INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIOrf REVIEW ••• REFUGEES TODAY Edited..by Barry N. Stein Sylvano M. Tomasi Vol. 15 Spring-Summer 1981 ^^ /^ ^ CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES 53/54 Editor: SILVANO M. TOMASI Managing Editor: LYDIO F. TOMASI, Center for Migration Studies, N.Y. Book Review Editor: ELEANOR M. ROGG, Wagner College Editorial Board: AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., Esq., N.Y. • MONICA BOYD, Carleton University • PHILIP GLEASON, University of Notre Dame • DONALD F. HEISEL, Population Division, U.N. • DONALD G. HOHL, Migration & Refugee Affairs, U.S.C.C. • CHARLES B. KEELY, The Population Council, N.Y. • MARY M. KRITZ, Population Science, The Rockefeller Foundation • C. MICHAEL LANPHIER, York University, Toronto • JOHN J. MACISCO, JR., Fordham University Board of Directors: EDWARD E. SWANSTROM (Chairman) • JOSEPH COGO • JOHN MCCARTHY • SYLVAN M. TOMASI Advisory Editors: SIMON ABBOTT, London Council of Social Service • IVO BAUCIC, Center for Migration Studies, University of Zagreb • GUNTHER BEYER, Editor, International Migration, The Hague • RAMIRO CARDONA. Centre Regional de Poblacion, Bogota • FRANCESCO CERASE, University of Rome • ROBERT D. CROSS. University of Virginia • DALE S. DEHAAN, Deputy U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva • SAMUEL N. EISENSTADT, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem • JOSEPH P. FITZPATRICK, Committee for Research on Migration, Fordham University, N.Y. • ANDREW M. GREELEY, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago • EVERETT S. LEE, University of Georgia • CHARLES A. PRICE, Australian National University, Canberra • ALAN RICHARDSON, University of Western Australia, Nedlands • ANTHONY H. RICHMOND, York University, Toronto • GEORGES P. TAPINOS, Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Paris • RUDOLPH J. VECOLI, Center for Immigration Studies, University of Minnesota. THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW is published quarterly by the Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., in cooperation with A.C.I.M. and Migration and Refugee Affairs, U.S.C.C., Washington, D.C. The Center for Migration Studies is an educational, nonprofit institute founded in New York in 1964 to encourage and facilitate the study of sociological, demographic, historical, legislative and pastoral aspects of human migration and ethnic group relations. The opinions expressed in this Review are those of the contributors. Subscription Rates: U.S.A.: Institutions:/! year, $22.50/2 years, $44.00/3 years, $65.50; Individuals: 1 year, $17.50/2 years, $34.00/3 years, $50.50. All other countries add $3.00 for each year's subscription to cover postage. Single copy rates: $6.50. IMR Cumulative Index Volumes: 1-10 (1964-1976); $5.00. Subscriptions are payable in advance. 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The articles in this Review are regularly abstracted in Sociological Abstracts: Historical Abstracts; America, History and Life; Current Content: Behavioral Social and Management Science; Bulletin Sigrialetique Sciences Humaines, C.N.R.S.; Guia a las Resenas de Libros de y sobre Hispanoamericana; United States Political Science Documents; and Universal Reference System. Copyright © 1981 by the CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES OF NEW YORK, INC. 209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, New York 10304, U.S.A. Tel. (212) 351-8800 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW VOLUME XV NUMBERS 1-2 SPRING-SUMMER 1981 5 Foreword BARRY N. STEIN SILVANO M. TOMASI Part I: Overview 8 Some Thoughts About Refugees and the Descendants of Theseus PETER I. ROSE 16 The UNHCR and Relief Operations: A Changing Role FREDERICK C. CUNY 20 Documentary Note Refugees: A New Approach JOHN F. THOMAS 26 The Political Refugee: 35 Years Later GUNTHER BEYER 35 Refugees and International Cooperation GORAN MELANDER Part II: The Analytic Framework 42 Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory EGON F. KUNZ 52 Refugee Asylum: Policy and Legislative Developments GILBERT JAEGER 69 Documentary Note Refugees in Europe ANNE PALUDAN 74 Organizational Expansion and Limits in International Services for Refugees LEON GORDENKER 88 Framing Refugees as Clients DORSH MARIE dE VOE Z, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Part III: Policy Responses 95 Voluntary Agencies and Government Policy ELIZABETH WINKLER 99 Immigration Policies and Refugees in Australia CHARLES PRICE 109 Documentary Note Australia's Settlers: The Galbally Report LESLIE F. CLAYDON 113 Canada's Response to Refugees C. MICHAEL LANPHIER 131 Documentary Note Indochinese Refugees in Canada: Sponsorship and Adjustment GERTRUD NEUWIRTH and LYNN CLARK 141 Refugee Act of 1980 EDWARD M. KENNEDY Part IV: Resettlement 157 Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees ROBERT G. WRIGHT 175 Refugee Dynamics: Angolans in Zambia 1966 to 1972 ART HANSEN 195 Africa 's Resettlement Strategies JOHN R. ROGGE 213 Documentary Note Rural Refugees in Africa TRISTRAM F. BETTS 219 Refugees in Dandakaranya K. MAUDOOD ELAHI 226 Troubled Waters: Vietnamese Fisherfolk on America' s Gulf Coast PAUL D. STARR 239 Indochinese Resettlement: Language Education and Social Services HOWARD H. KLEINMANN and JAMES P. DANIEL 246 Impact of Resettlement on Refugee Children EARL E. HUYCK and RONA FIELDS Part V: Adjustment Psychological Adaptation and Dysfunction among Refugees J. DONALD COHON, JR. FOREWORD 0 The Lithuanian Refugee Experience and Grief LIUCIJA BASKAUSKAS Occupational Assimilation of Refugees CHRISTINE ROBINSON FINNAN Family and Community among Vietnamese Refugees DAVID HAINES, DOROTHY RUTHERFORD and PATRICK THOMAS Part VI: Resources The Refugee Experience: Defining the Parameters of a Field of Study BARRY N. STEIN Documentary Note Bibliography BARRY N. STEIN The Authors BOOK REVIEWS International Conflict in an American City: Boston's Irish, Italians, and Jews, 1935-1944 by John F. Stack, J r. THOMAS KESSNER Human Migration: Patterns and Policies edited by William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams FREDERICK C. LUEBKE Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations by Joan M. Nelson HAGEN Koo After the Odyssey by Gillian Bottomley EVA E. SANDIS Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies by Michael J. Piore ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG The Future of Cultural Minorities edited by Anthony E. Alcock et al. and Minorities in History edited by A.C. Hepburn CORA BAGLEY MARRETT Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania 1900-1971 by R.H. Sabot JOEL SAMOFF Ethnic Organizational Dynamics: The Polish Group in Canada by Henry Radecki EUGENE E. OBIDINSKI ^ INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 410 Internal Migration Policy and New Towns: The Mexican Experience by P.G. Bock and Irene Fraser Rothenberg BRYAN R. ROBERTS 411 Japanese Americans: Changing Patterns of Ethnic Affiliation Over Three Generations by Darrel Montero MORRISON G. WONG 412 Hispanic Intermarriage in New York City: 1975 by J.P. Fitzpatrick and D.T. Gurak ROBERT SCHOEN 413 Emigration and Economic Development: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic by Jon C. Swanson NAZLI CHOUCRI 414 Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers edited by William 0. McCagg, Jr. and Brian D. Silver ROBERT A. LEWIS 416 L'emigration portugaise: Present et avenir by Nayade Anido and Rubens Freire VICTOR M.P. DAROSA 418 REVIEW OF REVIEWS 433 INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER ON MIGRATION 437 BOOKS RECEIVED Foreword Traditionally viewed as localized, nonrecurring and isolated flows, refugees and refugee movements stand singularly undefined and notably undocumented. Today, religious, ethnic and political conflicts, persecution, tyranny and war all combine to leave no region or continent without refugees. The magnitude and number of these movements is unknown. Data vary by source and definition, and journalism is too often deputed as research. Often rejected by both the countries of asylum and by the rest of the international community, refugees have become, internationally, the unwelcomed guests. Initially, an economic burden to their host, refugees are perceived to compete with the natives fot scarce resources, and their presence may exacerbate or create racial, ethnic, religious or economic conflicts. Sometimes, too, the host is more sympathetic to the country of origin than to the refugees. Thus, when countries of asylum appeal for international assistance, other states often feel no responsibility to share the burden. Global and unpredictable, but tragic in their persistent appearance, refugee movements have evoked a variety of governmental responses. In the past, open lands and free migration greatly eased the problem of finding refuge. Refugees then were considered immigrants and not a special class or problem. Today, however, refugees often have no place to go. Historically, the response of many states to the problem of unwanted or disliked groups has been extermination, enslavement or expulsion. While these " solutions " have not changed greatly, the particular answer chosen has shifted over the ages. Although slavery, serfdom and other forms of exploitative relationships have not been completely eradicated, they are generally outlawed and condemned. Similarly, genocide and extermination, while not yet methods of the past are, hopefully, no longer viable options for a modern government. Expulsion, on the other hand, is on the rise. Adding to the frequency of refugee movements is the increasing consciousness of ideological and ethnic differences. Formal ideologies, especially political, religious or nationalistic ones, mark differences among people. Thus, as sovereign states have become increasingly IMR Volume 15 No. 1 5 Barry N. Stem Silvano M. Tomasi 0 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW powerful and capable of controlling their subjects, they have also more frequently coerced into leaving or expelled those groups among them who are" different". These trends have their roots in distant centuries but have converged in recent decades to end open lands, to reduce migration and wandering, demand conformity, decrease tolerance, increase state power and increase the number of refugees while simultaneously leaving the refugees with fewer options for refuge. Suffering from decades of scholarly inattention, few institutional records or analyses of concluded refugee movements and resettlement programs have been developed. In both the public and private sectors, this lack of an institutional memory requires each new refugee wave to be treated on an ad hoc emergency basis. During each refugee emergency, then, a plethora of poorly planned temporary programs are created, designed to respond only to the specific needs of individual refugees. Coordinated efforts with built-in research components are non-existent. Experience with alternative strategies of intervention and assistance, and experience with systematic approaches to the matching of resources with needs go unreported and are lost for future reference. The scholarly inattention to refugee problems is understandable as refugee research does not fit neatly into distinct categories and is not a ready-made field of study. It lacks standard texts, a theoretical structure, a systematic body of data, and even a firm definition of the subject or the field. Generally, there has been a failure to learn from experience and to add to the cumulative body of knowledge on references. Either unwilling or unable to examine the etiology of refugee movements, research has simply addressed symptoms and offered palliatives. Superficially, when reviewing refugees and refugee movements, one is struck by the diversity and number of the groups involved. Too frequently viewed as isolated, deviant and nonrecurring, the refugee experience and refugee behavior may be scientifically perceived as distinctly consistent and notably predictable. The basic premise with which this issue has approached refugee research is that there is a refugee experience and that this experience produces what may be termed refugee behavior. From this perspective, refugees may be perceived as a social psychological type whose behavior, within certain parameters, is socially patterned. In this issue of the International Migration Review we are not just calling for more research on refugees. Rather, we seek to provoke new thinking and promote a comprehensive, historical, interdisciplinary and comparative perspective which focuses on the consistencies and patterns in the refugee experience. Ideally, such work should build the foundations of a new field of Refugee Studies, clarify concepts, formulate the questions to be addressed more precisely and define the parameters and priorities of such studies. The ultimate objective must be the development FOREWORD / of a new body of knowledge, the cataloging and evaluation of existing programs, and, perhaps most importantly, the establishment of an institutional memory for policy makers and operational personnel. The size and range of this issue attest to the fact that calls for refugee research have not gone completely unheeded. In fact, many governments, international agencies and research associations have actively begun to promote refugee research. The authors included herein represent ten countries and an even greater number of disciplines and backgrounds and cover most aspects of the refugee experience. Each of the five main sections in the issue attempts to address the salient aspects of each topic. It is hoped that the articles included will broaden perspectives, stimulate future research and, ultimately, contribute to the solution of a tragic human dilemma. The compiling, editing and publication of an issue of this scope and magnitude is achieved only through the cooperative efforts of many people. We are indebted to the authors appearing in this issue not only for their scholarship but also for their patience. Their commitment is reflected in the text that follows. We should also like to extend our thanks and appreciation to the editorial team and the Board of Reviewers at the Center for Migration Studies who collectively and successfully have implemented the first issue of its kind on contemporary refugee movements. Finally, our thanks must also be extended to the Ford Foundation for their generous support in the publication of this issue of the International Migration Review. Without this level of institutional support all research would ultimately fail to be brought to its greatest use. Part I: Overview Some Thoughts about Refugees and the Descendants of Theseus Refugees: A word that conjures up images of sad-eyed children with bloated bellies in dusty border camps. Refugees. Alexander Solzhenitsyn and his friends at a press conference in Zurich. Refugees. A family of bewildered Vietnamese arriving at a snowy airport in northern Minnesota. Refugees. A group of sullen Cubans behind a cyclone fence on an old army post in Arkansas. Refugees. Two elderly Soviet Jews being lionized at a community center in New Jersey. This issue of the International Migration Review is concerned with that special category of migrants called refugees, victims of racial, religious, or political persecution who have sought asylum in safe havens, often across the borders of their native countries. While the term refugee has only recently entered the legal vernacular, the seeker of sanctuary, driven out by centrifugal forces beyond his ability to control, is as old a figure in the human drama as communal life itself. Many contemporary refugees are exiles in the original sense of that Latin-rooted term: they are outcasts, expellees who have been banished from their homelands. Many more are exiles in the modern vein, reluctant leavers forced to flee, driven out by the prospect of an unacceptable fate should they choose to stay behind. And there are others, perhaps the largest group, the human flotsam and jetsam caught in the cross-currents of conflicts which are not of their direct concern. They are untargeted victims, bystanders sucked into the maelstrom then washed ashore (or along a muddy trail or a fetid campsite) with other frightened, hungry and bewildered displaced persons. Immigrants, by contrast, are more a^t to be pulled than pushed away . To be sure, poor economic conditions, hunger, disease, overcrowding, and the lack of opportunities for social mobility often serve as catalysts for consideration of permanent or temporary residence in another place. But, without the attraction of some Golden Medina, some land of promise, few would venture forth. Refugees have no such choice. Not only must they 8 IMP Volume 15 No. 1 Peter I. Rose REFUGEES AND THE DESCENDANTS OF THESEUS y leave but they must leave with the realization they may never be able to go home again. The Princes of Sacrifice return as rain in a drouth year, The Princes of War return as sores on the faces of politicians. The Princes of Betrayal return impaled on the swords of their friends. But the Princes of Exile never return. 1 Banished, uprooted, or displaced, the princes (and the paupers) of exile are found throughout history. We know of them from the biblical texts which tell of the Exodus from Egypt, from lamentations of those encamped along the Rivers of Babylon, and through the prayers of those in the Diaspora who for over two millennia proclaimed " Next Year in Jerusalem ". By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, Yes, we wept, When we remembered Zion. We hanged our harps upon the willows In the midst thereof. For there they carried us away captive Required of us a song; And they that wasted us Required of us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the songs of Zion. How shall we sing the Lord's song In a strange land? 2 We know of those who concern us here through the writings of Euripides, Sophocles, Virgil, and Ovid. We have read descriptions of those who escaped the wrath of zealous Crusaders, of Marranos who feigned conversion to avoid the flames of the Inquisitor's pyre. We have read the memoirs of the opponents of Republican France and the diaries of Decembrists and Forty-Eighters. And we are all too familiar with the sad reports and the documentary evidence of the suffering of refugees from Russian pogroms, Turkish terror, Nazi atrocities, and the brutalities of Richard Shelton, "The Princes of Exile," The New Yorker, 45, October 22, 1973, p. 50. ^Tsalm 137. 10 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Fascists and Communists and recrudescent nationalists in our own time, a time the novelist Heinrich Boll has called " The century of refugees and prisoners ". 3 A common expression that resounds like a leitmotif through all commentaries on the experience of exile is that of estrangement, of alienation. It is a condition that is the result of the seemingly unwarranted assaults upon the community, upon the person, upon the psyche. It is the result of the breakdown of the normative order; the fact that familiar rules no longer obtain, that social groups have been torn asunder, that relatives and friends will have to be abandoned. When people leave there is incredible apprehension about what lies ahead. Once gone there is anxiety and often there is guilt about what is left behind. Most of all there is loneliness. In the end, how refugees cope with the trauma of exile, with inevitable loneliness and irredeemable loss is largely dependent upon the kindness and compassion of others. Sometimes they are kin or countrymen. Often they are strangers. It has always been so. In Sophocles ' Oedipus at Colonus, we are told how Theseus, King of Athens, welcomed the beleaguered and blinded Oedipus to his homeland saying, Never could I turn away from any stranger such as you are now and leave him to his fate. . . . 4 And later, assuring the old man who is still confused by Theseus ' generosity, the compassionate King reiterates his words of welcome. Your life is safe—be sure of thatwhile any god saves mine. 5 In modern times, as in ancient ones, it can be devastating to the seeker of asylum when no Theseus stands by to assist, when there is nowhere to turn but inward. Historians, philosophers, poets and politicians have all written on these themes (as, of course, have refugees themselves); yet, curiously, rather few social scientists have done so. In fact, with some notable exceptions—and the contributors to this volume are foremost among 3 As quoted in W. Stanley Mooneyman, Sea of Heartbreak. Plainfield, New Jersey: Logos International, 1980, p. 207. 4 Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus in The Oedipus Plays of Sophocles, Paul Roche, trans., New York: New American Library, 1958, p. 110. ^Ibid., p. 137. REFUGEES AND THE DESCENDANTS OF THESEUS 11 them, this most sociological subject has been largely ignored by those who coined the word anomie and have devoted so much attention to exploring, examining, and explaining various forms of intergroup and interpersonal tension. Even many of those who have studied the character and consequences of forced migration and resettlement rarely have delved into the social and psychological ramifications of those affected by it. Few have studied the gatekeeper role played by government bureaucrats who carry out national policies or the effects their actions have on individuals, groups, and international relations. Fewer still have looked into the contributions of hosts and helpers, professional and volunteer, or analyzed their critical part in the acculturation process. A reflection on this state of affairs suggests that something has long been missing in our broader understanding of a most significant global issue that grows larger with each passing year. It is time (and, given the state of the world, timely) that attention be turned to the development of a sociology of exile and to a better understanding of the politics of rescue and the psychology of altruism. It is not enough to explicate the definition of refugee and distinguish it from immigrant. That is only the beginning of unraveling the complexity of being a part of and apart from two societies, sharing two "cups of life " and yet being ever-marginal to both. To point only to die problems such marginality brings to all refugees and the endemic conditions that lead to estrangement does not and cannot reveal the qualitative differences that do exist in how people react to crises or what factors in their backgrounds serve to enhance or retard the ability to adapt to sudden changes in circumstances. We need more work on the natural history of the refugee process and a critical assessment of a number of political, economic, social and psychological variables. For example, how much do the reasons for and conditions of leave-taking have to do with how people individually and collectively respond to the upheaval of exile? What of their cultural values, the level and type of education, socioeconomic and political status, and linguistic facility in both their own and other languages? Friends are important, too; so, to reiterate, are contacts with outsiders: advocates, agencies, and those who provide direct care and succor. But, we must ask, in what way are they important? How can we measure success and failure, adjustment and maladjustment? The fact is that refugees, however lonely and afraid, do not live in a vacuum. They are part of an intricate sociopolitical web that must be seen as the background against which any portrait of their travails must be painted and any dissection of their innermost thoughts and feelings must be pinned. Moreover, both looks and outlooks, physiognamy and philosophy, may have much to do with how refugees are received by others. 12 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Nations vary markedly as to their policies regarding immigrants, guest workers, and refugees. This was brought to many peoples ' attention during the widely discussed debates over the plight of the masses who fled Southeast Asia following the collapse of Saigon and the genocidal actions of Pol Pot, and subsequent discussions about those leaving Afghanis tan in the wake of the Soviet invasion, Iran after the revolution, and Cuba and Haiti in the spring and summer of 1980. The controversies remind many Americans of the contradictions in our own policies and in the confusing cross-signals we have long given to our people as well as to others. American history is filled with good thoughts about how this land has always welcomed the oppressed peoples of the world. Each Thanksgiving we are reminded of how, in the words of a stirring cantata, A band of exiles moored their bark On the wild New England shore. We grew up learning to recite Emma Lazarus ' famous poem " The New Colossus", with its moving imagery, its words of welcome. Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. 'Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!' cries she With silent lips. 'Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddle masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!' 6 We know the lines but we also know that, in 1921, that golden door was closed and, three years later, all but sealed. Americans have long been ambivalent about providing a home to the homeless, a refuge to the dispossessed. Opposition has come from many quarters, including those Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab have called the " once hads " and the " never hads ". 7 The former group, many refer to them as nativists, have long seen the country as threatened by foreign peoples and alien ideas. Of late, these old nativists have been •'Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus", Poems, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1889, pp. 202-203. ^.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, pp. 23-24. REFUGEES AND THE DESCENDANTS OF THESEUS 13 joined by some who were once anathema to them, certain " white ethnics" troubled by what the entry of newer groups might portend. A more recent source of opposition is a neo-nativist faction made up of certain "never-had" nonwhite minority group members who object to what they see as a double standard that seems to be expressed in selective policies and resettlement practices, and to the concern that it is they who, more than others, will probably have to pay the price for refugee relief both through funds diverted to those more dramatic causes (like the processing and resettling of 168,000 Indochinese refugees and almost as many Cubans in a single year) and competition in the job market. Unlike the old nativists, the neo-nativists often make a clear distinction between refugees and immigrants. They know full well that refugees are, today, favored outsiders. It was not always so. While it is unnecessary to recount the legislative history here, it is significant to note that, until the post World War II era there were no separate statutes to deal with refugees as distinct from immigrants. The Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, which established quotas fixed on the percentages of people from certain countries already in the United States in 1910 and 1890, respectively, effectively cut off not only the immigration of many still attracted by the promise of American opportunities but many who were in flight from the harsh dictatorships that singled out one group after another for persecution. While several hundred thousand Nazi-victims did manage to find asylum in this country, including many of the leading figures in the arts and architecture, mathematics and physics, psychology and psychiatry, sociology and political theory, and literature, many more who could have been saved were doomed to die. It took many years and considerable pressure—some forced by ideological considerations, some by humanitarian fconcerns—to begin to alter the traditional stances and to define refugees as a separate category of migrants and to treat them as a special case. In view of American history which is so often recounted in terms of the contributions of outsiders to the richness of life, it is ironic that it was so long before Americans heeded the sentiments expressed by Antigone to her blind and exiled father as he stood before Theseus. Must we special-plead for a cause so fair? Can one whom mercy's touched then turn his back on mercy? 