of the undocumented female remained in the United States after five years. But after IRCA, that proportion increased to 52 percent of the women and 25 percent of the men – an increase of 63 percent for females and 73 percent for males. Further study is necessary in order to understand this shift.

**CONCLUSION**

This article highlights the most important determinants of immigrant trip duration in the United States. In general, the results of the discrete-time hazard model demonstrate the importance of economic opportunities in both Mexico and the United States and the income needs of the household to determine immigrant trip duration.

The greater the household resources before migration, the longer immigrants stay in the United States, especially if they move without documents. Most Mexican immigrants originated from a household with at least a house or land. However, the opportunities available at origin and destination also affect trip duration. If immigrants originate from prosperous communities, they stay in the United States longer than if they originated from a community with restricted opportunities. However, most immigrants do not originate from prosperous communities. Finally, independent of household resources and opportunities at the origin location, immigrants stay longer in the United States if they are able to secure high paying jobs. However, most immigrants are employed in unskilled occupations, and the average wage for male and female migrants, respectively, is $3.25 and $2.20 an hour.

Furthermore, the findings of this study emphasize the need to study female migration. Their migration varies in important ways from that of men. Female migrants tend to have characteristics associated with longer trip duration. But they may also differ in terms of the motivations behind their migration. While some female migrants move to join other family members in the United States, the majority seem to be moving for economic reasons. Households may also use female migration strategically in order to secure savings for investment purposes at home.

Finally, the pre- and post-IRCA variable suggests the effect of immigration policy on trip duration. As indicated by previous research, recent immigration policies may have altered the settlement process, increasing the proportion of semi-permanent or permanent migrants. This is important because
policies that are meant to decrease the number of immigrants entering the United States may end up increasing the number of immigrants living in the United States. Policymakers need to consider this issue before creating amnesty programs and before encouraging more protective immigration policies.

**APPENDIX A**

**RESULTS OF THE DISCRETE-TIME HAZARD MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>Female</th>
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<td>-.04*</td>
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(Continued)
## APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
### RESULTS OF THE DISCRETE-TIME HAZARD MODEL

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<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>-.694&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>-.17&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.02</td>
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### APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

**RESULTS OF THE DISCRETE-TIME HAZARD MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Male Beta</th>
<th>Male SE</th>
<th>Female Beta</th>
<th>Female SE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
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<td>Wage*trip</td>
<td>-.006b</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<td>.52b</td>
<td>.239</td>
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<td>Doc*Education</td>
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<td>Doc*Head</td>
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<td>Doc*Bef_IRCA</td>
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<td>Doc*Agriculture</td>
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<td>Somers’D</td>
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<td>.66</td>
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Notes: a significant at a 1 percent level
b significant at a 5 percent level.

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The Impact of Temporary Labor Migration on Mexican Children's Educational Aspirations and Performance

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Pennsylvania State University

Grace Kao
University of Pennsylvania

This article examines how temporary U.S. labor migration by family members and by students affects the educational aspirations and performance of those same students growing up in Mexican migrant communities. Labor migration affects these children in two ways. First it brings remitted U.S. earnings into the household which allows parents to provide more education for their children and reduce the need for children's labor. Higher incomes are also associated with numerous factors that improve the general well-being of children, as reflected in various indicators including higher school grades. Labor migration also has negative impacts on children. In addition to family stress and behavioral problems with adolescents due to parental and sibling absence, migration provides an example of an alternative route to economic mobility. Children growing up in migrant households have access to information and social networks that reduce their likelihood of migration failure should they choose this alternative to the Mexican labor market. We analyze a unique data set from a stratified random sample of 7600 grammar, junior high, and high school-level students in a state capital, a large town, and 25 rural communities in a Mexican migrant-sending state. We find that high levels of U.S. migration are associated with lower aspirations to attend a university at all academic levels. We find, however, a positive relationship

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between U.S. migration and grades. We conclude that while U.S. migration provides financial benefits that allow children to continue schooling and perform well, it may also reduce the motivation to attain above-average years of schooling.

Temporary international labor migration from Mexico to the United States is often motivated by parental desires to provide economic and educational opportunities for their children. It also produces socioeconomic mobility for migrant families who face poverty and restricted or limited labor markets. Examinations of the economic mobility of migrants usually have involved looking at short-term wealth acquisition, but another approach considers the long-term well-being of children growing up in migrant households. Since education in developing countries is perhaps the strongest determinant of economic and labor market success and a primary vehicle for socioeconomic mobility, we explore the connection between international migration prevalence within families and education performance and aspirations for children growing up in Mexico.

Despite the history of temporary migration from Mexico since the past century and from many developing countries in the past three decades, few studies have explored the notion of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility in the same way as with the extensive literature for permanent U.S. migrants. Recent attention focuses on how temporary immigrants affect the U.S. economy and how permanent migrants’ children are faring in the U.S. educational system. The consumption of education goods is one means by which international migration can have a significant economic development impact. Studies have documented benefits from migrants’ remitted earnings to home communities in Mexico, but few, if any, have considered the tradeoff between increased material resources from migration on one hand, and negative consequences resulting from parental absence and migratory influence on the other.

This study is unique in several respects. First, it contributes to the limited understanding of the effects of international migration on households in migrant-sending countries by examining how children’s grades and educational aspirations correspond to the international migration experience of their families. Second, it utilizes original data from student surveys conducted in a random stratified sample of schools in a migrant-sending Mexican state. Third, the study conceptualizes international migration by examining the impact on students of both the extent of migration within their families, as well as one unexplored dimension – temporary migration by children themselves.
Relevant research is reviewed and the multiple influences that migration might be expected to have on children's grades and aspirations is discussed. Based upon our review, we speculate on positive and negative impacts of migration on children's education. The data, sampling and analysis methodologies are described. Finally, descriptive tabulations and analyses on the influences of migration on two salient measures of education progress – grades attained and aspirations to attend a university – are presented.

**FAMILY MEMBER MIGRATION AND CHILDREN'S EDUCATION**

Few studies have examined how temporary migration affects children remaining in their home countries, despite the fact that temporary labor migration is found increasingly in all areas of the world, particularly from lesser to more developed countries (Massey *et al.*, 1998). This is especially the case in the United States, where Mexicans outnumber other immigrant groups and where the majority remain in the country for less than one year for any given trip (Massey *et al.*, 1987).

The positive financial effects of migration have been documented by a number of studies showing that remitted earnings help migrants purchase capital goods (homes, land, vehicles), sustain their families (Grindle, 1988; Massey *et al.*, 1987; Mines, 1981), and attain a level of economic mobility that would otherwise elude them (Jones, 1995).

Income from U.S. migration relieves the household budget constraints that prevent children from continuing their schooling (Kandel, 1996). In one of the few studies that examine the consumption patterns of migrant households, Taylor (1987) provides evidence that remitted earnings from the United States allow primary school children to continue their studies. Although nine years of public education are tuition free, other expenses such as uniforms, books, supplies, and parents' association fees begin at kindergarten. Moreover, by the time students reach the sixth grade, opportunity costs to parents of keeping their children in school become significant, particularly in rural communities (Selby, Murphy and Lorenzen, 1990). Adolescent Mexican children living at home are expected to contribute to the household economy; remaining in school, even with part-time work, prevents them from doing so completely. Thus, by allowing additional consumption of education goods and reducing the need for children's paid labor, remitted earnings can positively affect educational attainment. To the extent that children are aware of their family's financial circumstances, remitted income may also
encourage them to contemplate additional investment in education, which would be reflected in their educational aspirations. In the United States, a number of studies have firmly established a link between family income and educational achievement (see, for example, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan and Mari- itato, 1997; Hanson, McLanahan and Thomson, 1997). Few of these studies specify the precise mechanisms through which income influences grades; most work has focused on the provision of learning experiences, parents' emotional and physical health, and parenting behavior. Previous studies also document the association between family income and general assessments of health, cognitive development, and “positive” behaviors (Brooks-Gunn et al., 1997).

Despite economic benefits to children from temporary migration by family members, there are also potential costs. Zoller-Booth’s (1996) study of a rural Swaziland community provides some basis for formulating hypotheses about such other effects. Using a sample of 54 primary level students, she found that parental presence and socioeconomic well-being had a positive impact on school progress, but that parental absence affected daughters and sons differently. While a lack of role models reduced sons’ academic performance, girls’ observations of their mothers’ economic difficulties increased their motivation to excel in school. Parents and their children reported similar experiences in Mexico during the fieldwork reported in this study.

Moreover, parental absence often creates stress within Mexican families. Although Mexican society has undergone dramatic social changes in the past three decades, well-defined family roles still characterize household behavior, especially in rural areas (Levine and Correa, 1993; Kandel, 1996). Fathers are popularly seen as family disciplinarians and mothers as care-givers responsible for children’s upbringing and schooling. Gender roles also dictate the behavior and life-course trajectories of sons and daughters. Such roles, particularly those of mother and father, make an already stressful separation due to migration more difficult to bear. Problems that parents and social workers frequently mentioned during fieldwork included increased marital stress for both partners, misspending of remittances, disciplinary problems, over-compensating leniency by mothers, and emotional distance of children from fathers (Kandel, 1996).

Family and educational research consistently shows that parental absence yields disadvantages for children, including poor school performance. The mechanisms by which this occurs are unclear. Astone and McLanahan (1991) argue that migration, typically from divorce or remarriage, negatively impacts
the educational attainment of U.S. children; Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986) point to lower incomes among single-parent households; and Krein and Beller (1988) and Seltzer (1994) contend that emotional and disciplinary problems result from incomplete family socialization and lack of parental attention and control. However, this research does not consider temporary parental absence occurring in migrant households, and it frequently confines itself to U.S. households which rely less on extended family networks than developing country households (Bruce and Dwyer 1988). In developing countries such negative economic effects may be offset by how resources are redistributed within the household (Lloyd and Blanc, 1996) and the assistance of extended family members (Buvinic, 1990).

Apart from cultural influences of migration that transform it into an adolescent rite of passage (Mines, 1981; Richert, 1981, 1982), the prevalence of migration reduces risk for potential migrants. A trip to the United States for most migrants involves physical danger, unpleasant working conditions, low social status, illegality, family separation, and other deterrents. Those who do not possess information and contacts to help them migrate view it negatively compared to the Mexican labor market (Kandel, 1996). However, with greater and more current information and advice, as well as with social contacts in the United States who assist new migrants because of family ties, social norms or reciprocal obligations (Espinosa and Massey, 1997), migration becomes more attractive as an alternative to educational investment in Mexico.

In addition, it is well known within most migrant communities that, in terms of social prestige and quality of life, the U.S. labor market does not reward educational investment acquired in Mexico to anywhere near the degree of the Mexican labor market. A young labor market entrant with the equivalent of a high school education can obtain a respectable clerical, administrative, or even professional job in Mexico without having to endure the hardship, risks, low status, and unpleasantness associated with illegal or legal migration to the United States (Kandel, 1996; Massey et al., 1987). Were that same labor market entrant to migrate to the United States, his or her position would most likely involve unskilled work. Although such a position would offer higher relative wages than a similar position in Mexico, its associated tangible and intangible costs make such work unappealing except to those who have few employment options in Mexico, such as rural residents or those with little schooling. Since U.S. wages for Mexican migrants are based more on work experience, employment contacts, English language skills, and legal
documents, potential migrants are not inspired to invest in schooling beyond primary school (Chiswick, 1979). Hence, if parents and children believe their futures lie in the United States – as temporary or permanent migrants – they have strong disincentives to invest in Mexican schooling.

**IMPACTS OF CHILDREN’S OWN TEMPORARY MIGRATION ON EDUCATION**

A substantial body of literature has considered the consequences of international migration for children of permanent migrants, commonly referred to as “the second generation” (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Portes, 1996; Zhou, 1997). However, few, if any, studies have considered how migratory experience during childhood affects subsequent migration or education outcomes for children growing up in the country of origin. The difficulty of establishing causality between exposure to migration during childhood and subsequent adult outcomes limits research on the topic, and what studies exist of immigrant children assume a context in which migration is permanent (Aronowitz, 1984).

The impact of a child’s own temporary migration experience depends on the circumstances surrounding migration. Migration prior to completing schooling in Mexico occurs for two main reasons: children either visit the United States as tourists, or they stay for extended periods with their employed parents, relatives or older siblings. If they visit as tourists, the trips are more likely to be pleasant ones, and such children are more likely to come from higher SES families where parents emphasize the value of education. If they visit the United States for reasons other than tourism, their visits are likely to be longer, involve some schooling or employment, or occur within the context of labor migration of family members. In addition, the latter children are likely to grow up in households where labor migration is prevalent, where parents and siblings give priority to occupational alternatives in the U.S. labor market, and where education beyond secundaria is devalued as an unnecessary opportunity cost.

**THE INFLUENCE OF MIGRATION UPON EDUCATION**

This analysis examines two characteristics of international labor migration: family migration involvement by immediate and extended family members, and children’s own migration, namely whether, and in what capacity, the child migrated to the United States.
Two dependent variables are used to measure education outcomes. First we examine whether the child aspires to attend the university. Status attainment research has long established a link between educational aspirations and eventual educational attainment (Sewell et al., 1968a, 1968b; Sewell et al., 1970; Duncan and Duncan, 1969; Alexander and Eckland, 1974; Campbell, 1983). Based upon this research, we assume that educational aspirations signal planned future behavior. To evaluate performance, we use the student's grade point average of the prior year (or prior semester for high school level students), standardized as a Z-score by school and grade-level. These two variables—grades and aspirations—have been shown to be positively correlated (Campbell, 1983; Kao and Tienda, 1998). In our sample, the correlation between the two is 0.16, which we consider sufficiently small to treat them as distinct dependent variables.

To measure international migration experience within the family, we use a series of five mutually exclusive dummy variables that cover a range of experience from none to considerable. Two dummy variables are then included to indicate if the student had ever been to the United States, either for purposes of tourism or for a more extended stay involving birth, schooling or employment.

How family and their own U.S. migration experience affect children's educational aspirations and performance is an empirical question for which we do not hypothesize in one direction or the other. High levels of migration by family members often indicate additional economic resources that promote educational achievement. Children in our sample—between grades six and twelve reflecting an average age of 11 to 17 years old—would benefit from living in higher income households through the various indirect mechanisms, discussed above, which are positively associated with academic performance. They would also be more likely to aspire to higher education levels because of a greater awareness of the financial resources available from migration and a lower demand for their financial contributions to the household.

On the other hand, greater migration experience within the family increases the likelihood that children growing up in such households will aspire to migrate as well. Aside from the well-established intergenerational link for occupations (Blau and Duncan, 1967), migration experience within the family proportionately reduces the amount of risk facing a potential migrant. Armed with knowledge on crossing the Mexico-U.S. border and living in the United States without documents, as well as having a network of
contacts to provide housing and employment information, adolescents are better able to weigh their labor market options and the role of education within them. If they opt for eventual migration, they will have little incentive to invest in their education in Mexico because of the nature of the U.S. labor market, discussed earlier.

Similarly, a child's own migration experience will affect academic performance and aspirations, depending on the circumstances of the visit. These include length of U.S. trip, location, purpose, and other factors that affect children's perception of life in the United States or the value of education. If children plan to migrate to the United States, their incentives to invest in Mexican schooling will correspond to what they know of the U.S. labor market. Trip circumstances also indicate something about their socioeconomic background; children who visit the United States as tourists usually come from higher SES families where education is more highly valued and more affordable, while children who have extended stays in the United States often come from families where labor migration is more prevalent.

**SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

Data for this analysis were collected by the principal author and come from student surveys administered to a stratified sample of students from schools in the western Mexican state of Zacatecas (1995 population: 1.34 million). The field sites are particularly appropriate for the study for several reasons. First, this study considers the impact of international migration on children, and Zacatecas historically has had among the highest levels of international migration of any Mexican state (Dagadog 1975; Durand, Massey and Charvet, 2000).

Second, the field sites lie within the region of the state that offers significant educational and employment opportunities for residents who prefer the domestic labor market to international migration. Zacatecas consists of two distinct regions: a large, sparsely populated, semi-desertic, northern region and a smaller, populous, more economically vibrant, southern region. Three large cities in neighboring states – Aquascalientes, San Luis Potosí, and Guadalajara – lie within commuting distance of the surveyed southern Zacatecan communities and possess extensive labor markets and numerous educational institutions.

Third, to obtain data that could yield more broadly generalizable results, fieldwork was conducted in urban, semi-urban, and rural settings. Because of the state's low population density, our sample does not mirror Zacatecas's stu-
dent population. The first site, Zacatecas, the state capital of the same name, is the state's most populous locale (1995 population: 175,000). The city is characterized by a relatively extensive labor market, a variety of education options beyond junior high school including several colleges and universities, and low levels of international migration. The second site, Jerez (1995 population: 37,000), is a municipal seat and commercial center to its surrounding agricultural communities. Because of its proximity to Zacatecas, some students attend universities there or in Fresnillo, another large city equidistant from Jerez. Unlike in the capital, a high proportion of Jerez residents have migrated to the United States for decades.

Because of the difference in the number of classrooms which could be surveyed in urban and rural schools, the rural setting involved many fieldwork sites. To produce a sample with equal numbers of students from urban, semi-urban and rural communities, we selected 25 rural communities within commuting distance of either the first two sites or of the three large border-state cities mentioned above. In addition to proximity, we used two other criteria to select rural sites: a population between 1,000 – 5,000 and the existence of junior high, technical or senior high schools. Moreover, the prevalence of international migration within these rural sites varies significantly, with some existing as veritable transnational communities and others with more modest levels of out-migration. Our sampling procedures yielded a total of 7,620 student surveys and covered a hypothetical population of 230,000 or 15 percent of the state (see Appendix Table 1).

Urban schools were selected according to how frequently they were mentioned by household heads and their spouses during a concurrent survey of randomly selected households in five representative neighborhoods in Zacatecas and Jerez. We supplemented this selection of schools with surveys from upper-level technical and senior high schools. In rural communities, we were able to survey all students at all included grade levels. Because education officials at the highest levels of state government granted us permission to conduct our study, almost all school directors cooperated with the study and respected the concept of representative sampling. To reduce the amount of disruption inherent in conducting surveys, we asked directors to select classrooms or sections that represented that school's typical students. Frequent spot checks with students from other classrooms confirmed that we had not surveyed exceptional students.

To ensure reliable and appropriate responses to survey questions within the broadest range of academic levels, we surveyed students from grades six
through twelve. Students were chosen in this grade range because they were old enough to make decisions about leaving school and could competently answer the questionnaire. The surveys were conducted with the help of two trained Mexican research assistants, and standard procedures were used to ensure consistent survey administration. Students in all classrooms were given a twenty minute introduction to the questionnaire. Because the survey included questions on international migration, students were assured the surveys would be completely anonymous and that they should not write their names or addresses on the survey. We monitored classroom conditions, insisted on silence, and, upon completion, briefly reviewed each survey with every student for missing data and obviously incorrect answers. Students’ instructors remained present throughout the period to ensure cooperation.

The five page questionnaire begins with a one page grid that asks for sociodemographic characteristics of each family member, including age, education, occupation, employment location, marital status and household membership status. Pages two to five ask about the student’s educational history; time spent on study, unpaid domestic chores and paid employment, how the student experienced any extended absence by the father during the previous year (migration by the mother alone is relatively insignificant), migration experience within the family, and educational, occupational and migratory aspirations.

We took measures to ensure the accuracy and seriousness of the students’ answers. To ensure that respondents as young as 10 years old would understand our survey questions, we pretested the questionnaire in one rural and two urban primary schools and substantially revised our questionnaire after each trial. Because many questions asked what transpired in the students’ lives during the previous week, surveys were conducted during the beginning of the week to allow for better recall, with Mondays reserved for the youngest primary school students. If students were deliberately uncooperative, the proctor could determine this when reviewing each survey at the end of the period. Ultimately, we discarded only 30 questionnaires – 0.4 percent of the total.

This fieldwork was conducted during the 1995–96 academic year, soon after the Mexican government devalued the peso that created the Mexican financial crisis of 1994. Since the data collected is cross-sectional, and since no other similar data exists, we have no way of knowing to what extent the responsiveness of students’ education outcomes might have been different had the survey been conducted prior to the financial crisis. However, unlike other more economically developed states, Zacatecas is not an export-oriented state. The five principal sources of revenue are agricultural products grown primarily for domestic consumption, tourism, financial and personal services,
and migrant remittances. Since a drop in the value of the peso would have differing effects on each of these revenue sources, it is difficult to say to what extent the crisis altered the occupational outlook for young people in the state, although Zenteno (1998) provides evidence that employment levels actually increased following the financial crisis.

**ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY**

We present models that estimate the effect of migration on academic achievement (GPA) and educational aspirations. Because we expect that our results will vary according to children's age-related employment prospects, we conduct the analyses separately for each of the three academic levels: primary school (grade 6 only), secondary school (grades 7–9) and preparatory school (grades 10–12).

For this analysis, we limit the ages of the respondents from 9 to 23 years old, thus excluding 27 cases of older students, or 0.2 percent of the sample. Because the analysis examines the impact of the father's migration history (as well as education and occupation) on children's education, we also exclude 288 cases where the father is deceased or no longer lives with the family. This leaves a sample of 7,305 cases.

OLS regression is applied to estimate the impact of migration-related and control variables on students' grade point averages for all courses taken in the previous year or, in the case of high school level students, in the previous semester. Although grading may not be uniform across schools, the curriculum in Mexico is controlled at all academic levels by the federal-level Secretaría de Educación Pública, providing some assurance of grading consistency. Nevertheless, to control for variations in school quality, grades are standardized using Z-scores obtained from the difference between each respondent's grade point average (GPA) and the mean of GPA scores aggregated at the grade level within each school.

Logistic regression is applied to estimate the impact of migration-related and control variables on whether or not the students aspire to attend university. Appendix Table 2 presents the question wording and response distribution (Questions 25, 25b). The logit model predicts how the independent variables increase the odds of an event occurring – in this case, the odds that a student will aspire to attend university.