8 As noted previously, the King of Athens did not turn his back. Nor; finally, did Americans, althougn the early responses were rattier limited. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, op. cit., p. 137. 14 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW The first statutes to deal exclusively with refugees were the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. The former charged the refugees against existing quota allotments; the latter permitted them entry outside the quota limitations, setting a precedent that was to find expression in subsequent actions between 1953 and 1957. Toward the end of that period the Attorney General began to use the discretionary parole authority to bring in more refugees. And, finally, after many years and some minor modifications (as in the legislation of 1976 and 1978 making conditional entry available to large groups from Communist and Middle Eastern countries), the Refugee Assistance Act was successfully maneuvered through the Congress by Edward Kennedy and Peter Rodino and signed into law by President Carter in 1980. In a very real sense the Refugee Act of 1980 symbolized a watershed in American history. In the main a response to the crisis in Southeast Asia and to concern with mounting pressure from other quarters to admit persons fleeing unpopular regimes in different parts of the world, it is something more as well. For the first time since a policy explicitly for refugees began to be formulated, the emphasis appears to have moved beyond Cold War priorities. Definitions have been broadened and the legislation itself is couched in language that takes full cognizance of international standards as specified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Moreover, it has called for the development of mechanisms to deal with the special needs of different populations. While the new legislation is clearly addressed to bringing future action more in line with the rhetoric of rescue, many problems remain. Among them are those having to do with how to most effectively play the role of host to those from outside the society while doing justice to those who are disadvantaged within it; concern about emerging rivalries between lobbyists for different groups who are deeply involved in the special pleading for their real and putative family members (a problem that grows exponentially as more and more newcomers arrive from a particular place); and the dilemma of being faced with the situation of becoming a nation of first asylum for Cubans, Haitians and others. Each of these matters has become the subject of considerable debate, not only by the congressionally created Select Commission on Immigration and Refugees but in a series of conferences and meetings and position papers by those who are beginning to form a community of specialists in refugee affairs. That community is a complex network of "Harbor Masters" and other government officials (including those in the Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs), representatives of the various sectarian and secular volunteer agencies and others from the private sector, advocates for and sponsors of particular groups of refugees and potential refugees, counselors for undocumented aliens, civil rights and REFUGEES AND THE DESCENDANTS OF THESEUS 15 minority leaders, and a small corps of academicians, including those whose work is represented here. Recently many of the issues have crystalized as various groups have begun to review and reflect upon the experiences of the past several years (most particularly the Indochinese refugee program and the Cuban/Haitian situation). They have also examined the implications of a rapidly growing federal apparatus for resettlement housed in part in the Department of State and in the Department of Health and Human Services and the unprecedented demands placed upon the volunteer agencies, assessed the economic and social impact of new admission policies, and tried to get a sense of the meaning of the growing backlash from various quarters. While sharp disagreements about policies and priorities are to be found at all levels, the plight of those in flight from political persecution must not be neglected or pushed aside by those with other equally important but qualitatively different agendas. Instead, there must be greater communication among the various players in the refugee drama to develop and maintain a clear and just policy. In the play Oedipus at Colonnus, there also is a chorus in the background which mutters and groans and harps and warns and admonishes. But there the protagonists stood firm and acted decisively. The citizens of Athens, we are told, overcame their reluctance to welcome the stranger. And so, we know, have we. We will again, as Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs in 1979 and 1980, has suggested: Despite all the problems in our cities today, despite all the burdens that our communities are bearing with unemployment, inflation, housing and taxes, you should recall that the record of history is clear: Whenever we have helped others to come here and build a new life, whether it was the Irish in Boston long ago, or the Italians in New York City, or the Chinese in San Francisco, or the Cubans in Miami, there have always been those who would close the golden door, but afterwards we have always been able to say, 'By helping these people, we have helped ourselves'. Our role as a beacon of freedom in a darkening world is too precious a part of our tradition, too central to our strength as a free people, to allow it to weaken even in the hardest times. If we ever determine that the Statue of Liberty has become obsolete, we may find that we have become obsolete also. 9 Refugee Resettlement Resource Book, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1980, p. The UNHCR and Relief Operations A Changing Role This article briefly explores the changing role of the UNHCR and the requirements that must be met to make this role more effective. In any refugee relief situation, one agency should be designated as the primary operating agency, with responsibility for coordinating relief activities and ensuring that all refugees receive the basic, minimal level of assistance. If the host government does not assume this role, the organization generally looked to is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR traditionally operates by identifying operating partners with sufficient capability to deliver specific services and contracting with these agencies to provide the necessary services. In situations where the number of refugees involved is small and the capability and resources of the operating partner are adequate to meet the need, this arrangement is satisfactory. However, given the large numbers of refugees coming under the protection of the UNHCR in recent years, the usual arrangement is becoming strained. Furthermore, potential operating partners have varying degrees of skill and experience, and the resources available to each are vastly disparate. The scope of the refugee problem, and the sheer number of refugees involved, have severely taxed the capabilities of the international relief system, and perceived shortcomings on the part of some operating partners have necessitated changes in the role of the UNHCR and the way it operates in the field. At the present time, the UNHCR is actively involved in examining new possibilities and revising emergency response mechanisms to secure a higher standard of service for the refugees. ASPECTS OF THE COORDINATION ROLE The three primary tasks that must be carried out by any coordinator of relief operations include the responsibility to insure: 1) that all refugees have equal access to the services being offered; 2) that all refugees receive a basic, minimal standard of care and support while in refugee camps; and 16 IMP Volume 15 No. 1 Frederick C. Cuny THE UNHCR AND RELIEF OPERATIONS: A CHANGING ROLE 17 3) the coordination of the services offered by various operational partners (usually the international voluntary agencies), so as to guarantee that no gaps in services or levels of service occur. To accomplish these tasks, the UNHCR must assume a technical role beyond the traditional approach. In short, the UNHCR would take a more active part in developing mechanisms to ensure that the quality and level of services are adequate and uniform. To be effective, the UNHCR must assume an active posture within the relief operation. It must arrive early and promptly, and not only participate in the decisions that are made regarding the refugees, but also take an active role in formulating and guiding the overall policy framework to ensure that the objectives of the entire program are coordinated and properly conducted. The usual operational partners of the UNHCR are agencies and ministries of the host government, sister UN organizations (WFP, UNICEF, etc.) and the Red Cross and voluntary agencies. Only a host government can provide the same coordination and protection services as the UNHCR and assume the same technical role. In reality, however, it may not be possible for a government to provide these services due to political and economic conditions. Other UN organizations and voluntary agencies are essentially service organizations, each specializing in a certain range and level of services to be offered to the refugees. A majority of these organizations have the capability of providing only medical or nutritional services. Thus, a large gap may exist in the provision of basic management and community services within the refugee camps (such as the provision of water, sanitation, garbage collection, etc.) which must be filled by the UNHCR. There are four categories of services in each camp: camp site services (sanitation, shelter, etc.); feeding and nutrition; provision of social services; and distribution of personal goods and supplies. The development of case-specific uniform standards to regulate the provision of each of the services offered to the refugees is one of the most important and immediate tasks in a new refugee situation. Standards should reflect the basic minimum quantity, as well as the minimum acceptable quality, of the services or items being delivered. This is not to say that the standards should be restrictive or too inflexible to be adapted to the specific situation in each of the camps. Failure to develop and enforce uniform standards means not only that there will be unequal services among the camps, but also that even within the larger camps, refugees living in one section will receive a different level of services than those living in adjacent sections. A further problem is that many of the agencies working as operational partners of the UNHCR may have had little prior experience, either with 18 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees or with the particular services they are providing. It is discouraging to see programs emerging in the field of housing or nutrition and supplementary feeding that are duplicates of programs which have been ineffective in other relief operations. Thus, standards serve as a means of ensuring equal services and reducing the repetition of mistakes. The UNHCR should provide the information and, in some cases, the necessary training so that its operating partners can attain the standards that are set. Many of the services provided to refugees cannot be quantified in terms of standards. However, the UNHCR should set basic policies which will serve to guide the operating partners in establishing programs for the delivery of these services. For example, it would be difficult to set standards for self-help and economic development programs. However, basic policies can be set which delineate the limits of involvement and help frame the basic guidelines for each of the specific programs that fall under this heading. A final function is that of determining the limits of involvement of the operational partners. As noted earlier, the operational partners, especially the voluntary agencies, have varying degrees of capability. Due to the nature of the organizations, some will be able to provide services for a long period of time and others for only a limited period. Thus, to ensure that the level of services remains constant, the UNHCR should determine the agency's time commitment and the contributions the agency can make to the overall relief operation. This means that the UNHCR must develop a contract with each of the operating partners which spells out specifically the time period involved and the obligation of each party. The UNHCR should determine the capability of the organization to meet its obligations under the contract before entering into the agreement. This process will eliminate the possibility of surprises such as an agency running out of money and leaving at a critical point in the operation. Acceptance of this technical role will affect field office organization. To carry out its technical functions, the UNHCR should retain experienced personnel with technical backgrounds. For example, in the field of feeding and nutrition, a Nutrition Officer may be required to assure that standards are met in all the camps. Enforcement of these criteria may require some changes in the structure of the UNHCR operation. Thus, to ensure that supplementary feeding standards are met, it may be necessary to set up a centralized purchasing office to acquire the food needed. If the role as outlined above is accepted and the organization shifts from a passive to a more active role in relief operations, the UNHCR must provide technical support and training for the operational partners in addition to funds and coordination. THE UNHCR AND RELIEF OPERATIONS: A CHANGING ROLE 19 The implications of assuming the role outlined above are farreaching. The UNHCR becomes accountable for the status of the refugees both physically and emotionally within the camps. If hunger or malnutrition exist within a camp, if an epidemic breaks out which is attributable to sanitation or water systems or if refugees become apathetic or lethargic due to long periods of enforced inactivity, the UNHCR will accept responsibility. If the refugees are provided a safe and helpful environment, if malnutrition is eradicated and the refugees are provided with a minimum level of self-supporting economic endeavor, the UNHCR would share the accolades with its implementing partners. Obviously, each refugee situation is unique and requires a response tailored to meet specific needs. Reassessment of its role will enable the UNHCR to enter each emergency with clear operational objectives and an improved level of preparedness allowing for a wide variety of responses depending upon the situation. By taking a leading operational and technical role in the early stages of an emergency, the UNHCR can take a major step forward in improving overall coordination and cooperation in the field. Documentary Note Refugees: A New Approach When Poul Harthng, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, informed a January meeting of the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in Geneva that the amount required by his office to meet the General Program and Special Program costs was 550 million dollars for 1980, the listeners were stunned. When Dr. Hartling enumerated the areas of need and the numbers of refugees requiring help, the statistics were mind blowing. It became obvious that the business of dealing with the world ' s refugees had become big business with the costs increasing almost daily.1 There are those who contend that the main function of any international body concerned with refugees should be identification of the causes which produce refugee populations with an eye toward the elimination of these determinants. A study of the refugee world during the last two decades will show that this is easier said than done. A more realistic approach would entail an examination of the methods used to cope with the refugee situations which have arisen over the last 20-30 years. When a refugee situation occurs the responsibility of the international community is to provide care and maintenance for the people in flight. It is the contention of this article that a research group should be convened to examine the office of the UNHCR, and to determine the possible need for an additional organization to cope with the dilemma of international refugees. Little attention has been paid by the governments comprising the Executive Committee of the UNHCR to the impact that the swelling refugee population has had on that organization. The heavy financial requirements necessary to meet the refugee problems of today, and uncertainty as to the measures to be undertaken and the staff to be employed has led to some inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the agency. The serious nature of this problem warrants a new, enlightened approach. Discussions on the international level might be based on working papers developed on the following fixed agenda items. 1) Historical and analytical reviews of major refugee problems occur-Statement by the High Commissioner, UNHCR Executive Committee, January 28, 1980. 20 IMR Volume 15 No. 1 John F. Thomas REFUGEES: A NEW APPROACH 21 ring over the past two decades. This could include an assessment of the initial handling, methods of financing, and the ensuing results; 2) A review of the roles of the effectiveness of the work of bodies such as: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LI CROSS), International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and National Governmental Agencies (NGA); 3) A review of current refugee problems and current approaches towards solutions, including a delineation of responsibilities of those agencies that might be involved; 4) Consideration of the creation of a new overall coordinating body or the realignment of current agency responsibilities, or a combination of both; and 5) Establishment of a new financial base for international refugee work. The responsibility for convening such a discussion/study group rests with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Responsibility for detailed preparations could be delegated to the Secretariat of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. A governmental steering committee might be selected from representatives of some of the governments on the UNHCR Executive Committee. CURRENT PROCESSES It might be of interest at this juncture to cast a glance at the normal management approaches to refugee movements of the past. 1) The control of refugee influxes: a) initial provision of care and maintenance; b) analysis of individual and family needs including counseling; and c) action: repatriation, local settlement, resettlement outside the country of first asylum; 2) The financing of the operations: a) on the part of the host country; and b) on the part of the international community. In the international management of current refugee situations some questions have been raised as to whether or not the UNHCR has strayed too far from its original mandate: legal and political protection. It is most important that a United Nations Representative be present wherever the rights of an individual requesting political asylum are being determined. Too often this decision so vital to the person in flight is left to (he 22 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW judgment of the country whose border has been crossed. In addition there are groups whose status as refugees remains questionable, such as de facto refugees and so-called "economic " refugees. Since the numbers of persons involved are sizeable and the human suffering intense, the UNHCR might employ more of its energies in the direction of clarifying these matters. Any study of the management of refugee problems must focus on the question of finances. Whenever a heavy outflow of refugees occurs, i.e., the Hungarian flow into Austria and Yugoslavia (1956), Cuban refugees into the United States (1959 ff. and 1980), Jews out of the Soviet Union (1971 ff.), there is generally a great deal of emotion involved in the host countries. Fortunately the general reactions of the public are responsive to the humanitarian elements. Thus, during the early stages the refugees are welcomed. After, however, if there is not an immediate out-movement of the refugees, signs of resistance begin among the indigenous. While these feelings may be stirred by the difference in cultural characteristics or fear of competition for jobs, the main question arises: who is going to maintain these people? Fortunately, in western oriented countries the governments have generally been responsive to the need for financial support for care and maintenance. International organizations such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, EEC, are among those that have responded to appeals for assistance. Nongovernmental agencies such as the ICRC, LICROSS and the local branches of the international voluntary agencies have contributed to meet the costs of this phase of the refugee situation. But, here again, there is a lack of coordinated efforts. Because of the characteristics of most refugee influxes it is not believed that much can be done to change the initial management approaches currently utilized. The speed with which such eruptions of population occur, the pathos and hysteria usually accompanying the exodus, the political or religious components involved, all tend to defy advance planning. However it is believed that some unit within the UN family might be given the responsibility of early coordination of relief efforts similar to those placed on the UN disaster relief agency. There needs to be an early definition of terms and a quick allocation of agency responsibilities. To this extent some forward planning can be done. To reach such conclusions in international refugee management should be one of the targets for the study group advocated in this article. It is crucial that from the start all elements involved in a refugee crisis be fully aware of the nature of the movement and be ready to meet the psychological needs of those on the move. The sooner the victims of mass movements are made aware of an international response in their favor the less deleterious the psychological effect will be. REFUGEES: A NEW APPROACH 23 Financially, UNHCR has been burdened over the years with the obligation to raise ever increasing amounts of funds to meet the costs of the projects of this office. The responsibility for financing refugee programs has fallen on the shoulders of only a few countries. A cursory examination of the budget for 1979 of the UNHCR 2 shows that, although some 86 countries contributed to the office, the greater load fell on a handful of governments. Many of the 153 countries holding membership in the United Nations did not even make a token contribution to refugee work. This aspect cries for re-examination and re-assessment. The principle of universal financing of refugee work is a just principle. Nations that join the UN are expected to pay their dues. Not all benefits deriving from UN efforts should be devoted to political and economic items. Humanitarian programs should be granted high priority when governments build their annual budgets. The important tasks of the UNHCR might be better served if that office were relieved of the chore of raising funds to meet every emergency caused by the sudden outflow of population. Perhaps it might be well to separate these responsibilities in line with a) General Programs, and b) Special or Emergency Programs. In doing so the financial responsibility of the UNHCR could be limited to funding only the General Program items. This would be in keeping with the original mandate of the office, a) legal and political protection; b) supplementary support to the country of first asylum; c) technical advice and assistance in the development of projects for " sur place" resettlement. 3 The cost of services furnished under the General Program could be met through the normal UNHCR budget process as authorized by the UN General Assembly. In the face of burgeoning financial requirements in the refugee field the international community should take a close look at a new approach to current budgeting methods. 4 Note should be taken of recent developments within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Negotiations Conference on a Common Fund Under the Integrated Program for Commodities. It can be argued that the principles underlying the UNCTAD Common Fund type of financing might be ^N Economic and Social Council E/1979/75 May 16, 1979. 3 Care in the future should be taken to place this economic responsibility in the hands of existing development agencies thus removing this load from the refugee programs. 4 Government supported agencies should stay out of the raising of funds from the private sector. At best such fund raising projects are for public relations activities as their value to the overall financing of a governmental agency is limited. The private sector as a source of funds for refugee work should be the domain of the private, nongovernmental agencies such as LICROSS and the international voluntary agencies. In the establishment and support of governmental agencies the responsibility for financing should be left with the governments alone. The ICM Council adopted a resolution in 1970 to this effect. ICM Council Resolution 455 (XXXI) 2/12/69. 24 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW duplicated for refugee programs. The attraction of a common fund approach is that it provides for universal participation in financing programs of a humanitarian nature, the solution of which is seen by all governments to be desirable. This approach (and the terminology would certainly differ in many instances from that utilized by UNCTAD) would call for the payment by all member governments based on a scale devised to meet the needs. Factors such as a) capacity to pay, b) extent of involvement in refugee problems and c) actual utilization of the agency 's services might be among the established criteria for the scale of contributions. The initial contributions (similar to UNCTAD ' s Directly Contributed Capital) could be the basis for financing the present UNHCR Special Programs as well as those elements of the ICM program related to its participation in the Special Program activities. The establishment of such a fund, replenishable by further assessed contributions, would eliminate the present "crisis " approach that causes the UNHCR to launch one appeal after another with hardly time for the ink to have dried on the previous appeal. 5 As most of the refugee outflows come with little warning and are in the nature of emergencies, there is much time lost with ensuing human suffering before forces can be brought to bear. Once the emergency is recognized more time is lost with the gearing up of those governmental agencies prepared to launch resettlement programs. This is mainly a financial problem. The existence of a common fund in the 500 million dollar range which would be readily available to finance programs would do wonders in the alleviation of the misery that comes with each exodus. It is not anticipated that such a new approach would be promptly embraced. Much work will have to be done within the UN conference halls to win approval. The point here is to offer some guidelines for action. The establishment ot^a new internation al agency is not a proposal that will find immediate acceptance. There are some drawbacks. Even in the hands of the mp^t well-meaning persons in ternational agencies tend to grow rapidly and often political and personality factors negate the good intent of the founding fathers. Yet such an agency serving in a coordinat-^he Fund for curable Solutions as incorporated in the UNHCR 1 980 budget is a step in the right direction but it calls for far too little and is devised to meet the costs of only a limited part of the overall requirements. At times the UNHCR might use its good offices to appeal for resettlement opportunities or to negotiate for the repatriation rights for individuals desiring to take this route but all operational aspects in the movement of people should rest with other international agencies competent to meet (his responsibility as extensions of already existing programs in their charge. Resettlement processing and transportation aspects might be left with ICM, as an example. REFUGEES: A NEW APPROACH 25 ing role might be the answer to the management question in the refugee field. The distribution of capital, both monetary and human, needs to be carried out multilaterally. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the International Monetary Fund have been trying for years to achieve a higher outflow of grants and loans at low interest rates for development aid. It is clear that the need for such aid far outweighs the possibilities of providing it, until there is a redistribution of the material wealth of the world. 6 Tohn F.Thomas, 1971 The Political Refugee: 35 Years Later This article describes the human and socioeconomic aspects of the political refugee problem before and after World War II, and explains the facts which caused the flows of forced migrations throughout the world. The twentieth century has been called the "century of the homeless man". The number of persons permanently displaced for political reasons as a result of wars, treaties or sometimes obscure reason is startling. Excluding the forced migrations of the Chinese in the 1930s, by 1939 approximately thirty million people were forced to leave their homes. During World War II nearly forty million civilians were forced from one place to another, and since 1945 an additional 60 to 70 million people have become victims of forced migrations. More than one hundred million have been uprooted in the first eighty years of the twentieth century—millions permanently displaced as a result of revolutions, division of countries, annexations or boundary changes and other territorial arrangements. The political refugee has become the symbol of worldwide political and social change (Rees, 1959). Throughout history the significance of large-scale expulsions for political or religious reasons has often been ignored. The expulsion of entire minority groups, regardless of the religious or political beliefs, can be considered cases of political persecution when the expelled minority is hostile to the belief system of the dominant group. The largely involuntary dislocation of nearly one hundred million people since the Russian Revolution demonstrates that internal strife within a"civilization " and aggression by "barbarians " from beyond the pale have become powerful forces of migration (Heberle, 1956). Dramatic consequences result for both the expelling countries and the countries giving asylum and permanent settlement (Bender, 1970). Since World War I at least seventy million persons have had to move as a result of political, military or ideological dispute and today they can no longer be looked upon as displaced persons or as refugees in the narrower sense, but as political emigrants (Wander, 1951). Political refugees are one of the main problems for the international community of the twentieth century, especially in regard to "psychological refugee-ism" (Flaschberger, 1962; Weinberg, 1961; Ex, 1966). 26 IMR Volume 15 No. 1 Gunther Beyer THE POLITICAL REFUGEE: 35 YEARS LATER 27 What comprises the definition of a political refugee varies. "International refugee " usually applies to individuals who have left the homeland under pressures that may be political, social, economic or religious in nature. Whether such flight is deemed voluntary or involuntary is considered a matter of personal perception (David, 1969). For the endless flows of political refugees, freedom of movement, as it is embodied in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is fundamental. The disregard of human rights by certain governments resulting in the persecution of innocent people or of those resisting oppression has underscored the importance of flight and asylum as an ultimate human right (Grahl-Madsen, 1972). The very existence of refugee problems is a result of the fact that human rights are not observed everywhere, and efforts for the international protection of human rights have met with only limited success (Besterman; Gusy, 1980; Weiss, 1972). According to existing national and international legal norms, the definition of international political refugees is two-fold: 1) they are persons or categories of persons who have left the territory of the state of which they are nationals; and 2) they become refugees as a result of their relationship with the existing government (ruling class). National refugees are defined as people fleeing under pressure of persecution from one part of a nation state to another in search of protection under national legal norms. According to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article I: A refugee is an individual who 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, memberships of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it'. For the social scientists the emphasis is quite different. The legal status is but one important element to be considered. The social scientist is interested in learning how the refugee will alter the structure of the indigenous population, the extent to which the refugee can and is willing to be assimilated, and the effect the refugee may have on the labor market or political stability of a country. Through their experience and knowledge, sociologists, economists, and social psychologists can help moderate the impact of forced population movements. Surveys which report movements of persons or groups since 1912 contain a vast margin for error. The definition of refugee is but one of the many variables affecting the statistical validity of these surveys. Counting 28 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW heads in a dynamic situation of crisis is always difficult and it is probably wise to assume that even the most conservative estimates are inflated (Rees, 1959). Before and following World War I, large numbers of refugees from the Russian and Ottoman empires moved to Central and Western Europe and Asia (Shanghai). After the Balkan wars (1912-1914), the involuntary transfer of ethnic minority groups in that region began: 250,000 Bulgarians from Romania, Serbia and Greece; 50,000 Greeks from Bulgaria and 1,200,000 from Turkey; and, as a result of renewed fighting, continued into the early twenties. In 1955 many of these refugees were still living in camps in Greece—35 years later. In that same period (1922-1924) about 400,000 Turkish Moslems were transferred from Greece to Turkey. The population transfers based on the treaties of Versailles resulted in the expulsion of some 200,000 Hungarians from Romania, of 20,000 ethnic Serbs from Hungary and the Assyrians from Turkey. The resurrection of Poland allowed the voluntary return of some 570,000 Poles from Siberia, France and the then Republic of Germany. The loss of parts of the eastern provinces of Germany, of Alsace-Lorraine and Eupen-Malmedy in the West forced about 1,050,000 ethnic Germans to cross the new frontiers into the Republic of Germany. The revolution and civil war in Russia (1917-1923) created the first large group of international refugees. Over 1,500,000 Russians escaped persecution and saved their lives and personal freedom by fleeing to Central and West Europe and to China. After the creation of the Baltic States, some other ethnic Germans, 25,000 from Estonia and Latvia became homeless, most of them also sought refuge in the Republic of Germany. Another result of the Russian revolution was the expulsion of about 350,000 Assyrians, Greeks, Turks and other minority groups from their traditional homes in the southern parts of Russia. They found asylum in Turkey, Greece and some other countries. In the same period the Turks forced hundreds of thousands of Armenians into flight by the massacres of hundreds of thousands; they found refuge in the Armenian Soviet Republic and in several countries of the Middle East. During the years 1923-1939 large new groups of international refugees were formed as a result of racial, religious and political persecution. Fascism forced 200,000 Italians to leave their country, and about 450,000 Germans fled Nazi Germany, both groups seeking protection and sustenance in Western Europe, North and Latin America. Several thousands of them went to Palestine. In the same period, religious persecution resulted in the involuntary migration of about 10,000 Mennonites from the Soviet Union to Canada and Latin America (Paraguay). As an aftermath of the Spanish civil war 300,000 Spaniards sought refuge in France and in Central and Latin America. Since 1945 the flow of refugees has increased rapidly. Of the total six THE POLITICAL REFUGEE: 35 YEARS LATER 29 million victims of the concentration and destruction camps of Nazism, thousands could be repatriated and some found protection in countries of asylum. Of the 9,500,000 slave laborers of the Third Reich, some 1,050,000 were not repatriable. These refugees were resettled with the help of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and later the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and, last but not least . The Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in the United States (330,000), Canada (125,000), Australia and New Zealand (180,000) Israel (140,000) and in liberated European countries (270,000). About 600,000 ethnic Germans and thousands of refugees from European countries, not willing to be repatriated, found asylum in Austria. In Finland 300,000 to 400,000 Karelians had to be resettled twice—in 1939 and 1945 after the wars with the Soviet Union (Gadolin, 1952). The geographical changes of the boundaries in eastern Poland resulted in the transfer of some million Poles to central and western Poland (Daric, 1945). As a consequence of these transfers from the East to the West, about 500,000 Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians had to cross the frontier of East Poland into the Soviet Union. Nine million or more national and ethnic Germans were expelled to the divided Germany from the eastern provinces of Germany, from parts of Poland, east Prussia and part of the USSR, other eastern European countries occupied by the Soviets, as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. German minorities, amounting to almost 3,500,000 people were also forced to leave Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Many of them found new homes in Austria. The national German refugees were excluded from assistance organized by the big international governmental organizations, and also from the help of the UNHCR after the creation of this international organization. Thanks to the initiative of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Austria, the absorption and integration of these millions was possible. The financial aid given by the United States greatly contributed to favorable resettlement. There are still many international refugees in Europe. In 1980 according to the report of the UNHCR the number of refugees in Europe is estimated at 500,000. This increase is partly the result of asylum seekers from various parts of Europe but mainly due to the admission of refugees under UNHCR auspices from other parts of the world (Council of Europe). The available data on refugees in the Far East, South and Middle East is not reliable. In 1947 the creation of two separate states, India and Pakistan, was followed by an exodus of about 8,500,000 Hindustani and Sikhs from Pakistan to India, and 6,500,000 Moslems to Pakistan. Many of these transferred people remained landless and homeless decades after 30 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW the exodus. The flight of over 50,000 Tibetans resulted in dispersion and resettlement in various countries around the world. The wars in Korea and in Vietnam, the independence of East Pakistan transformed into Bangladesh, the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, the exodus after armistice and peace in South Vietnam have resulted in countless numbers of refugees. The Boat People and the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kampuchea, many still waiting in camps for resettlement, have received wide publicity and are recognized as a special concern of the international organizations. In Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries there were in the first month of 1980 about 150,000 Kampucheans and about 280,000 Indochinese refugees (ICM, 1980). The problem of international tensions arising as a result of the Kampuchean refugees is complicated by their presence in sizeable groups along the Thai-Kampuchean border. These groups fluctuate considerably in number and tend to respond to various pressures by moving in and out of Thai territory. Indonesia received a great influx of Boat People asking for first asylum while waiting for resettlement on the Galang Islands. The Boat People also found first asylum in Hong Kong, Macau, the Philippines and Japan. Malaysia admitted in 1979 about 70,000 Indochinese refugees from Vietnam for temporary asylum; permanent resettlement was provided for 32,000. Like the exodus to the south or the open seas from Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, the exodus from Vietnam into China started as a trickle in the spring of 1977; one year later in May and June 1978 it reached its climax. At that time up to 10,000 persons were crossing the border each day, and by the end of the summer of 1979 some 260,000 refugees from Vietnam had sought asylum in China; 220,000 of them were of ethnic Chinese origin. According to official statistics the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had risen by May 1980 to some 1.4 million persons. Of these refugees 1.1 million are concentrated in camps or shanty towns in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. Afghan refugees asking for resettlement are generally highly educated. They have left behind them everything they owned except their Islamic faith and the strong family bonds on which they rely. Since 1948 the refugee problem in the Middle East has been widely publicized. The Palestinian refugees influence political issues more profoundly than any other refugee group. Many of the Palestinians have been born in the countries of asylum, but are unwilling to integrate. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East, figures show that there are approximately two million Palestinian refugees, 220,000 in Lebanon, 203,000 in Syria, 700,000 in Jordan and, since 1967, 680,000 in the Gaza Strip and West THE POLITICAL REFUGEE: 35 YEARS LATER 31 Bank territories occupied by Israel. Lebanon was the first country of asylum not only for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians but, since 1918, for many Assyrians. In Lebanon the number of non-Palestinian refugees has recently risen as a result of the 2,900 Ethiopian refugees from Eritrea. Finally, the Middle East refugee problem has to include the approximately 400,000 Jews who have been forced to leave their traditional homes in Iraq, the Yemens and some North African Moslem States (Birks, 1980). It is in Africa where the international community is confronted with the most complex challenge and to which it has to devote a major share of its social and economic resources. The flow of refugees in Africa became an acute problem in the 1960s, coinciding with the struggle for an attainment of independence by most African States. The process of decolonization brought new and powerful political forces into play and released forces which had been checked or suppressed during the colonial period. Since 1963 the young African States and the Organization of African Unity have spent a considerable amount of their energy on refugee issues, a consequence of the Nigerian civil war, the Eritrean independence movement, the recessionists in the South of Sudan and many other disputes between states and ethnic minorities (Aiboni, 1978). Until the revolution in Ethiopia and the Ugandan civil war, the problems of the permanent refugee were more or less related to political opposition against " apartheid " in the Republic of South Africa and in some former colonies such as Namibia. A smaller group were the refugees of racial and ethnic minorities like the Hindustani and Pakistani in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda who were forced by legislation to leave their countries for resettlement elsewhere. In the colonial period the scramble for territory in Africa and the trend which led to the partition of the continent in many cases disregarded ethnological, tribal or national considerations, resulting in boundary conflicts that produced displaced persons throughout Africa. The emergence of new nations in Africa has led elements of the autochthonous population who, fearing for their safety, sought refuge in neighboring countries. Liberation wars resulted in steady streams of temporary refugees in need of temporary asylum. Most of the flights were symptomatic of and inseparable from nation-building problems. The struggle of African people in South Africa also produced its share of refugees. In 1974 it was estimated that " nearly one and a half million persons have become temporary to permanent refugees in Africa " (Aiboni, 1978) However, in the seventies the Ethiopian and Somalian conflicts as well as the conflicts in Uganda and the West of the Sahara inflated the numbers of refugees to about 2.5 to 3 million or more, a significant increase by 1980. The African continent harbors the largest number of refugees in the world. As 32 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW statistical data show, the total number of refugees in the post independence period continues to swell. Temporary political refugee groups continue to comprise the bulk of the African refugee population. At both national and local levels the African countries of asylum, all of which fall into the category of developing countries, have proved remarkably generous in their response to refugee influxes. Unfortunately, national resources are wholly inadequate to deal with the large-scale refugee needs (Holborn, 1975). Here the international community must help. It is clear that the developing countries are feeling the socioeconomic and political strains caused by the presence of large numbers of refugees, who are competing with the national population for the same basic resources. Until recently the refugees in Africa received little international attention when compared with refugees from other areas of the world, primarily because of Africa's traditional policy of hospitality throughout the continent. In general it can be said that the African refugee groups have proved to be different from those in other parts of the world in size as well as in character and needs. In Europe decisions on eligibility were usually made on an individual basis whereas in Africa it has generally been necessary to deal with refugees "collectively " or en bloc. Refugee status has been extended to those persons who are neither recognized by countries of asylum nor qualified according to the mandate of the UNHCR. Since its inception the Organization of African Unity has taken a keen interest in refugee questions and has created both administrative machinery and legal instruments to affect the position of refugees. The OAU Convention of September 10, 1969, reviewing the specific aspects of the refugee problems in Africa, issued the first legal document in Africa to cover the intricate legal questions of asylum, travel documents and activities (Holborn, 1975). This is the first internationally accepted agreement which issues absolute and unqualified requirements stipulating that no refugee shall be subjected to measures, such as rejection at the frontier, which might compel him to return or remain in a territory where life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened. In Latin America the total refugee population has been estimated at some 110,000 owing to the many temporary political refugees returned to their homelands (e.g., Nicaragua). In other parts of Latin American relatively small numbers of refugees were admitted in transit (e.g., from Chile). The hard core of European refugees in Latin America was estimated at about 28,500 persons. In the decades after 1956 it became necessary to pay more attention to the Caribbean region where the phenomenon of political refugees increased. Approximately 650,000 Cubans fleeing from Castro' s regime after 1959 entered the United States followed by another wave of 125,000 in THE POLITICAL REFUGEE: 35 YEARS LATER 33 1980 (Warren, 1980). In April 1980 thousands of Cubans rushed into the Peruvian Embassy seeking asylum and the refugee drama ended weeks later as the last boats of the Freedom Flotilla arrived in Key West. In those weeks the Flotilla managed to bring more than 100,000 refugees or one percent of the Cuban population. Since 1972 thousands of Haitians have been fleeing from the tyranny of the Duvaliers. These Haitian boat people deserve asylum as do those from Vietnam (Fitzroy, 1980). CONCLUSIONS In this article an attempt has been made to prepare a rough summary of the refugee problem in the twentieth century. Questions remain about "new nomadism " as the central and crucial problem for the international community. The tremendous population shifts effected after the many wars in the twentieth century seem to have the common purpose of sorting out ethnic groups. Also in recent years the exodus of population took place under politico-military pressure and is, as in the years immediately after World War II, characterized by its completeness and massiveness—a forced migration started without hope or illusions. It seems that the national and international refugee problems have, in the main, the same political background. In many cases one will find that the expulsion was systematically organized by agreements, and resulted in the case of the national refugee in resettlement; on the other hand one sees clearly that the refugee is used to create internal or international tensions in the country of asylum and especially in border regions. The refugees and expellees in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe influence the entire complex of peoples and nations. Assistance, therefore, should not only be directed toward emergency relief but be designed to encourage continuous integration and to facilitate assimilation when repatriation is not feasible. However, in contradiction to the foregoing, a political solution that would permit repatriation of the refugees is seen as the ultimate goal, and implementation of the humanitarian relief programs have been from the beginning inextricably intertwined with the complex political and military situation. That repatriation may be a possible solution is shown by Latin America and Africa where refugee situations are often resolved in that manner. The refugee problem is often viewed as a matter of charity—of helping the children, the weak and the aged. Basically, it is of the utmost importance to realize that serious dangers and great potential benefits are counterpoised in this huge integration process and that they can only balance each other without risk of social collapse when there is a rapid 34 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW expansion of the entire economy. The measures adopted to deliver aid are often haphazard in nature. There was and is sometimes too much improvisation lacking sufficient insight into the state of affairs. While governments have practiced remarkable international cooperation, they make loud proclamations about human rights while ignoring the existing laws and regulations as they are anxious to avoid obligations or are unwilling to provide the essential assistance to the refugees. Not much can be said and even less is known about massive crimes against humanity, but the disregard for human rights must be clearly marked. All countries adopt measures to enlarge the sources for help to political refugees in their everyday life. A careful review of existing laws and regulations should be undertaken with the aim of reducing the limitations, secrecy provisions, and other constraints in the national acceptance of refugees. In areas where reasonable restrictions may be considered necessary, these should be provided by national law, subject to judicial review and in line with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants and other instruments adopted by the Community of Nations relating to human rights and freedom of movement. Since 1951 the cooperation between the office of UNHCR, the UNRWA, governmental, intergovernmental and private agencies appears to be a useful way to consider international refugee problems in relation to permanent settlement and/or repatriation. Such cooperation can facilitate regulations on an enlarged scale. It appears that the refugee problem is a continuing drama, as never before have there been more refugees in need than today. May it be that the race with time and the rising number of refugees can be won, and that the necessary equilibrium of the populations in the countries of permanent resettlement can be kept, and that the international community will not be faced with international tensions and the danger of a choice between peace and war. Refugees and International Cooperation This article explores three ways in which to solve a refugee problem: voluntary repatriation; integration in the country of refuge; and resettlement in a third country. The two latter cases both presuppose that asylum is granted. Over the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the number of refugees around the world. Systematically, the international community has failed to respond, offering neither asylum nor financial assistance. Concomitantly an imbalance has evolved among the various categories of refugees. As such, for some refugees it has become easier to find a solution, while in other situations the refugees seem to have become more or less forgotten. THE GRANTING OF ASYLUM In international law, while a state has the right to grant asylum, there is no corresponding right of an individual to be granted asylum. In Africa this situation has been somewhat improved by the inclusion in the 1969 (Organization for African Unity) Refugee Convention of an obligation for contracting states to "use their best endeavors consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality ". A similar provision has been suggested in the United Nations Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum.1 While this is certainly far from an individual right to be granted asylum, and some argue such a right still belongs to the moral sphere, some progress has been made in the direction of strengthening the individual ' s right to asylum.2 On the other hand, the principle of non-re foulement is similarly wellestablished, 3 and it appears that there is an increasing tendency toward ^N Doc. A/CONF. 78/12. 2 Cf. Grahl-Madsen, Op.cit., p. 43. 3 In treaty law the rule has been expressed in the 1951 Refugee Convention (article 33), and in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (article II, paragraph 3). IMR Volume 15 No. 1 35 Croran Melander 36 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW the recognition of the principle of non-re foulement as part of international law. 4 Consequently, a country is not obliged to grant asylum, but it might be prohibited to return an asylee or refugee to a country in which there would be a well-founded fear of persecution. From a legal point of view, then, the refugee has been placed in a political non-status. In most cases it is considered that it is the so-called country of first asylum which is responsible for the refugee. 