Definitions and descriptive tabulations of variables are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 2 indicates that 35.4 percent of all pupils intend to continue their schooling after completing the current academic level and
intend to stay enrolled through the college or university level. The frequency of university aspirations may appear high considering the state’s low socioeconomic indicators and degree of international migration. However, Table 2 indicates that 30 percent of respondents’ fathers and 25 percent of their mothers have completed secondary school and, although not shown in Table 2, 14 percent of fathers and 7 percent of mothers completed teacher’s college or university. When we take into account these figures, the tendency of children generally to overstate their educational aspirations (see Kao and Tienda, 1998), and the level of educational expansion that Mexico and other developing countries have undertaken in the past three decades, the percentage of students aspiring to attend university appears reasonable.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Definition of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GPA:</td>
<td>overall standardized grade received for all academic subjects in the previous academic year. GPA has been standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Aspirations:</td>
<td>=1 if student aspires to complete a university education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Definition of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Work Experience within Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family migration</td>
<td>=1 if no member of the extended or nuclear family ever worked in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended family migration</td>
<td>=1 if any member of the extended family has ever worked in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family migration</td>
<td>=1 if any member of the nuclear family has ever worked in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 1-2 United States trips</td>
<td>=1 if father has made 1 to 2 trips to the United States since respondent entered primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 3+ United States trips</td>
<td>=1 if father has made 3 or more trips to the United States since respondent entered primary school</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student's Migration Experience</th>
<th>Definition of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist visit</td>
<td>=1 if student has visited the United States as a tourist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended stay</td>
<td>=1 if student has visited the United States for an extended stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (Zacatecas)</td>
<td>=1 if survey was conducted in Zacatecas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban (Jerez)</td>
<td>=1 if survey was conducted in Jerez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (various)</td>
<td>=1 if survey was conducted in a rural community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td>=1 if mother completed 0-5 years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary</td>
<td>=1 if mother completed 6-8 years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary +</td>
<td>=1 if mother completed 9+ years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>=1 if mother’s education is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td>=1 if father completed 0-5 years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary</td>
<td>=1 if father completed 6-8 years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary +</td>
<td>=1 if father completed 9+ years of schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>=1 if father’s education is unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>=1 if father is in a professional occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father in Professional Occ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mom wants schooling</td>
<td>=1 if mom wants R to continue studying after this grade level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dad wants schooling</td>
<td>=1 if dad wants R to continue studying after this grade level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. dependents</td>
<td>Total no. of non-working dependents living in student's home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student's Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest</td>
<td>=1 if student is the oldest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age of student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>=1 if student is female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Repeated</td>
<td>=1 if student has ever repeated a grade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE TABULATIONS OF VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Aspirations</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Members worked in the United States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family migration</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended family migration</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family migration</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 1-2 U.S. trips</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 3+ U.S. trips</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student's Migration Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist visit</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended stay</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Locale</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (Zacatecas)</td>
<td>0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban (Jerez)</td>
<td>0.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (various)</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mother's Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary +</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Father's Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary +</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Father in Professional Occ.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mom wants schooling</td>
<td>0.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dad wants schooling</td>
<td>0.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. dependents</td>
<td>3.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student's Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>14.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Repeated</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The independent variables of interest measure the extent of migration within a student's family and consist of five mutually exclusive gradations of migration constructed as separate dummy variables. Question 27 (see Appendix A, Table 2) instructed students to note as many categories of friends and relatives as they knew that had ever worked in the United States. These trips could have occurred recently or before the student was born. The first migration variable indicated that no member of the immediate and extended family had ever worked in the United States. The next variable indicated if extended family members only—cousins, aunts and uncles, and grandparents—had ever worked in the United States. The third variable included nuclear family members: brothers, sisters or either parent. The fourth and fifth migration variables use Question 28, which asks for the number of father's working trips to the United States since the child entered primary school. These trips tended to occur relatively recently and indicate a higher prevalence of migration. Children who responded affirmatively to this question noted higher levels of migration for siblings and other relatives, providing assurance that the construction of these migration variables does indicate a gradient of U.S. migration involvement within the family. We thus use two dummy variables that correspond to a father having made one or two trips and having made three or more trips since the student entered primary school.

Missing responses for this question, 23 percent of all cases, consist of students for whom the question was not asked initially, students who marked that their father had migrated but did not know how many times, and students who left the question blank. Students' reluctance to answer such a question is understandable considering that a significant portion of their fathers and other relatives may have been undocumented and or working in the United States at the time of the survey. Rather than discard these missing cases, we estimated the number of trips with an OLS regression model that used personal and migration characteristics of the father not included in our analyses. We found that the results did not change significantly from identical analyses omitting these cases.

We also examined how students' own migration affected our dependent variables. Students were asked if they had ever been to the United States and, if so, in what capacity. Students could mark off any combination of four categories: tourism, birth, employment and schooling; those who marked categories other than tourism were coded as having made an extended trip. We did not ask the length of stay, and it is possible that some tourist visits could have lasted longer than what we classify as an extended visit. Of the 1,239
students who noted that they had been to the United States, 84.8 percent marked “visit” as one of their activities there, followed by “attend school” (24%), “work” (4.9%) and “born there” (3.4%).

We control for characteristics that are expected to significantly affect children's educational aspirations and performance. Dummy variables for location are included, using rural communities as the reference category. Because of concerns over anonymity, students were not asked if they lived in the surveyed community or commuted from another locale. Casual conversations with school administrators in Zacatecas and Jerez suggested that few schools received significant numbers of students from surrounding rural towns.

Consistent with other studies on educational attainment, we use four dummy variables for different levels of father's and mother's education: 0–5 years (primary incomplete), 6–8 years (primary complete), 9+ years (secondary complete), and unknown education level. We suspect that the latter category is comprised of parents with six or fewer years of education because children would be more likely to know if their parents possessed above-average schooling.

To control for socioeconomic status acquired independently of education, we included a dummy variable indicating whether father's occupation is highly skilled or upper-level administrative. Students were told in the introductory presentation to list the specific types of work their family members did and in what sorts of places they worked. Cases with missing values of father's occupation comprised 8.1 percent of the total, but they were still included in all analyses. We are confident that this group includes very few professionals by applying the same reasoning noted above for parents' education.

In lieu of direct measures of household wealth, we compute the number of dependents or nonworking children living at home. To control for parental interest in education which may affect children's grades and aspirations apart from parental education levels, we include dummy variables indicating each parent's desire that the student continues his or her schooling after completing the current education level. Although students had six possible responses for what they thought each parent desired, two thirds thought each parent wanted them to continue schooling. This figure corresponds with the response distribution of Question 25 shown in Appendix Table 2, where the same percentage of students indicated that they planned to continue their schooling after completing their current academic levels.

Individual-level characteristics include a dummy variable for whether the child was the oldest in his or her family. Oldest children in Mexico are more
likely to leave school in order to contribute to the household economy – a pattern within families frequently noted during fieldwork – and they are also more likely to affect a responsible role which usually has implications for their academic performance (Blake, 1989). We control for sex and include the student’s age to capture effects from students older or younger than the mean age for their grade. A crude prox is used to control for academic ability – if the student ever repeated a grade since entering first grade.

RESULTS

Results are shown in Table 3 and, in general, they indicate a negative association of U.S. migration among students’ household members with aspirations to attend university and a positive association with academic performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family members worked in the United States</th>
<th>Primary College GPA</th>
<th>Secondary College GPA</th>
<th>Preparatory College GPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No family migration</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended family migration</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear family migration</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.387</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 1-2 U.S. trips</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father took 3+ U.S. trips</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student's Migration Experience to United States</th>
<th>Primary College GPA</th>
<th>Secondary College GPA</th>
<th>Preparatory College GPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist visit</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended stay</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Primary College GPA</th>
<th>Secondary College GPA</th>
<th>Preparatory College GPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban (Jerez)</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (Zacatecas)</td>
<td>0.785</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (various)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother's Education</th>
<th>Primary College GPA</th>
<th>Secondary College GPA</th>
<th>Preparatory College GPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Primary</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary +</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3

EFFECTS OF FAMILY MIGRATION ON CHILD’S COLLEGE ASPIRATIONS AND GPA: BY CHILD’S ACADEMIC LEVEL

...
The pattern of university aspirations corresponds to the degree of migration. Greater levels of U.S. migration are associated with negative coefficients of increasing magnitude at all three academic levels. However, they are not significant at the primary school level. Primary school students often do not know how far they will continue their schooling. Their parents may not know until they can more accurately gauge both their children’s interest and ability at higher academic levels as well as their own capability to pay for such schooling.
The coefficients are significant at the secondary and preparatory level. These academic levels correspond to ages when students make decisions about future educational investment and when they are most susceptible to the influence of migration as an alternative career path. Because the construction of our migration variables may include numerous effects and migration from different family members, we do not quantify the effects by transforming the coefficients. We do note, however, that the size of the coefficient for 3+ trips for preparatory students is twice that compared to that of secondary students. One could interpret this finding as well as the other negative coefficients for university aspirations in two ways. The prevalence of migration within a family could negatively influence children's educational aspirations by providing them with an alternative means for economic mobility. An alternative explanation is that U.S. migration places economic hardships on the household that discourages enrolled children from considering university attendance. This occurs if the absence of the father or siblings requires that children contribute more to the household economy due to insufficient or infrequent remitted income. We tend to doubt this latter explanation. Ethnographic fieldwork tends to support our contention that the economic effects of U.S. migration are not only positive, but noticeably positive, and that children growing up in migrant households have greater opportunities to receive education at higher academic levels, given that they have an interest in doing so.

This fact is reflected in the results obtained for grades. In contrast to its impact on educational aspirations, U.S. migration within the family is positively associated with students' grades. This is consistently the case for all academic levels and all levels of U.S. migration, although the coefficients at the preparatory level are insignificant. We also note slight evidence that the positive association between migration and grades decreases with greater degrees of family migration for primary and secondary school students. This is a particularly striking finding when we consider that children's grades and university aspirations are positively and significantly associated at all academic levels. Our results indicate that migration provides the economic resources for students to do well while in school, even while it simultaneously decreases aspirations for continuing schooling beyond an average level of attainment. We posit that our results reflect the well established relationship between economic resources of a household and the academic performance of its members.

An alternative explanation for the positive association between migration and grades involves selection bias. All students, to varying degrees, are self-
selected for SES and academic ability and interest. Students in rural areas are particularly self-selected because of labor demands and lower parental appreciation for the value of schooling. Since rural students are more likely to have family members who have worked in the United States, one might argue that the positive relationship between U.S. migration within the family and students’ grades reflects a selectivity bias of rural children. We conducted two separate analyses to test this alternative hypothesis. First, we removed all migration variables from our OLS models to see if the results for the region variables would change. Presumably, if migration is a proxy variable for rural residence, we would expect a positive relationship between students’ grades and rural region, net of other factors which affect students’ grades. However, removing the migration variables from these models had no effect on the size or significance of the coefficients for the region variables. Second, we reran our models not by academic level but by region. If the alternative hypothesis were correct, we would expect no relationship between U.S. migration experience and students’ grades in rural areas, and perhaps a negative or nonexistent relationship in the urban areas. However, we noted again the same positive relationship between grades and the U.S. migration variables.

In contrast to family member migration, a student’s own migration experience is positively associated with university aspirations if it involves a tourist visit. The effect for extended stays involving birth, employment or schooling in the United States is positive but not significant. This result corresponds to our contention that children who visit as tourists are likely to come from higher SES families where the parents have higher than average education levels, are more likely to have professional occupations, and place greater emphasis on educational attainment and economic mobility within the Mexican labor market. An alternative explanation is that something about the U.S. experience encourages children to have higher educational aspirations. Yet, given the lack of significance of the extended stay variable, as well as the lack of significance of both variables on grades, this explanation seems less likely. What we can state from our results is that, compared to tourist visits, more extensive migration by children is not associated with positive education outcomes. This does not explain why students’ own migration had no significant effect on their grades. If children’s tourist visits capture some SES effects, one would expect a similar effect as other SES variables such as father’s professional occupation or father’s or mother’s university level education. Students’ grades simply may not reflect the experience of students’ own U.S. visits, some of which could have occurred years before the survey date.
Results for control variables were consistent with prior education research. Attending school in urban areas is positively associated with educational aspirations compared to the omitted category for the rural community, reflecting greater accessibility of college-level schooling as well as more popular support for such educational investment. The impact of community size on grades, however, works inversely to aspirations. Because of selection bias discussed above, rural students who face more obstacles to continued schooling are more likely to be self-selected for ability and interest in schooling than students in urban communities where labor force demands are fewer and schooling at all levels is more accepted and accessible.

Parental education levels were positively associated with students' aspirations but had little impact on students' grades after controlling for other factors. Variables for unknown levels of education for fathers and mothers, when significant, were negatively associated with both dependent variables, corresponding to our earlier supposition of what this variable measures. A positive effect on both dependent variables was found for the variable indicating a father's professional or administrative occupation. Likewise, parents' desires for continued schooling for their children was positively associated with aspirations and grades at all academic levels.

In general, the number of dependent children living at home, the age of the student, and being the oldest child did not significantly impact either grades or aspirations. As found in other studies, female students academically outperform male students (Michelson, 1989). We were surprised to see similar, if mostly insignificant, results for university aspirations considering the discriminatory labor markets facing Mexican women and strong societal norms against employment after marriage. Finally, and not surprisingly, grade repetition is negatively associated with university aspirations and grades at all academic levels.

Little of the variance in aspirations and grades is explained by our models, as indicated by the small pseudo R square values. However, our intention in this analysis was to demonstrate an associative relationship between different characteristics of migration within the family and children's education outcomes. Given the limitations of our data, we cannot include variables that might otherwise be more appropriate for models predicting either aspirations or grades.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Our analysis leads to the following conclusions:

1. U.S. migration from Mexico by family members is negatively associated with university aspirations for children growing up in Mexico. We con-
tend that frequent migration by family members presents a successful example of an alternative route to economic mobility apart from the conventional approach of education. Since it is implicitly understood that the U.S. job market does not reward education acquired in Mexico beyond the primary or secondary level, prospective migrants have less motivation to continue their education beyond the junior or senior high school levels or even to simply remain in school and complete those levels of schooling. Recurring migration among family members converts working in the United States from an occasional ‘emergency’ measure for targeted needs to a viable occupation. More numerous migrants within the family also provide children with more information and U.S. contacts, all of which reduce the risk of migration failure.

2) In contrast to university aspirations, family member migration to the United States is positively associated with students’ academic performance, as measured by standardized grades. This result occurs independently of any bias resulting from the self-selection of more able and interested students from rural areas who are more likely to have migrating family members. We argue that this result stems from the financial resources provided by U.S. migration, which lowers the likelihood of children’s labor force participation and increases resources for consumption of education-related goods.

3) Children’s own migration prior to leaving school is positively associated with university aspirations. The effect is significant only for trips involving tourism as opposed to trips involving birth, schooling or employment. The former group experienced the United States under relatively pleasant circumstances, and they are more likely to be self-selected from well-off families who can visit the United States without having to work there. Second, their exposure to the United States – with its mandatory high school education, wealth of educational opportunities, and limited occupational mobility for those with little education – may have encouraged a more expansive view of education.

4) The influence of U.S. migration on children’s education reaches its height during secondary school, the norm of scholastic attainment for most children in Mexican migrant-sending states and the age when students are old enough to make viable careers working in Mexico or migrating to the United States.

5) The effects described above occur irrespective of gender and community context. One might expect that in Mexico, where social roles and careers
are often influenced by gender, an analysis of the determinants of educational aspirations and performance would find differential impacts for males and females. Although such outcomes were frequently heard during fieldwork, preliminary analyses produced few significant differences. For that reason, we decided to increase the efficiency of the estimates by including sex as a covariate, rather than present separate models for male and female students. Similarly, during preliminary analyses, we ran models separately for rural, semi-urban and urban contexts with no significant differences in our outcomes.

Students who respond to surveys are both formally enrolled in school and not absent due to work obligations, disciplinary problems, lack of interest and ability, or other selecting factors. At higher academic levels, students are increasingly self-selected for financial resources. Such a bias actually works to our advantage, because these characteristics—ability, interest and high SES—make it less likely students will be influenced by migration compared to the broader school-aged population. The latter group includes many young people who have left school precisely to migrate to the United States and who, if included in the sample, would show greater susceptibility to the influence of U.S. migration within their families. Moreover, we tested for rural self-selectivity and found no effect.

The intention in these analyses was to demonstrate an associative relationship between different characteristics of family migration and children’s education outcomes. The results from this analysis suggest that international migration from Mexico to the United States has a negative impact on children’s educational aspirations, particularly when it occurs during adolescence. Given the limited options for economic mobility in Mexico without greater levels of education, children who opt not to continue their schooling beyond secondary school face an increased likelihood of eventually migrating to the United States for employment. While U.S. migration allows Mexican parents to overcome economic obstacles to schooling their children, it delivers a harmful message about the value of educational investment to children growing up in migrant households and communities. Low returns to education in the United States compared to Mexico, combined with the sizable wage differential, leads to a depreciation of the value of education and the election of international migration as a vocation.

The consequences of ignoring this phenomenon are significant. Remitting earnings offers migrants one of the few options they have to improve the welfare of their families over the long term, thereby ensuring that their chil-
Children have more opportunities than simply a poverty-versus-migration decision. Understanding how families can be economically supported from international labor migration while minimizing its negative impacts is an important issue in Mexico and other countries that export labor to more developed countries. The patterns demonstrated by this analysis point toward the reproduction of low-skilled, low-paid immigrants within the U.S. labor market and a barrier to higher educational development in Mexican migrant-sending communities.

### APPENDIX TABLE 1
**Survey Sample Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Level</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Sample %</th>
<th>State %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory School</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>855</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>779</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>534</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3,849</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (50,000+)</td>
<td>2,546</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban (5,000-49,000)</td>
<td>2,677</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (1-4,999)</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,305</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INEGI 1993.

### APPENDIX TABLE 2
**Survey Questions and Response Distributions for Selected Variables**

25. "Will you continue studying after you finish this academic level?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>(Go to another question)</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isn't sure</td>
<td>(Go to another question)</td>
<td>1,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Go to 25b)</td>
<td>4,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25b. (If 25 is affirmative): "Up to what academic level would you like to study?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td></td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical school</td>
<td></td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory school</td>
<td></td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher's college</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable; will not continue</td>
<td></td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2 (CONTINUED)

SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES

27. "Mark the persons or relatives that you know at some point worked in the United States:"
(MARK WITH AN "X" EVERYONE THAT HAS WORKED THERE)

Brothers; Sisters; Uncles; Cousins; Other people; Neighbors; Grandparents; Father; Mother; Friends; No one

28. "Since you entered primary school, how many times has your father worked in the north?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zero times</td>
<td>4,063</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 times</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 times</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6 times</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 times</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 times</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+ times</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question initially not included</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (we know father recently migrated)</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (no additional information)</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,305</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Zoller-Booth, M.
Local Economic Opportunity and the Competing Risks of Internal and U.S. Migration in Zacatecas, Mexico

David P. Lindstrom
Brown University

Nathanael Lauster
Brown University

This article uses a competing risks model to examine the effects of origin economic conditions on the probability of temporary U.S. and internal labor migration in the Mexican state of Zacatecas. We measure origin economic conditions with municipal-level indices of employment and small-scale investment opportunities that we constructed from population and economic census data. The results of our analysis demonstrate the important influence of local employment and investment opportunities on migration outcomes. Controlling for the prior municipal rate of U.S. return migration and other factors, positive opportunities for small-scale investment are associated with a higher risk of temporary migration to the United States. This result is consistent with investment oriented migration predicted by the new economics of labor migration theory. We also find comparable social network effects for both internal and U.S. migration. Having social ties to active migrants of one type (U.S. or internal), encourages migration of the same type and discourages migration of the other type.

This article examines the effects of origin economic conditions and social ties to U.S. migrants on the competing risks of internal and U.S. migration in the Mexican state of Zacatecas. Migration researchers widely recognize the influence of community characteristics on migration patterns in developing countries. The study of migration from the perspective of sending communities is especially well developed in the case of Mexico-U.S. migration. Most local
Determinants of migration fall into two general categories—push factors, which provide the economic incentives for migration, and social network factors, which reduce the barriers to migration and influence the choice of destination. The purpose of this study is to assess the consistency of migration behavior with the predictions of the neoclassical, new economics of labor migration, and social network theories. These three theoretical perspectives dominate much of the literature on community-level migration effects, and in some instances they make contradictory predictions regarding the influence of local conditions on the likelihood of internal and international migration.

In spite of well-documented community differences in migration patterns, there are few systematic analyses of the effects of community characteristics on individual migration behavior. Recent papers by Massey and Espinosa (1997), Lindstrom (1996), and Durand, Parrado, and Massey (1996), using data from a multicommunity study, provide evidence of significant municipal-level effects on the probability of U.S. migration, the hazard of return from the United States to Mexico, and the flow and use of remittances (Mexican Migration Project, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania). This article builds on this research in several important ways. First, it uses data from a sample of randomly, rather than purposively, selected communities which include a wide range of economic conditions and migration patterns. Second, it uses four indices of employment and investment opportunities constructed from a large selection of diverse measures of economic activity. Third, it examines the competing risks of internal and U.S. migration which provides a more powerful test of the three theories than analyses which focus on U.S. migration alone.

The analysis is divided into three parts. First, using maps, we examine the quartile distributions of municipal wage and investment opportunities, internal and U.S. migration rates, and U.S. return migration. Evidence of a correlation between the different economic and migration measures at the municipal-level provides additional justification for incorporating municipal-level effects into models of individual migration behavior. Next, we use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the effects of individual-, household-, community-, and municipal-level factors on the probability of internal and U.S. migration. Finally, we use the coefficients from these models to derive the relative risks of internal and U.S. migration in municipalities characterized by different levels of economic opportunities and prior U.S. return migration rates. By showing how the risks of internal and U.S. migration change with comparable shifts in the different municipal-level conditions,
our results can inform policy discussions concerning the probable impact of changes in local economic opportunities on the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States.

MIGRATION THEORIES

Neoclassical Theory

Neoclassical economic theory views migration as purposeful behavior designed to maximize individual or household economic well-being based on a comparison of income opportunities in alternative locations (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Davanzo, 1981; Mincer, 1987). Labor migration occurs when the difference in location-specific wages or employment opportunities is large enough to encourage individuals to invest in the initial costs of migration in return for higher expected earnings. An important element of the neoclassical approach is the assumption that migration represents an investment in human capital, the benefits of which may not be immediately realizable but which accrue over time (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969).

Target income theory adapts neoclassical theory to explain temporary labor migration. It retains the neoclassical emphasis on push-pull factors and individual cost-benefit analysis, but relaxes the assumption of lifetime income maximization (Berg, 1961; Hill, 1987). The theory starts with the assumption that workers strongly prefer to remain in their communities of origin, but must resort to temporary labor migration because of limited income opportunities at home. Optimally, migrants would prefer to spend as little time as possible away from home and yet accumulate enough savings from migrant earnings to reach a particular savings target. Hence, migrants enter destination labor markets as target earners. When they have saved or remitted money equal to some target, they return to their home community (Berg, 1961; Byerlee, 1974). Regardless of whether individuals migrate to maximize lifetime income or to compensate for current income deficits in their home communities, the predicted direction of origin economic conditions on the likelihood of migration are the same. All else being equal, the incentives to migrate are greater for individuals living in communities where current wages are low and the prospects for income growth are poor than for individuals living in communities with more favorable economic opportunities.