5 Yet, there is no generally accepted definition of this term. Normally, it connotes the first country in which the refugee is physically present after flight, i.e., the first country in which he or she could have requested asylum.6 On some occasions the country of first asylum has, for various reasons, refused to grant asylum. When this situation is at stake it is necessary to find another country willing to admit the refugee for resettlement. Since World War II, this secondary form of refugee migration has occurred either when the country of first asylum has been faced with an "excessive " influx of refugees, or when the refugee, for individual reasons, cannot be granted or continue to be granted asylum. Refugee migration in "excessive " influx situations occurs on an ad hoc basis, i.e., the international community is prepared to admit refugees from one country of asylum, only when it is apparent that this country is either unwilling or unable to continue to grant asylum. However, there are no clear or internationally agreed upon criteria by which an excessive burden may be determined. As such, many African states are faced with a considerable number of so-called urban refugees who in most cases cannot find a decent way of life on that continent. Yet, this is not considered to be an "excessive " influx situation. In a few cases countries have decided on annual quotas for the admission of refugees. These quotas are largely determined on an annual basis without reference to the actual need for migration. They are usually limited to refugees from certain areas (for instance. Southeast Asia), so that refugees from other areas, such as Africa, might be disqualified for migration. A number of criteria also must be met before countries are willing to ^^Weis, "Recent Development in the Law of Territorial Asylum", Human Rights J ournal, 1968, p. 391. 5 There is a tendency to get away from this concept of country of first asylum by making use of the term "country of temporary refuge". The reasoning behind this new terminology is that the country of temporary refugee shall have no more responsibility than other countries for the granting of asylum. ^he consequences of the lack of a uniform definition of the term "country of first asylum" sometimes leads to a situation which has been referred to as "Refugees in orbit". See, Melander, Refugees in Orbit, Geneva 1978. REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 37 relieve the country of first asylum. A critical factor is the actual number of the refugee population. This certainly varies from case to case and from country to country. After the incidents in Hungary some 200,000 refugees suddenly asked for asylum in neighboring countries and were accepted in countries of second asylum. However, this number of refugees is, in view of recent experiences on other continents, not an overwhelming figure. A common argument for refugee migration is that it is impossible for the country of first asylum to take care of the refugees. This argument has been put forth in all situations where refugees have been moved to another country. Another key factor is the attitude toward the refugees in the country of first asylum. If and when a country refuses to accept the refugees and when it tries to make conditions as hard as possible for them the international community is usually more willing to accept refugees for resettlement. Assumptions concerning the eventual success of a refugee migration are also considered and taken into account. This aspect has been used as an excuse to refuse admittance to African refugees who have been told to find their future within Africa. The political reasons for becoming a refugee are also important. After the incidents in Hungary in 1956 Western European States engaged in a virtual competition for these refugees. Yet, refugees from rightwing dictatorships in Latin America have notorious difficulties in finding a country of second asylum in Western Europe. Cultural and racial prejudices periodically hinder refugee migration. In spite of the fact that Europe has " exported " a considerable number of refugees to Latin America and to Africa, European countries have been most reluctant to admit refugees for resettlement when these continents have been faced with a mass influx situation and where migration schemes might be necessary. The problem of creating a machinery for mass migration of refugees has received little attention. As stated before, it has, however, found its solution in Western Europe through the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), so far as refugees from Eastern Europe are concerned. In Africa the Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR) was created to achieve burden-sharing between African states by way of refugee migration. However, for various reasons the BPEAR has not been effective and the number of resettled refugees are few. A proposal to achieve burden-sharing of refugees was constructed by Grahl-Madsen in 1965. 7 This system suggests that the industrialized ^rahl-Madsen, "Plan for Distribution of Asylum Seekers", Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret 35 (1965), p. 175 ff. 38 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW countries should accept the responsibility of admitting refugees according to a certain quota based on the population of the country and the Gross National Product. Another method to achieve burden-sharing was used in 1979, when the Secretary General of the United Nations convened a meeting on the Indochinese refugee question. Similar meetings have been organized by the UNHCR before and after the Geneva meeting. This has turned out to be a fruitful exercise when a considerable number of delegates sit together, discussing a specific refugee problem and its solution. Similar consultations to discuss other refugee problems could be convened with a broader participation than the present UNHCR Executive Committee. Distinct from the mass migration of excessive numbers of refugees are cases where refugees, for various reasons, must be moved to a country of second asylum. Sometimes the person is mentally or physically handicapped and will have better possibilities for resettlement in another state. In other cases political reasons will motivate the migration of refugees to a second country of asylum. Some machinery exists for processing cases of this kind, but it works slowly and with difficulty. The various Branch Offices of UNHCR are the implementing organs which try to find countries of resettlement, normally on another continent. A weak point connected with the present system is the lack of information: the receiving states do not know what measures have been taken by other states, and they are jealously watching each other to make sure that the burden of these refugees is equally shared. For these cases it might be possible to create something of a quota system. An agreement may be concluded between the UNHCR and a number of states, according to which each country agrees to admit refugees assigned by the UNHCR. However as the number of refugees requiring resettlement is reduced, probably not more than some 200 individuals every year, the quota for each country should be lowered. In accordance with such a system the UNHCR would make a quick decision and decide in which country a refugee should be settled. ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES The granting of asylum sometimes implies financial contributions from other states, especially when the refugees have found shelter in a developing country. Accordingly, an important task for the international bodies responsible for refugees has been to coordinate assistance to them. In this respect the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR notes: REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 39 The High Commissioner shall administer any funds, public or private, which he receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute them among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he deems best qualified to administer such assistance. 8 There are reasons to suspect that assistance to refugees is not equally distributed. Presently, the refugees in Europe and in Southeast Asia are getting the greater part of available resources, while there are numerous refugees, especially in Africa, who have received little assistance. Table 1 shows the total UNHCR expenditure in a number of countries, the estimated number of refugees (mid-1979), and the expenditures per capita. Certainly it is difficult to compare the conditions and the costs in various (countries of asylum. Similarly, direct and bilateral assistance is not accounted for and the degree of self-sufficience varies among refugee populations as well as the cost of living. The Table also does not reflect the proportion of urban and rural refugees in a country of asylum, and all calculations here are based upon information reported by the Office of the UNHCR.9 The differences in international assistance to the refugees are significant. For instance, the refugee situations in Djibouti and in Somalia have the same causes, thk refugee population has equal origin and in both countries the refugees are mostly rural people. However, in Djibouti UNHCR assistance amounts to US $1,062 per capita, while the corresponding figure in Somalia is only US $161. The refugees in Tanzania arrived in the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s. Assistance is focused on organized rural settlements, and a great TABLE 1 ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES PER CAPITA Estimated Country of Expenditures Number of Expenditures Asylum in 1979 Refugees Per Capita Djibouti 1,698,700 16,000 1,062 Malaysia 35,636,800 172,000 2,072 Mozambique 5,374,800 120,000 448 Somalia 3,547,500 220,000 161 Sudan 3,744,300 330,000 113 Tanzania 4,085,800 160,000 255 SGA Res. 428 (V) of 14 December 1950. SUN Doc. A/AC. 96/564. 40 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW number of the refugees in the old settlements are self-sufficient. Assistance per capita in Tanzania is US $255. Refugee assistance to Malaysia resembles the assistance to Somalia in that for both emergency assistance is at stake. One striking difference, however, is that in Malaysia assistance is not needed the whole year, as refugees are transferred to other states; a considerable part of the expenditure has, however, been used for transportation. The comparison gives the impression that refugees in a few countries are receiving far too little international assistance. This explains the almost desperate appeals from the Somali government to make the international community aware of the serious situation in the country. Yet, in spite of all efforts, the response has so far been half-hearted and the situation for these refugees remains precarious. As a result, a unique step was taken by the Sudanese government to declare 1980 "The Year of the Refugee in Sudan " and arrange an international refugee conference in June 1980. The office of the UNHCR has continued to persevere in its efforts to find means for a more equitable distribution among the world ' s refugee population. The office has appealed to the international community to raise funds for refugee assistance, some of which goes to refugees in Africa. The traditional donor agencies seem, however, to be more interested in assisting the " popular " and more spectacular refugee situations. It is difficult to understand the motives for this policy. One explanation might be found in the causes for a refugee problem. Interest is easily generated when the reasons for the refugee ' s plight can be attributed to the activities of the Soviet Union. In Africa, the etiology of the refugee situations is not so clearly related to the activities of the Soviet Union, although this country is sometimes seen in the background. Another argument for modified assistance to the refugees in Africa, is that the problem is exaggerated and that the real number of refugees is lower. It is true that the official estimate of the number of refugees can seldom be confirmed, but on the other hand, they cannot be disapproved. The mass media also has a responsibility when it comes to the distribution of refugee assistance. Currently it is the situations in Southeast Asia, in Pakistan and Zimbabwe, which draw all the attention of mass media, and as a result the greater part of the international assistance is given to these countries. Governments and international bodies should attempt to limit the influence of the mass media when it comes to the distribution of resources. On the other hand, voluntary agencies are, to a great extent, dependent upon what is reported, as their assests are normally collected from the public. This is one reason why it is important that the mass media give a correct picture of the overall situation. REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 41 The Somali and the Southeast Asian experiences are illustrative. It was not until the past few months that the catastrophe in Somalia has been given any attention, and now the refugees are gradually getting more assistance. It should be remembered that a few years ago, it was the boat people who were in a desperate situation and who were denied international assistance. The flow of refugees from Vietnam had started in 1975 and the affected governments and the UNHCR appealed to the international community in vain. It was not until spring 1979, when the world press found an interest in the serious and highly dramatic situation and started to report it, that governments and other agencies responded. Perhaps the day will soon come when Eastern Africa will also be "discovered" by the world press. Part II: The Analytic Framework Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory This article extends the analysis of factors affecting refugee outcomes to those areas preceding and succeeding flight. Thus, although the refugee situations may appear unique, the study and analysis of recurring elements offer explanations of the events actually observed and enable one to predict the course which future events may take. People within any community differ in their sense of identification with their surroundings and in the degree of intensity with which they share prevalent, majority beliefs. 1 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that within any refugee wave, individuals who constitute it are not equal in their social relationships; some feel more marginal than others toward the society which they leave behind. Because in the resettlement phase many of the refugees ' problems could be traced back to their emotional links with and dependence on their past, the refugees ' marginality within or identification with their former home country is important. Regardless of whether a refugee chooses to leave the country of birth by an anticipatory flight, or is carried into exile in an acute refugee situation, refugees in their social relationship to the population of the home country which they leave behind appear to fall into three identification categories. The first of these categories consists of those refugees who are firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events is shared by the majority of their compatriots. These refugees identify themselves enthul ln a previous paper entitled "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement", I.M.R. 7(2): 125-146, 1973, the author dealt with the central part of the refuge's Odyssey: displacement, transit and arrival in the host society. This article, which extends the analysis of factors affecting refugee outcomes to aspects preceding and succeeding flight, utilizes concepts and terms defined and used in the earlier article. Also, the central panel of Figure III has been reproduced from that article. 42 IMR Volume 15 No. 1 Egon F. Kunz EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT: REFUGEE THEORY 43 siasdcally with the nation, though not with its government. They may be best called majority-identified refugees. The second type covers those who either because of events immediately preceding the refugee situation, or because of past discrimination are ambivalent or embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots. The ambivalence of those in this group derives from their original desire to be identified with the nation, and their subsequent realization of their rejection by the nation as a whole, or by a section of its citizens. They are people whose marginality was latent or suppressed but came to the fore in a sequence of events. These we may call events-alienated refugees. The group includes religious and racial minorities but seldom social classes; the displacement forms carrying such refugees over the border of their countries may include expulsion, anticipatory departure or acute flight. The best known examples of events-alienated refugees in modern times were the German Jews and Germans with partly Jewish origin, who, however deeply rooted in German culture, became unwanted aliens in their homeland. Their alienation may have been exacerbated by the fact that the reality of their situation dawned only gradually. Other eventsalienated people of our times include the expelled Volksdeutsche and the Hindu and Moslem groups made homeless by the partition of India and Pakistan. What is common among them is their knowledge that events have irrevocably alienated them from their fellow citizens of the past, and unlike the majority-identified refugees, they seldom entertain the hope, and only rarely the wish, to return to live among their former compatriots. The third type of refugee encompasses exiles who, for varied individual reasons or philosophies, have no wish to identify themselves with the nation. These self-alienated persons might retain some attachments to the panoramic aspects of their homelands, but their attitudes overwhelmingly shaped by ideological considerations and their departure is a logical result of their alienation. These categories are fairly distinctive, and it is usually easy to identify refugee vintages or individual refugees with one of the three social relationship categories. It is, in some cases, more difficult to establish whether individuals who belong to self-alienated groups are refugees or voluntary immigrants. Attitudes Toward Displacement: Active and Reactive Groups Refugee groups' may be termed either reactive fate-groups or purpose groups according to their attitudes toward displacement (See, Fig. I). Purpose groups, in turn, may be further subdivided into self-fulfilling purpose groups and groups of revolutionary activists. 44 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW FIGURE I HOME RELATED FACTORS Idendfication/Marginality The Majority-Identified The Events-Alienated The Self-Alienated Attitude to Flight and Homeland Reactive Fate-groups Purpose Groups Ideological-National Orientation Abroad Restoration Activists The Passive Hurt Integration Realists Eager Assimilationists Revolutionary Activists Founders of Utopias Reactive fate-groups in flight have repeatedly filled history ' s roads of desperation. The individuals in this category are characteristically the refugees of wars, sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions. The flesh and blood of such refugee movements is supplied by majority-identified, national refugees. In addition, reactive groups frequently include eventalienated ingredients. Occasionally event-alienated individuals or groups may make up complete reactive vintages (e.g., persecuted Jews, expelled Volksdeutsche), but if the refugee movement comes as a result of a national calamity, event-alienated individuals form a minority alongside the majority-identified refugees. There is empirical evidence, at least in recent refugee movements, that in circumstances of national upheaval when the push factor is balanced by the intensity of the individual ' s desire to stay, event-alienated individuals are more liable to take flight. Consequently, reactive national refugee situations, though always dominated by majority-identified refugees, as a rule contain event-alienated minorities exceeding their demographic proportions in the home country. The common characteristic of reactive fate-groups is the nature of their flight; they flee reluctantly, without a solution in sight; they flee because they react to a situation which they perceive to be intolerable. While the motivations behind the flight of politically exposed selfalienated or events-alienated persons are mostly clear and usually acknowledged, the reasons why individuals who appear to belong to majority-identified reactive-fate groups flee are often called into question. The borderline between political refugees and those dissatisfied economically can indeed be blurred when displacement occurs in reaction to events. Yet, the mamitude of the decision should be kept in mind as well EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT: REFUGEE THEORY 45 as the pressures of the social forces which finally result in the seeking of exile. Refugees belonging to purpose groups differ sharply from reactive refugees. As they are usually the makers of their own refugee situations, at times it is not clear whether they should be classified as refugees or voluntary migrants. Self-fulfilling purpose groups almost always comprise persons who became alienated by their insistence on the overriding importance of a certain facet of belief, dogma, or by their passionate pursuit of a form of society which derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those current in the home country. Self-fulfilling purpose groups had more scope of operation in the early periods of colonization when the need tor closer settlement in the frontier areas of overseas colonies coincided with their wish for a closed and uniform life style away from outside pressures. Being almost always self-alienated, members of the selffulfilling purpose groups sometimes leave voluntarily. Whether they can be considered refugees or voluntary migrants depends on how much their ideologies clashed with those of their home country and whether their actual departure was caused by harassment and fear of persecution or by their wish to start on the desired way of life. Ideological-National Orientation in Exile It is only natural that those who left their homeland as self-alienated persons with strong political, religious or ideological motivation to live a life purposefully dedicated to such aims should, after their arrival in the country offering them permanent asylum, continue their pursuit in lands with sufficient freedom. For those who left in a group to live a communal life, arrival itself granted fulfillment of their aim as was the case with the founders of ideologically-inspired idealist colonies. Such aims were certainly easier to attain in earlier times when the new world offered empty spaces for social experimentation. Nevertheless there are some twentieth century examples of self-alienated purpose groups achieving their aims, although the chances for such groups maintaining their isolation becomes ever less likely in the modern world. Unlike the founders of idealist settlements who turn their back on society and find fulfillment by practicing a life of new values far and untouched by the outer world, other self-alienated exiles turn their energies to preparing a revolution which would change the governments and lifestyle of their own homeland, or if possible, the whole world. Such revolutionary activists are usually self-alienated persons, although eventsalienated individuals, once in exile, occasionally ally themselves with revolutionary causes. The true revolutionary activist can be distinguished 46 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW from other exile activists by his alienation from the mainstream ideologies, and from the singleminded way he subjugates matters of family and chances of long term resettlement to the purpose he set out to achieve. In contrast to the purposeful colonizers and the determined revolutionary activists, the ideological orientation of refugee waves composed mostly of majority identified reactive fate-groups is uncertain and changeable. Believing that they share a cause with the majority of their compatriots left behind, many feel guilty for not sharing also their fate with them. This sense of guilt lead some to perceive the existence of an "historic responsibility " which is placed on them, impelling them to work for the cause and compensate for their freedom, by speaking up for those silenced at home. Those in leadership roles among them will be likely to reinforce this sense of guilt and commitment. Others, in an effort to escape their guilt and forget their past, may engage in hyperactive search for assimilation and the achievement of material success. Between these two extremes are the passive who retire hurt, and the realists seeking the way to an integrated accommodation with the host society which is consistent both with their past and present roles. While these solutions may be found side-by-side in reactive fategroups, most individuals within the fate-groups pass through these rolephases from their day of flight, progressing and regressing until they die or repatriate themselves. HOST RELATED FACTORS However much the newly arrived refugees are under the influence of memories of home and transit, they rarely remain fully captives of their past. Unless they are irrevocably broken by trials, they will soon begin to explore the surroundings, assess the attitudes of the hosts, and endeavor to find a niche for themselves in which they can feel consistent both with their background and with their gradually changing expectations. In doing so the nature of the country of resettlement and its population will be of vital importance. Yet, when making their choices the refugees are seldom aware of these crucially important factors, and even when they are, they are seldom able to exercise a rational choice. Cultural Compatibility Perhaps no other host factor has more influence on the satisfactory resettlement of the refugee than cultural compatibility between background and the society which is confronted. In a linguistically strange EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT: REFUGEE THEORY 47 environment the refugees might find themselves excluded and isolated from human contact, and their loneliness may result in depression or even in paranoic hallucinatory reaction. Inability to overcome the gap created by unaccustomed values and practices could similarly lead to inhibition and withdrawal from human contacts. If, in contrast, the refugees find a sufficient number of people in their new home who speak their language and share their values, traditions, lifestyle, religion, political views and food habits, and they are able to anticipate and evaluate their hosts' actions and responses, the integration will be accelerated and eventual identification with the new country assured. Yet, only seldom do refugees enjoy the luxury of linguistic compatibility and even rarer are the refugee ' s chances to move to a culturally compatible country. Israel is an outstanding exception here. In more restricted numbers anticipatory refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa found compatible havens in Australia and in Canada, despite the markedly different social structure of these countries. Also, following various political changes at home, Iberian refugees found, on occasion, linguistically compatible surroundings in Central and South America. The preference shown by the United States of America, Canada and Australia for settlers of Nordic stock stems from the awareness of a cultural affinity between these former British colonies and people originating from the northern, Protestant areas of Europe. A similar affinity between Latin cultures and temperaments facilitates the resettlement of southern Europeans in Central and South America. Although cultural compatibility is desirable even in voluntary migrations, in the case of FIGURE II I HOST RELATED FACTORS Sanctuary societies—tolerant 48 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees, where the migrating masses are frequently demoralized and neurotic, the added strain of culture conflict could precipitate problems which are not always possible to overcome, in spite of the considerable capacity of human nature to adapt to changing circumstances and environments. There are no indications to show that the majority of future refugees will ever find linguistically and culturally compatible places of resettlement. Population Policies of the Host Country Some underpopulated countries actively support population growth through immigration. Such augmentative societies are likely to look at the refugee as a sought after and valued immigrant who is expected to contribute to the nation 's numerical growth and its economic capacity. Resettlement in an augmentative society holds out obvious advantages for the refugee: short in manpower and backward in development as they usually are, they frequently offer limitless possibilities. Yet augmentative societies have their disadvantages as places of resettlement: they look at the pool of refugees primarily as a manpower source to be exploited to their own advantage, and tend to select the healthy and young, leaving the old and ill behind. Also, significantly, they treat refugees as permanent immigrants, and being growth oriented, they tend to be unsympathetic to homeward oriented refugees who envisage their exile as only a temporary phase. In contrast, overpopulated or demographically self-sufficient countries are less likely to accept large numbers of refugees. Because they are not particularly anxious to retain and assimilate new arrivals they are less likely to press the refugee to abandon a home oriented outlook and activities. Being more complete, more mature and self-assured, such societies are usually more tolerant and more willing to offer the refugee a sanctuary without forcing the adoption of their particular way of life. Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Holland have traditionally shown such a tolerant attitude to political refugees. Social Receptiveness Augmentative societies, as noted earlier, are likely to exact the price of assimilation in exchange for the privilege of admitting the refugee. The degree of conformity which they would demand from the newcomer would depend on their social receptiveness: monistic societies are less likely to be hospitable to people who cling to their differing cultures than pluralistic societies of broader experience. The demands for conformity made by a monistic society are less damaging if these are directed to the events-alienated refugee who, having EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT: REFUGEE THEORY 49 been antagonized by his former compatriots and unable to return, looks for permanent settlement and frequently becomes an eager assimilationist. The same demands, however, can exert great stress on the majorityidentified, homeward oriented refugee, by forcing a premature facing of emotionally charged choices. The chances for advancement which augmentative societies may offer to refugees would also depend on whether they are multiethnic, pluralistic communities open to all comers, or monoethnic, monistic communities which give significant preference to sib-arrivals from countries of affinity, but keep only the servant door open to peoples of other races and traditions. Such discriminatory behavior is rare in countries still in their early developmental stages, with a still fluid social order. It is found more often in societies which have passed their fluid stage and become stratified enough to repel from their higher echelons the intrusion of non-sib arrivals. Predictive Hypotheses The classification of concepts, establishment of a terminology and the construction of typologies outlined in this and previous studies, provide tools with which one may attempt to draw up predictive hypotheses. The following list of such predictive hypotheses and postulates based on interconnections suggested by Figure III and on observations derived from the study of past and present refugee movements, indicates the use which can be made of this type of theoretical work: 1) Anticipatory refugee moves are composed almost solely of the well informed, well-to-do and well-educated; 2) Anticipatory refugee moves tend to include an overwhelming proportion of events-alienated persons; 3) Acute refugee movements of reactive fate-groups tend to heighten emotions: the identification of the majority-identified bec . omes more pronounced, and the alienation of the events-alienated, more definite; 4) Vintages may be composed of people belonging to a similar type of political, educational, social or religious background. Although seldom fully homogeneous, each vintage tends to take different proportions of the ingredients of the society they left behind, making it distinctive enough not to resemble in its composition another vintage; 5) The larger the number of vintages a refugee settler wave is composed of, the more likelihood there is of divisive refugee politics after settlement; 6) All things being equal, refugee settlers of events-alienated back- EXILE AND RESETTLEMENT: REFUGEE THEORY 51 ground, unless experiences have made them strongly neurotic, adjust themselves more quickly to life in augmentative societies and are more successful than refugee settlers who identified themselves with the majority; 7) The events-alienated refugee settler, who arrives as an anticipatory refugee, is most likely to become a successful settler: the background combines both a motivation of tabula rasa towards the host society and the most favorable pattern of refugee kinetics; 8) Vintages arising from acute refugee movements are geographically biased in their intake, reflecting the nuances of war, political events and the point of exodus; 9) The distance of the native land from the country of asylum and the number of countries the refugee has to cross in his flight to get there, act as selective factors: the distance overcome and the quality of refugee are positively related; 10) Reactive fate-groups which in their history had long experience of minority life, after settlement, tend to form communities with emphasis on friendship, customs, self-help and ethnic identity. Such associations of refugee settlers are structurally wellintegrated into the host society, and show high participation rates of refugees who, as persons or families, assimilate slowly; 11) Majority-identified reactive fate-groups which had memories of substantial national independence behind them, after their settlement tend to form politically orientated associations. Such associations of refugee settlers are structurally alien to the host society, show low participation rates and, by alienating their compatriots, force them to assimilate quickly; 12) Homeward oriented activists find settlement in self-sufficient, sanctuary societies more congenial because such societies demand neither commitment nor participation; 13) Event-alienated refugees in exile may join the ranks of the selfalienated and form purpose groups with them; 14) The absence of marginality experience among the majority identified reactive fate-groups makes them a primary target for shock, authoritarian attitudes, schizophrenia and alcoholism particularly if they find themselves in a monistic society of alien tradition; and 15) Initial cultural incompatibility can be overcome by the young and the highly educated with a greater ease, but the highly educated, in the long run, may remain more impervious to assimilationist pressures than less educated compatriots. Refugee Asylum: Policy and Legislative Developments This article highlights the development of new facts and trends concerning asylum to and protection of refugees, especially between 1975 and 1980. Asylum is singled out as the fundamental act of protection and dealt with from its position in international law. Asylum is the first objective for the protection of the refugee. Asylum is also the fundamental act of protection. It enables the refugee to survive and it lays ipso facto, and sometimes ipso jure, the basis for any further action relevant to the asylee. This article is designed to single out asylum as the fundamental act of protection and to deal with it separately in view of its different position in international law. Concomitantly this work will review the developments in asylum and international protection of refugees for the period 1975-1980. ASYLUM Two events have dominated the problem of asylum on the international scene since 1975: 1) the meeting and failure of the United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum in January-February, 1977 and 2) the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. The United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum has shown that because of different juridical concepts of the relation between state and individual, conflicting geopolitical interests, and ideological cleavage there is at present no possibility of a universal consensus on the granting of territorial asylum. More specifically, there is no readiness, even among "liberal" states, to underwrite an unlimited obligation to grant asylum to asylum seekers, whatever their definition (Coles, 1980). By example, the recent crisis in Southeast Asia which forced a number of refugees and displaced persons, estimated conservatively at more than 1.6 million persons, to leave Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam evoked a variety of responses from states in the area: 1) Asylum was granted on a durable or permanent basis. 2) Temporary asylum was granted without restriction except, of course, its provisional nature. 52 IMR Volume 15 No. 1 Gilbert Jaeger REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 53 3) Temporary asylum was granted subject to strict conditions of " residence " (in most cases, in " camps"). 4) Temporary asylum, within or without camps, was granted after a government (in the case of boat people, generally the government of the flag state) or UNHCR guaranteed to cover the care and maintenance of the asylees as well as resettle them in a country of durable asylum. 5) Asylum was refused on the land or sea border, but without coercion. 6) The refusal of asylum involved measures of coercion. 7) The refugee was refoule (obviously by coercion) to the country of origin, either after having resided de facto in the territory of the state where he was seeking asylum, or sometimes after having benefited from temporary asylum {e.g., in a camp). " Actually, several of the States concerned have had a fluctuating policy of admission, depending on the number of asylum seekers, the internal political situation, their relations with the country of origin, or the support they were receiving or were hoping to receive from the High Commissioner and from other States . . ." (Jaeger, 1980). The above analysis is actually valid in refugee situations world wide. That is, millions of other refugees have been granted some kind of temporary or durable asylum in Africa (refugees from Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Western Sahara, Zaire, Zimbabwe, etc.), the Americas (refugees from Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador .. .), other parts of Asia (refugees from Afghanistan, Burma . . .), and Europe (the usual trickle from Eastern Europe, but also many refugees from Africa and Asia). The "boat people" are a category not only in the South China Sea, but also in the Caribbean. Refusal of asylum and violation of asylum (refoulement) have taken place in the various countries, including " liberal " countries. It is nevertheless true to say that the dominant asylum crisis on the international scene has been and still is in Southeast Asia. The Legal Framework of Asylum The international community has reacted to the asylum crisis inter alia by trying alternative methods of improving the legal framework of territorial asylum. Within the United Nations this has been done mainly through the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner ' s Program and particularly through a new institution, the Subcommittee of the Whole on International Protection. Although this committee has no executive capacity in protection 54 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW matters it is nevertheless the only statutory body in the United Nations which is specifically competent to deal with international protection and has been for some thirty years the meeting point of governmental experts on the subject. 1 Its "conclusions ", 2 which are now prepared by the subcommittee, carry, therefore, a definite authority when they emphasize principles of refugee protection and may have a distinct practical effect when they offer an official interpretation of existing legal instruments. The UNHCR Executive Committee has adopted significant conclusions on asylum and non-re foulement, particularly at its twenty-eighth, thirtieth and thirty-first sessions (October 1977, October 1979 and October 1980). One of the conclusions " reaffirms the fundamental importance of the principle of non-re foulement both at the border and within the territory of a State—of persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees ". 3 Additional movements in this area of non-refoulement and particularly the protection of refugees against extradition may be noted in the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at the end of 1979: Article 9 1) A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant to this Convention, shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing: a) That the request for extradition for an offense set forth in Article 1 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion; or b) That the person's position may be prejudiced: i) For any of the reasons mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or ii) For the reason that communication with him by the appropriate authorities of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot be effected. 2) With respect to the offenses as defined in this Convention, the provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between The initial United Nations High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees was established by the Economic and Social Council in autumn 1951 (Resolution 393 B [XIII] of 10 September 1951). ^On account of its separate responsibilities ratione materiae the Executive Committee takes "decisions" on material assistance programs and adopts "conclusions" on protection matters. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 12A (A/32/12/Add. 1), para. 53(4) (c). REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 55 States Parties are modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention. 4 The importance of these provisions in a treaty which is otherwise of a distinctly repressive nature needs hardly be emphasized. A similar development occurred on the European scene with the conclusion on January 27, 1977 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which has also a distinctly repressive character and has elicited strong reactions from international lawyers and various organizations. Article 5 of the Convention provides a safeguard against extradition of refugees and a further, merely optional, protection against extradition of political offenders is contained in Article 13. 5 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted on October 7, 1977 Recommendation 817 (1977) on Certain Aspects of the Right to Asylum which contained reservations on the above Convention, specifically mentions a"right to asylum" and: Recommends that the Committee of Ministers call on all governments of the member States: . . . b. to reaffirm their intention of maintaining their liberal attitude towards persons who seek asylum on their territory on the basis inter alia of the principles laid down in Resolution (67) 14 of the Committee of Ministers, and having regard to the provisions of the UN Convention of 28 July 1951, relating to the Status of Refugees and of its 1967 Protocol. 6 Following the failure of the United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum and taking into account the above Recommendation, on December 5, 1977 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe issued a Declaration on Territorial Asylum in which ". . . the member States of the Council of Europe reaffirm their intention to maintain .. . their liberal attitude with regard to persons seeking asylum in their territory ". 7 A more specific reaction to the abortive UN Conference can be found in Recommendation 842 of September 30, 1978 in which: The Assembly, . . . 5. Regretting that the United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum, held in Geneva in February 1977, has been unable to complete its task of considering and adopting a convention on territorial asylum; . . . United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/34/46), Resolution 34/146, Annex. ''Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 90. council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session (Second Part), 5-13 October 1977, Texts Adopted by the Assembly, Strasbourg 1978. council of Europe, 1977 Resolutions, Committee of Ministers, Strasbourg 1978. 56 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 8. Further recommends that the Committee of Ministers: i. consider the possibility of elaborating a European convention on territorial asylum should any initiatives taken in regard to this matter at universal level not lead to any concrete results in the near future; . . . 8 During this time ^ the American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969 entered into force on July 18, 1978. It deals with asylum in Article 22 and contains an unqualified prohibition of refoulement: In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions (Art.22.8). Africa is the only continent where the legal framework for the granting of territorial asylum is satisfactory, as a result of the O'AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa which contains an unqualified prohibition of "rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion " on behalf of refugees. 9 The Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, which met in May 1979 at Arusha, Tanzania, has also adopted a liberal recommendation on asylum which inter alia: Condemns the existence and conclusion of agreements of whatever kind concluded between African States permitting the forcible return of refugees to their country of origin, contrary to the principles of asylum as prescribed, inter alia in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention;10 The recommendations of the Conference were approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its sixteenth ordinary session, Monrovia, July 1979, and also " fully endorsed " by the General Assembly of the United Nations,11 and have therefore acquired a considerable value as an instrument of protection in Africa. council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Thirtieth Ordinary Session (Second Part), 27 September-4 October 1978, Texts Adopted by the Assembly, Strasbourg, 1978: Recommendation 842 (1978) on the 21st report on the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. United Nations, Treaty Series, No. 14691; Art. 11.3. ^Asylum in Africa, (REF/AR/CONF/Rpt. I/REC.l), attached to the Report of the Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, 7-17 May 1979 (REF/AR/ CONF/Rpt.I). United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/34/46), Resolution 34/61. (In further footnotes, General Assembly resolutions will be identified only by their serial number and date of approval.) REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 57 There is little to report on the legal framework of asylum in Asia. A Round Table of Asian Experts on the International Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons met in Manila in April 1980, at the initiative of the UNHCR, the University of the Philippines Law Center and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. It adopted the Manila Declaration on the International Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Asia which "stresses the fundamental importance of the principles relating to asylum " and " of the observance of the principle of non-re foulement"^ It is a timely statement, but not so precise and specific as the Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees adopted in 1966 by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee.13 The Manila Declaration does show however, that improvement of the legal framework for asylum has continued to preoccupy academic circles. In fact, Grahl-Madsen recently proposed a protocol related to territorial asylum of which the key provision reads: A refugee will not be denied admission to the territory of a Contracting State, nor will a refugee be forced to leave such territory, if that would expose the refugee to a risk of persecution, threatening life or freedom or otherwise of a serious nature.14 This proposal could and perhaps should be considered as a basis of negotiations by all states party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, as it establishes a specific link with these instruments. For the same reason it is doubtful that other states would be interested. Removing the Obstacles and Prevention Measures While little could be achieved concerning the legal framework of asylum, much better results were obtained in removing the obstacles to the granting of asylum, particularly in the Southeast Asia crisis. An analysis of this crisis shows that the states of Southeast Asia. . . refuse to grant durable asylum for reasons of ethnic antagonism, internal and external national security and lack of economic absorption capacity inter alia as a result of arable land shortage. Temporary asylum would be refused since it is only a first stage to durable asylum and, to a lesser extent, because of lack of reception facilities or financial means. 15 ^International Institute of Humanitarian Law, University of the Philippines Law Center, Round Table of Asian Experts on Current Problems in the International Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Manila, Philippines, 14-18 April 1980. ^Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Eighth Session, Bangkok 1966, Doc. No. 17 (VIII). ^Cf., Grahl-Madsen, pp. 69-80 and Annex AAA, pp. 216-219. Other private texts of the period 1965-1977 are also to be found in the Annexes. ^Cf., Jaeger (II), para 218. 58 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW It is impossible to remove the obstacles which prevent these States from granting durable asylum. On the other hand, the obstacles to the granting of temporary asylum can be removed by: 1) providing funds for reception facilities and the care and maintenance of refugees and displaced persons accommodated in such facilities; and 2) by giving the state of temporary asylum the assurance that the refugees and displaced persons will leave its territory after a relatively short stay. This implies either voluntary repatriation or resettlement in a country of durable asylum. It is these two measures—particularly resettlement—which have eased the asylum problem in Southeast Asia. The asylum crisis in Southeast Asia has also prompted the international community to try and take specific preventive measures with a view to slowing the flood of refugees and displaced persons. These preventive measures were among the main objectives of the two ad hoc meetings held in Geneva in December 1978 and July 1979,16 specifically: 1) The " orderly departures" from Vietnam on which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding on May 30, 1979; 17 2) the "moratorium on illegal departures" negotiated between the SRV and the Secretary-General during the meeting of July 1979; and 3) the policy of providing aid to people in the country of departure to ". . . influence the decisions both of those who might wish to repatriate voluntarily and of those who might consider leaving for economic reasons".18 Orderly departures are not a new method of dealing with a refugee crisis and were already referred to in 1938 by the Intergovernmental Committee set up to deal with (potential) refugees from the nationalsocialist regime in Germany and Austria. The moratorium on illegal departures was received with reservations, if not criticism. It could be held that to request a state to prevent its citizens (or residents) from leaving the territory would be a flagrant ^A "Consultative Meeting with Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia" was convened by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva on 11 and 12 December 1978. Cf., United Nations, General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, A/34/627, Appendix to Annex I. Upon the initiative of Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the UN Secretary-General Convened a "Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia" also in Geneva, on July 20 and 21, 1979. Cf., A/34/627. ^United Nations, General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Third Committee, A 1C. 3/34/7 p.2. ^Cf., A/34/627, Appendix to Annex I, para. 5(h). REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 59 violation of the principle stated in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration:" Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country ". On the other hand, the international community is certainly entitled, without infringing on any principle, to request a state to put an end to a policy of systematic expulsion. It is probably premature to evaluate this preventive measure against a massive influx of refugees and displaced persons. It would require a thorough legal and political analysis, including an investigation of conditions in Vietnam, particularly in regard to the Chinese minority. The High Commissioner for Refugees, whose work " shall be of an entirely nonpolitical character",19 has systematically avoided engaging in analyses of, let alone controversies on, the causes of refugee problems which obviously are to be found in the internal conditions of the states of origin. This has also been the traditional attitude of the Executive Committee. In the aftermath of the July 1979 meeting, which was prompted by the desire of a number of states to discuss the politics of the problem, but was eventually contained within a humanitarian approach, the Executive Committee at its thirtieth session in October 1979: (d) Expressed the wish that the root causes of those situations, which fell outside the competence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, should be taken up at the earliest opportunity in the appropriate forums, for example, the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. 20 It is therefore not surprising that the Commission on Human Rights on March 11, 1980 adopted Resolution^ ( XXXVI ) on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses: The Commission on Human Rights, . . . concerned by indications that such large exoduses of persons and groups are frequently the result of violations of human rights . . . Considering further the responsibility of the international community to help alleviate the conditions which cause these exoduses, . . . 3. Urges those States which are the source of the exodus or the place of refuge of persons and groups involved in large-scale exodus to cooperate fully among themselves and with other States, intergovernmental and humanitarian organizations, on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in rendering protection and assistance to victims, in searching for enduring solutions for these situations, and in helping to prevent and eliminate conditions which may precipitate such exoduses; ^Statute of UNHCR, Paragraph 2. ^C/., A/34/12/Add.l, para. 43.A 60 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 4. Requests the Secretary-General, in cases where any such large-scale exoduses become a matter of international concern and solidarity, to consider establishing direct contacts with appropriate governments to assess the relationships between the situation and full enjoyment of human rights and to make concrete recommendations for ameliorating such situation; . . . 