Neoclassical models of migration dominate much of the literature on the expected effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on migration from Mexico to the United States. In the short term, migration from Mexico to the United States is expected to increase as Mexico goes
through a period of economic adjustment due to the removal of trade barriers and the exposure of backward sectors of the Mexican economy to foreign competition. However, in the long term, migration to the United States is expected to decline due to eventual employment and wage growth in Mexico (Cornelius and Martin, 1993; Hinojosa and Robinson, 1992; Hinojosa, 1994).

New Economics of Labor Migration

A growing body of migration research criticizes neoclassical theory for its narrow focus on wage and employment opportunities. The new economics of labor migration theory elaborated by Stark and others (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999; see also review articles by Massey et al., 1993, 1994) expands the basic neoclassical model to include household demand for insurance and credit as a motivation for temporary labor migration. In areas of less developed countries where capital markets are absent or poorly developed, temporary labor migration provides a means to acquire funds for large lump-sum expenditures in the place of origin, such as home construction, the purchase of major durable goods, or investments in agriculture and family businesses. In addition to providing access to capital for investment in income-generating activities, migration enables households to insure themselves against crop or business failure by diversifying the sources of household income. The ability of households to self-insure through migration further lowers the barriers to investments in agricultural production and small-scale commercial or manufacturing enterprises. The use of migration to overcome market constraints suggests that remittances can play an important role in agricultural modernization and the development of a small business sector in rural villages and towns (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999).

The new economics of labor migration stresses the positive impact of migrant remittances on local economic activity. Migrant savings spent on locally sold or produced goods and services creates opportunities for the formation of small businesses. These opportunities generate a demand for investment capital, which in turn generates additional investment-oriented migration. The demand for credit and the use of migrant savings for productive investments is dependent upon the expected returns on local capital investments. Rural areas with poor soil and limited water resources offer low returns on agricultural investments. Likewise, communities with small populations can support only a limited number of commercial enterprises. On the other hand, zones of commercial agriculture, regional market centers, or
urban areas with dynamic small-scale manufacturing bases provide multiple opportunities for small investment.

The use of migrant savings as a substitute for small investor credit services leads to migration behavior that is inconsistent with the basic neoclassical model. Dynamic local economies with favorable opportunities for employment and small capital investment discourage employment-related out-migration. However, in the absence of well-developed capital markets, the same conditions encourage temporary migration as a means for acquiring capital to finance entrepreneurial activity. The neoclassical focus on expected wage differentials predicts the negative relationship between local employment opportunities and out-migration; however, it does not predict a positive relationship between local investment opportunities and out-migration.

Studies of U.S. migration conducted in migrant-sending communities in Mexico provide ample evidence of the use of remittances to finance major outlays such as home construction, small business formation and expansion, and the purchase of farmland and other agricultural inputs (see review by Durand and Massey, 1992; Arroyo, de León and Valenzuela Varela, 1991; Escobar, González and Roberts, 1987; Jones, 1992; Rionda, 1992). Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996:255) find that migrants are more likely to remit earnings when they come from economically dynamic, entrepreneurial communities rather than stagnant, depressed ones. They also find that the use of remittances on productive investments is determined primarily by access to productive resources. Migrant remittances and savings provide a means for upward economic mobility through the acquisition of productive capital resources, but only in communities where the probable returns on productive investments are positive.

In addition to U.S. destinations, potential migrants in Mexico have an array of alternative destinations in Mexico from which to choose. Relative to the United States, destinations in Mexico offer a number of advantages such as positive returns on educational investments, a familiar cultural and linguistic environment, geographic proximity, substantially lower travel costs, and the avoidance of the costs associated with undocumented legal status. However, the advantage that U.S. migration has as a source of scarce capital is not offered by internal migration. Expected wage differentials, in most cases, are substantially lower for internal migration compared to U.S. migration. Internal migration therefore requires longer trips in order to reach a particular savings target. The peso is also a relatively poor store of value due to inflation and frequent devaluations, which provides a further disincentive for
using internal migration as a means to accumulate savings. Roberts and Esco-
bar (1997:71) believe that rural-urban migration within Mexico was at one
time an important source of capital for lower class rural Mexicans. However,
from the 1980s onwards migration to urban areas became a less effective way
to accumulate capital, making international migration the most effective
option for accumulating savings. The relative advantage of international
migration over internal migration as a strategy for accumulating savings is
found in other developing countries as well (for the case of Pakistan, see
Adams, 1998). These factors suggest that the positive effect of investment
opportunities on U.S. migration predicted by the new economics of labor
migration should be weaker or absent in the case of internal migration.

Social Network Theory

One of the most consistent findings of the community based studies is the
prominent role that social networks play at every stage of the migration
process. Individuals migrate as members of households, kinship groups and
communities. Social ties to experienced U.S. migrants emerge from many of
the analyses as powerful predictors of migration behavior (Taylor 1986;
Massey and Garcia 1987). Experienced migrants provide novice and repeat
migrants with information on wages and job opportunities in the United
States; they help finance the cost of getting across the border and to a desti-
nation, and they provide newly arrived migrants with a place to stay as well
as financial and emotional support which eases the process of adjustment and
settlement. Because the assistance offered through social networks is location
specific, community migration streams tend to be directed to a few destinations
where earlier migrants were successful at establishing a foothold in the
local labor market. The superiority of a particular destination is therefore
dependent upon having a network of social contacts in the destination and
not on wage and employment opportunities alone.

An important characteristic of network-led migration is that it tends to
be self-perpetuating. As more members of a community gain migration expe-
rience, community and kinship based migration networks expand, leading to
a successive lowering of the barriers to migration for each new cohort of
others describe the formation in migrant sending communities of a culture of
out-migration in which life-style and mobility aspirations are increasingly
tied to U.S. migration. Massey (1990) refers to the interrelated processes of
network growth and the increased U.S. orientation of migrant communities
as the “cumulative causation of migration.” According to Massey (1986), one of the major consequences of cumulative causation is that U.S. migration from Mexican communities develops a momentum of its own that is independent of the economic conditions that originally set it in motion.

Social network theory has important implications for the potential effects of local economic conditions on migration. First, it suggests that factors that are highly endogenous to the migration process, mainly the geographic and occupational locations of migration networks in destination areas, determine the possibilities for individual migration. Second, the strong pull built into migration networks implies that job creation in Mexico will have little effect on deterring U.S. migration in communities that are strongly oriented toward the United States. Network theory therefore predicts that social ties to U.S. migrants will have a positive effect on the risk of U.S. migration and a negative effect on the risk of internal migration. The theory also predicts that the negative effect of local wage opportunities on the risk of U.S. migration is lower for individuals with social ties to U.S. migrants than for individuals who lack such ties.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

We evaluate the predictive power of the neoclassical, new economics of labor migration, and social network theories using data from a study of migration conducted in the north central Mexican state of Zacatecas. Traditionally, Zacatecas has ranked as one of the poorest and least developed states in the country. Most of the state is arid and mountainous, with close to two thirds of the population living in localities of under 10,000 inhabitants. Historically, mining and agriculture have been the mainstays of the state’s economy, with agriculture being the single largest source of employment. Substantial agricultural development, mainly in the form of irrigation projects, has occurred over the last three decades in several regions of the state. Temporary labor migration to the United States and to other regions of Mexico has a long tradition in Zacatecas. In contrast to the state’s relatively poor economic base, some of the fastest growing and most economically dynamic urban centers are located in neighboring states to the south, east and north and are common destinations for Zacatecans seeking work.

The Zacatecas Migration Survey was designed to provide representative information on the magnitude, characteristics and consequences of recent labor migration in the state (INEGI, 1991, 1992). For sampling purposes, the state was divided into eight regions with rural-urban strata defined with-
in the regions. Six regions were defined on the basis of geographical considerations and intercensal estimates of out-migration. Two other regions covered, respectively, the largest urban area in the state, and all other municipalities not included in the first seven regions. Twenty nine of the 56 municipalities in the state were selected for study. Within each strata, rural localities and neighborhoods within urban areas were randomly selected, followed by blocks within these areas. The census registry was then used to randomly select households in each block. Samples in each municipality ranged in size from 40 to 640 households. A total of 6,528 household interviews were completed in December 1990 and January 1991, with a response rate of 96 percent.

The survey collected data on the age, education and marital status of current household members, including members temporarily away on migrant trips at the time of the interview. Basic demographic and migration data were also collected for all emigrant children of female household members. In this article, we use information on the migration experience of current household members during the five year period immediately preceding the survey to classify individuals as internal migrants, U.S. migrants and nonmigrants. We restrict the analysis to men and women age 15 to 65 at the time of the survey.

A test of the new economics of labor migration theory requires municipal-level economic measures that distinguish between wage and investment opportunities. We compiled a municipal-level data base of over 140 measures of economic activity in the state of Zacatecas taken from the population and economic censuses. Based on bivariate correlations and theoretical considerations, we narrowed the number of relevant measures to 33 variables and divided them into nonagricultural variables and agricultural variables. We then used factor analysis to construct indices of nonagricultural and agricultural wage and investment opportunities. Details of the procedures are provided in the Appendix, along with variable descriptions. Our objective in developing the indices was to construct theoretically coherent, composite measures of wage and investment opportunities that were as uncorrelated as possible with one another. Bivariate correlations among the four indices range between roughly .2 and .4 (see Appendix Table 3).

Figure I shows the municipalities that are in the bottom quartiles of nonagricultural and agricultural wage opportunities and the top quartiles of internal and U.S. migration rates. Municipalities offering poor wage opportunities are primarily located in the predominantly rural and arid regions of
the state. Consistent with both the neoclassical and new economics of labor migration theories, municipalities with poor wage opportunities have some of the highest levels of internal and U.S. migration. In fact, eight of the fourteen municipalities with the highest rates of internal and U.S. migration are also among the ten municipalities with the least favorable wage opportunities. Figure II shows municipalities in the quartiles of nonagricultural and agricultural investment opportunities. Municipalities with vibrant commercial and service sectors, and productive agricultural lands, are concentrated in the center of the state and in the more temperate southern region. In contrast to the strong relationship between low wage opportunities and high migration rates, the relationship between positive investment opportunities and U.S. migration is less apparent. Only three of the municipalities in the top quartile of

**Figure I** Wage Opportunities and Temporary Migration Rates, Sampled Municipalities Zacatecas Migration Survey.

U.S. migration rates are among the top municipalities in terms of investment opportunities.

How does current migration relate to the prevalence of U.S. migration networks? As a proxy measure of migration networks, we use the municipal rate of return migration from the United States in 1979–1980. This rate is
based on a question in the 1980 Mexican census which identified household members who had been in the United States for six months or more and returned to Mexico during the twelve month period prior to the census. According to social network theory, the return flow of migrants is important for maintaining close ties between settled migrants in destination areas and potential migrants in places of origin. Return migrants also typically accompany new migrants on subsequent trips to the United States. Municipalities with high rates of U.S. return migration therefore are likely to have well-developed migration networks.² Figure II displays the municipalities in the top quartile of U.S. return migration rates. Only two of the municipalities with high levels of return migration are also among the municipalities in the top quartile of current U.S. migration rates. However, five of the municipalities with high levels of return migration are also among the municipalities with the most favorable investment opportunities. Are these prior rates of U.S. return migration the cause of the current, favorable investment climate in these municipalities? One way to address this question is to examine how the municipalities ranked in terms of economic opportunities before U.S. migration became so pervasive in the state. Figure II also shows the municipalities in the top quartile of the proportion of economically active persons age 12 and above working in commerce and services in 1950 and municipalities in the top quartile of value of harvested crops per hectare of arable land in 1950. Four of the seven municipalities in the top quartile of return migration rates were also among the most economically developed municipalities in 1950. Nine of the thirteen municipalities with the most favorable investment opportunities in 1990 were similarly among the most economically developed municipalities in the state forty years earlier.

Our review of the spatial distribution of economic opportunities and migration reveals that municipalities with high prior levels of U.S. return migration have some of the highest levels of small business activity and the most profitable agricultural sectors in the state. However, these same municipalities were also among the most economically developed municipalities in the state before U.S. migration became so pervasive. Favorable opportunities for commercial and service activity are related to locational advantages that do not change over time, including the historical dominance of certain communities as regional market centers. Similarly, municipalities with the most

²Findley (1987), in an analysis of internal migration in the Philippines, found that families living in communities with a high prevalence of return migrants were more likely to send out migrants than families living in places with few return migrants.
productive agricultural lands in early periods are likely to remain among the most productive areas of the state, although major irrigation projects can alter the distribution of agricultural production. High levels of U.S. migration do not guarantee economic dynamism. Several municipalities with high prior levels of U.S. return migration and more than half of the municipalities with high current rates of U.S. migration are not among the leading municipalities in terms of investment nor wage opportunities.

**MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS**

We explore these relationships at the individual level using multinomial logistic regression models. The outcome of interest is departure for an internal or U.S. destination during the period 1986–1990. More than one trip was possible during this period, and individuals could make both internal and U.S. trips. We do not distinguish between single and multiple trips of the same type during the period. We do, however, allow for trips of both types. Indi-
individuals who were internal migrants and U.S. migrants during the period appear twice in the analysis file, once for each outcome, and are weighted by a factor of .5 to preserve the observed sample total.

The multinomial logistic regression model defines the log odds of internal migration and U.S. migration compared to nonmigration as

$$\ln[p_{m,i},i] = \beta_{m,0} + \gamma_{j} \beta_{m,j} X_{m} + \gamma_{k} \beta_{m,k} W_{ik} + \gamma_{l} \beta_{m,l} Z_{il}, \quad m=1,2$$

where $p_{m,i}$ is the probability of internal migration during the period 1986–1990 for person $i$ with individual-level characteristics $X_{m}$, household-level characteristics $W_{ik}$, community and municipal-level characteristics $Z_{il}$, and unknown parameters $\beta_{m,0}, \gamma_{j}, \gamma_{k}, \gamma_{l}$ and $p_{1,i}$, $p_{2,i}$ is the probability of U.S. migration for person $i$ with covariates $X_{m}, W_{ik}, Z_{il}$, and unknown parameters $\beta_{2,0}, \beta_{2,j}, \beta_{2,k}, \beta_{2,l}$; and $p_{3,i}$ is the probability of nonmigration for person $i$ with covariates $X_{m}, W_{ik},$ and $Z_{il}$. The individual-level characteristics include sex, age, age squared, education and marital status. Household-level characteristics include number of own minor children, number of working age adult household members, active internal migration network, and active U.S. migration network. Age, sex and marital status are used to control for the strong association between migration, gender and the life-cycle that has been observed by others (Massey et al., 1987). Education is a predictor of expected wages from alternative types of migration. In general, high levels of education reduce the likelihood of U.S. migration due to the low returns of a Mexican higher education in U.S. labor markets (Taylor, 1987). Information on occupational status in the municipality of origin was not available for all household members. However, educational status is strongly related to occupation and therefore provides an adequate measure of earnings potential. The number of adults in the household is a measure of the availability of household labor for migration.

Each municipality contains a principal town or urban area which is the seat of local government and in many cases a center of commerce and services, as well as outlying rural towns and villages typically ranging in size from as few as 20 to as many as 1,000 inhabitants. We use the indices of municipal wage and investment opportunities to characterize the local structure of economic opportunities available to inhabitants of the municipality. However, basic services and infrastructure development are often not evenly distributed across communities within municipalities. To control for basic development at the community-level, we use an index of marginalization constructed from census data on population size, literacy levels, housing conditions,
and access to services such as water and electricity (Consejo Estatal de Población, 1998).3

Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of selected sample characteristics. Close to one of every five men in the sample was a temporary migrant at some time during the period 1986–1990. U.S. migration is more common than internal migration, with close to 14 percent of men making at least one trip to the United States compared to around 7 percent of men who migrated internally. Less than 3 percent of men made both internal and U.S. trips during the period. Temporary migration to internal and U.S. destinations is considerably less common among women. Only about 2 percent of women were internal migrants, and even fewer were temporary U.S. migrants. About one in seven of the men and women in the sample live in households with at least one other member who was an active internal migrant, and close to one in six live in households with at least one other member who was an active U.S. migrant.

### TABLE 1
**SELECTED SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS, MEN AND WOMEN
AGE 15-65, ZACATECAS MIGRATION SURVEY 1991.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable label</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: Migration status in 1986-90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal migrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. migrant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (male=1)</td>
<td>.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than secondary education</td>
<td>.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of minor children (≤17)</td>
<td>1.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of adults (18-65)</td>
<td>3.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active internal network</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active U.S. network</td>
<td>.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>20,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zacatecas Migration Survey, 1991

3The marginalization index is based on population total in 1995; total number of private, occupied dwellings in 1995; percentage of population age 15 and above literate in 1995; percentage of population employment in the primary sector in 1990; percentage of dwellings without piped water in 1995; percentage of dwellings without a sewer connection in 1995; percentage of dwellings without electricity in 1995; percentage of dwellings with a dirt floor in 1995; and the average number of occupants per room in 1990.
Table 2 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression model of internal and U.S. migration. The model was estimated using sampling weights equivalent to the inverse of individual selection probabilities. The standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted to take into account sample stratification at the regional-level and clustering at the community or neighborhood-level. The table presents results for predicting the log odds of internal migration versus nonmigration, U.S. migration versus nonmigration, and U.S. migration versus internal migration. We concentrate our discussion on the social network and economic opportunity variables. The results for the individual- and household-level demographic variables are consistent with the findings reported in other studies of U.S. migration.

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal Migrant vs. Nonmigrant</th>
<th>U.S. Migrant vs. Nonmigrant</th>
<th>U.S. Migrant vs. Internal Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$\text{std}$</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male=1)</td>
<td>1.585* (13.43)</td>
<td>2.700* (26.54)</td>
<td>1.115* (7.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.004 (.84)</td>
<td>.020* (3.87)</td>
<td>.024* (3.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^2$</td>
<td>-.002* (7.03)</td>
<td>-.005* (13.55)</td>
<td>-.002* (5.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>-.053 (.43)</td>
<td>.104 (.85)</td>
<td>.157 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>-.186 (1.25)</td>
<td>-.542* (3.45)</td>
<td>-.356b (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-.166 (1.29)</td>
<td>.141 (1.31)</td>
<td>.307 (1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of minor children</td>
<td>-.105* (3.55)</td>
<td>-.097a (3.98)</td>
<td>.007 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of adults</td>
<td>-.067b (1.74)</td>
<td>.048a (2.47)</td>
<td>.115a (2.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active internal network</td>
<td>1.897a (11.43)</td>
<td>-.306b (1.76)</td>
<td>-.2203a (9.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active U.S. network</td>
<td>-.514c (3.60)</td>
<td>1.147a (10.94)</td>
<td>1.662c (9.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginality index</td>
<td>.039 (.55)</td>
<td>.018 (.79)</td>
<td>-.021 (.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Migration Networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of U.S. return mig. (1990)</td>
<td>-.187a (4.09)</td>
<td>.054 (1.27)</td>
<td>.241a (5.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>-.240a (2.59)</td>
<td>-.350a (3.22)</td>
<td>-.110 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>-.237 (1.32)</td>
<td>-.480a (3.39)</td>
<td>-.244 (1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>.089 (.72)</td>
<td>.314a (2.65)</td>
<td>.225b (1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>-.043 (.48)</td>
<td>.124b (1.79)</td>
<td>.167b (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.978a (12.80)</td>
<td>-4.221a (16.48)</td>
<td>-1.243a (3.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>67.3c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>20,218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < .05
b p < .10. Standard errors adjusted for stratification at the regional-level, and clustering at the community- and neighborhood-level)
Consistent with social network theory, membership in a household with an active internal migration network significantly increases the likelihood of internal migration and significantly reduces the likelihood of U.S. migration. Likewise, membership in a household with an active U.S. migration network significantly reduces the likelihood of internal migration and significantly increases the likelihood of U.S. migration. At the municipal level, the prior rate of U.S. return migration has a significant negative effect on the chances of internal migration and a positive but nonsignificant effect on the chances of U.S. migration. However, when we compare U.S. migration to internal migration, the prior rate of U.S. return migration is highly significant. The strong positive effects of U.S. networks on U.S. migration and their negative effects on internal migration are consistent with the findings of other studies, however, the deterrent effect of internal networks on U.S. migration is somewhat surprising given the strong pull of superior U.S. wages. This result suggests that households do not attempt to diversify risks by simultaneously placing members in U.S. and internal labor markets.

Controlling for migration networks, persons living in municipalities with favorable nonagricultural wage opportunities are less likely to migrate either internally or to the United States. The level of agricultural wage opportunities is also inversely related to the likelihood of U.S. migration, but has no significant effect on internal migration. These results are consistent with both the neoclassical and new economics of labor migration theories. Given favorable employment opportunities nearby, individuals are significantly less likely to migrate to other areas in search of higher wages. Controlling for migration networks and employment opportunities, investment opportunities have no significant effect on internal migration, but they have a positive and significant effect on the risk of U.S. migration. This result, not predicted by neoclassical theory, is consistent with the new economics of labor migration.

As a final test of social network theory, we estimated a model with interactions between active U.S. network and the indices of nonagricultural and agricultural wage opportunities. Table 3 presents the effects of wage opportunities interacted with active U.S. networks on the log odds of U.S. migration versus nonmigration. Consistent with social network theory, the negative effect of an increase in nonagricultural wage opportunities on U.S. migration is greater for individuals without an active U.S. network than for individuals with such a network, although the difference is not statistically significant. In the case of agricultural wage opportunities, the difference is highly significant. An increase in agricultural wage opportunities has a significant deterrent
effect on U.S. migration for individuals living in households without an active U.S. network, but the same increase has no effect for individuals living in households with an active U.S. network. This result provides additional evidence of the influence of social networks on migration patterns, although the relatively weak interaction with nonagricultural wages suggests that wage growth in urban areas will deter some U.S. migration even in communities with established U.S. migration networks.

**TABLE 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of wage opportunities in municipality of origin</th>
<th>U.S. Migrant vs. Nonmigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural without active U.S. network</td>
<td>-.379* (3.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural with active U.S. network</td>
<td>-.308* (2.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural without active U.S. network</td>
<td>-.618* (3.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural with active U.S. network</td>
<td>-.062 (.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: *p < .05. Only coefficients for wage opportunities and interactions with active U.S. network are presented here. In addition to the two interaction terms the model included all the variables presented in Table 2.