21 The importance of this text consists in the public emphasis on the violation of human rights as the cause of refugee movements, in the appeal to states of origin to cooperate " in helping to prevent and eliminate conditions which may precipitate such exoduses " and in the stress on the responsibility and role of the international community, including the United Nations. This resolution, the travaux preparatoires and the full text of which deserve a more exhaustive analysis, has established a new principle in the attitude of the international community toward refugee problems. On July 23, 1980, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, spoke at a special session of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on the " global issue of refugees ", but obviously in connection with the recent developments of the problem of refugees from Cuba. The preventive trend is again perceptible. Christopher suggested four principles to guide the search for an international solution to the refugee problem: 1) Large-scale displacements of persons should be discouraged in the name of humanity and international law; 2) Persons displaced from their homelands should be repatriated as promptly as conditions permit; 3) International procedures must be devised to solve the problems which arise when permanent resettlement becomes necessary; and 4) Efforts must focus on the fundamental human issues involved and not made the subject of partisan or ideological polemics.22 CONCLUSIONS The subject of asylum is inexhaustible. It should be necessary to review also recent developments in municipal law, as a large number of countries have amended their legislation on asylum. We must restrict this succinct analysis to the international aspects and reach a few conclusions: ^United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 3 (E/1980.13-E/CN.4/1408). ^C/., United States Mission, Chambesy (Geneva)/United States Embassy, Bern, Daily Bulletin Number 137, July 24, 1980; pp. 5-6. REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 61 1) The trend towards an instrument on territorial asylum which has suffered a major defeat early in 1977 continued in academic and in intergovernmental circles, at regional and universal level, but has not materialized in any tangible manner. One reads useful declarations of principle as well as repressive phraseology in new conventions on terrorism. 2) There is a tendency perceptible favoring the conclusion of regional instruments on asylum pending the hypothetical conclusion of a universal instrument. 3) The principle of non-re foulement is not only being reaffirmed in resolutions etc., but also upheld in otherwise repressive new legal instruments. 4) Territorial asylum has fortunately been granted on both a temporary and durable basis to millions of persons, whereas throughout the same period the number of refusals of asylum and violations of asylum (refoulement) has been greater than ever. 5) The grant of both temporary and durable asylum, particularly to refugees and displaced persons from Indochina, has been largely facilitated through a systematic "removal of the obstacles ", which has required very effective international cooperation of all those concerned. 6) Another reaction of the international community to " massive exodus " has been a revival of preventive methods and the emergence of new attitudes tending to deal with the very causes of the refugee phenomenon. OTHER ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Implementation of Existing Legal Instruments One major problem of international law is the implementation of treaties in the territories of contracting states, particularly in those countries where international treaties have no automatic statutory position in municipal law. This problem has severely affected the implementation of the major international instruments relating to refugees, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol. Until today, important countries belonging to the " liberal " group of nations do not apply these two instruments—to which they became parties a long time ago—in their full scope. This applies specifically to determination of refugee status, a technical requirement inherent in the implementation of the Convention and Protocol on behalf of any refugee. Although anyone may claim at any time the benefit of these instruments, this may entail a protracted process and may even defeat the purpose of the exercise, unless the person concerned possesses readily available evidence that he, or she, is consid- 62 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW ered by the contracting state to be a refugee. Retrospectively, the conclusions reached by the executive committee (upon the recommendation of the subcommittee) at its twenty-eighth session in October 1977 on determination of refugee status have acquired an historical significance.23 The practical formulation of these conclusions, combined with a series of persistent demarches of the UNHCR with the contracting states, has resulted in a considerable improvement in the implementation of the Convention and Protocol in regard to refugee status. It would appear that the number of contracting states which have established a formal procedure for the determination of refugee status has increased from 18 in summer 1977 to 32 in summer 1980.24 Another consequence of the same session of the Executive Committee has been the drafting and publication by UNHCR, at the request of the Committee which endorsed a United States move, of a "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees "25 While this " Handbook " has no conventional value whatsoever, it is nevertheless an official interpretation by the only international, nonpolitical authority26 in this field, of the definition of " refugee ". The "handbook" could also be seen as a response to earlier complaints by governments about the lack of uniformity of various national practices and to attempts, specifically on the European scene, to " harmonize " determination procedures.27 The institution of formal procedures for determining refugee status by an increasing number of states stems, of course, not merely from a principal desire to improve the implementation of the Convention and Protocol, but also from the necessity for sifting genuine refugees from other applicants. The need is closely connected with the swelling numbers of asylum seekers from and in an increasing number of countries on the various continents. It should be noted that the need to determine individual refugee status has developed simultaneously with the need to determine collectively refugee (or nonrefugee) status in the case of large-scale movements of ^United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 22A (A/32/12/Add.l); para. 53(6). ^United Nations, General Assembly, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Twenty-eighth Session, A/AC.96/INF.152, and Thirty-first Session, A/AC .96/INF.152/Rev. 2. ^Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on ....... Geneva, September 1979. ^As distinct from, e.g., the General Assembly. "C/., Jaeger (I), paras. 57-62. REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 63 asylum seekers. This is not a new problem and is in fact being referred to in the Handbook. 28 A problem immediately connected with determination of refugee status is its extraterritorial effect. Like any other international treaty, the Convention and Protocol purport to establish, as between contracting states, an international community on the subject. Furthermore, the extraterritorial scope of refugee status is referred to expressis verbis or implicitly in various provisions of the 1951 Convention. 29 The practice of countries varied until recently (and still varies) from state to state. The extraterritorial scope is recognized for travel purposes, i.e., the holder of a travel document issued in accordance with the Convention and Protocol is admitted to the territory of contracting states (and for that matter, also of other states) with or without visa, as the case may be. In many cases, however, a recognized refugee is not admitted to reside in the territory of another contracting state as a refugee unless status has been assessed or validated according to the prevailing national procedure. The purported reason for this negative attitude of contracting states regarding the extraterritorial effect of determination of refugee status has often been the lack of uniformity. A more accurate reason would probably be an overly strict and narrow interpretation of the principle of state sovereignty and the fear that automatic recognition of refugee status determined elsewhere may carry an obligation to grant residence rights. In: "Consider (ing) that the very purpose of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol implies that refugee status determined by one Contracting State will be recognized also by the other Contracting States," and in: "Recognizing), therefore, that refugee status as determined in one Contracting State should only be called into question by another Contracting State in exceptional cases when it appears that the person manifestly does not fulfill the requirements of the Convention, e.g., if facts become known indicating that the statements initially made were fraudulent or showing that the person concerned falls within the terms of a cessation or exclusion provision of the 1951 Convention," the Executive Committee (upon the recommendation of the Sub-Committee) has made a major contribution to the progress of international refugee law. ^Cf. Handbook, para. 44. ^^l Conven tion : Art. 14, Art. 16.3 and Schedule (Paragraphs 7, 11, 12). 64 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Improvement of the General Legal Framework of Protection The improvement of the legal framework of international protection should be considered from both a geographic and substantive point of view. The geographic extension of the main legal instruments, the Convention and Protocol, develops every year albeit gradually. Between March 1975 and March 1980 the number of contracting states increased from 65 (Convention) and 59 (Protocol) to 79 and 76 respectively.30 In addition to the abstention of most socialist countries of Asia and Europe, the conspicuous geographic weakness of these instruments is the fact that only four states in Asia, all in Western Asia, are contracting parties. This has, of course, not made the protection of refugees in the ongoing Southeast Asia crisis any easier. From a substantive point of view, i.e., the development of new international legal instruments, the attention of governmental and academic jurists seems to have been monopolized by the problem of asylum. In regard to other aspects of protection, little has been produced, at either universal or regional levels. Some progress has been made nevertheless in the official interpretation of existing international instruments, e.g., through the conclusions of the Executive Committee, or in inserting provisions on refugees in "ancillary" treaties, not directly concerned with refugee law. The Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States Bordering on the Mediterranean, adopted in Nice on December 17, 1976 by the UNESCO International Conference of States, includes the following provision: Considering that recognition refers to the studies followed and the certificates, diplomas or degrees obtained in the recognized institutions of a given contracting state, any person, of whatever nationality or political or legal status, who has followed such studies and obtained such certificates, diplomas or degrees shall be entitled to benefit from the provisions of Article 3, 4 and 5 (Art. 6.1)31 The Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted on June 8, 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law ^The total number of Contracting States had reached 83 by the end of 1980. ^Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Collection of International Instruments Concerning Refugees, Second Edition, Geneva 1979; p. 331. REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 65 Applicable in Armed Conflicts, includes a separate article (73) on "Refugees and Stateless Persons" which provides: Persons who, before the beginning of hostilities, were considered as stateless persons or refugees under the relevant international instruments accepted by the Parties concerned or under the national legislation of the State of refuge or State of residence shall be protected persons within the meaning of Parts I and III of the Fourth Convention, in all circumstances and without any adverse distinction. Other articles (74, 85, 88, 89) of this Protocol are also relevant to the protection of refugees in case of conflict.32 An aspect of the asylum crisis in Southeast Asia which has called for considerable attention is the refusal of asylum to refugees rescued on the high seas and, as a consequence, the nonobservance of the obligation to rescue, a treaty obligation to which practically all seafaring nations have subscribed.33 A major reason for this difficulty is the fact that, contrary to other persons disembarking after having been rescued on the high seas, rescued refugees will not be taken care of by a consular or diplomatic agent after landing. As a result of intervention by the UNHCR, the International Conference on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, has included in the Annex to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, a provision which notes: 2.1.10 Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found. as well as another paragraph: 5.3.3 Upon the declaration of the distress phase, the rescue coordination center or rescue subcenter, as appropriate, shall: . . . .8 notify the consular or diplomatic authorities concerned or, if the incident involves a refugee or displaced person, the office of the competent international organization.34 The significance of these two paragraphs for the protection of refugees is obvious. Significant also is the fact that the reference is to" refugees and displaced persons". ^Ibidem, pp. 96-98. ^C/., Isi Foighel, The Legal Status of the Boat-People, in Nordisk Tiddskrift for International Ret, Vol. 48, Fasc. 3-4, 1979; pp. 217-243; and Jaeger (II), paras. 151-171 ^International Conference on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, Documents SAR/ CONF/6/12 and SAR/CONF/11; the emphasis concerns the UNHCR amendments. 66 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW The Institutions of Protection Among the instruments of protection, a distinction has been made between legal and institutional instruments. The latter comprise public (i.e., governmental or intergovernmental) institutions at national and international levels, as well as nongovernmental organizations, also at both levels. A further distinction must be made, in all categories, between "refugee agencies" and a host of other " ancillary " bodies which partake occasionally in the protection of refugees.35 Contrasting with the relatively meager improvements of the international legal framework which have been mainly of an interpretative nature or related to ancillary treaties, the period 1975-1980 has been rather productive in the institutional development of protection. In countries where the refugee problem did not previously exist, as well as in those countries where there has been a significant increase of the refugee problem, the need has been felt to create governmental agencies (or merely special services within the framework of existing authorities) to deal with these problems. In other countries where a structure had existed, it was found necessary to initiate additional coordination machinery to deal with new aspects. It is typical, for instance, that while the countries in Southeast Asia had to establish completely new administrative structures to deal with the refugee emergency in the area, countries in Europe and elsewhere, who have admitted for resettlement purposes significant numbers of Indochinese refugees, have felt the need to establish new interministerial working parties and other coordinating bodies. Apart from the numerical aspect, governments have become increasingly aware of the fact that the implementation of international refugee treaties (and for that matter, of municipal refugee legislation) requires adequate administrative infrastructure. A typical development has been, e.g., the establishment of boards or commissions for the determination of refugee status in all countries where the need for a formal determination procedure was finally realized. The institutional development has also extended to the nongovernmental sector, where it has been closely associated with the development of organizations concerned with human rights. It is hardly possible to review the expansion of existing private organizations or the creation of new ones, whether at national or international levels. The notably active role of nongovernmental organizations may be noted in: 1) direct, immediate protection activities on behalf of individual refugees; ^Cf., Jaeger (I), paras. 12-14, 177-179, 186. REFUGEE ASYLUM: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 67 2) the enforcement of existing laws and regulations on behalf of refugees at large or of special groups or categories; 3) the development of national laws and regulations as well as of new international legal instruments (through colloquia, seminars, symposia, publications of all kinds, etc.). If the protection of refugees is viewed as a series of diversified, yet convergent efforts requiring the cooperation of private and public, national and international agents of all kinds, the fundamental role of the nongovernmental organizations cannot be overestimated. There is much less to report on the institutional development at intergovernmental levels, where the structures have existed for many years. However, with the establishment of the Subcommittee of the Whole on International Protection, an important institution has come into being for the interpretation, improvement and development of international refugee law and therefore also of municipal law. The major intergovernmental instrument of protection is naturally the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. As a result of the geographic diversification and the considerable numerical increase of refugee situations, the UNHCR has augmented the number of its field offices from 49 to 81 between early 1975 and mid-1980, whereas the total number of staff members went from 380 to 1,460.36 Although this expansion relates to all activities of the UNHCR, it has also benefited in a large measure the protection activities, particularly if the latter are considered Idto sensu. SUMMARY The purpose of this article was to highlight among the recent developments concerning asylum to, and protection of refugees, new facts and new trends, rather than to provide a systematic, let alone chronological analysis. We believe that in addition to the specific developments concerning asylum reviewed in the first section of this article, the characteristic general developments of the latter 5 to 6 years can be succinctly summed as follows: 1) The widening of the category of subjects of protection in international refugee law which includes, or re-includes, the " displaced persons". 2) The further widening (or trend towards widening) of this category in municipal or international (regional) law. ^UNHCR figures. 68 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 3) New Policies (preventive measures) and new attitudes (dealing with the "root causes") are developing with regard to massive exodus and the asylum problems it generates. 4) More attention is being given to determination of refugee status, both as regards individuals and groups. 5) A very slow improvement of the legal framework, at least at the international level, as regards specific refugee instruments, but a further "infiltration" of refugee law in other international treaties. 6) A considerable expansion of the institutional framework of protection, particularly at the national, but also at the intergovernmental level. These developments must obviously be considered against the background of the considerable geographic and numerical extension of refugee situations. Further to Resolution 30 (XXXVI) of the Commission on Human Rights, a similar Resolution 35/196 on "Mass Exoduses " was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly at its Thirty-fifth Session (September 1980-January 1981). Much more specific is the new Resolution 35/124 on " International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees" by which the General Assembly: . .. "Convinced . . . that the United Nations is called upon to consider, in addition to humanitarian and social relief, suitable means to avert new flows of refugees, .. . 2. Invites all Member States to convey to the Secretary-General their comments and suggestions on international cooperation to avert new flows of refugees and to facilitate the return of those refugees who wish to do .so. . )) Documentory Note Refugees in Europe In the late sixties and early seventies, new faces began to appear among the "traditional" Eastern European refugees who had filled the reception rooms at European refugee assistance agencies during a generation of Cold War and East-West conflict. The new refugees came not only from the Third World: Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East—but also, surprisingly, frpm within Western Europe itself—Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece. They requested assistance, but case workers, both in Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and in governmental services, were unfamiliar with their language and with the social and political background which prompted the exodus from their home countries. To deal with the immediate questions regarding asylum and refugee status, as well as the long-term problems of racial discrimination, cultural clashes and educational differences, agency workers needed retraining and research. The imprint that this new wave of refugees would etch on the European refugee picture was not apparent until the appearance of a large number of Portuguese war-resisters during the liberation wars against Portugal. They were followed by the Ugandan Asians and the refugees of the Chilean crisis of 1973. Finally, with the arrival of the Indochinese refugees in 1975 and thereafter, the so-called "new refugees " in Europe were no longer the minority, but the majority. Equally important—most of them now arrive on government schemes or quotas, while a smaller and less conspicuous number arrive individually on their own. Europe of the Eighties: A New Area of Resettlement The new refugees entered Europe during a period of economic expansion, but the Europe of the eighties has slowed down its economic growth. Increasing employment has affected both nationals and migrants; the latter, once considered an asset to the economic growth, are now blamed for glutting the job market. Borders have been closed to foreign manpower, and measures taken to limit the number of immigrants in residence. Nevertheless, thousands of migrants from countries with severe economic problems persist in gaining access to the "social eldorados " of I MR Volume 15 No. 1 69 Anne Paludan 70 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Western Europe, sometimes pretending to seek asylum. This influx of millions of legal and illegal migrants has created a growing tension between nationals and foreigners, including refugees, resulting in increased outbursts of xenophobia and racism, sometimes violent, but more often in the form of "petty discrimination". Against these odds, however, the Europe of the eighties has recognized the need to receive the "quota-refugees". The Individual Refugee: Between the Orderly and the Illegal The arrival of the "quota-refugees" is legal, "orderly ", and the result of a collaboration between the UNHCR, governments and refugee-assistance agencies, and their reception and integration can be planned in advance. In contrast, the individual new refugees and asylum seekers arrive on their own and are immediately on arrival faced with legal problems. The influx of Third World job-seekers and the abuse by some groups of migrants of legal rights instruments for refugees has had detrimental effects on the legal position of genuine asylum-seekers, especially for those coming from the same areas as the illegal migrants. In the sixties and early seventies, when the European economies needed manpower, the authorities were lenient in granting refugee status. In contrast, applications for asylum today especially by new refugees, tend to be examined with the utmost skepticism and mistrust. The asylum-seekers' credibility is questioned almost a priori', they are rarely given the benefit of the doubt, and in practice they carry the "burden of proof ". Refugees in Orbit One of the most serious legal problems of individual refugees in Europe is the question of the country of first asylum and the phenomenon of refugees " in orbit" i.e., without a country of asylum. Until the late sixties, Western European countries were mainly countries of first asylum for refugees coming from Eastern Europe and processing procedures were often more or less routine. The individual new refugees, however, come from completely different geographical and cultural contexts. They are unfamiliar with voluntary agencies dealing with refugees and the legislation and practice concerning refugees. Their ignorance of the unwritten rule of the first country of asylum—which is where they are supposed to submit their application—frequently results in governmental authorities passing around asylum-seekers from border to border, a practice which has spawned the phenomenon of refugees in orbit. It might be asked why the asylum-seeker is not simply sent back to the first country of asylum. That would most likely be a Third World country with scarce resources even for its own citizens and it would refuse to re- REFUGEES IN EUROPE 71 admit asylum-seekers. Thus many, if not most, individual asylum-seekers who become refugees in orbit remain within Europe. Refugees may be sent into orbit even before they have requested asylum. Prescreening practices whereby asylum-seekers are prevented even from entering the asylum procedure are known in most countries, and there is reason to believe that they have become more widespread in recent years concomitant with the growing pressure from illegal migrants. Such measures are often at the discretion of immigration officers or border police, and are difficult to demonstrate. De Facto Refugees Another major legal problem related to the individual new refugees and asylum-seekers are the " de facto refugees ", a term which is used to describe persons who are not recognized as refugees according to the Convention and Protocol and, thus, are deprived of legal status and protection, but who for valid reasons cannot or will not return to their country of origin. Two main types of de facto refugees are distinguished: a) those who could qualify for refugee status according to the Convention/Protocol, but for various administrative and/or personal reasons are not able or willing to avail themselves of this status; and b) those who fall outside the scope of the Convention/Protocol as presently interpreted by most European states, but who cannot, or will not return to their country of nationality or habitual residence for reasons that may be recognized as valid. It is a fact that restrictive or outdated interpretations of the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention have prevented many new refugees and asylum-seekers from obtaining protection. Political bias, preconceived notions about physical appearance, as well as a lack of sufficient background information can all affect the decisions-making process. Often new refugees are not asked the right questions, nor are their stories understood or believed. Briefed by well-meaning friends, individual new asylum-seekers have been known to lie about their background or itineraries, become fearful of police retaliation regarding themselves or their families or give so little information that their own credibility suffers. Also, many new refugees do not want to declare themselves refugees as a matter of principle or out of solidarity with friends and comrades at home. In the seventies some countries, for humanitarian, diplomatic or other reasons, gave de facto refugees the benefit of the doubt and let them stay with some kind of preliminary status, whose most important characteristic was that they were not usually sent back. On the other hand, they were 72 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW not given any positive guarantees of non-refoulement; thus they remained in a limbo between refugee and migrant status, without social and legal rights, and yet without the possibility of returning home. Gradually these purely temporary administrative measures became permanent. The Scandinavian countries and Holland accorded almost the same social rights to B-status refugees as to convention refugees, others treated them like ordinary aliens. Council of Europe and the UNHCR The legal problems of individual new refugees and asylum-seekers are far from solved, but they have gradually been put on the agendas