To summarize our results thus far, Table 4 compares the predicted and the estimated direction of the municipal-level effects on the probability of internal and U.S. migration. Elements of all three theories receive support, which highlights the importance of incorporating a variety of theoretical frameworks into explanations of migration behavior. However, on the points where the neoclassical and new economics of labor migration theories disagree, the results are consistent with the investment effects predicted by the latter. The results are also consistent with the predictions of social network theory, although the positive influence of U.S. networks on the likelihood of U.S. migration are, in some instances, not significant.

Just how important are these municipal-level effects on the likelihood of internal and U.S. migration? Table 5 presents the relative risks of internal and U.S. migration for alternative municipal-level economic opportunities and rates of U.S. return migration. The relative risks presented in Table 5 indicate how many times more likely are individuals living in communities that score one standard deviation above the mean on the specified municipal characteristic to migrate than are individuals living in communities that score one standard deviation below the mean on the same characteristic. All other individual-, household-, community-, and municipal-level characteristics are set equal to their respective sample means. This exercise allows us to compare the
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF PREDICTED AND ESTIMATED DIRECTION OF MUNICIPAL-LEVEL EFFECTS ON THE LOG ODDS OF INTERNAL AND U.S. MIGRATION ACCORDING TO THE NEOCLASSICAL, NEW ECONOMICS OF LABOR MIGRATION, AND SOCIAL NETWORK THEORIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal-level factors</th>
<th>Predicted Direction</th>
<th>Estimated Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neoclassical Theory</td>
<td>New Economics of Labor Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Mig.</td>
<td>U.S. Mig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage opportunities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment opportunities</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Migration networks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of U.S. return migration (1980)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active U.S. network</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural wage × Active U.S. network</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural wage × Active U.S. network</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < .05.

relative impact of comparable changes in the different municipal-level conditions. For example, individuals living in communities with wage opportunities one standard deviation above the mean are half as likely to migrate to the United States as individuals living in communities with wage opportunities one standard deviation below the mean. The relative risks provide a clear depiction of the important social network effect described in other studies. Individuals living in communities with U.S. return migration rates one standard deviation above the mean are .4 times as likely to migrate internally as individuals living in communities with return migration rates one standard deviation below the mean.

CONCLUSIONS

The neoclassical emphasis on wage differentials and cost-benefit analysis has been central to most explanations of Mexican migration to the United States. Criticism of this perspective is generally directed more at the theory's simplifying assumptions and narrow focus on wage and employment opportunities, than at its underlying premise that migration is a rational response to locational differences in economic opportunities. The new economics of labor migration and social network theories expand the range of factors considered relevant to decisions about migration to include capital markets and the social organization of information flows and migration assistance. The new eco-
nomics of labor migration theory identifies the demand for credit as a motivation for temporary migration. In communities where credit is absent or prohibitively expensive, the presence of opportunities for small-scale investment encourages temporary migration as a means to acquire funds for investment purposes. The positive effect of local investment opportunities on the likelihood of temporary out-migration is entirely unanticipated by the neoclassical perspective. Social network theory emphasizes the importance of social ties to experienced migrants in places of origin and destination as potential sources of information and migration assistance. The presence of family and friends in the United States provides an additional pull to the already strong pull of superior U.S. wages. The pull of social ties inherent in bi-national migration networks is expected to reduce the deterrent effect of employment growth in Mexico on migration to the United States.

Our results are consistent with aspects of all three theories. Favorable employment opportunities in origin communities are associated with significantly lower risks of out-migration to both internal and U.S. destinations. On the other hand, all else being equal, the risks of U.S. migration are significantly higher in places with abundant opportunities for small-scale investment. This result holds even after controlling for prior rates of U.S. return migration and is consistent with the investment-oriented migration predicted by the new economics of labor migration theory. Finally, we find social network effects consistent with our predictions. Social networks facilitate and deter competing types of migration. The positive effect of social ties to experienced U.S. migrants on the chances of individual migration to the United States are well documented in the literature. However, we find comparable effects for internal migration networks. Having active internal migrants in the

---

**Table 5**

**Relative Risks of Internal Migration and U.S. Migration for Values of Wage Opportunities, Investment Opportunities, and Migration Networks One Standard Deviation Above Versus One Standard Deviation Below the Sample Means, Zacatecas, Mexico.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relative risk of internal migration</th>
<th>Relative risk of U.S. migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>[.67]</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural</td>
<td>[1.19]</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>[.93]</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Migration Networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of U.S. return migration (1980)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>[1.30]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: figures in brackets not significant at \( p < .10 \).
household raises the risks of temporary internal migration for other adult household members and discourages temporary U.S. migration.

These results provide reasons for both optimism and pessimism with regard to the effectiveness of employment growth in Mexico as a deterrent to U.S. migration. Decisions about migration are clearly responsive to local employment opportunities, even in a state such as Zacatecas where migration to the United States is pervasive and has a long history. Nevertheless, substantial improvements in wages and employment stability will be necessary in order to overcome the powerful draw of U.S. migration in communities where migration to the United States is well entrenched. Our finding that U.S. migration is strongly associated with positive investment opportunities suggest that the development of small investor credit services in Mexico should be viewed as an integral part of development strategies designed to reduce temporary migration to the United States.

APPENDIX

Construction of Indices of Wage and Investment Opportunities

Starting with a municipal-level data base of over 140 measures of economic activity, we narrowed the number of relevant measures to 33 and divided them into nonagricultural and agricultural measures (Table A1). We then used correlation analysis to identify redundant measures (i.e., \( r > .85 \)) and eliminated an additional 16. We subjected the remaining measures to exploratory factor analysis to isolate groupings of variables that correspond to wage and investment opportunities. On the first iteration of each factor analysis we allowed an unrestricted number of factors. We then eliminated factors with eigenvalues of less than one. After several iterations, this procedure led us to a five-factor solution for the nonagricultural measures and a four-factor solution for the agricultural measures. Based on theoretical considerations, we identified in each of the two sets of measures a factor that corresponded to wage opportunities and a second factor that corresponded to investment opportunities. In line with the iterative method of index formation suggested by Marradi (1981), we retained only those variables that loaded highly upon our two factors of interest (greater than .50) and ran the factor analyses again. Eigenvalue tests among both sets of measures indicated two-factor solutions in line with our wage and investment factors.

Table A2 presents the results for the two-factor solutions. Among the nonagricultural measures, the proportion of economically active men employed by others, the proportion of economically active women employed by others, the
proportion of economically active men reporting an income, the proportion of economically active women reporting an income, and the proportion of economically active men in commerce all loaded significantly on a single factor which we identify as wage opportunities. The proportion of economically active men in commerce, the proportion of economically active women in commerce, the proportion of economically active men earning more than double the minimum wage, the number of commercial establishments per economically active person, the number of service establishments per economically active person, and the natural log of per capital municipal revenues loaded significantly on a second factor which we identify as investment opportunities. Among the agricultural measures, the number of agricultural workers per farm, the proportion of arable land irrigated, and the proportion of agricultural workers earning more than the minimum wage loaded significantly on a single factor which we identify as wage opportunities. The value of all agricultural production per farm, the value of all agricultural production per agricultural worker, and the value of harvested crops per hectare of arable land loaded significantly on a second factor which we identify as agricultural investment opportunities.

To create each of our four indices, we separated the nonagricultural and agricultural measures further into wage and investment opportunities and ran final factor analyses on each of the four groupings. Because our goal was to construct indices that were as uncorrelated as possible, we dropped the proportion of men in commerce from the nonagricultural wage and investment groupings. We also dropped from the nonagricultural investment group the proportion of men earning more than double the minimum wage because intuitively it should also be a good measure of wage opportunities. The final factor loadings and scores that we used to construct our four indices are reported in the columns on the right half of Table A2. To create the summary indices we took the municipal values for the variables and multiplied them by their corresponding scoring coefficient, and then we summed these products (Kim and Mueller, 1978). Table A2 reports Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients for each index. High values indicate that an index provides an internally consistent measure of a single underlying concept. All four values of Cronbach's alpha are near or above the .80 minimum acceptable level recommended by Carmines and Zeller (1979).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable labels</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonagricultural opportunities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Natural log of municipal population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men economically active</td>
<td>Proportion of men age 15+ economically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women economically active</td>
<td>Proportion of women age 15+ economically active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men working for others</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men employed by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women working for others</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women employed by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in manufacturing</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men working in manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in commerce</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men working in commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in services</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men working in services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in manufacturing</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women working in manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in commerce</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women working in commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in services</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women working in services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men with an income</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men reporting an income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women with an income</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women reporting an income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men twice minimum wage</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men earning twice or more the minimum wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women twice minimum wage</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women earning twice or more the minimum wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commercial establishments</strong></td>
<td>Number of commercial establishments per economically active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service establishments</strong></td>
<td>Number of service establishments per economically active person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacturing establishments</strong></td>
<td>Number of manufacturing establishments per economically active person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal revenue</td>
<td>Natural log of per capita municipal revenues from property and sales taxes (impuestos), utility and service fees (derechos), sale or lease of property and goods (productos), and fees (aprovechamientos). Excludes special assessments for infrastructure improvements (contribucion a mejores)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural opportunities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of production per worker</td>
<td>Value of agricultural production per agricultural worker (includes beans, corn, other grains and vegetables, fruit, and meat) (average for 1990 and 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of production per farm</td>
<td>Value of agricultural production per farm establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of crops per hectare</td>
<td>Value of harvested crops per hectare of arable land (includes beans, corn, and other grains and vegetables) (average for 1990 and 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of fruit per hectare</td>
<td>Value of fruit production per farm establishment (average for 1990 and 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers per hectare</td>
<td>Agricultural workers per hectare of arable land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms per hectare</td>
<td>Farm establishments per hectare of arable land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers per farm</td>
<td>Agricultural workers per farm establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land in ejidos</td>
<td>Proportion of land in ejidal and communal holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land in ejidos</td>
<td>Proportion of arable land in ejidal and communal holding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land irrigated</td>
<td>Proportion of arable land irrigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence farms</td>
<td>Proportion of farm establishments not producing for the market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric workers minimum wage</td>
<td>Proportion of agricultural workers earning a minimum wage or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in agriculture</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active men working in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in agriculture</td>
<td>Proportion of economically active women working in agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE A2

**TWO FACTOR SOLUTIONS, FACTOR LOADINGS AND SCORES FOR WAGE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY INDICES, ZACATECAS, MEXICO.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable labels</th>
<th>Factor 1 (Wage opportunities)</th>
<th>Factor 2 (Investment opportunities)</th>
<th>Factor scores</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Factor scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men working for others</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.268</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Women working for others</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.66**</td>
<td>.208</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men with an income</td>
<td>.80**</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.74**</td>
<td>.275</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women with an income</td>
<td>.75**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.80**</td>
<td>.355</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men in commerce</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in commerce</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.76**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men twice minimum wage</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial establishments</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service establishments</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal revenue</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.79**</td>
<td>.76**</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach's Alpha (standardized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.87</td>
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**Agricultural opportunities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable labels</th>
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<th>Factor 2 (Investment opportunities)</th>
<th>Factor scores</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>Factor scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers per farm</td>
<td>.96**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land irrigated</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric workers min. wage</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of production per farm</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.83**</td>
<td>.92**</td>
<td>.613</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of production per worker</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>1.02**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of crops per hectare</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach's Alpha (standardized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.89</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Loadings greater than 0.50*

### TABLE A3

**CORRELATION MATRIX, INDICES OF WAGE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND SELECTED MUNICIPAL-LEVEL MEASURES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ZACATECAS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Nonagricultural wage</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agricultural wage</td>
<td></td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.76</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nonagricultural income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Agricultural income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Twice min wage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Women with an income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Municipal revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Women in manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Women economically active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Stark, O.

Taylor, J. E.


Todaro, M. P.
Extending the meaning of "citizenship" well beyond its primary significance as a legal status, this ambitious work examines the diverse ways in which contemporary societies incorporate immigrants as new members, provides a critical discussion of their shortcomings in relation to democratic ideals, and suggests how matters might be improved in the face of ongoing migratory realities. Their starting point, in keeping with innovative approaches to the subject, is that international migration inherently challenges conventional views of the international order, as it demonstrates on a daily basis that human beings are not bound by its division into mutually exclusive states. Thanks to their remarkable capacity for adapting to a wide range of natural and social environments, they can vote with their feet; moreover, under contemporary conditions, many can, in effect, live in more than one country. The authors' starting point is the observation that "globalization" has raised the incidence of international migration to an unprecedented level, so that societies with substantial immigration today include not only the traditionally immigrationist overseas democracies, but also the earlier emigrationist states of Western Europe, as well as some countries in post-Communist Europe, and many more in the developing world. They then go on to suggest that these population movements, originating far and wide, have produced among the receivers an unprecedented broadening of cultural values and practices, which outpaces established processes of acculturation and assimilation and hence results in unprecedented challenges for citizenship: "The idea of the citizen who spent most of his or her life in one country and shared a common national identity is losing ground" (p. viii). Millions today hold multiple citizenships, with their lives straddling several countries; others find themselves at the opposite end of the continuum, not living in their country of formal citizenship, but unable to become citizens of their country of residence. They conclude that "The advent of increasing numbers of citizens who do not belong undermines the basis of the nation-state as the central site of democracy." In the light of this diagnosis, the authors prescribe "a mode of citizenship that reconciles the pressures of globalization with the reality that states will continue, for the foreseeable future, to exist as the most important political unit," inspired by the Kantian ideal of "universal hospitality," translated into contemporary practices.

Overall, however, the book is stronger on diagnosis than on prescription. It is organized on the basis of a division of labor, reflecting the authors' respective specialties, sociology of migration and political theory. Castles contributes five chapters, starting with an analysis of how globalization simultaneously erodes the autonomy of the nation-state, undermines its foundational ideology, and fosters increasing mobility of people across borders: "The global context . . . is changing dramatically, but so is the way in which we perceive it" (p. 2). The enlarged scale of movement and its increasing distance, both in physical and cultural terms, raises the question of whether contemporary migrants will be acculturated into nationals of the receiving countries, or whether they will constitute diasporas, in which case the nation-state and the status of citizens will have to be modified to fit new realities. Castles' other chapters deal with immigration and minority-formation; the process of incorporation into citizenship, pointing to convergence among contemporary democracies; the consequences of globalization for citizenship in the Marshallian sense; and the dynamics of ethnic mobilization. Without belittling the contribution of the dynamics of international capital to
stepped up movement, surely population
dynamics constitute a factor as well. Surpris-
ingly, the book is entirely silent on the sub-
ject; but one need not subscribe to anti-
immigration populationism to pay serious
attention to population growth in poor
countries as a critical issue in the contempo-
rary world.

Davidson provides another five chap-
ters, starting with a critical review of the evo-
lution of theories of citizenship, from the
Athenian and Roman models, through
European developments in the modern era,
and culminating in the rise of the welfare
state. He then goes on to examine the
appearance of new forms in the contempo-
rary era, with an emphasis on distinct forms
of multiculturalism in the United States and
Australia, as well as the emergence of quasi-
citizenship at the level of the European
Union, and parallel developments in the
Asia-Pacific region. He concludes with a
critical review of suggestions for new forms
of citizenship, concluding with a skeptical
assessment of their relevance to conditions
in the world at large: “What these lived real-
ities add up to is the impossibility of equat-
ing civic education exclusively with teaching
people to love their country, as the commu-
nity of its citizens” (p. 214). He points out
that the novelty of the contemporary situa-
tion arises not merely from the quantity and
diversity of the immigrants, but also from
the advent of significant changes in the dis-
position of the receivers toward them. In
short, the marked broadening of the scope of
acceptable differences within liberal democ-
racies established a precedent that in effect
obligates them to accept a broader range of
differences arising from immigration. Under
these conditions, the new lived realities
make it impossible to equate civic education
exclusively with teaching people to love their
country, as the community of its citizens,
but extends to trust and love in exchanges
with others. This is not to say, however, that
the process of incorporation is thereby ren-
dered conflict-free.

As is the case in much of the current
work founded on the notion of “globaliza-
tion,” the authors exaggerate the uniqueness
of the contemporary situation. For example,
the proportion of foreign-born in the Unit-
ed States today is approximately the same as
it was on the eve of World War I, and much
lower than in 1850; much the same holds
not only for Canada and Australia, but also
for the early industrializers of western
Europe, notably Great Britain (with regard
to the Irish), Germany (Poles), France (Ital-
ians, Belgians, Spaniards, Poles), and Bel-
gium (Poles, Italians). “Globalization” of
capital and labor has been under way for a
very long time, as attested by the determina-
tion of organized labor from the mid-nineteen-
teenth century onward to operate as a
transnational movement. International
migration expanded concomitantly, thanks
to the advent of the railroad and of iron
steamships, which brought about a revolu-
tionary transformation of long-distance
transportation. A simultaneous information
revolution was induced by the spread of
cheap print and the telegraph, as well the
rapid spread of literacy, which provided
human beings in even the most remote
places with intelligence regarding conditions
and opportunities outside their native locality,
region, or country. Forced migrations
increased even earlier, as the dynamics of
European state-formation generated violent
identitarian conflicts, starting with attempts
by rulers to impose religious homogeneity.
In the eighteenth century religion gave way
to ideology, and in the nineteenth to nation-
alism, with similar consequences, while
technological advances in weaponry ampli-
fied the destruction wrought by conflicts
within and between countries, fostering an
increase in forced displacement.

The novelty of the challenges posed by
“heterogeneity” and “transnationalism” is
somewhat exaggerated also. On the sending
side, Castles invokes Manuel Castells as well
as the journalist Robert Kaplan to the effect
that globalization is responsible for the
growth of particularistic identities based on
ethnicity, religion, regionalism, or national-
ism; but surely the populations in question
were not less particularistic before recent
developments in the world economy? Were the Balkans less "balkanist" in the inter-war period, or even before World War I, which they helped bring about? The same question can be raised with regard to the post-colonial world: for example, while colonial strategies of "divide in order to rule" surely contributed to the exacerbation of tensions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which were driven to the explosive stage by the introduction of majority rule in the course of decolonization, the conquest of the Hutu by the Tutsi two centuries earlier did not bring about a tension-free golden age of material satisfaction and spiritual joy.

On the receiving side, while the majority of today's immigrants to western Europe and North America originate outside of Europe, it does not follow that they are more "heterogeneous" than their European predecessors, who were regarded by receivers at the time as vastly different and unassimilable. In particular, the massive arrival of Catholics in societies that self-identified as Protestant triggered reactions remarkably similar to those provoked by the arrival of Muslims today. Reactions were even more severe to the arrival of East European Jews, which —together with the granting of French citizenship to Algerian Sephardic Jews— precipitated the Dreyfus Affair in France and severe immigration restriction in Great Britain (1905), and contributed significantly to mounting determination to close the American door (1897-1924). In the final analysis, it was identitarian exclusiveness rather than economic defensiveness that led to the elaboration of a highly restrictive immigration regime in the early decades of the twentieth century. Incidentally, one of the main grounds invoked by restrictionists was the transnationalism of the "new immigrants," who were said to maintain links with their country of origin, thereby resisting assimilation.

This exhumation of the past is by no means a gratuitous exercise in historical correctness. It reveals that formation of the exclusivist form of national citizenship, which Castles and Davidson correctly view as inappropriate to the situations encountered in contemporary democracies, was in fact largely shaped by reactions to the onset of greater mobility during a period that was also one of increasing international tensions. In this light, it can be better seen that this work's most important contribution might be to help us forestall similar reactions in our own age.

In this light, in most cases immigration today should be understood as a revival rather than an unprecedented phenomenon. Similar questions can be raised with regard to the notion that "globalization" erodes the power of governments to control the economy, the welfare system, and national culture. What is the baseline for this evaluation? Once again, the dynamics of western state-formation generated nearly constant international conflict, whose consequences in turn determined the course of development of each state involved; and its cultural dimension, initially focusing on religion and subsequently on language, entailed a constant tension between the national and the trans-national. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the fates of most western nation-states were shaped as much by two world wars and a catastrophic worldwide economic depression as by internal choices, while nearly all of Africa, most of Asia, and much of Latin America, were subjected to colonial rule. As for Central and Eastern Europe, their governments had little purchase over the economy, the welfare system, or national culture either in the first half of that century or in most of the second, when they were subject to the dictates of a powerful external actor. Moreover, the relative autonomy the more affluent democracies achieved in the post-World War II period was conditioned upon their relative success in creating international organizations that maintained war in a cold rather than hot state, and established a broad Keynesian baseline that provided limited choice with regard to the social dimension of Marshallian citizenship.
In short, while Castles and Davidson provide an excellent account of the intimate linkage between traditional conceptions of citizenship and the nation-state as an imagined community, we would do well to take into consideration that this process was all along dialectically related to globalization.

In what sense, and to what extent, is citizenship “more problematic” today? In relation to what baseline? Without minimizing the problem of disenfranchisement, it should be pointed out that on the whole, the most egregious instances of long-term disenfranchisement of immigrants occur in countries where the local population also lacks political rights. With a few exceptions, notably Germany and Austria, the countries that rank highest on a scale of democratization with regard to their “traditional” populations also rank quite high with regard to their stance toward newcomers. The foreign population of European OECD countries in 1995 amounted to 19.4 million, of whom 6.7 million were EU citizens; the major other groups were Maghrebi (2 million), Turks (2.6 million) and former Yugoslavs (1.4 million). But the majority of second-generation North Africans in France, at least, are citizens. Although we lack adequate research on the subject, evidence from other countries (notably the United States) suggests that the low rate of acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is not due entirely to barriers imposed by the receiving country, but also to the relatively low incentives for doing so under conditions where many rights are extended to non-citizen legal residents—which includes the vast majority of immigrants, even in the United States!—and, especially in Europe, including social and economic rights. This would appear to be confirmed by the rush to naturalize in the United States following enactment of the 1996 law depriving even legal immigrants of non-insurance welfare benefits.

We also have a problem of the short- versus the long-term. The situation in receiving countries today, especially where the majority of immigrants are of the first generation, cannot be compared to the outcome of immigration in the previous large wave, which was observed mostly after the wave was completed, and considerable pressure was brought about to incorporate, or where the children eventually became citizens.

In Chapter 1, Castles suggests in effect a constant-sum view of the nation-state, wondering if the model can work if all the societies of the world constitute themselves as nation-states and seek equality in a global system, or is it premised on the domination of weaker countries, and the stigmatization and exclusion of others?


MARK J. MILLER
University of Delaware

This slender volume examines the impact of globalization upon international migration. The author claims that international migration has been given short-shrift in the voluminous literature about globalization. But in the major volume on globalization edited by James Mittelman, international migration figures quite centrally in the analysis.

The focus is very much upon the economic face of globalization and international migration and draws quite heavily from the papers prepared for the July, 1994 workshop sponsored by UNCTAD and IOM on investment trade and migration. Teachers of undergraduate courses on international migration will want to consider adoption of this book.