of governments and governmental bodies, both regional and international, like the Council of Europe and the UNHCR, as well as of a considerable number of voluntary agencies. Thus, a group of NGOs have financed the updating and competion of the NGO handbook on" Asylum in Europe". The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe has adopted farreaching recommendations for member states about the protection of de facto refugees. It has also made recommendations on specific groups (e.g., Chileans) and on the harmonization of procedures for the recognition of refugee status. These recommendations are not legally binding. A special advisory committee on legal aspects of asylum and refugees has addressed itself to the problem of refugees in orbit, within the context of the question of the first country of asylum. Presently, the "unwritten rule" stipulates that the country of first asylum only identifies who is not responsible for asylum-seekers and refugees. Real progress for the individual asylum-seekers could be made if criteria were established defining which country, under which conditions, must accept asylum-seekers and refugees, and appropriate measures taken that would guarantee their legal protection and fair and equitable "burden sharing" among states. Such measures would be a necessary complement to the well established quotas and other government schemes which rule the reception of new quota-refugees accepted for resettlement in Europe. The UNHCR Secretariat and Executive Committee, is currently studying legal problems relevant to the individual new refugees and asylum-seekers, and has published a handbook for governments on the 1951 Convention and its interpretation. The UNHCR Executive Committee has made recommendations on the determination of refugee status, on asylum and on refugees without a country of asylum. In 1979, for instance, the Executive Committee recommended that border police should not reject applications for asylum without reference to a central authority. Asylum should not be refused solely on the grounds that it REFUGEES IN EUROPE 73 could have been sought elsewhere. Failure to comply with formal criteria should not lead to asylum requests being excluded from consideration. If acted upon these recommendations would greatly reduce the number of "orbiting " new refugees and asylum-seekers. Organizational Expansion and Limits in International Services for Refugees This article employs studies of organizational behavior and of international organizations to propose what limitations may apply and what difficulties lay ahead for organizations, large and small, which deal with refugees. The dependence of growing masses of refugees on organized assistance raises questions as to the extent and capacities of transnational efforts for humanitarian purposes. A host of organizations, ranging in size and complexity from prominent intergovernmental institutions disposing of hundreds of millions of dollars to obscure voluntary groups, all bring life-preserving aid and other services to several hundred thousand helpless people in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa and Pakistan. Simultaneously, such agencies have been busy with smaller numbers in less dramatic situations on every continent. Both the numbers of organizations involved and the services they provide have expanded strikingly during the last decade and especially during the last three years. This expansion poses the question of what limitations apply and what difficulties may lay ahead. The liquidation of the camps remaining after World War II have involved large masses of people moving quickly into other countries. Such a description fits the war fought in 1948 for the establishment of the Israeli state, the aftermath of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the flight from the Bangladesh war in 1971, the departures from Vietnam after the collapse of South Vietnam, the Kampuchean hemorrhage and the waves leaving Ethiopia for Sudan and Somalia during 1979 and 1980. Such incidents have received formal attention from intergovernmental organizations, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM). In addition, a wide sample of voluntary agencies has joined in such n^he au thor is grateful for the support given by the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales and the Centre de Recherches sur les Institutions Internationales, Geneva. 74 I MR Volume 15 No. 1 Leon frordenker INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 75 efforts. Other refugee streams, such as the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the outflow of Cubans primarily to the United States, have been handled with much less involvement of intergovernmental machinery, although the private voluntary agencies have been active. Still other refugee incidents resembled more closely the classic pattern of trickles of destitute people fleeing from oppressive regimes. Much of the intergovernmental machinery was originally designed for such flows. It could be argued that the mass flows of refugees in recent years stem in part from causes other than political oppression, such as the economic and social disturbances resulting from civil war, radically changed economic policies or famine resulting from natural causes. Whatever the casual adulteration, refugees mean to governments on whose territories they appear new burdens to be coped with immediately. Nor can a receiving government easily hide behind indifference, for some national bureaucracies, as well as intergovernmental machinery intended to protect refugees and human rights, direct outside attention to refugee situations. Governmental needs to cope with refugee situations, especially in the developing world where local resources are thin, and the existence of specialized intergovernmental machinery has encouraged the rapid growth of transnational treatment. One index to this expansion is the increase of the total budget of the UNHCR for 1980 by six times the expenditure of 1976. UNHCR 's expenditure for 1980 is approximately $500 million and the budget for 1981 will again reach that amount. 2 Large budgets also appear among voluntary agencies, many of which, such as OXFAM, have had unprecedented success with their recent appeals for mass financial support. Personnel rosters expand with budgets; as organizational tasks grow in scope and change in quality more elaborate institutionalization follows. The transnational network created to handle refugee problems growing out of the upheavals in Indochina illustrates the process of expansion. ^'Expenses foreseen for 1980 reach nearly |>500 million", UNHCR: News from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, No. 1, April-May 1980, p. 12. The number of refugees from Afghanistan has already surpassed estimates, making it virtually certain that expenditures for 1980 will be near the $500 million level set in January. This level is nearly double the amount approved as a target at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's program which met in October 1979. For 1976 expenditures, See, UN General Assembly, Official Records: 32nd Session, Supp. No. 12, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, p. 86. For 1980 expenditures, as of mid-year and early estimates for 1981, See, UN Document A/AC, 961/578,18 Aug. 1980. See also, statement by the High Commissioner to the Third Committee of the General Assembly, 10 Nov. 1980. 76 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW The UNHCR had a modest office in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1975, where a total of one international official was employed. Five years later more than 200 officials were at work, either in Bangkok or elsewhere in Thailand in refugee camps. UNHCR designated a senior official to head the vast network of services and personnel that grew up around its expected budget of more than $28 million and its status as a leading agency. 3 This budget became obsolete almost as soon as it was produced because of the volume of new refugees from Kampuchea. In November 1979, a pledging conference summoned by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in New York pledged $210 million in cash and kind for Kampuchean relief alone. Other contributions would be made bilaterally. 4 The ICRC and the United Nations Children ' s Fund (UNICEF) found ways to bring relief supplies directly to Kampuchea. 5 In addition to UNICEF, nine other intergovernmental agencies had enough interest in Thailand and the surrounding area to present their views to the special meeting on refugees and displaced persons in Southeast Asia in July 1979 in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General decided that the UN family of agencies was sufficiently and confusingly enough engaged in Thailand so that he should name a special representative with the "high-powered" reputation so beloved in international administration. Accordingly, Sir Robert Jackson, an international official with experience stemming from World War II, became a super-coordinator. In addition to intergovernmental agencies active in Thailand, a recent compilation of voluntary agencies showed that seventeen had their own programs related to Indochinese refugees in venues ranging from Hong Kong to Indonesia. 6 Among these agencies was the International Red Cross movement, which, like some others, involved a complex of national societies. More than fifty agencies were represented at a meeting held before the July 1979 conference on Southeast Asia; jointly they drew up a statement for presentation to the conference, manifesting both their interest in cooperation and their ^N Docum en t A/AC. 96/564, 14 Aug. 1979, pp. 168/169, "Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1978-1979 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budgets for 1980". Bilateral arrangements controlled by donor governments and voluntary agency expenditures not under the control of UNHCR will come to much more than this figure. ^N Press Release IHA-33, 5 Nov. 1979, Geneva. An additional pledging conference was convened in New York in March 1980. Strictly speaking, these programs do not assist refugees, but displaced persons. Nevertheless, Kampucheans in large numbers have moved along the border with Thailand and sometimes cross it, where UNHCR and other programs give them aid in camps which are the responsibility of the Thailand government. ^Compendium on Voluntary Agency Assistance to Indochinese Refugees, Geneva, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 1979. This listing certainly is far from complete, but it does make clear that some broad, well-articulated programs and agencies with high capacities are involved. INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 77 own role as participants alongside governments and intergovernmental agencies. Thus, the transnational voluntary agencies carried with them a lengthy train of less obvious groups. Other programs of assistance to refugees emanating from governments and delivered directly, either to the Thai government or through it, were in operation. These bilateral programs do not come under the direction of the UN and UNHCR representatives but were nevertheless essential elements in the work. Finally, numerous small voluntary groups produced contributions in money or kind and were represented in yet another set of transnational coordlinative structures operated in Geneva through the International Council of Voluntary Agencies. In Thailand itself, a Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons had been in existence since 1975 to represent eighteen voluntary organizations, some of which were represented elsewhere, in relations with UNHCR and the Thai government. 7 The doctrine supporting the expansion of UNHCR and most other organizations relates the emergency assistance given recent arrivals to the more distant vista of repatriation as the best possible outcome in the future. Failing the emergence of conditions which allow for voluntary repatriation, refugees are expected to benefit from possibilities for resettlement in the country of first asylum or in another country. A variety of legal devices with international legal sanction were intended to achieve such a result over a short period of time. 8 Notions that UNHCR should in some fashion seek to change the policies of governments producing refugees have always been excluded from its organizational doctrine and its explicit legal capacities. Such conciliation would properly belong to the United Nations or other explicitly political agencies. Rather, UNHCR relies in the first instance on a doctrine of humanitarian assistance to victims of disasters caused by government. The intensity and volume of recent refugee streams have overwhelmed the earlier case-by-case method of dealing with refugees. UNHCR and other agencies now deal wkh sizeable groups without making individual differentiations. By adopting such a course within a broad notion of ^bid., p. 127. A UN official who knows the situation in Bangkok claims that at least 100 voluntary agencies are represented there. Whatever the exact numbers they are substantial. ®The relevant documents can be found in Collection of International Instruments Concerning Refugees, 2nd ed., Geneva, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1979. A fundamental statement is UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 Dec. 1950, which includes the Statute of the Office of UNHCR as an Annex. This Annex makes it clear that the General Assembly can assign additional tasks and approve evolving programs. It did so in a long series of resolutions, which are collected in UN Doc. HCR/INF/48/Rev. 2, United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. 78 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW obligations to offer humanitarian aid, UNHCR, and to some extent the entire UN system, has drawn closer to the practices of voluntary agencies which give assistance to those who have been forced, for whatever reason, outside of their usual homes. At the same time, UNHCR has formal obligations, which its officials claim to respect, to give legal protection to individual refugees who require it. Nevertheless, the explosive expansion of UNHCR programs has come in programs of assistance rather than in dealing with the individual status of refugees. Doctrines of humanitarian assistance inevitably have a short-term character. The aid that they project presumably tide unfortunate people over temporary misfortune while the conditions that caused their suffering somehow change. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance implies a managerial approach to the extension of aid, rather than one that attempts to rectify the causes of human need. Delivery of services comes first, as is logical in the relief of possibly mortal deprivation, but such a procedure involves no guarantee whatever that the suffering will stop. That it often does may be a greater tribute to human elasticity and adaptability than to the brilliance of doctrine or the success of diplomatic persuasion. Humanitarian assistance usually entails disclaimers of political intent and even political implication. These disclaimers almost invariably mask a political reality. For example, when a government decides that the presence of refugees on its territory should remain a secret to avoid creating friction with a neighboring government that prefers to avoid advertising its inhumanity, the intervention of an outside agency, whether on the basis of humanitarian assistance or not, whether in camera or in open forums, can only be regarded as a political act. Another instance comprises recent cases in Southeast Asia of governments simply refusing to allow the entry of refugees unless large-scale outside assistance were promised in advance and third country resettlement opportunities definitely existed. To react to such a situation, either the policies of the country producing the refugees must be changed or those of the country of first asylum must be adjusted so that humanitarian aid can be organized. Without such a change, presumably not even the local Red Cross could help those who sneaked past the barriers. Alternatively, those governments who would accept refugees for permanent settlement would have to move to actual programs of a size satisfactory to the government of first asylum. Such a response would also need to be organized at the international level to endow the effort with sufficient order and scope to be convincing. However such a situation is viewed, it necessarily involves decisions on policies an on programs by governments. Such authoritative decisions which instruct bureaucracies and dispense monies collected INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 79 by taxes are by definition political. The real issue regarding political activity connected with handling refugees, then, has to do with the character of the political edge and the level at which it comes into use. The tension between doctrines that emphasize minimal performance in caring for refugees and those practices which stretch beyond strict doctrinal limits accompanied the creation of UNHCR at the beginning of the 1950s. Led by the United States, governments which had cared for refugees and displaced persons during the last stages of World War II secured a series of organizational transformations intended to liquidate both their responsibilities and the problem of refugees. The wartime United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration gave way to the more specialized International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was supposed to find permanent homes for the several hundred thousands of remaining refugees. Even before that task had been altogether completed, the camp and counseling structures were dismantled. The Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration continued to operate after the IRO disappeared. The present UNHCR began working as part of the UN Secretariat in 1951 primarily to protect the rights of refugees under the Convention of 1951, which set out legal safeguards for European refugees. UNHCR was not to function as an operating agency but only to help governments meet their obligations. Its original three year mandate from the UN General Assembly has been extended for five years at a time. UNHCR doctrine functions to protect its organizational boundaries. By relying on its mandate and on the primacy of humanitarian assistance, it was able to detach itself from the less predictable activities of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the search for peace and security. UNHCR insisted its work should be regarded as technical, despite its life-saving character. Refugees and their causes . Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who became High Commissioner of UNHCR in 1965, told the General Assembly in 1977, are(( . . . an infallible indicator of the world 's political fever—a fever that UNHCR cannot cure, but the consequence of which determine, each year, the actions and concerns of this nonpolitical office ". 9 The High Commissioner and his staff formally are part of the United Nations Secretariat and a small part of the office ' s budget derives from the normal appropriation process in the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, both the doctrinal basis of UNHCR and the way its activities are framed and supported tend to draw operational distinction between it, the UN "•"Statement of UN High Commissioner for Refugees to the Third Committee". Press release, 14 Nov. 1977. See also, note 8 above. 80 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Secretariat and other agencies in the UN system.10 In this respect, the behavior of UNHCR does not differ from general expectations about any organization and especially not from other parts of the UN system which both cooperate and compete in their areas of activity. Furthermore, UNHCR ' s partnerships with operating voluntary agencies incorporate what are supposed to be clear limitations of each of the parties ' functions. In any case, the voluntary agencies have no formal place in UNHCR 's decisional structure, even though consultation can take place at various junctures in the process. Leadership in UNHCR tends always to be attributed to the High Commissioner or his immediate directorate. Initiatives which resulted in the expanded scope of the office were issued in the name of the High Commissioner. They did not come, at least until recently, from either the UN Secretary-General or from member governments of the UN. Nor could they formally come from voluntary agencies where governmental action was required. Leadership by the High Commissioner tended to give additional definition to the organizational boundaries in activities to serve refugees. The policy and decisional processes in UNHCR help to keep the organizational boundary sharp. Policies are developed primarily within the Geneva headquarters and a principal task of the senior officials is to monitor their development and application. Expansion of the scope of the office and adjustment of its policies is the subject of internal discussion and largely confidential diplomatic consultations. When the High Commissioner and his senior colleagues determine that a proposed policy adjustment may be acceptable to its main governmental supporters or clients, UNHCR often seeks formal approval through consultation with the Executive Committee (primarily for program matters) and with the broader UN machinery. Furthermore, UNHCR officials participate in regional meetings, such as those of the Organization for African Unity, as well as in such global organs as the UN Economic and Social Council. UNHCR accepted an invitation to take part in the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which organizes coordinative consultations among the agencies of the UN family. Such meetings permit UNHCR to make soundings of governmental and bureaucratic opinion. Finally, the High Commissioner and many of his officials travel frequently to the sites of refugee activities and to national capitals. As a result of sampling ^UNHCR officials consider their office exempt from the geographical distribution regulations of the UN system, which are intended to insure a broadly multi-national staff. This is based on language in Statute, Chap. 3, 15, and long practice, which emphasizes devotion to the cause of refugees. An incidental effect of the practice is generally to bar nationals of the Soviet Union and its allies from the staff. INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 81 national opinions and of the climate within international organizations, UNHCR usually can insure the acceptance of policy decisions without public controversy. Moreover, the process of consulting with senior governmental officials and participating in international conferences as head of an active organization with a high moral purpose enhances the High Commissioner 's leadership role, both within his agency and in external settings which affect it. The policy process links with an administrative process that is characteristic of an organization that must deal with considerable uncertainty and must adapt its routines accordingly. Hence a rather thick policy layer presides over more specialized officers who have considerable discretion in making decisions. These officials are organized in both geographical and functional fashions, depending on whether their responsibilities fall in the growing field of assistance or in the less expansive protection and legal fields. Field officers have general functions for the most part, although the explosive growth of assistance programs produces increasingly specialized responsibilities nearer the ultimate clients, either refugees or governmental or voluntary service agencies. Supervision from headquarters of field activities takes place in both specialized and general offices, some organized geographically and others by function, such as protection or administration. Consequently, internal policy coordination at headquarters requires considerable attention and discretion. Under the current High Commissioner, Poul Hartling, former Prime Minister of Denmark, much effort is made to achieve consensual decisions encompassing the agreement of senior officials. At the same time, a strong group of specialists concentrates on outward relationships, which include money raising and preparation for and management of meetings of deliberative bodies, such as the Executive Committee or the Economic and Social Council. Voluntary agencies that enter into service partnerships with UNHCR deal directly with geographical units while other sections attempt to ensure liaison with voluntary agencies generally and with communications media. These organizational structures and individuals within them command a technology which heightens the distinct! veness of UNHCR among other intergovernmental agencies and also sets it apart from voluntary agencies. Its officials have specialized knowledge of refugee affairs and control exclusive collections of information. By its longevity, the organization maintains a bureaucratic memory and the personal experience of officials with more than 30 years of service still is available. They can give authoritative legal definitions of refugee status and national governmental obligations. They can prepare cost estimates of settlement projects and temporary shelter for refugees. Their numbers 82 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW include specialists in counseling and the organization of educational facilities. They claim to know the capacities of voluntary agencies and have personal acquaintance with their leaders. A large proportion of the headquarters officials have served in field posts, either in administering assistance or maintaining quasidiplomatic missions in capitals, and have first-hand knowledge of programs. Thus, they can deliver products to the several publics of refugee affairs and at the same time filter crucial information from the flow in several channels. Although structures and processes within UNHCR have contributed to the defense of its organizational boundaries and its role, whether leading or parallel, with regard to other agencies, the system has been subject to increasing friction and clogging. Some of this results from its rapid expansion, some from the increased variety of its undertakings. Many decisions related to services for refugees have to be made in emergencies or to cope with unexpected developments. Time for deliberation is scant or unavailable. Therefore, policy decisions may have to be made implicitly, causing difficulties for officials who later have to interpret just what their organization will and will not do. While bureaucratic memory, based on the experience of individuals who have direct access to each other, continues to be available in UNHCR, the increased size of the agency necessarily limits its use. Moreover, many of the senior officials whose experiences reach back to the early days of the office have retired or soon will. The institutional memory is still less firm. No continuous research or planning function has been carried on in UNHCR and many special enquiries have employed senior officials or recent retirees. The consensual decisional process, favored by Hartling for major issues, may often seem time consuming. It has the merit that it promotes commitment. If it is informed by research and planning, it can have a valuable comprehensive quality. However, it also tends to reward all participants with some deference to their views in order to end controversy. It may engender a constant wariness among participants who feel themselves on the defensive in discussion of their bailiwicks and unrewarded for attempts at leadership. At the same time, it is not clear that the most senior officials, who participate in the top level meetings with the High Commissioner, dependably respond to initiatives from their juniors who may have novel suggestions or points of view but only restricted forums to present them. Finally, field officers sometimes complain of uncertainty as to whether their special views of particular situations have much bearing on decisions at headquarters.11 ^The remarks on the internal decisional process at UNHCR rely mainly on interviews with officials of all ranks and on interviews with knowledgable observers from voluntary agencies and national delegations in Geneva. Little has been published by academic researchers on INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 83 The organizational capacities of UNHCR, nevertheless, have contributed to and partly digested its rapid expansion. These capacities depend on well-defined organizational boundaries, a specialized internal policy and administrative process, possession of essential information, and a grasp of the relevant technology and relationships which permeate organizations linked to it by their interests in refugees.12 In addition, in recent years UNHCR has demonstrated a formidable ability to raise money, much of which flows out to refugees through the intermediary of other organizations. One may ask if a continual expansion of such structures can be expected and where the limits are. The existence of large-scale refugee problems, requiring the mobilization of resources on the scale of hundreds of millions of dollars and of dozens of intergovernmental and private organizations, tend to force an up-grading of UNHCR's political level. Earlier, according to the testimony of veterans in UNHCR, contacts between the UN Secretary-General, the political nerve-junction of the UN system, and the High Commissioner rarely took place. Both treated refugees affairs as delegated to UNHCR. The latter's liaison office in New York, which has a busy schedule of representation in UN meetings and contacts relating to programs, served as a connection with the rest of the UN Secretariat. Lately, however, tte Secretary-General has personally taken public initiatives regarding financing of refugee programs in South Asia and has attempted to lead in securing help for Somalia, awash in an overwhelming wave of refugees from Ethiopia. High Commissioner Hartling and Secretary-General Waldheim shared press conferences. The appointment of Sir Robert Jackson, who had been the representative of the Secretary-General in the Bangladesh relief effort, as a senior coordinator for the UN system as it relates to assistance to refugees in Southeast Asia indicates both the extent of, and the difficulties associated with, mobilizing the resources of the UN system. Moreover, the political tension around Kampuchean affairs, the expansive military policies of Vietnam and the background concerns of China, the Soviet Union and the United States all suggested that Jackson and the Secretary-General have more in mind than administering refugee camps. While such broader political concerns were anything but absent in, for example, Cyprus, the presence of refugees was far less central in the political context. Several issues of future policy emerge for organizations devoted to serving refugees and especially for UNHCR. The uncertainties surrounding the Kampuchean refugees and the policies of Vietnam with regard to UNHCR's bureaucratic evolution. Nor has UNHCR done much overtly to encourage such research. ^Such technology need not necessarily be the best or most appropriate conceivable. 