The scope of analysis is global. The author illustrates observations with examples drawn from around the world. He recurrently summarizes how the world’s various regions compare on themes like the effects of remittances, the degree of government involvement in organization of labor emigration or on the effects of brain drain. Stalker’s knowledge of Asian migration is particularly strong.

The analysis avoids many of the by now commonplace pitfalls of those who
study globalization. The author is well versed in the history of international political economy and skillfully sketches the outline of international migration's role. Drawing from Williamson, he argues that mass transatlantic migration contributed to convergence between Europe and the New World in the 1870 to 1914 period. A second period of convergence occurs in Western Europe after World War II. But globalization meanwhile has enormously heightened economic divergences between OECD area countries and most of the rest of the world, creating background conditions for a new age of migration. The bulk of the rest of the book examines whether there are credible scenarios for alternative futures to the new age of migration.

Chapters four and five review trade and migration issues, foreign direct investment and export processing firms, respectively. A number of preventable errors detract from an otherwise outstanding effort, such as the mislabeling of Figure 2.1 on page 12. The figure charts coefficients of dispersion from 1950 to 1985 and beyond, while the actual period charted was 1870 to 1913.


JEROEN DOOMERNIK
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam

In objective terms, both Northern America and the European Union show all the marks of countries/regions of immigration: they equal each other in the relative number of foreign born legal and illegal residents and share a similar annual influx of newcomers. Yet, the first considers itself to be open to immigrants, the latter's member countries as a rule do not (though marked European policy changes are underway). Admission of immigrants follows from international obligation based upon concerns for human rights. In the United States, in contrast, though not discounting such obligations, admission first and foremost serves economic needs. For this reason thorough studies on the economic costs and benefits of (further) immigration like those brought together by Borjas in a single volume are hard to find in Europe. Whereas to the editor and his co-authors such questions are seen as interesting and quite legitimate, to most European scholars it would appear unethical to relate immigration aimed to accommodate humanitarian needs to its economic consequences. And the few politicians who raise the issue are usually to be found at the right end side of the political spectrum.

Even though the focus of this volume is restricted to the impact of immigration on U.S. society in general and the economic consequences in particular, some of its findings should interest not just those who study U.S. immigration policies and their consequences but also other scholars and policy makers, not in the least those in the EU where fundamental discussions on immigration are rife.

Many interesting questions are posed in the nine essays that make up the book, going well beyond the "classical" ones pertaining to employment and income of immigrants and the consequences of the native labor force. Among those are whether immigration impacts on crime and, therefore, the costs of the prison system (it does); whether the balance between taxes paid and social security benefits enjoyed is negative or positive for immigrants (barely positive, mainly because many stay temporarily and never claim benefits); whether the children of immigrants do better or worse than they did half a century ago (not much change: in economic terms they consistently perform better than their native peers). This last conclusion is probably most striking to European readers as it goes against their general experience.

The chapters in which these matters are dealt with are preceded by a number of more standard analyses (the classical ones referred to above) based upon data from subsequent US censuses. The broad conclusion of those
is that the skill levels and earnings of immi-
grants have declined considerably during the
last decades. However, as pointed out by
Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith in their contribu-
tion, the policy implications are not as
straightforward as they might seem, because
these data include illegal immigrants, of
which there is a fair number in the US.
These authors have therefore sought
recourse to a different set of data: the INS'
records of legal immigrants. Those turn out
to provide quite a different picture. During
the past 25 years skill levels among legal
immigrants were equal or higher than those
of the native population. This would imply
that US immigration policy as such benefits
the economy but fails to address one way or
the other the highly bi-forked nature of the
demand for labor by "producing" consider-
able illegal immigration and employment of
low skilled workers.

All in all, the present volume offers,
first and foremost economists, but also oth-
ers with an interest in the economic impact
of immigration, more than sufficient mater-
ial for debate and further research.

Regularisations of Illegal Immigrants in the
European Union/Les régularisations des
étrangers illégaux dans l’Union Européenne.
Under the supervision of Philippe de Bruy-
ccker. Bruxelles: Etablissement Emile Bruy-
lant, Collection de la Faculté de Droit de
420.

EVA KOPROLIN
Council of Europe

The study is the first comparative research
on regularization of illegal aliens in the
European Union undertaken by the academ-
ic network for legal studies on immigration
and asylum in Europe, which brings togeth-
er specialists on the rights of foreigners in
the universities of each member State. The
choice of the subject is timely at a moment
when the European Union is starting to
devise elements of a European immigration
policy. The matter itself is contradictory:
migration management strategies aiming
everally at combating irregular immigra-
tion, what good reasons could there be to
"counteract" the effort by regularizing for-
eigners in an illegal situation? The research,
covering eight member States, compares
national practices with regularization mea-
ures with a view to identifying common ele-
ments and evaluating the political coherence
of these operations.

After a brief introduction, Philippe de Bruycker sets out the major questions:
advantages and inconveniences for the indi-
vidual and for the State concerned, interrela-
tions with restrictive immigration policies,
paradoxical effects, etc. Subsequently, James
Clark confronts the reader with the statisti-
cal aspects of the issue: irregular migration
is, by its very definition, unquantified and
largely unmeasurable. Figures can only be
estimated and these estimations seem to
develop a fatal tendency to be quoted in the
political debate as facts.

The central chapter of the book consists
of the synthesis report drawn up by the coor-
dination team of the Odysseus Academic
Network comprising Joanna Apap, Philippe
de Bruycker, Cathérine Schmitter, Sophie de
Seze and Cathérine Ray. A rather wide defini-
tion of the term "regularization" is suggested.
It is followed by a classification of various
forms of regularization: permanent or excep-
tional, individual or collective measures, rati-
fying an accomplished fact or aiming at the
protection of the persons concerned, legal
opportunity or obligation, implementation in
the framework of an organized procedure or
not. In a more descriptive part, an inventory
is established summarizing country by coun-
try the substantive and procedural rules gov-
erning the regularizations carried out over the
last 20 years.

The comparison allows certain conclu-
sions: The - very heterogeneous - phenome-
non is spreading in space and accelerating in
time and the numbers of foreigners con-
cerned are thus increasing. As concerns the
legal base, countries opt either for regulariza-
tion by a legislative act or by administrative
decree. Regarding the material conditions
for candidates to fulfill, an almost exhaustive list of 10 criteria can be established, including a territorial, an economic, a humanitarian criterion, one related to asylum procedures, a health criterion, one relating to family ties, a quantitative criterion, consideration of the nationality, of integration perspectives and of training and professional qualifications. An analysis of the formal conditions follows. In a second part, the reports established by the national correspondents are reproduced in full.

The comprehensive study allows the reader to develop an in-depth view of a very complex issue: migration movements are first and foremost a fact of life, a reality, which restrictive measures apparently do not succeed to limit entirely. In order to avoid a widening gap with reality, the normative framework has eventually to acknowledge the situation ex post facto.


MARGARET ADSITT
Carleton University
SHANNON STETTNER
York University

In the first chapters of Immigrants and the Labour Force, Pendakur reviews the evolution of immigration policy in post World War II Canada to demonstrate how it has defined the nature of Canada’s immigrant intake and the type of work immigrants perform. The policy sections are interesting, especially as they relate to the role of politics.

In the first analyses sections, the education and age profiles of “cohorts” of immigrants and non-immigrants are investigated within the context of an eight-sector typology of industries, using Census data from 1961 to 1991. These sections are supportive of his thesis, but rely too much on the rational economic model, ignoring cultural differences.

In the last chapter, Pendakur analyzes earning inequalities by ethnic origins. There is a fundamental methodological flaw in this analysis that pivots around the assumption that unexplained differences in earnings constitute “discrimination.” The logic behind Pendakur’s methodology is as follows: if differences in earnings still exist in the data, after controlling for all the variables that determine wages, then there is evidence of discrimination. This assumption is problematic because all relevant variables have not been adequately controlled. Specifically, at least three of Pendakur’s measures of the real life components of fair wage determination are inadequate for the task at hand: experience, language ability and education.

Pendakur uses age and a number of assumptions about how people have spent their lives to create a measure of experience. It is now well documented that an age proxy cannot adequately measure experience in studies of this type. This is because very few people have spent their lives as the age surrogates assume. Certain immigrant groups are more likely to have experienced disrupted careers due to emigration, an inability to speak an official language or childrearing responsibilities. Some groups have low average levels of schooling. We know that people with lower levels of education are more likely to have labor force disruptions than others. In assuming continuity in employment for all, Pendakur has granted many disadvantaged groups more experience than they actually have. This alone could generate large and unexplained earning gaps.

As for language ability, a “yes” or “no” response to a question about one’s knowledge of a language does not measure language proficiency. A literacy survey undertaken by Statistics Canada in 1990, found that only 48 percent of immigrants compared to 66 percent of nonimmigrants claiming to have knowledge of the language were actually proficient. There is also evidence of social class and/or intergenerational effects on language proficiency; this could take earnings inequality beyond the first generation of immigration; language proficiency is a prerequisite for higher paying jobs and for translating degrees into earning power.
Space limitations preclude a discussion of the problems with Pendakur's two measures of education; however, see Thomas Sowell's *Preferential Policies* (William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990). Pendakur's inability to adequately control for three of the most important components of wage determination precludes his ability to make a scientific claim about labor market discrimination.


**DAVID P. LINDSTROM**
**Brown University**

In this book, Peter Andreas examines the border from the perspective of the state and views it as a political stage where sovereignty is contested, and imagery is more important than reality. Andreas uses the symbolic dimension of the border to explain, first, why the U.S. government is escalating its efforts to control the border with Mexico, while at the same time making the border more open to the flow of legal goods and services; and secondly, why the government continues to put so much effort into controlling the border when all of the evidence appears to indicate that its efforts have been largely ineffective in stemming the flow of undocumented migrants and illegal drugs. For Andreas, "the escalation of border policing has ultimately been less about deterring the flow of drugs and migrants than about recrafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state's territorial authority. Those who view border enforcement as either puny and ineffective or draconian and inhumane too often fail to appreciate its perceptual and symbolic dimensions" (p. x).

To understand the actions of the state, we need to recognize that law enforcement has an expressive role (reaffirming moral boundaries) in addition to instrumental goals (effective defense of physical boundaries). A successful border policing strategy is, therefore, as much about image management as it is about successfully keeping undesirables out. Once a commodity which is in demand is made illegal (such as drugs or migrant labor), the stage is set for smuggling, a game in which the state tries to keep what is undesirable out and smugglers seek to get it in. The border game has many players, and it is not a zero sum game. Stricter border enforcement increases the demand for the services that smugglers offer and the level of sophistication of smuggling operations. More sophisticated smuggling, in turn, calls for more resourceful and aggressive border enforcement. The get tough approach to border enforcement arises from the public perception that the border is out-of-control, and the resultant pressure on the state to react. By concentrating enforcement efforts along the most visible sections of the border, and not at the actual points of demand were undocumented labor is employed and illegal drugs are consumed, the state can claim it is defending the borders and addressing the flow of migrants and drugs without disrupting the patterns of consumption which drive these flows. Meanwhile, migrants and drugs continue to enter, but in less visible (and thus less symbolically threatening) ways. While primarily focused on the U.S.-Mexico border, the book also includes a chapter on the German-Polish border and Spain's southern borders for comparative purposes.

*Border Games* offers a counterpoint on the border to studies of transnationalism which view the border as a political and sociocultural construct of diminishing importance. Clearly, the border continues to be an important reality for the electorate and policy makers in migrant-receiving countries, the undocumented migrants who risk their lives to cross it, and the border guards who are charged with patrolling it.

Ruth Rubio-Marin’s book emerges from a well-founded concern at the growing numbers of long-term residents in the world’s leading liberal societies who do not possess full political rights. Her stirring response conjoins an argument for the political inclusion of these denizens with a proposal for extending citizenship to them automatically and unconditionally—for legal as well as illegal immigrants, and regardless of whether this means accepting dual or multiple citizenship. In support of her view, she innovatively blends normative political theory with a comparative legal examination of the German and American contexts.

It is a widely held assumption that states possess an unfettered right to determine who is to be admitted to their citizenry. Against this notion, Rubio-Marin contends that a commitment to liberal democracy imposes inherent limits on a political community’s power to control admission to membership. While democratic states are legitimately self-determining with respect to citizenship, they are constrained to acknowledge that the “self” in question “automatically incorporates” all those long-term residents—including migrant workers and illegal immigrants—who are subject to the law and “deeply affected” by the political life of the community. Once they become socially integrated, resident aliens must be viewed as entitled to full civil and political equality with citizens. Consequently, after a certain duration—ten years, Rubio-Marin suggests, or perhaps less for legal immigrants—states should simply accord citizenship to those who do not have it, regardless of whatever other memberships they already possess.

This proposal flies in the face of received wisdom about the dangers of dual citizenship and the need to cultivate a homogeneous culture as a basis for democracy. But Rubio-Marin ably responds to these two objections, registering their force but poking holes in their empirical claims and demonstrating their substantial theoretical limitations. She elegantly turns around the argument that allowing dual citizenship for migrants is unfair to native-born citizens, showing that fairness concerns ultimately weigh in on the side of preventing the continued political exclusion of permanent residents. Likewise, she makes the case that fully including heterogeneous immigrant populations in the political realm is likely to augment rather than harm the practice of democracy.

Perhaps the most striking element of Rubio-Marin’s thesis is her insistence that settled illegal aliens are just as entitled to political inclusion as any other long-term residents. In buttressing this claim, she dispenses with numerous misconceptions about these migrants and exposes the extent to which contemporary societies depend on the benefits of illegal immigration. At the same time, she effectively criticizes consent-based theories of immigration and underlines the particularly grave consequences of exclusion for the undocumented.

Having established her normative case for inclusion, Rubio-Marin turns, in a crucial chapter six, to a discussion of means. The policy she defends would simply grant citizenship to residents after a certain period, “automatically,” without requiring their application or assent, but with a provision allowing them to expatriate themselves if they desire. Such a course, she argues, is for various reasons preferable to alternative paths to inclusion such as lowered naturalization standards and amnesties. It can be adopted, moreover, in a manner that remains sensitive to the traditional link between political rights and national identity. And, just as importantly, it is feasible in terms of both international and constitutional law.

But how likely is it that today’s democracies will move in this direction? In the balance of the book, Rubio-Marin plunges into a detailed comparative study of constitutional debates over immigration in the U.S. and Germany, with a view to assessing the prospects for her proposed reforms. Her work here is assured and thorough, and she
avoids the temptation to overdraw the contrast between the two cases. Her conclusion—that both countries, in different ways, have made halting progress toward a more inclusive constitutional conception of citizenship—has been borne out in part by recent actions of the German government and the U.S. Supreme Court.

Among this volume's many strengths are the author's versatility in moving among political, moral and legal debates, and her capable criticisms of some of the leading theorists in the field, including Rainer Bauböck, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith. The boldness of Rubio-Marin's positions is matched by the care with which she supports them. Nuggets to be found in the text include a brief discussion of group rights (p. 77-80) and a meditation on the desirability of mandatory suffrage (p. 118-19). There is a more complex array of positions in the German debates than Rubio-Marin suggests, and one might have hoped for more than just passing mention of the problems of territorial admissions and the advent of a European citizenship. But these are quibbles that do not detract from this book's dual stature as a stunning policy proposal and a solid contribution to liberal democratic discourse on citizenship.


**Charles Tilly**  
*Columbia University*

Juan Delgado-Moreira apparently believes in miracles. Through 200 pages of sludgy language, he proposes simultaneously to 1) integrate empirical and epistemological analyses of European citizenship; 2) persuade European policy-makers that American postmodern ideas of multiculturalism provide a superior basis for organizing citizenship to the confused federalism, with its residues of national sovereignty, that he sees as currently prevailing; 3) merge those identity-oriented ideas with liberal culturalism, which rests on the strategy of satisfying individual needs for coherent cultures as a way of maximizing the collective good; 4) rescue individual rights from claims of group identity without falling into the trap of classic liberalism, 5) reconcile constructivism and essentialism; 6) apply the concepts of "tangled hierarchies and self-organization" to institutional processes within the European Union; and 7) vivify and clarify the discussion of all these issues through "semantic and structural discourse analysis" of pronouncements by various European institutions.

Juggling so many fragile plates at once, Delgado-Moreira inevitably smashes quite a few. He feigns surprise, for example, that the Commission of the European Union advocates European citizenship based on pan-European cultural heritage, while the Committee of the Regions follows long-established nationalist models in seeking rights for culturally distinct regions. He treats Britain's objections to a French ban on the importation of mad-cow-threatened British beef as a consequence of conceptual confusion—an insufficiently clear representation of the European Union's organizational structure—rather than an outgrowth of material interests and political log-rolling. The justification: "while autopoietic theories do not affect a cell's life, our knowledge influences the construction of the European Union" (p. 174). Let us be clear. Normative positions do, as Delgado-Moreira assumes, typically rest on ontological foundations and empirical propositions. They begin with some idea of what constitutes social reality, then proceed to make claims about the existence of certain entities and processes, about causes and effects of those entities and processes, about the possibility of alternatives, and about the efficacy of certain actions in achieving those alternatives. Confusedly, Delgado-Moreira, is pursuing a critique and reconstruction of the ontological foundations and empirical propositions of competing positions concerning proper European citizenship. His treatment of subsidiarity (the principle that the Community only intervenes in matters where individual
states lack the means to deal with the problem at hand) shows him at work on this project. He argues, uneasily and wordily, that a de facto shift of political power toward culturally homogeneous regions and other "smaller collectives" makes subsidiary available to subnational entities as a basis for claims on transnational authorities. If he actually provided evidence that such a shift is occurring, he would indeed contribute powerfully to our empirical and normative understanding of what is happening in Europe. Alas, his hesitant glosses on current debates fall far short of any such accomplishment.


DAVID PEARSON
Victoria University of Wellington

Australia provides a fascinating example of a state whose public image shifted, in the space of a few decades, from a 'White' history of restrictive immigration and migrant settlement policies to one of 'multicultural' innovation. Why did a country once so wedded to monocultural assimilation become one of the most pluralistic polyethnic societies in the world? Mark Lopez provides a detailed examination of the formative years of this transformation. His book is divided into two parts. In the first, the author traces the origins of large-scale and increasingly heterogeneous post-war immigration, and describes the waning of assimilationism and integrationism and the waxing of what he calls 'protomulticulturalism'. In the second part, he examines the process of gradual, and highly uneven, acceptance of new forms of migrant settlement and welfare policy and practice, eventually called, multiculturalism. There are particularly interesting sections on the Whitlam years, including an engaging portrait of Grassby, the then Immigration Minister. Yet these visible figures, the author argues, were less influential than backroom public servants and activists, who successfully spread the ideology across linked government departments, to the point where a bipartisan Labor/Liberal acceptance of the 'ism' was achieved.

Lopez adds new insights and interpretations of these processes, drawn from a study whose primary data is particularly rich. For specialists, this is where the work will be most valuable. For general readers, the style and presentation are certainly accessible, but the fine grained and lengthy exposition in many sections of the book might find them using the word 'exhausting' instead of 'exhaustive'. The doctoral ancestry of the text is decidedly evident, so, in my view, more judicious editing would have improved the flow of argument without detracting from the necessary in-depth display of evidence.

Lopez is receptive to much previous literature explaining the Australian metamorphosis in terms of internal political economy, global changes in trade and migration flows, and the growth of a rights-based climate which made overtly racist policies unsustainable. But his central thesis relates to the actions (and inactions) of individual actors as they engage in 'behind-the-scenes' interpersonal politicking. From these informal relations arise the public definitions which shape policies and practice. For the author, it is human agency, in the guise of 'key definers' and 'leading activists', which explains social change. 'Multiculturalists', represented by a relatively small number of the intelligentsia, politicos, and, an initially weak, but eventually influential panethnic rights lobby, were the prime movers who succeeded in establishing a new policy regime and national image.

This argument isn't entirely novel, but here we have the most thorough analysis of primary material to date to support the viewpoint. Whether Lopez succeeds in his repeated aim of neutrally demythologizing what others have mystified is more debatable. The author is frustratingly coy about his own political views. Some might see this as praiseworthy, but a realist stance, which I
have sympathy with, requires more than a disavowal of having a value preference to sustain it. This aside, the book is an invaluable work deserving a wide readership.


DAVID M. REIMERS
New York University

Nancy Foner, an anthropologist well known for her research on health care and West Indian immigration, has written an engaging book, examining two large waves of immigration to New York City. She looks at the period 1880 to 1920 and the recent migration since 1965. Foner draws upon secondary material, census data, novels, statistical material, memoirs, and biographies. She is aware of the limited material available, such as education, and uses what she can with care. She also uses her own research on West Indian immigration to New York City. The result is a book packed with information, but at the same time is a clear “interpretive synthesis”. Along the way, she puts to rest many myths about Gotham’s immigrants, but this is not simply a book to debunk those who make uniformed statements. Rather, she seeks to find the many differences and similarities between the first and second wave, and to inform the reader that while easy generalizations about the past and present are often wrong, they do have a grain of truth.

In a book of this length, not all subjects can be included. Her chapters explain who the old and new immigrants were, patterns of living and work, transnational ties, education, prejudice and the role of women in the workplace. It is not possible in a review of this length to examine all of these topics; hence, several will do. In education, too many observers have used the Jewish model as the ideal, claiming that the first and second generations had a passion for learning and moved ahead with great speed and had high rates of school attendance. There is, of course, some substance to this romantic view. She points out that while the great bulk of Jewish children did not complete school beyond the elementary grades, they did attend high school and even college, in higher proportions than Italians. But there was no golden era for children at the turn of the century. For the recent newcomers, education is also complicated. To be sure, among the latest wave one can find highly educated professionals and college graduates who have skills needed in the city’s labor markets. At the same time, many of the poorest immigrants have limited educations. Yet, even such comparisons are difficult because the schools of today are so vastly different than those of 1900. Moreover, she notes, if today’s immigrants on the whole are better educated than the Jews, Italians and others of the past, the employment needs of today are much higher than those of 1900.

One of the best chapters is that dealing with women and work. She notes that a century ago most working immigrant women were young and single, but recent immigrant women with families and young children are working for pay. Moreover, the opportunities of today are vastly different for women. Indeed, comparisons of women’s working lives of 1900 to those of 2000 are almost meaningless.

Chapters dealing with the other themes she raises are just as enlightening as those focusing on women and education. Scholars, of course, will already know of many of her main points, but she has done an excellent job of telling the stories. Cutting through many myths and complicated issues, her main arguments are compelling and informative. *From Ellis Island to JFK* is a well-written and delightful book, one that should appeal to the general public.

THOMAS J. ARCHDEACON  
*University of Wisconsin, Madison*

Filiopietistic histories written about their forbears by the descendants of European immigrants to the United States as well as works through which the first generations of arrivals tried to pass their traditions and values to their progeny form the raw material for Øverland’s interesting study. Historians have tended to dismiss those histories as amateurish or banal, and they have seen the exhortations of the elders as evidence of efforts to maintain ethnic separatism. Øverland, however, sees both kinds of sources as essential to the creation of “homemaking myths” that facilitated the process of immigrant adaptation.

The dominant Anglo-American element of the population was reluctant to recognize newcomers, especially those from non-English or non-Anglo-Saxon backgrounds, as having claims equal to theirs to being true Americans. The homemaking myths were an assertion by those rejected groups of their right to call the U.S. home. For the vast majority of group members, Øverland argues, the goal was not to preserve enclaves but to generate self-respect and to avoid complete disappearance in the melting pot. Celebrations of European ethnicity in the United States, including those that duplicated observances in the countries of origin, had little to do with preserving Old World loyalties and much to do with creating American identities. The nationalism they expressed was American, and the ideologies they supported were those of middle-class uplift and the American dream.

Homemaking myths fell into three categories, which often overlapped. Immigrant groups argued that their ancestors played key roles in the founding of the nation, or that their nationalities shared some special kinship - including, at an elemental level, “whiteness” - with the founding group. Thus, in addition to touting the role of Leif Erikson as the original discoverer of America, Scandinavians argued that the Pilgrims came from areas of England heavily settled by the Norse.

Shedding blood in the wars of the United States was a second thread in the homecoming myths. Tales of military exploits in the Revolution, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I yield Øverland’s richest set of examples. For some groups, reports of financial support for the War of Independence or for the Liberty Bond drives of 1917-1918 served a similar purpose.

Asserting a deep spiritual and ideological connection with the American nation formed the third strand of homemaking myths. The Irish claimed to share not only the Americans’ love of independence and freedom but so did their arch-foe, the English. Jews likewise found the ideas of the Constitution rooted in the thoughts of Moses and the prophets. Indeed, hardly any group proved unable to find ties to Americans in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Homemaking myths were important to the ethnic groups, but they rarely changed the minds of the Anglo-American population. The Italian co-option of Christopher Columbus actually reduced his importance as a national icon. Until each nationality achieved security, the myths also aggravated inter-ethnic tensions, as groups vied with one another to prove that they were here earlier, were more patriotic, and were more in tune with American values. In the late 19th century, even African-Americans used their history as loyal workers to seek a preferred position against immigrant unionist and strikers.

*Immigrant Minds, American Identities* is filled with interesting information, including a separate chapter on Americans who came from Øverland’s Norwegian homeland. The author’s arguments, by and large, are convincing. The book implicitly raises questions about assertions of ethnicity among contemporary immigrant groups, but Øverland does not answer them. Although he occasionally touches on the connection between non-white minorities and homemaking myths, his focus remains on Americans of European origin.

WENDY M. GORDON AND AMY BASS
State University of New York, Plattsburgh

In the vein of recent work on the racial implications of immigrant history, particularly by scholars such as David Roediger and Matthew Jacobson, Katrina Irving offers a useful book that is far more concerned with ideas about immigrants than about the immigrants themselves. Based on meticulous readings of the likes of Willa Cather, Harold Frederick, Frank Norris, Jacob Riis, and Stephen Crane, Irving explores the debate that surfaced regarding southern and eastern European immigrants at the turn of the 20th century, something that is seemingly not a new topic. But her methodological vehicle is an innovative one, using these literary representations of immigrant women—particularly immigrant mothers—to investigate anxieties regarding the influx of “foreign” peoples on America’s shores.

Irving breaks the anxious parties into three primary camps—nativists, Americanizers and cultural pluralists—whose differing viewpoints produced a complex public discourse on immigration. The nativists exhibited opinions fed by the swell of scientific racism, such as eugenics, prevalent to the period, and consequently set the terms for the broader debate. Using the same categories, Americanizers welcomed immigrants with the stipulation that they absorb the normative principles of “American” life, particularly in the home, ensuring that immigrant women raised politically and economically productive citizens. Cultural pluralists, for their part, maintained that immigrants inherently conformed to American political and economic ideals, and by sustaining domestic Old World traditions, broadened the cultural diversity already embedded in the nation.

Such a perspective on immigration does an admirable job of illuminating the motivations of Progressive-era social workers and other well-meaning Americanizers already described from an immigrant point of view by historians such as Linda Gordon. With this approach comes an innovative reorientation of the “New Immigrants,” based on a shift in native ideas about immigrants rather than on the changing composition of the immigrant stream itself. Especially interesting, albeit somewhat underdeveloped, is Irving’s connection between femininity and the racial acceptance of immigrants. The degree to which a particular group was accepted was largely connected to how the foreign female fulfilled the role of American woman, making “woman” a malleable site upon which racist, nativist fears could be projected, augmenting the contemporary idea of both gender and race as social constructions. Accordingly, cultural pluralists saw these tradition-bound immigrant women as fulfilling the void left by those in the middle class who increasingly vacated their homes for public life.

While Irving’s arguments form an appealing and teachable approach to the furore that led up to the Johnson-Reed Act, the book itself is not teachable, at least for an undergraduate audience, owing to inaccessible, specialized language and dense construction. As with many such books with an intense literary focus, it is not adequately contextualized in terms of concurrent historical developments, assuming extensive prior knowledge of eugenics, modernization, and progressivism. Further, she implies that the turn of the 20th century is unsurpassed in its xenophobic tendencies, in spite of a nod in her conclusion to later developments. The reader thus needs an understanding of the world outside the text in order to grasp its importance.


JOSE C. MOYA
University of California, Los Angeles
This book is a worthy companion to the author's award-winning *Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and Spanish America in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). On the Spanish side, the geographical focus remains local but shifts northward to Brihuega, a woolens manufacturing town 50 miles northeast of Madrid that sent about a quarter of its 4,000 inhabitants to the Indies, a rate of emigration that surpassed that of any other place in the Iberian Peninsula then. On the American side the focus becomes more localized. The outward flow from Brihuega was exceptionally unidirectional: almost all of it headed for Puebla, the second-ranking city in colonial Mexico. Brihugans arrived in the Americas somewhat later than their compatriots from Extremadura, missing the Conquest period, and were of humbler origin. Both of these factors would influence their adaptation to the New World. And—in contrast to her previous book—this is where Altman concentrates her analysis.

Brihuegans had a significant impact on Puebla’s formation, particularly because it was one of the few Spanish towns in Mexico that did not develop out of a preexisting indigenous settlement. They made this city the center of the textile industry in Mexico. In contrast to Brihuega where shops were small and production domestically based, the obrajes they founded in Puebla often became large-scale establishments that employed scores of Indians and some African slaves. However, few became wealthy enough to translate their economic success into political clout. In this respect, those who stayed behind exhibited higher participation than those who left. Politics in Brihuega were relatively inclusive compared to Puebla, where public office was restricted to an elite made up mainly by the conquistadors and their descendants. Moving from the profane to the sacred, Altman compares lay religious organizations, the role of the Inquisition, ecclesiastical careers, and the charitable foundations of a particular family in Brihuega and Puebla. She then examines how family connections, ritual kinship, and local ties formed a dense transatlantic social network and a tightly-knit—though not conflict-free—community in Puebla that retained its distinctiveness for at least three generations.

This process resembles to a surprising degree the microsocial mechanisms that made possible the mass transoceanic migrations of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Altman neither draws any comparisons to postcolonial migrations nor engages the vast scholarly literature on these movements. But by treating migration as a continuum rather than as a process that began when immigrants got off the boat, she has much to offer to migration scholars in general. Similarly, Altman does little to place the Brihuega-Puebla nexus within the context of global forces and trends. But her micro-historical approach, and the richness of the information she offers on specific individuals and families, functions as a magnifying glass. It exposes and illuminates, as no other study that I know of, the process by which people, institutions, and cultural norms traveled from the Old World to the New during the early modern period, and how they adapted to the American milieu. This is a major accomplishment. And Altman delivers it in elegant prose and an engaging style.


RITA J. SIMON
American University

The particular focus the author takes in this comparative study of public attitudes toward immigration is the evaluation of the relative strength of three explanations for opposition to immigrants and immigration. Like other scholars who have examined public opinion toward immigration, be it in the major immigrant receiving countries (the United States, Canada, and Australia) or in countries that have had a history of ambivalence or that have adopted laws and publics that are
opposed to immigration (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan), Fetzer agrees that most publics have a negative attitude toward immigration or toward increasing the number of immigrants their country legally admits at any given time. The three explanations the author examines for explaining opposition to immigrants are marginality (especially cultural forms, but also economics, gender-based, etc.) economic self-interest, and contact. Marginality, by which Fetzer means the experience of being oppressed or outside the mainstream (for reasons of race, religion, culture) should produce support for other minorities or marginalized people of which immigrants are one. Economic self-interest on the other hand is likely to correlate with anti-immigrant attitudes on grounds that immigrants pose a threat to the native born’s jobs and wages, and other economic services and benefits. The third major theory focuses on the kinds and extent of contacts the native born population has with immigrants. Referencing Gordon Allport, the author notes that not all contact is alike. “True acquaintance” is likely to decrease prejudice and negative attitudes, while casual contact is likely to increase negative feelings. These three major variables: marginality, economic self-interest and contact are used to examine public attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, France and Germany from the 1880’s to the present.

Before getting to the heart of his work which involves quantitative time series and cross-sectional models to isolate the causes of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy, the author provides a brief history of each of the three country’s laws, policies, economies and demographics. What are the major findings in this work? For the United States the author concludes that cultural marginality rather than economic marginality, economic self-interest, or contact is the best explanation for anti-immigrant sentiments. In the author’s words: “In the face of perceived threats to their cultural hegemony, Anglophone white, old-state Protestants (America’s insiders) appear to react with outbursts of hostility to immigrants, opposition to immigration and support for such anti-immigrant political movements as Proposition 187.” For France, the author claims that economic threat plays as large a role as cultural threat in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes. In the author’s words; “Immigration politics in France appear to turn just as much on whether the country’s culture will remain primarily Catholic and European as on whether most native-born French workers will be able to find jobs.” The explanations for anti-immigrant sentiments in Germany appear to the author to be more complex. In Fetzer’s words: “While much political discourse in the United States and France focuses on the labor-market effects of immigration (e.g., immigrants are taking our jobs), the immigration debate in Germany tends to concentrate more on the use of services ... being well off in Germany would thus make one less likely to support immigration than it would in the other two countries.”

Overall, the author claims the results show that cultural marginality is the strongest indicator of anti-immigrant sentiments. In France and the United States periods of economic depression also provoked anti-immigrant sentiments. In none of the three countries did the proportion of foreign-born cause fluctuations in anti-immigrant policies.

To get to these very briefly summarized results, readers are taken on a long and often torturous walk through multi-variate time series analyses on a country by country basis. The author does a better job presenting his statistical analyses than he does explaining what the results mean. Fetzer concludes on a positive note. For France and Germany he believes that the concept of foreigners is giving way to the more cosmopolitan concept of European, and for the United States he believes that the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of today’s Americans will view the current anti-Mexican sentiments with the same disdain that Americans today view the anti-Irish or anti-German sentiments of the 19th century.

K. SCOTT WONG
Williams College

Among historians of the Asian-American experience, John Kuo Wei Tchen occupies a unique niche. While most scholars have focused on the mid-19th through the 20th centuries, Tchen begins his study of the Chinese presence in America in the 18th century with the rise of the colonial and early republican trade with China. By documenting the early arrival of Chinese seamen, many of whom chose to remain in New York City, at times establishing families with Irish and Irish-American women, Tchen challenges us to reconsider the standard version of Chinese-American history: Chinese began coming to the United States in the 1850s because of the California Gold Rush and then began heading East as they encountered anti-Chinese violence in the West. Instead, Tchen places Chinese on the East Coast well before the Gold Rush, living in multiethnic and multiracial settings, apparently interacting with Americans from a variety of backgrounds.

Tchen builds on the seminal work of Edward Said and the concept of orientalism, whereby Europe measured itself against its perceptions of the "Orient". According to Tchen, there existing three sets of overlapping orientalisms that played a role in the shaping of the early American identity, which he labels patrician, commercial and political. Patrician orientalism consisted of the American attraction to and desire for "things Chinese", especially porcelain tea sets, in order to demonstrate their refined status. Later, a commercial orientalism would take hold in New York, as evidenced in the display of Chinese people such as Afong Moy, the "Chinese Lady," and the more famous Cheng and Eng, better known as the "Siamese Twins." Although degrading for those on display, these "edifying curiosities" were generally well-received by New Yorkers. Soon, however, with the influx of more Chinese from the West after the completion of the transcontinental railroad, New York would be pulled into the orbit of the anti-Chinese movement. As the Chinese were increasingly associated with vice, immorality and unsanitary culinary habits, political orientalism would take center stage as many in New York would support the politics that would eventually lead to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first American immigration law to exclude a people based on their race and class.

A book of this ambitious scope inevitably raises many questions as it tackles new issues and covers new terrain. Tchen has long been a pioneer in studying Chinese-Irish marriages in New York, and he provides new information here on these unions, but one wishes he would offer a more in-depth analysis of how these examples of miscegenation were received in their respective communities, how they influenced notions of race, gender and sexuality in early America, or simply, why these two immigrant groups were open to marrying each other. Likewise, this study leaves one wondering how long-lasting the impact of "things Chinese" was on the continual reformation of the American identity. These comments, however, are not criticisms, but rather, reflect the appreciation I have for this outstanding book. It simply leaves you wanting more!


MARY RÉDEI
ELTE University, Budapest

This book is a blueprint about Chinese migration flow in Europe in 90's followed the main political, economical aspects. sever-
al case situations help to understand the background of Chinese mind. Having a comprehensive knowledge on the destination and the origin country situation, the background of the author is on the day-by-day problem of migration management. The Eastern European migration is discussed as movement towards the developed world, and there is little information about the new potential sources on East.

The empirical, quantitative examination of the dominant types of population movements associated with the new migration flows would reveal fundamental differences compared to traditional qiaoxiang migration to Western Europe. The classical case, a qiaoxiang migration is likely either never to return to China or return after retirement. Many Chinese in Hungary came from North and Northeast Chinese cities with no tradition of overseas migration.

The author raises the problem of local ruling and discussing the consequences of the host regions. "The trade connections are cultural connection," he writes on the page 45. The cultural (public) capital of Chinese plays a determinant role in the assimilation process, which is not built up in the destination country, but is carried with them. Most of the migrant Chinese think consciously, those who migrate have higher awareness, good evaluation skills, and knowledge about their opportunities. That is related to their trade professions as well. The skill and global experience mean a valid ticket for the world. This is the basis for mobility. Those who are not able to use an official procedure or went in package tour will be trafficked by "snake head" like travel agencies.

Those who are not able to profit from their ability in the given geographical place, are moving to another one. The main motivation for migrants is where can I profit and how can I reach the place." Some of them, who had not enough experience to run their own business moved to Germany to earn money from very simple work, e.g., washing and then went to Hungary to start their own shop. They clearly follow the spatial differences of the work payment.

The enlargement of European Union in East is a political initiative, but it is proved by the economical integration which helps expand the globalization. The author indicates how the variety of employment means a good basis for the cultural network.


Victoria M. L. Yew
University of Sydney

This book provides a lucid account of Australian white settlement history, detailing substantially the early settlers' struggles for personal and cultural subsistence. Researchers and students of history, cultural and political studies, and general readers will find Weiss's book informative reading. Whilst very long, the book is punctuated with numerous anecdotes of Australian argot and humor making it extremely entertaining.

However, the book is uncertain on two accounts: (1) the theoretical framework underpinning the discussion, and (2) the scope of the discussion. On the first point, and contrary to the title, the book is not so much about the quest for identity as the cultural production of identity. As identity is fluid and multi-faceted, it often eludes encapsulation. Because of the plasticity of identity, it can be ephemeral, like a chameleon, blending in or standing out when conditions suit. Weiss faces the same frustration in trying to come to terms with Australian identity. For example, he acknowledges the struggles of the early settlers' experiences in an outpost of a declining British Empire, but vaguely glosses over their fortitude in forging a better life. Here is an example of the plasticity of their identity that Weiss has overlooked.

Weiss argues that settling under the cloud of post-Second World War antagonism, "New Australians" first adjusted to life through imitating their neighbours by living
in “mass-produced houses (fibro-plaster-asbestos...)... with a Holden, Ford... in the driveway... large lawn in front of their houses, and another one in the back... with at least ... one orange and one lemon tree (pp. 269 - 271)” and so on. The initial strategy of mimicry, blending into the Australian landscape like any other old-timer, was followed by gradual transformations, such as the planting of “one or two birch trees... in front of the house... or a fir... or poplar tree” (p. 272) as a reminder of their heritage. Such fine observation illuminates the discussion of an identity construction process underway.

In regard to the scope of the discussion, Weiss is ambitious in his consideration of Australian identity. Not wanting to reduce identity into picayunish accounts of individual case studies of particular persons or ethnic groups, nor straddling vaguely over cultural or historical accounts, he has attempted an all inclusive thesis, crossing the domains of culture, history, power, politics and religion of the early Australian settlement landscape. However, the book wavers between boundaries of scholars here and seemingly cavalier sketches of folkloric tales. Nonetheless, citizenship and immigrant identity are captivating notions, and In Search of an Identity will make interesting reading in these regards.


SHENG-MEI MA
Michigan State University

Madeline Yuan-yin Hsu’s Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home is lucid and well-argued, based on archival research in South China, drawing from Asian American studies on migration. Hsu first of all provides a complete historical background on the economic problems besieging Taishan County, Guangdong, resulting in massive migration since the 19th century. These problems include war, famine, overpopulation, and scarcity of land. The migration is made possible by the lure of Gold Mountain, the demand for labor in California, and the rise of Hong Kong as a treaty port of ship our workers.

The title suggests that the book deals specifically with the period of the Chinese Exclusion Act and thus is a useful companion to novels such as Louis Chu’s Eat a Bowl of Tea (1961) set in postwar New York Chinatown, a bachelor community that is the legacy of the Chinese Exclusion Act. While Hsu’s title indicates strong influence by American history of discrimination and Asian American scholarship, the unique contribution of Hsu’s book lies in the archival research and interviews conducted in Taishan, excavating materials from Chinese soil to complement events in California, which have long been the focus of Asian American studies.

In fact, one of the goals set forth in Hsu’s Introduction is to “construct bridges between the historically related but as yet critically unlinked fields of Asian American and Asian studies” (p. 4). Hsu does it brilliantly in, for instance, Chapter 5, “Magazines as Marketplaces: A Community in Dispersion,” where she analyzes qiaokan, “overseas Chinese magazines,” produced in Taishan and Hong Kong but distributed worldwide, wherever Taishanese happened to have settled. Qiaokan is a nexus of information, forging solidarity for a dispersed community, one which Hsu calls “transnational.” Hsu indeed resorts to Asian studies in her detailed study of the impact on Taishan County exerted by overseas Chinese, a community which has enjoyed a great deal of attention from Chinese scholars. Overseas Chinese, for example, has been euphemistically called “Fathers of the Revolution,” the revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Ching dynasty.

“Transnationalism” is no doubt a theoretical angle to “construct bridges between... Asian American and Asian studies.” However, Hsu does not systematically draw from
transnationalism and globalization to formulate the critical link she sets out to accomplish. How does transnationalism inform the power imbalance that plagues overseas and home community, one a provider of resources and the other a recipient? What about the power imbalance between Taishanese Americans and the American society? Transnationalism, a late capitalist condition, seems anachronically and retroactively superimposed on the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th; it is in danger of becoming an empty catch word that bears tangentially on Hsu's subject matter, in the same vein that the Roman Empire or the Jewish diaspora are labeled "transnational."


**BARBARA BALLIS LAL**  
*University of California, Los Angeles*

Shompa Lahiri examines the expectations, experience, and the ongoing process of negotiating identities rooted in South Asian culture of Indian students who came to Britain between 1880-1930 to universities - notably Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh and London - or to attend law or medical schools. Her interesting and valuable case study adds to scholarship in two respects. First, she investigates the ways in which colonial status, racial stereotypes and discrimination, and in many instances, economic hardship, affected the self-conceptions of her group, contributing to postmodern writing on identity, cultural hybridity and representation. In addition, her empirical data suggests that liberal ideals of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, as well as issues concerning women's rights and socialism, all subjects of debate in Britain in official circles, the press, political parties, university lectures and student associations, were useful additions to the arsenal of political concepts subsequently used to justify the nationalist movement in India. Such discussion also exposed the gap between political rhetoric and practice in British institutions and social life. Thus, Lahiri adds to research querying the influence of Western political thought and colonial encounters in the imperial metropolis in the subversion of colonial rule and the emergence of particular types of political and social post-imperialist institutions in newly independent states.

The group that Lahiri studies are a relatively small number of young men and fewer women - taken together, seemingly not more than 1800 at any time between 1880-1927 - recruited from different regions of the sub-continent and a range of religions. Most were in England for three to four years. She uses autobiographical material, such as letters and diaries, with newspaper and journal articles, official records and publications, private papers, oral archives, and also secondary material both to reconstruct the experience and changing vision of these early visitors to Britain and how they were perceived by the British. Drawing on popular culture, particularly novels and theatre, she shows how the British representation of Indians as "Babas," discontented revolutionaries," and "cultural hybrids," interacted with both official and unofficial policies and conventions, and the reality of discrimination, for example in housing, to shape Indian evaluations of the English and their culture. Lahiri's work avoids oversimplification and is stronger for showing the variety of responses to living in Britain, including ambiguity, change and contradiction in matters of acculturation and identity. She notes, for example, instances when feature of Indian culture, absent in the West, were reinforced, as in the emotional support offered by the obligations of kinship and of the extended family.

The collective experience of an earlier, selective group invites comparison with those who came to Britain in the late 1950s and afterward, intending to settle and to obtain British citizenship for themselves and their children. In a postscript, Lahiri contends that the reception of this second group
continues to be affected by racism, discrimination, and a desire to limit the number of newcomers from the Indian sub-continent. My view is that the current ascendancy of ideas of such as multiculturalism and diversity, as well as the independence of India, have changed the nature of these encounters more than she suggests.


KATIE WILLIS
University of Liverpool

This book deals with the intersection of gender, class and place of origin in one of China's wealthier eastern provinces during the recent period of economic reform. The focus is a silk-producing town (given the pseudonym Sicheng), south of the Yangtze River near Shanghai, and the author aims to produce a 'bottom-up' study to describe and explain the experiences of the large numbers of female migrants from Subei (north of the Yangtze).

Given the scarcity of literature from a qualitative perspective on women's migration in China, I had great hopes for this book. Unfortunately, I found myself frustrated by almost every chapter. While there are certainly useful insights into China's economic reform, having completed the book I do not feel that I really have a great deal of in-depth information about the experiences of women migrants.

This is partly because of the book's structure, but is also because of the way in which the author uses her empirical material. I found the introductory chapter jumbled and hard to follow as sections on theory are intermingled with overviews of China's economic reform and the silk-producing process, an outline of the project and various methodological considerations. There then follow two chapters, with one focusing on the reform process highlighting the lack of gender awareness, while the other provides details of changing class structure and state discourse on class. While this provides useful information to 'set the scene' it is not until page 102 that the reader gets down to the case study of Sicheng, and even then the chapter still does not get to the 'grassroots'. Chapters 4,5 and 6 finally get us into the factories and dormitories and provide some indication of migrants' lives.

The use of empirical material is tantalizingly limited. At the beginning of each chapter there are a number of quotations, but this structuring means that much of the richness of these quotations is lost as it is not picked up on later in the chapter. In addition, despite the range of material the author must have collected, as she spent a number of months interviewing factory workers, as readers we are given very little in the way of case studies or quotations. For example, Chapter 5 deals with the issues of surveillance in the factories and also the ways in which Sicheng society views the migrants (men and women) from Subei. The controlling mechanisms are well described, but the author also claims that there are forms of 'everyday resistance' from the workers. Given the importance placed on this conclusion, there is scant empirical evidence given.

In conclusion, while I found much of the book interesting in terms of an overview of recent Chinese reform and its impact on a town outside the coastal Special Economic Zones, the focus on 'women migrants' in the book's title is misleading. This was a disappointment as there is a need for research on this topic, particularly work which focuses on the daily lives of these migrants.

West Indians In West Africa, 1808-1880. By Nemata Amelia Blyden. Rochester: The University of Rochester Press, 2000. $75.00

EDMUND ABAKA
University of Miami

Sierra Leone has an important place in African Diaspora Studies both as an area of slave acquisition (forced migration), and a home for return migration to the continent or
the African diaspora in reverse, as Nemata Blyden calls it. This return migration is often singled out for the cultural transfer of western values and western civilization by Afro-Brazilians, Saro (Krio), black poor from London, loyalist Blacks from Nova Scotia, forced Africans from captured slave ships, soldiers of the West Indian Regiments and the West Indians in the employ of the British colonial administration in Sierra Leone in the post-abolition period.

Sierra Leone, then, as a haven for returned Africans, and people displaced by the slave trade, was a socio-cultural experiment which aimed at making the colony a haven of western values and western civilization. Nemata Blyden’s *West Indians in West Africa, 1808-1880,* focuses on the West Indians who took up paid positions in the colonial administration in Sierra Leone - a small and dedicated group that was attracted to their “roots.” The book is woven together in neat chapter divisions - employment of Blacks and British colonial policy, British policy in both Sierra Leone and the West Indies, the hiring of West Indians in Sierra Leone, the relationship between West Indians and the Black settlers in Sierra Leone, and the gradual cessation of the practice of using West Indians in high offices in the West African colony. The book is unique in focusing on the post-abolition period and West Indians in high office in Sierra Leone.

Originally governed by the Sierra Leone Company, the British crown took over the colony in 1808, and made it a place of settlement of Africans captured off slave ships. From the 1820s onward, high mortality rates among European officials increasingly militated against any attempts to maintain those in the colony and recruit new ones from England. Blyden argues that demographic and epidemiological reasons made the practice of hiring West Indians for service in Sierra Leone into the cornerstone of colonial service in Sierra Leone. From the 1830s, then, the use of officials of color, mostly from the West Indies, who were seen as adaptable to the climate, became the solution to the mortality problem in the salubrious climate of Sierra Leone. In addition, Blyden argues, the officials of color would serve as “examples of progress to the African populations in the colony” (p. 2), as well as homes to some of the increasing “colored” middle class in the West Indies. The familiarity between Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Jamaica — all with Creole and black populations, westernized and Christianized under the British crown - made adaptation in Sierra Leone relatively easier.

Blyden also analyzes the complex relationship between West Indians and the colony’s black settler population, arguing that over time, the initial receptivity and cooperation accorded the West Indians sometimes turned to hostility as the former occupied positions for which black settlers felt qualified. Occasional flare-ups culminated in an 1862 settler petition to the Colonial Office charging West Indians with conspiracy, nepotism, and even incompetence. Using specific examples of high profile West Indian administrators such as Alexander Fitzjames who was Queen’s advocate, William Fergusson, commissioned in the Royal African Corps as an army doctor, John Carr, Queen’s advocate and others, Blyden refutes the claim of incompetence. Many of the West Indian officials were qualified, dedicated people of high caliber. Others had carried with them a history of activism against colonialism in the Caribbean, and had, therefore, supported those who fought against discrimination and marginalization of blacks in Sierra Leone, especially in the colonial administration.

From 1850s onward, the policy of hiring West Indians to take up high offices in Sierra Leone ceased. Blyden attributes this to a conjuncture of forces, most especially, heightened racism in Europe — in part due to the effects of the work of European anthropologists proclaiming the inferiority of “colored races,” — the misapplication of Darwin’s work to bolster the superiority of Europeans, and Britain’s colonial problems in the West Indies.

While Sierra Leone is the setting for the book, the inhabitants of Sierra Leone constitute only an appendage to the story. They are mentioned only in a few instances such as
when William Fergusson initiated contact with Alimamie Yah Yah, Chief of Timbo (p. 64). Are we to conclude that there was very little contact with the indigenous inhabitants? Or is this perception dictated by the sources? Either way, it is a question that needs to be addressed. Do oral histories have anything to offer? Walter Rodney obtained a sizeable body of data about pre-colonial indigenous populations. In addition, the book does not specifically cast its arguments in terms of migration or return migration.

The book is well written and is an important contribution to Diaspora, Atlantic, and migration studies, in this case, return migration. Both generalists and experts will find it extremely useful.
Section 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 identifies involuntary abortion or sterilization as a basis for seeking asylum. This article explains the history of this section and the changes it made to existing law, the international protection of reproductive rights that could form the basis for an asylum claim under this section, how population control programs may violate reproductive rights, and the connection between coercive population policies and establishing persecution under Section 601.

Contemporary Philippine labor migrations are viewed in light of analogous transborder movements of workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The broader
context of indentured work in the nineteenth century and the reaction by such countries of origin as China and Japan to interrogate the pervasive sense of shame and victimization felt in present-day Philippines arising from the export of labor are analyzed.

A8, F1

This article focuses on the government's use of secret evidence in the deportation, exclusion, and removal cases pending against more than two dozen Arab and Muslim aliens. It examines the extent to which the government's strategies seem designed to curb the free speech, association, and religious rights of these individuals residing in the United States. These cases raise question of constitutional and procedural irregularities that appear to be immune from serious challenge or judicial review.

A6, E2, G

It is difficult to write about others in the study of the politics and differences in education. Recent writings demonstrate that we are multipositioned, implicated in unequally empowered ways of understandings and doings. This article seeks to understand the implications of this changing of the subject on positionality, based on a study on racism and how it is dealt with in Australian schools.

A8, C8

The purpose of the essays in this volume is to explore ideas, concepts, and skills that will offer both a foundation and boundaries to social workers to help them work effectively with immigrants and refugees. It takes an ecological perspective, examining social work practice, community work, policy issues, cultural diversity, multiculturalism, social justice, oppression, populations at risk, and social work and ethics.

A8, F1

The argument that deportation is punishment is first placed within modern Supreme Court punishment jurisprudence. Case law outlining the constitutional definition of punishment is then analyzed. Finally, the article synthesizes the historical analysis of the transportation of criminals, the Supreme Court's punishment jurisprudence, and the modern immigration system of deportation of criminals to conclude that the deportation of criminal aliens is punitive.

A8, E1

The history of the Southeastern New England textile industry during the nineteenth century is reconstructed. A fresh look is taken at the process of industrialization from the point of view of management as well as labor and the struggle between the two is interpreted in terms of class, culture, and power. The shifting fortunes of a labor force striving to accommodate immigrants, adapt to new technologies, and contest the control of the mill owners are also examined.

The four parts of this collection cover the participation and exclusion of migrants in the field of economics; social relations at the neighborhood level and their impact on exclusion/inclusion; the political aspects of exclusion and how they are related to social and economic exclusion; and how conceptions of law and order and security affect migrants' exclusion/inclusion opportunities.


The process of creolization is examined from five different aspects: its origins; historical and modern meanings of the term; and the continuing process of cultural exchange and adaptation. The consensus is that the notion of cultural syncretism is a conception tool of crucial importance for analyzing the interchange between peoples of Europe and the Americas.


The complex nature of Middle East politics is interpreted from a citizenship perspective, focusing on the relationship between the state and the people, within and without its borders. It also provides theoretical contributions and case studies and includes a significant section on Israel and Palestine.


Rural unrest on 1830–181 spurred a reexamination of the roles of government and individuals in fighting poverty. In those years, British immigrants sent to Upper Canada by the Petworth Committee could either accept assistance or rely on their own resources. Eventually, however, government or parish assistance was abandoned.


This article, which is based on the author's own pedagogical experiences, indicates that an insignificant amount of students and members of correctional institutions defined themselves in racial terms. While this points to the deracialization of discourse in South Africa currently, it also indicates a serious theoretical problem in postmodernist discourses.


The deconstruction and reconstruction of such issues as the reality in history, the truth of autobiography, the authenticity of mythology, and the criterion for literary canon in Chinese American literature are analyzed.

After providing the background to the current situation of handling refugee claims in Poland, this article explores the Polish legal system, how access to refugee status is made, what constitutes inadmissible applications, administrative and judicial review of determinations, the participation of NGOs in the asylum procedure, the role of the UNHCR, who has the burden of proof in refugee proceedings, the status of unaccompanied children, the right to apply for family reunification, deportation proceedings, and integration of recognized refugees.


Plots by Asian American writers struggle to address the historical contradiction between a democratic rhetoric of inclusion and the realities of exclusion, discrimination, internment, and cultural marginalization. These texts claim Americaness for Asian American subjects and construct accounts of Asian ethnicity that complicate, while support, the primary claim of Americaness.


The focus of the papers in this collection is on the consequences of illegal immigration for both the migrants and the host society, and on policy options once illegality has come into being.


For a self-described “nation of immigrants,” how does the current level of immigration affect the nation? Certain aspects of immigration policy are helpful to the country while others are not. The answers depend on the facts of immigration and on each person’s vision of the United States.


Articles in this collection of Marxist-inspired writing suggest that immigration is not the problem it is frequently made out to be. Rather, the problem lies in immigration control and racism. The contradictions between human rights and restrictions on movement, citizenship, work and social benefits to broader dynamics of capitalist development are traced. An argument is made that the politics of inclusion and exclusion are deeply rooted in the ideology and practices of capitalism.


This article focuses on how “particular social group” has been interpreted in Canadian law. The central issue is whether there is a framework of analysis, consistent with the overall purposes of the Convention Refugee Determination Division that, if applied rigorously, would yield consistent and principled results. A human rights based approach to the particular social group ground would lead to such desirable results.


Statistics and other information is provided on population change and structure, fertili-
ty, marriage, divorce, mortality, external migration, subnational population estimates, induced abortions, and national and subnational demographic projections.

A8, C3, E1

A temporary migrant worker voucher market conduct via a web-based job board would provide daily information on the price and number of temporary job offers.

C12, G1

The papers in this volume contribute to the examination of the Italian Jewish experience in both historical and contemporary analysis. They chronicle the breadth and depth of the Italian Jewish experience in a way that is meaningful to Americans of Italian-Jewish descent.

A6, D1, E1, J

Migration reduces gender differences in occupational distribution by increasing women's participation in traditionally male occupations. Permanent male migrants are more likely to be upwardly mobile than females if their move occurred in the later market economy program. Thus, while freedom of movement and the ability to engage in private enterprise have allowed women more autonomy, they have not yet successfully promoted female upward occupational mobility.

A3, E2, G

Differences in global poplar culture were a critical factor in the racial conflict and tension at a South African high school. Taste's flexible and changing borders, however, also allow for border crossing and hybridity.

A6, C1, E1

Three periods clearly appear in pattern of migratory flows between Indonesia and Malaysia: (1) the precolonial and colonial eras when mobility was intense; (2) nation-building and the closing of borders, aimed at limiting immigration; and (3) the integration of the countries bordering on the straits of Malacca into the global economy.

F

Citizenship's historical and conceptual origins, its contemporary dilemmas, and its emancipatory potential are explored. Addressed are such subjects as whether citizenship can exist without the nation-state; the balance between rights and responsibilities; should groups as well as individual rights be enjoyed; whether citizenship is relevant to private as well as public lives; and whether the processes of globalization has rendered citizenship redundant.

A12, C8, G
There is a rank correlation between the degree of civic community of the various ethnic groups in Amsterdam and the levels of political participation and political trust in local, non-ethnic, political institutions. Civic engagement and social capital are the most powerful determinants of the quality of multicultural democracy.

A5, A6, C3, E1


A closer cooperation among Japan, the newly industrial economies and Southeast Asia in monitoring and facilitating short-term labor migration can be a positive factor in narrow the gaps between less educated and educated workers and between developing and developed countries. Enhancing the skill formation functions of the migration process and upgrading the skills of workers in labor importing economies are among the critical areas that would benefit from regional cooperation.

A12, E2, G


Racism in education the largely white areas of the United Kingdom is analyzed as operating at the personal, cultural, institutional, and structural levels. The implications of change at each of these levels are examined. Motive, both individual and institutional, is a critical problem. A model is presented that argues that only a mutually reinforcing series of change at all four levels at which racism operates will produce any lasting change.

A8, C1


The main focus of this book is on the benefits and costs of legally migrating to the United States. The book sketches the history of U.S. immigration policy and the country's history of immigration. It then discusses a model of the determinants of overall U.S. immigration and develops models of the gender, age and occupational composition of U.S. immigration. These models also distinguish immigrants who are numerically exempt under U.S. law from those who are numerically restricted. A summary and conclusions are then provided.

A8, C5


This collection of first-person narratives of those who fled their homelands because of ethnic, religious, or political conflicts, recount the situations that forced them to leave. In addition, it describes their experiences carving out a new future in Canada.

C1


This book looks at a range of security and human security issues related to the displacement of civilian populations and shows how the tenuous existence of migrants can lead to a myriad of human security threats. It argues, through the use of major theoretical analyses of recent migration trends and in-depth case studies, that a redefinition of the notion of human security is needed.

A8, C8

Specific groups of immigrants and particular communities are used to provide a rough composite of what immigration means for Americans and what America requires of immigrants. Thus, there is a dual attempt to look at the specifics of these processes and envision what the commonalities might be across localities.


The population history of Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the Caribbean, is presented from pre-Columbian times to the present. The information, including two essays on the Amerindian population, is presented in a nontechnical format. A statistical appendix summarizes basic demographic measures over time for the United States, Canada, and Mexico.


Migration policy in Japan appeals to a double political preoccupation, preserving a national harmony, while reinforcing Japan’s international and economic influence, and reconciling Japan’s labor system with the demand for labor from the expanding economic sectors. While the 1990 Immigration Law authorizes highly qualified workers, there are few arrivals in this category. This law also increases the different categories of foreigners, but bars their hiring for low-qualified jobs, thus ignoring illegal workers.


The different roles and structural positions of men, women, and children apparently affect their performances of cultural and gender identities in variable ways. This book explores the significance of food provisioning and consumption in relation to the performance of these identities.


The relative contribution to minority protection of individual human rights, minority rights, and the right to self-determination are analyzed and evaluated. All three of these rights are needed and would interrelate for the establishment of an adequate system of minority protection.


This special issue has articles on how the dynamics of economic and social change have been intertwined with shifts in the structure and dynamics of the family, the historical functions of the ethnic media, the way in which cultural differences affect workplace, social adjustment in Korean-owned factories, and the “micro-sociology” of immigrant sociology in Japan.


The recent financial crisis has not led to a diminution in the flow from East Indonesia to East Malaysia. The causes of the move-
The movement has not only increased in scale, but has become more complex with more women becoming involved and migrant workers entering a wider range of occupations.

A6, C1, C5, E1


The first two and a half years of the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia have increased economic pressures on potential migrant workers, which has resulted in out-movement. In both pre- and post-crisis situations, this has been dominated by women. While the labor market in some of Indonesia’s main destination countries has been tightened, the segmentation of the labor market in those countries has limited the reduction of jobs. There has been more pressure on undocumented migrants, but the extent of repatriation, although increased from pre-crisis situation, has been limited. These, and other changes, have significant policy implications.

A5, C8, G


High levels of education and occupational upward mobility of Koreans in urban areas, historical experiences, and structural conditions have contributed to the assimilation of Koreans in Russian society. Nevertheless, Koreans have maintained high levels of ethnic identity.

A12, C7


This review includes different elements involved in the analysis of trafficking of migrants in Europe, from the ongoing discussions on definitions, to the exposition of different international agreements and conventions. Also presented are the findings from three case studies conducted in Hungary, Poland, and the Ukraine.

A12, C8, F


The Belgian debate over enfranchisement was mainly elite driven. The negative attitude of the Belgian political establishment proved to be a good incentive for immigrant and antiracist action, but the involvement of immigrant associations and their supporters did not exert any significant effect. The decisions were made, and the policy was set out, by existing political establishment.

A5, C4, E1


Urban-to-rural movements mostly consist of return migration while onward migration is mostly inter-urban movements. Returnees, in general, tend to be less successful than their onward counterparts. Location-specific capital left behind also exerts a strong positive effect on return migration. Onward migrants are sensitive to market forces and spatial disparities in economic opportunities. Thus, there should be more focus on measures that help open up market information for the labor force to improve the efficiency of relocating human resources.

Major themes and concerns of Chicana writers and critics in relation to the problems caused by inequitable gendered power relations are examined. This is followed by a discussion of the proposed solutions. Finally, the relationship between Chicanas and other women writers and critics of color to the mainstream feminist movement and Jewish feminists is explored.


The lengthy duration of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the large number of persons that temporarily sought refuge in European states have revealed that cooperation among states, including possible harmonization of domestic legislation, is necessary. This article outlines the development of temporary protection in the European Union.


This analysis of a study on the impact of political traumas on the mental health adjustment of the affected family members provides an overview of political victimization, describes the methodological framework of the study, describes research findings, addresses various themes that arose in focus group discussions, and summarizes the major themes of the study.


This volume provides documented information concerning Belarusan-Americans from the 17th century through the early decades of the 20th, and about posts World War II emigrants as well. It attempts to decipher the irregularities resulting from faulty categorization and to analyze mistakes made by authors and agencies in the past.


Germany’s ethnocultural conception of citizenship and nationality has stood in the way of including “foreign” migrants, including their German-born descendants into the national community. This conception has affected public perception and self-identification of migrants, the political mobilization of ethnic minorities, and the mobilization of xenophobic and extreme-right groups.


Europe, splintered along ethnic and nationalist lines, is contrasted with the United States, whose cultural practices have mitigated against ethnic divisions. The contrasting attitudes of these two regions toward the welfare state, the human rights tradition in the United States, and the role of regionalism in shaping conceptions of national identity are discussed. Also described are new forms of cultural membership that are emerging to take the place of nation-based citizenship.

The aim of the more than 400 entries in this work is to provide a comprehensive account of the Italian experience in the United States. The volume includes analyses of topics relating of the arts, history, religion, Italian organizations and groups, archival depositories, and other resource material, pop culture, social science/politics, sports, wartime military and home front activities, and science and technology. Each area is treated both in general, thematic essays and pieces devoted to specific aspects of a subject.

I


This discussion addresses the right of indigenous people to self-determination together with the reaction at the United Nations; the historical legacies that constrain debates on self-determination; the major issues involved; the problems inherent in the state-centered view of self-determination; and the elements of an approach to such right of self-determination that could reconcile their concerns with those of the state.

A8, F1


The documents in this volume chronologically trace the major laws regulating both immigration and naturalization. These documents, which also include court cases, opinion pieces, and many other papers, also provide an historical overview of U.S. immigration and naturalization policies.

A8, C8, G


This illustrated examination of Cuban life in Miami touches on all aspects of Cuban influence: politics, cuisine, music, religion, and everyday life. It also examines the personal and political toll that living in exile exacts.

A8, A9, C5


The contributors to this book recount the events that followed the massive uprootings during the early 1980s. It provides a political-economic perspective on the migration process, showing how military and human rights pressures, emerging ties between Guatemala and places of exile, and unfolding globalization phenomena both shape and are shaped by migration.

E2, G


This book takes a biocultural approach to the examination of health and illness in specific groups in the U.S. It first focuses on research ethics, research study design, and examines basic constructs such as race, ethnicity, gender, sex, sexual orientation, health care utilization, and health care-seeking behavior. It then examines health and illness in African-Americans, Asians and Pacific Islanders, Latinos Native Americans, women and communities with varying sexual and gender orientations.

A8, E2, F1

This loose-leaf volume is designed for professionals dealing with a health-related immigration problem. It provides information on how to obtain nonimmigrant and immigrant statuses for health care professionals, the immigration problems faced by health-impacted clients attempting to obtain nonimmigrant and immigrant status in this country, and possible remedies, and alien entitlement to publicly-funded medical care, and the immigration consequences of that support. Each part contains sample forms and pleadings, based on actual situations.


In order to refute racist stereotypes they must first be evoked. In the process, the two often become entangled. The careers of many post-1960s Asian American writers reveal that while Asian American identity is constructed in reaction to Orientalism, the two cultural forces are not necessarily at odds.


In the shadow of debate on different “integration models,” Western European countries have implemented a whole range of similar immigrant policies. Significant differences exist, however, in policy fields touching the core of historically established notions of how state and society should relate to each other.


These essays start with portraits of everyday life in Idaho as viewed by an immigrant from India. They then acquire depth as they uncover a deeper sense of possibilities in making the connections in our global community.


The carvings on aspen trees (arborglyphs) provide an account of the sheepherder experience as told by the herders themselves. These arborglyphs are analyzed by topic, language, politics, the Basque homeland, the sheepherder’s life, sex, and pictorial themes. These, and an examination of sheepherder artifacts, provide an account of the lives of Basque sheepherders in the American West.


The simultaneous decline of demography and a booming economy has led to a reversal of Singapore’s zero immigration policy. Today, one of four workers is a foreigner. While, the less qualified remain in a highly precarious and sometimes desperate situation, integration seems to be the master word for government as well as for the indigenous population.


The hopes and fears surrounding the greater incidence of dual nationality in the modern world are both exaggerated. The oppositionists, however, do have a point in that dual citizenship often overlooks the advantages of citizenship as an important area for exercis-
ing the virtues of democratic participation and engagement, etc.


The current problem-solving paradigm is limited in the case of the international response to natural disasters. The complexity and magnitude of the environmental displacement problem is highlighted by surveying the many types of environmental forces that can trigger migration. The conclusion is reached that a more proactive policy approach to migration caused by natural disasters is needed and the core elements of such an approach are sketched.


Some segments of the immigration population have higher propensities to give than those who were Canadian-born. As the length of residence increases, so does the average contributions of the foreign-born, with some changes in their motivations and organizational preferences. Although religious organizations were always preferred during the immigrant integration process, more secular organizations received more support at the latter stages of this process.


This special issue empathizes the struggles of South Asians in the United States, and their conflicts within what some might assume was a monolithic community.
This study focuses on analyzing the development of fertility, mortality and internal migration in north Namibia among the Christian population and tries to understand the factors affecting population development.


The development of the notion of folklore is plotted and located historically, politically, and socially. While folklore has played a pivotal role in identity formation, the usefulness of the concept today in an era of unprecedented cultural circulation is questionable.


This coverage of ethnic minorities in post-war Europe encompasses all categories of minorities, including immigrants and refugees, localized ethnic groupings and dispersed peoples. The scope of the book ranges from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Mediterranean to the Arctic, with the focus being on those states with the largest populations and the most difficult ethnic problems.


The contributions that Latino studies have made to immigration research is assessed by bringing in selected works of research on Latino studies to show that those who were once invisible to social science are now making substantial contributions to the field’s development.


The effect of the relationships between Vietnam and the Viet Kieu, Vietnamese living outside of the country, are explored. The politicization of these relationships has led to misunderstandings and antagonism on both sides. At the same, economic relationships developed between people in and out of Vietnam have had a major impact on the country’s liberalization and development since 1975. The passing of time and the establishment of new relationships have led to a normalization of the situation in recent years.


In spite of some significant drawbacks, women’s letters are an important resource for social historians interested in a wide range of
periods, regions, and topics. They have given information about how women felt about their lives and experiences, the undocumented roles they played in the home and the community, and how social and historical forces affected their lives. This information is not available in any other primary source.


Based on a multivariate analysis of an individual database of 110,000 asylum seekers and refugees, in-depth interviews and 174 questionnaires to refugees and employers, this article explores the role of refugees in the Swiss economy and the factors that influence their incorporation into the labor market.


Soviet Koreans, Germans, North Caucasians, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, among others, were systematically deported solely on their ethnicity by the Stalin regime to areas whose living conditions led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. This book is a rebuttal to the denial of this ethnic cleansing in Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory.


The relationship between migration and the city is examined from the point of view of the various determinants of contemporary labor flows, the political sources of resistance to international migration, and the renewed protagonist role of metropolitan areas as strategic nodes of the international system. As part of the last process, the rise of transnationalism as a novel form of adaptation to immigration and as a potential response to global capitalism is sketched.


Many thousands of non-European and Muslim immigrants and refugees who took advantage of Sweden's generous immigration policies now find themselves the object of discrimination and worse. Cultural racism has intensified, negative ethnic stereotypes have proliferated, and there has been spatial segregation of the non-Swedish.


Latina/Latino theatre has evolved from its pre-Columbian, Spanish, and Mexican origins to its current prominence within American theatre. The role of Chicanas/Latinas during the Mexican Revolution helps in understanding the effects on a people who lived under a dictatorship and then emerged to participate in a major theatrical movement in the U.S. The entry of women in the political arena has also left its mark on the evolution of the American stage.


International law is a difficult medium for providing adequate rights for minorities and
for effectively safeguarding those rights. The weaknesses in the international protection of minority rights are analyzed through a detailed examination of the practices and policies of Pakistan.


The Amish in Iowa are traced from their initial settlement, through the community’s experiences at the close of the nineteenth century, and into the early part of the twentieth century. The Amish’s experience of marginality and persecution in early modern Europe has helped them to develop actions and attitudes that enabled them to preserve their community during migration.


This collection of documents appears in nine chapters, organized around chronology and themes. Each section of primary sources is preceded by a short survey history for each era, which puts the documents within a proper historical framework. Together, these documents tell the history of Mexican Americans in the United States.


This article studies the effects of the Israeli migration regime on the prospects for the emergence of a politics of claims-making by labor migrants, comparing the structures of constraints and opportunities to establish organizational frameworks faced by documented contract workers and undocumented spontaneous migrant workers.

Schabas, W. A., *Genocide in International...*
In general, this study follows the structure of the Genocide Convention. It gives a history of the development of international legal efforts to prosecute genocide, surveys the process of drafting the Convention, examines the definition of genocide in Articles II and III, covers domestic and international prosecution of genocide matters raised by Articles V, VI, and VII of the convention, and discusses the prevention of genocide.


The process by which white, racialized identities are inscribed as normative constructions in the discourses of white pre-service teachers at a Canadian university are investigated. The power of dominant groups to resist oppositional pedagogies problematizes the potential for whiteness to affirm itself, even as a virtue.


The National Police Agency is using penal statistics to substantiate the trend of an exponential increase of foreign criminality and to legitimize sterner crack down policies on illegals and overstayers. This attitude is leading to a spreading image of foreigners likely to stir up trouble and, consequently, an increase in discrimination attitudes among the public.


Ethnic and national identities in many areas are discussed to illuminate the uses and meaning of alternative theories. A case is made for the value of the author’s own ethno-symbolist approach.


The 1970s innovative view expressed a promise of multicultural group rights for immigrants in addition to social and political rights. Barely a decade later, however, the government moved closer to existing international practice in the area. Since the 1980s, the development of immigrant social and political membership in Sweden has led to further shifts that put stronger emphasis on individual rights as the basis for immigrant membership entitlements.


Contemporary migration flows in Asia are characterized by an increasing number of women and children, greater numbers of clandestine migrants, and more refugees. Brain drain, illegal migration, and trafficking of women and children have become significant problems for many countries in Asia.


The British race relations approach estab-
lished in the 1960s had an important effect that still shapes the patterns of political contention by different minority groups. British "racialized" cultural pluralism has structured an inequality of opportunities for African-Caribbeans and Indian subcontinent minorities.

A8, A14, C8

The status of Arabs in North America is covered from a wide range of perspectives. An assortment of different communities is discussed to illustrate the range of Arab emigrant experience. More broadly, Arabs are examined in the legal system, youth and family, and health and welfare, as well as Arab American identity, political activism, and attempts by Arab immigrants to achieve respect and recognition in their new homes. Both the present situation and prospects for the future are discussed.

C1, E1

Level of education, major field of study, and knowledge of official languages are key determinants of finding high-skill employment. Region-of-origin effects are important in the development of policy efforts to use the skill sets of immigrants in the Canadian labor market.

A12, C8

The Danish election system contains greater incentives to collective mobilization than election rules in other countries, thus resulting in higher voter turn-out among immigrants to Denmark than other countries. In some Danish cities, a very high voter turnout is attributable to the collective mobilizing of certain ethnic groups.

A8, E2, G

The analyses by the contributors to this book, non-Caucasian scholars, evoke powerful images of a racialized, White-dominated academy that produces "academic wetbacks" who must struggle for dignity and equality.

A8, C8, G

Residential districts in the Greater Eastside of Los Angeles that are populated by low-income Latinos have been reduced to powerless jurisdictions that function as bedroom communities for the neighboring cities. These districts have no influence in the policies of the cities through the democratic process. Latino politicians are also disempowered when their constituencies are segregated into low-income, low-resource jurisdictions where their votes cannot effect those with power and wealth.

A12, A13, C5, F, I

The contributors to this book describe and analyze the reaction of the seven EU member states toward the management of the cri-
sis created by the displacement of ethnic Albanians. The analysis centers on accounts of society, threatened identities and xenophobia, as well as international norms pertaining to state sovereignty and human rights.


A number of judicial decisions of various courts, including the Supreme Court, have provided a series of rights to the millions of refugees who have had to cross internationally recognized borders and continue to stay in India. These courts have also extended the required legal as well as constitutional protection to a number of refugees.


Circular migration among the Iban of Indonesia has historical links to headhunting, early market involvement with forest product collection, and Iban values that have fueled these activities. Yet the Iban only occupy a marginal position in both Indonesia and Malaysian Borneo. The historical antecedents of the current Iban circular labor migration are described, as is the transnational nature of Iban labor circulation, the work experience of men who engage in it, and its domestic consequences.


The development of Australian jurisprudence in claims for refugee status based on sexuality, particularly by homosexuals, is assessed. Although the recognition by the courts and the Refugee Review Tribunal that sexual minorities may constitute particular social groups is appropriate, the treatment of the concept of persecution has, in many cases, been problematic.


The challenges faced by immigrant students of secondary school age and the schools they attend are detailed. Six immigrant high school students are profiled. Their language, cultural backgrounds, frustrations, and successes are described. Four programs attempting to develop responsive instructional philosophies and approaches are analyzed and ten characteristics that can offer effective teaching and learning for immigrant youth are identified.


Spanish, Italian, and French labor leaders' immigration preferences have been translated into actions and policies. In the 1990s, labor unions were influential in efforts to legalize undocumented immigrants, ease restrictions on family reunification, extend the length of work and residency permits, and, in Spain and Italy, open legal avenues for employment-based immigration.

Unmarried temporary female workers, dagonmei, migrating to the Pearl River Delta region have been cast as either rebellious or filial daughters. Based on a recent study, it might be more meaningful to understand the tension these workers face in their desire to be independent and their sense of family obligation.


This book describes and compares interactions between three indigenous populations in Alaska, the Dena'ina, the Altai, and the Chukchi, and Russian missionaries throughout the nineteenth and up to the beginning of the twentieth century.
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The International Newsletter on Migration is a publication of the Research Committee on Migration (RC: No. 31) of the International Sociological Association. Address all correspondence to the Editor of the Newsletter, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (50, Avenue Duquesne, 75007 Paris, France, Tel. 47-34-77-85) or to Lydio F. Tomasi, Editor of IMR, E-mail: <cmslft@aol.com>.

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**CONFERENCES**

- “Business across Borders: The European Union and Movement of Economic Actors”: Nijmegen, The Netherlands, September 28-29, 2001. This Conference looked at economic migration from the perspective of the needs of companies and businesses (what are the rules which regulate movement of persons for economic purposes), and from the perspective of the individual (what are the concerns of the individual migrant). Contact: Pallas Consortium: <Pallas@cpo.kun.nl>

- “Go West: The Impact of Locale on Ethnicity”: 34th Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 25-27, 2001. Among the many topics explored are Italian American studies in the 21st century; association and interaction of Italians, Mormons and Waldensians; and fascism among Italian Americans, politicians
and the press. Contact: AIHA Executive Director, Dominic Candeloro: <Dominican@hotmail.com>

- "Immigration, Migration, and Diaspora": The second biennial Allen Morris Conference on the history of Florida and the Atlantic World, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, February 1-2, 2002. Contact: Elma C. Green: <egreen@mailer.fsu.edu>
- "Italian Migrations in Europe in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries": University of Bali, Switzerland, April 25-27, 2002, organized by CSERPE and The Latin Humanism in Switzerland. This international Congress will deal with main currents of Italian migration to Europe, focusing on methodological aspects of the study of Italian migration; historiographical analyses on the presence of Italian Communities in Continental Europe; and on trends and issues of integration of Italian workers in Europe. Contact: Luciano Trincia at <I.trincia@umanesimolatino.net>.
- "Southeast Asia's Population in a Changing Asian Context": 2002 IUSSP Regional Population Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, June 10-13, 2002. It includes the following sessions: S10 International Female Labor Migration (Organizer: Brenda Yeoh, Singapore - <larysa@nus.edu.sg>); S11
International Migration and Age Structure (Organizer: Jerrold Hugnet, USA, <hugnet.unescap@un.org>); S12 Migration into Fragile Ecosystems (Organizer: Ligia Noronh, India, <terigoa@goal.dot.net.in>); S13 Internal Migration and Organization (Organizer: Graeme Hugo, Australia, <ghugo@arts.adelaide.edu.au>); S14 Policy and Migration (Organizer: Dang Nguyen Anh, Vietnam, <pc.anh@netnam.org.vn>); S15 Conflict and Migration (Organizer: Riwanto Tirtosudarno, Indonesia, Fax: 62-21-520-7205).

- ISA Research Committee on Migration RC 31: XV ISA World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, Australia, July 7-13, 2002.

The ISA Research Committee on Migration (RC 31) will hold 16 Sessions and 4 joint sessions with other ISA Research Committees:

Sessions of RC 31:

1. Migration Theory. Chair: Monica Boyd (Florida State University, USA and University of Toronto, Canada) <monica.boyd@utoronto.ca>
2. Methodologies of Migration Research. Chair: Hanya Zlotnik (United Nations, New York, USA) <zlotnik@un.org>
3. Migration and Citizenship. Chair: Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (Centre d'Études des Relations Internationales, Paris, France) <catherine.dewenden@ceri.sciences-po.fr>
4. Integration and Multiculturalism. Chair: Marco Martiniello (Université de Liège, Belgium) <M.Martiniello@ulg.ac.be>
5. Migration Policies. Chair: Maria Baganha (University of Coimbra, Portugal) <mbaganha@sonata.fe.uc.pt>
6. Refugee Movements: Resettlement and Resistance. Chair: Michael Lanphier, (York University, Toronto, Canada) <lanphier@yorku.ca>
7. Gender and Migration. Chair: Devanyak Sundaram (University of Madras, India) and Kesav Kaistha (Panjab University, Chandigar, India) <dsundaram@hotmail.com>
8. Migration and Biography. Chair: Rita Rapoport (University of Haifa, Israel) <ritamano@research.haifa.ac.il>
9. Immigrant and Ethnic Entrepreneurship. Chair: Lloyd L. Wong (University of Calgary, Canada) <llwong@ucalgary.ca>
10. Transnational Family Interactions. Chair: Raelene Wilding (University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia) <rae@cyllene.uwa.edu.au>
11. International Migration in the CIS countries. Chair: Elena
Sadovskaya (Al Farabi Kazakh State University, Kazakhstan) <elenasadovskaya@hotmail.com> or <ccm@online.ru>

12. Migration in the Asia Pacific Region. Chair: Paul Spoonley (Massey University, New Zealand) <P.Spoonley@massey.ac.nz>

13. Migration in China and Chinese Diasporas. Chair: Eric Florence (Université de Liège, Belgium) <eric.florence@ulg.ac.be>

14. Potential Receiving Countries without Immigration; How do they Cope? Chair: David Bartram (University of Reading, United Kingdom) <dbartram@coloradocollege.edu>

15. New Trends in International Migration Research. Chair: Han Entzinger (Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands) <entzinger@fsw.eur.nl>

16. RC 31 Business Meeting.

Joint Sessions with other Research Committees:

I. Racism and Migration (with RC 05, Race and Ethnic Studies). Chairs: Lydio F. Tomasi (Center for Migration Studies, New York, USA; RC 31) <cmslft@aol.com> and Kogila Adam-Moodley (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada; RC 05) <kogilia.adam-moodley@ubc.ca>

II. Migration and the Family (with RC 06, Family Research). Chairs: Ursula Mehrländer (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn/Berlin, Germany; RC 31) <Ursula.Mehrlaender@fes.de> and Bernhard Nauck (University of Chemnitz-Zwickau, Germany; RC 06) <Bernhard.Nauck@phil.tu-chemnitz.de>

III. Migration and Development (with RC 09, Social Transformations). Chairs: Han Entzinger (Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands; RC 31) <entzinger@fsw.eur.nl> and Ulrike Schuerkens (Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany; RC 09) <ulrike.schuerkens@caramail.com>

IV. Rising Challenges for the Next Millennium: Globalization, Migration, Work and Urbanization. Integrative Panel, to be organized jointly by RC's 02 (Economy and Society), 21 (Regional and Urban Development), 30 (Sociology of Work) and 31 (Sociology of Migration), (to be confirmed; invited speakers only).

You should register as a conference participant before January 1, 2002 in order to have your name appear in the program and to have an abstract of your paper published on the Internet.

The program coordinators for RC 31 are Han Entzinger, president of RC
31, at entzinger@fsw.eur.nl and Lydio F. Tomasi, secretary-treasurer of RC 31, at cmslft@aol.com Feel free to contact either of them if you have any queries that are not related to one specific session.

• “Allocation Processes and Ascription”: 97th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, IL, August 16-19, 2002. Submission deadline: January 10, 2002. It includes the following sessions: 1) “Immigrant Communities” (Linda Vo, University of California, Irvine, volt@uci.edu); 2) “Immigration” (Susan Gonzalez Baker, University of Texas, Austin, sbaker@prc.utexas.edu); 3) “Impact of Immigrants on American Institutions” (Prema Kurien, University of Southern California, Kurien@rif.usc.edu); 4) “Population Processes” (Katherine Donato, Rice University, kmd@rice.edu); 5) “Race and Ethnicity” (Tyrone Foreman, University of Illinois, Chicago, tyforeman@uic.edu).

ITEMS

• Forced Migration Online: A web-based portal
The Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) at the University of Oxford is developing a comprehensive electronic information system for refugee and forced migration studies that will offer a wealth of web-based resources to researchers, practitioners and other interested parties. With a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and further support from the EU, the project has been funded for a three-year period which began in January 2001. The portal, Forced Migration Online (FMO), emerges out of the success of the RSC Digital Library Project which started in 1997, also with funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the RU. Several thousand documents will be available online for full text searching by late 2001, and the full portal will be launched in 2002. A portal differs from a search engine in that it targets a particular audience and focuses on a specific subject area; it can therefore produce more relevant results and achieve greater depth in its coverage. The resources available on FMO will include: 1) a searchable catalogue with descriptions of relevant resources in the field of forced migration and links to those resources; 2) a cross-search agent allowing simultaneous searching of websites, library catalogues, online databases and other electronic resources; 3) A digital library of full text documents and journal articles which can be read online, searched and printed as required; 4) thematic and country-specific guides to research on forced migration issues with
pointers to further information available on the web; 5) a news feed with regularly updated highlights; 6) back runs of academic journals; and 7) online teaching resources. FMO defines forced migration broadly, encompassing displacement as a result of disasters, development initiatives and environmental factors, as well as conflict (refugees and internally displaced people). The research guides will provide a detailed overview of many key issues in forced migration studies, including significant populations of forced migrants around the world and important thematic issues and the plight of the internally displaced. Written by specialists, these guides will be cross-referenced and will also identify the key relevant literature and electronic resources. The portal is being hosted by the RSC but the coordination team will rely upon a network of international partners to create a global information resource. A core advisory panel for the project comprises: the Czech Helsinki Committee; the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University, Boston; the Program on Forced Migration at Columbia University, New York; the Higher Education Digitisation Service in the U.K.; and The American University in Cairo. The project is directed by Dr. Marilyn Deegan at the RSC. <http:www.forcedmigration.org/portal/home/homepage.htm>.

- **The Swedish Emigrant Institute's Research Scholarship**

  The Swedish Emigrant Institute (SEI) is hereby inviting scholars and students in migration research to spend 1-6 months during 2002 at The House of Emigrants in Växjö, Sweden's national archives, library and museum on emigration, and keeper of Europe's most comprehensive collections on emigration from one single country. For more information, see www.svenskaemigrantinstitutet.g.se. The SEI has also a close cooperation with the University of Växjö.

- **Museum of Migrations**

  The Government of the State of Veracruz has undertaken the task of building a Museum of Migrations in the port city of Veracruz. Banco de Ideas is currently working in a research focused on the global phenomenon of human migration, so this museum can offer a broad, updated, and innovative vision on the subject. The Museum is soliciting information from researchers, curators, collectors and anyone willing to share their valuable data or expertise with them. Contact: Sandra Luna, Project Coordinator at <museodelasmigraciones@yahoo.com.mx>.

- **Saloutos Memorial Book Award, 2001**

  The Immigration and Ethnic History Society announces the annual
Theodore Saloutos Memorial Book Award Competition for 2001. The 2001 award will be presented for the book judged best on any aspect of the immigration history of the United States. To be eligible for the award, a book must be copyrighted "2001," must be based on substantial research in primary sources, and must present a major new scholarly interpretation. A book may be nominated by its author, the publisher, a member of the prize committee, or a member of the Immigration and Ethnic History Society. Contact: Professor David A. Gerber, Department of History, State University at Buffalo, Amherst, New York, 14260-4130, or <dagerber@buffalo.edu>

Immigration History Museum
The University of Texas is spearheading a bi-national effort to create the Peso al Norte Immigration Museum, the first national institution dedicated to the history of immigration across the southern border of the United States. Contact: Marguerita Rivera Houze, Executive Director, at (915) 747-8673, or write at <pesoalnorte@utep.edu>

PUBLICATIONS

This volume is an output of a global migration management project - New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP) - directed by Bimal Ghosh over the past three years. Specialists from different disciplines and various parts of the World address the issues from diverse perspectives and use different tools of analysis, but they are all geared to the central theme of the book - the prospects and problems of developing a comprehensive and internationally harmonized regime for better management of movements of people in the 21st century, based on the principle of regulated openness.

**Books Received**


BEJA HORTA, A.P., Video, *A Casa de Maria Fruta*. Time: 38 min. Universidade Aberta, CEMRI, Simon Fraser University, Fundação para e Ciência e Tecnologia PRAXIS XXI.


CAESTECKER, F., *Alien Policy in Belgium, 1840-1940: The Creation of Guest Workers*,


Negotiating Identities
States and Immigrants in France and Germany
Riva Kastoryano
Translated by Barbara Harshav

Riva Kastoryano draws on extensive fieldwork—including interviews with politicians, immigrant leaders, and militants—to analyze interactions between states and immigrants in France and Germany. Making frequent comparisons to the United States, she delineates the role of states in constructing group identities and measures the impact of immigrant organization and mobilization on national identity.

Princeton Studies in Cultural Sociology
Paul DiMaggio, Michèle Lamont, Robert Wuthnow, and Viviana Zelizer, Editors
Cloth $55.00 ISBN 0-691-01014-5 Due January

Second edition now available

The Global City
New York, London, Tokyo
Saskia Sassen

This is a thoroughly revised edition of the classic work that chronicles how New York, London, and Tokyo became command centers of the global economy and underwent massive and parallel changes. Saskia Sassen has updated all the data in the book and thoroughly rewritten all of the chapters to engage with debates sparked by the first edition. She has also added a new preface and a substantial new epilogue. This is a timely edition of a work that changed the way we think about cities in the global economy.

From reviews of the first edition:

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"A genuine tour de force, well worthy of all the laudatory reviews it has received."—Peter Taylor, Review of International Political Economy

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