84 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW its own people suggest that UNHCR 's activities can be made part of the substance of a political settlement. Such a course has a parallel in the sad career of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees,13 where the UN machinery failed to deal with the refugee situation as part of a broader political settlement. Similar comments could be made about the situation in Somalia, where the limited absorptive capacity of the country implies that the hundreds of thousands of refugees and their so far willing hosts must either have an endless international dole or else the benefits of peace making. It can be argued that UNHCR's humanitarian approach will not permit it to wash its hands of such situations. Yet its "nonpolitical " doctrine does not give it convincing leverage in political developments. It could be left with large programs and little prospect of seeing them to a conclusion. The issue then is whether the usual short-term aid to refugees can be executed in some of the most dramatic contemporary situations without enlisting UNHCR and perhaps voluntary agencies in efforts to wipe out the causes which produce refugees. Furthermore, the very size of refugee incidents as those in Southeast Asia and in Somalia, where one study by intergovernmental organizations urges a program which could reach some $180 million for the initial year,14 raises an issue of fair shares. Assuming that resources available for refugees are limited—a perfectly reasonable assumption in the light of earlier governmental and human behavior—the question arises as to whether the support is divided as it should be and whether just criteria are used. Resettlement programs for Vietnamese refugees are expensive on a per capita basis. One might question how much of their scarce resources UNHCR and other agencies can put into such efforts without neglecting situations elsewhere, such as those in Africa, where per capita expenditures have been much smaller. Perhaps a balance should and can be achieved between immediate assistance and longer-term settlement, such as the schemes proposed by Sudan to open new lands to refugees from Ethiopia. Resources might also generally be better used if they could be diverted to longer term projects of a more developmental nature, as is implied in explorations which began in the 1979 meeting of the UNHCR Executive Committee of a Fund for Durable Solutions.15 ^On UNRWA, See, E.H. Buehrig, The UN and the Palestine Refugees, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971, and D.P. Forsythe, United Nations Place Making, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. report of the Mission to Somalia, 10-16 December 1979. This otherwise unidentified report was assembled by a mission sent by the UN Secretary-General after Somalia declared a state of emergency. The mission was headed by Gordon Goun dry, a senior UN official and an economist. ^Proposed by the High Commissioner at the 1979 meeting of the Executive Committee, Doc. A/AC. 96/569. It is intended to provide ". . . the means to establish substantial and INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 85 Another set of issues has a more institutional character. The personnel of UNHCR and of voluntary agencies has expanded rapidly during the last three years. These officials deal with large scale programs affecting hundreds of thousands of people. Can the management and policy structures perform their functions? Can they adapt to new situations without breakdown? Some clear signs of reorganization and experimentation can be found in the intergovernmental structures. UNHCR has for the first time installed a training program. The High Commissioner has established a planning and evaluation office, whose director will report to him. Outside consultants have been brought in to evaluate some programs. UNHCR has appointed a senior official with a reputation for active leadership as regional coordinator for its programs in Southeast Asia. A similar appointment has been made for the Horn of Africa. An advisor on data processing designed a program, which was put into effect in the camps in Southeast Asia, for keeping track of individual refugees and their movements. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has begun using a word processor to compile compendia of operating agencies engaged in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Such organizational elaboration suggests the increasing complexity of both internal and external relationships in HCR. This is paralleled by growing complexities in relationships with governmental bureaucracies, with pressure groups and with executing agencies. Growing international programs and dramatic situations attract the attention of national bureaucracies which are touched by them, however distantly, either as donors or receivers. In some countries, especially the United States, legislators recently began to give more of their time to refugee affairs and soon were to be found inspecting remote camps. Management-minded officials and bureaucrats in many locales seek to correct what they think of as inefficiencies. Voluntary agencies not usually associated with refugee matters begin to offer support and service. Such offers, along with the need to obtain the usual services on a large scale, induced difficulties with coordination and new responses. UNHCR has shown considerable interest in creating defined channels of contact with voluntary agencies to reduce unscheduled negotiations and special provision of information Such an effort to simplify liaison is a sure sign of growing, perhaps unmanageable, complexity. These issues suggest that the definition of organizational boundaries which had become characteristics of transnational handling of refugees is increasingly threatened. Both the character of recent refugee incidents and long-term refugee integration projects linked to the development of a prospective country of settlement". It still is in the negotiating stage and is the subject of diplomatic discussions in Geneva. 86 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW the political upgrading that has attended their increasing cost and complexity of causative factors interferes with the definition of UNHCR as a largely technical organization with short-term purposes. Moreover, UNHCR increasingly is forced to coordinate its work with organizations that have other or wider purposes than its own doctrines suggest. In addition, the information on refugee affairs which once was largely in the hands of UNHCR has necessarily become more diffused and in the possession of other groups as the scale and character of the incidents dealt with require broader organizational participation. Thus, UNHCR 's distinctive technology tends also to have a less exclusive character. The accompanying institutional complexity also suggests that opportunities for the High Commissioner to exert leadership may have become less clear as to their outcomes than during earlier years. At the same time, control of an expanded organizational structure places additional managerial requirements on a layer of leading officials that once perhaps had more time for reflecting on possible reactions to refugee situations to produce imaginative responses. It can be inferred from this analysis that several factors inhibit much more organizational expansion on the part of UNHCR, barring some quite drastic policy changes. Its doctrine provides a constant brake on enthusiastic, wholesale expansion, even if its present size reflects a great deal of growth. That growth and recent demands have brought UNHCR into contact with political and developmental programs in quite novel ways. Its responses have not yet indicated full awareness and acceptance of such new contacts. Yet, a germinal response could be read in the proposals for a Fund for Durable Solutions, but the lack of much interest in the United States Congress has apparently arrested any further progress. Whether UNHCR can embrace activities which aim at the elimination of refugee-provoking policies by national governments remains anything but clear despite the association of the UN Secretary-General with refugee problems. Each one of these issues inevitably becomes the subject of debate within the bureaucracies, including that of UNHCR, which deal with refugees. The discussion is, however, perhaps the most crucial within UNHCR, where a certain tension is constantly generated between its status as an intergovernmental body and its obligation to supervise the ultimate delivery of services to individuals. Opting for expansive policies would no doubt confront UNHCR with hesitation in cooperating with and competition from other organizations, which in itself would have a dampening effect on further expansion. Some of the competition might well arise with national governments, which are themselves organizations delivering services on behalf of refugees. This competition derives from a scarcity of financial resources INTERNATIONAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES 87 for refugee operations and from political decisions on the part of national administrations to keep some aspects of such a program in their own hands. Furthermore, the growing expense of the large-scale refugee incidents of recent years attracts the attention of officials and politicans interested in efficiency and the avoidance of waste.16 Issues of efficiency and charges of waste have already become important in the United States Congress, which can easily inhibit the activities of any organization for which it must appropriate funds. National investigations and critiques almost always encourage caution on the part of international officials. In addition, the very complexity of relationships with the host of voluntary organizations, intergovernmental bodies and national governments tends to check expansion. If present refugee incidents can be reduced through repatriation or settlement, UNHCR and other organizations would be left with a record of success and with excess capacity. Because organizations dealing with refugees are intended to work themselves out of their jobs, the ability to contract is the opposite face of expansion. Large organizational arrangements can be difficult to dismantle, if past experience is a guide. The probability of future contraction can in itself become an argument against expansion, especially in relation to the appointment of permanent staff. Yet once expanded, an organization can often find employment, especially in a world which has no shortage of disasters of various stripes. Whether or not the issue of ultimate contraction has yet been clearly posed, it remains implicit in the notion that refugees should eventually be able to change their status and lead normal lives. ^A substantial piece of evidence of this increasing concern is World Refugee Crisis: the International Community's Response. Report prepared at the Request of Senator E.M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1979. Framing Refugees as Clients This article examines attempts and workings of various organizations engaged in international charity and refugee programs and the reactions of Tibetan refugees in particular. The lasting impression engendered by refugees around the world is that of a victim, a kind of immigrant and, perhaps most importantly, a client in need of assistance. 1 The refugee problem is typically viewed in terms of filling only the immediate requirements of a needy people. 2 The collection of documents and reports about refugees reflects with few exceptions, a logistical, legalistic concern, with little supporting qualitative scholarly material. Similarly, current work supports vast misconceptions about refugees as people with particular psychocultural histories. Understanding the impact of the event of flight in the lives of these people rarely enters the analysis of refugee needs, problems and programs. It is as if culture were a novelty easily dismissed in the face of the events which have turned persons into victims. Yet, the events and the aftermath have meaning beyond the functional, instrumental forms of physical survival: it is particularly clear in statements from those who have lived in refugee status for several years (Tibetans and Palestinians) that the survival of their ethnic identity or ethos is essential, and is threatened not only by the event of flight, but also, its aftermath. Quick, tragic historical events muster odd unions of sympathy and concern for their victims. The character of such events is devastating: there is the event itself, with the true threat of death by enemy and element; and there is the aftermath, marking the course of refugee life, reshaping—perhaps destroying the totality of meaning of predictable patterns of culture. "Survivors" and " refugees " are victims well beyond the event labeling them as such. 1 ! use the label "client", "beneficiary", "recipient" interchangeably to refer to that individual who is in some sense deemed helpless and needy in the minds of the donor or benefactor professionals, the charity agents. 2 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966). 88 I MR Volume 15 No. 1 Dorsh Mane de Voe FRAMING REFUGEES AS CLIENTS 89 THE TIBETANS In 1959, 85,000 Tibetans fled their homeland, taking asylum in neighboring India, Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan. Tibet, situated due north of India and Nepal and to the southwest of China has, since 1949, when the Chinese People 's Republic was established in Peking, experienced innumerable aggressive acts by the Chinese intending to establish territorial control. Resistance against Chinese troops began to weaken and citizens feared an attempted kidnap of their spiritual and temporal leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In 1959 he clandestinely fled his country for India, with some 80,000 Tibetans following suit. They fled southward over the closest border, spilling into Nepal and India, two countries with which they had a longstanding history of trading. Perhaps more important, Tibetan Buddhism had its origins in India; Pandit Nehru held the young Dalai Lama in high regard and offered his people asylum in the face of Chinese communist aggression. Apparently, both Tibetans and Indian officials assumed that the exile would be short, and repatriation would occur quickly. Twenty years have passed, and the Tibetans still live in exile, most of them electing to retain refugee status even when offered citizenship in their host countries. They have spread out from India and have grown in number with about 15,000 in Switzerland, 6,000 in Bhutan, 4,000 in Sikkim, 8,000 in Nepal, 300 in Canada, 50 in the United States, and small numbers in Taiwan, Japan, England, France, Holland and Germany. Most, an estimated 100,000, have remained in India. The history of the flight of these Tibetans is filled with anecdotal information about the character of these people who weathered the rugged trans-Himalayan trek; they are classified as refugees whose numbers and needs were noted, along with many others, in the annual reports of voluntary agencies and aid organizations. In the course of being " understood " as refugees, they have become forgotten as Tibetans. Applying the concept of " situational career" to Tibetans in exile, several interesting questions arise not only about their lives but also about the nature and workings of various organizations engaged in international charity. Though a comparatively small group and some twenty years after the event of flight, relief still comes to the Tibetan communities. How does this aid intervene in the lives of its recipients, orchestrating lives in exile? How does the social structure of organized aid imprint itself on the daily lives of refugees who have long associations with charity agents? At what point does charity relief aid become welfare; what is the difference between charity and development aid? And, what can be observed in the conceptual beneficiary-benefactor relationship which characterizes charity agents and refugee clients? 90 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW The study of the relationships between givers and receivers or benefactors and beneficiaries attends to the elements of compassion, gratitude, and mutual trust theoretically and ideally implicit in this interaction or exchange. Of particular interest is the dissonance between this model and the scenario which frequently portrays the giver and the receiver at odds, with the giver doubting the need of the recipient, and the recipient eyeing with suspicion and disbelief the offerings of the benefactor. Since the gift offered is perceived " not as originating from genuine sympathy of a desire to help but directed at confirming the survivor ' s helplessness, weakness, and humiliation ", continual ambi valence plagues the refugee who distrusts this nurturance as counterfeit. 3 " Benefaction " is not altruistic or unilateral, but virtually overwhelming in its creation of uncertain but felt obligations. 4 The benefactor, on the other hand, may feel used, that his gift is belittled. The face-to-face denial of obligatory aspects contained in the relationship between members of organizations engaged in the charitable servicing of refugees and their clients forms an insistent, binding, paradoxical structure within which neither party has a chance for graceful escape. Ma-baap, an Indian expression for mother-father, is an aptly analogical expression which describes another viewpoint of the conflictual nature of the refugee-helper relationship. 5 Expectations for nurturance and reliable, continual support are the ma aspect of interveners; the paternal authority, the controlling, punishing figure who judges the worthiness of the refugee is the baap aspect. Disturbances in communications between client and agency are within the paradoxical nature of the agency that composes their relationship. Thus it is that aid organizations, for the stated goal of self-sufficiency, run refugee settlements and nurture dependency rather than independence. The professional initially frames the refugee as"client" through an agreed upon set of criteria. This initial prejudicial judgment establishes the need hierarchy which is then matched to the services and expectations offered by the agency. In this sense, experts take custody of the refugees by taking custody of what they, the experts, have identified as the refugee 's "problem ". 6 Refugees cannot effect their own release from the situation; only others can. 3 Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 193. 4 Peter Blau argues that overwhelming benefactors produce and fortify status differences between superiors and inferiors. As Malinowski observes, "The main symptom of being powerful is to be wealthy, and of wealth is to be generous". Quoted by Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964, p. 106. 5 Stephen Keller, Uprooting and Social Change (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975). tangential but important to this article is Maruyama's persuasive argument that there are prevailing structures of reasoning or "psychotopologies" that interpretively create both the FRAMING REFUGEES AS CLIENTS 91 Like other people who are clients, refugees are categorized with an impersonal quality, like property. Then, institutions interested in absorbing or rehabilitating refugees impose an organization of relevant facts, needs and goals in a way that the institutional structures can handle them. Even the absorption of immigrants depends on the outcome of an interplay between their desires and expectations and the extent to which they can meet the demands of the organizations controlling them. 7 There objectivity and the relevance of all matter of inquiry. I believe his "non-reciprocal-causal epistemology" best describes the overarching structure of thought in such phenomenon as refugeeism. That there are universal 'truths' about refugees, that a cause and effect are "evident", that refugeeism constitutes a "social problem", and that a specific, standardized prescription for salvation is "evident", from the present-conclusive knowledge of the problem are pieces of a logic that derive selective theoretical and empirical support from one formalized, abstract, and often tacitly-perceived structure of reasoning. While Kuhn's discussion of paradigmatic thought also applies here, Maruyama's emphasis on the ethnocentricity of the nonreciprocal-causal epistemology clarifies how cultural-boundedness facilitates an organization of convincing "knowledge" in such a way that the organizers entrench themselves in the position of "experts". An hierarchy, assumed from the onset, is perpetrated in the carrying out of a solution, for instance, because the subject's (or client's or folk's) knowledge of their "problem" is designated as "biased", opinionated, uninformed, or less objective than the expert's. In such, there is a disconfirmation of refugees that forces them as "clients" into collusive "counterfeit nurturance" binds, wherein the sincerity of acts of both giving and receiving are doubted by each, though neither is in a position to gracefully escape the relationship without a deep sense of human failing. See, Thomas L. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Vol. 2 #2, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1970), and Magorah Maruyama, "Psychotopology and its Application to Cross-Disciplinary, Cross-Professional, and Cross-Cultural Communication", in Perspectives in Ethnicity, Edited by Regina Holloman and Serghei A. Arutium (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978). nrhis effective arbitrariness of who "becomes" refugees is clearly illustrated in the following statement: "While the definition of the term refugee is, with the exceptions noted above, the same in the Statute [of the UN High Commission of Refugees] and the Convention [1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and a Protocal Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons], the two documents charge different bodies with applying the definition. The decision as to who shall be accorded refugee status is, under the Convention, a matter for the authorities of the participating states. While in some states, representatives of the UNHCR participate in some way in the determination of refugee eligibility, it is the decision of the state authorities which is binding. At the same time, the UNHCR has the final say as to who shall be considered a refugee under his mandate and therefore eligible for his international protection. But recognition as a refugee by the UNHCR will not by itself either secure the refugee admission to a country or confer a legal status. And a determination of eligibility by one country does not, with the possible exception of the matter of travel documents, necessarily confer a refugee status upon the individual in other countries." Holburn,pp. 161-2. When the Indian Government was confronted with flood of Tibetans in 1959, the refugees who were Muslim were detained. There has been, historically, a rather small community of Tibetan Muslims in Lhasa, Tibet, called by Tibetans "Lhasa-kachi" or, Lhasa Muslims. India would not let the Muslims in under the same category as the Buddhists, even though they were both of the same experience necessitating, in their minds, 92 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW is an assumption that refugees are different form the " normal " resident population, that they require help to fit with their new environment and that aid is necessary and beneficial. Buehrig pointed out in his study of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) that the purpose of that organization was to restore economic viability to those refugees on the assumption that exile would then be acceptable to them. It may be noted, however, that welfare which included education, rations, shelter and distribution of donated clothing might have increased Palestinians' hostility and distrust toward charitable involvement with them, for welfare aimed at permanent resettlement undermined their own ambition for repatriation. 8 Most of the agencies involved in Tibetan rehabilitation were non-Buddhist. These agencies built houses, developed land and handicraft centers to help the Tibetans become economically self-sufficient. Their aid was not evenly distributed among Tibetan refugees, for it is the well organized and enterprising groups that attract most of the foreign attention and aid. Furthermore, differences in the Tibetan community itself have rarely been considered important by these agencies. The monks are probably the class of refugees who have suffered the most since they were least prepared for the life circumstances in exile, a life that forces them to work alongside the lay refugees in fields and carpet factories, in accordance with rehabilitation plans, rather than study and transmit the Buddhist teachings. "Cultural rehabilitation and cultural preservation were not declared within the scope of the voluntary agencies, which were mostly Christian." 9 The ambitions of the agencies had little to do with what Tibetans consider the most important aspect of their resettlementthe restoration and maintenance of monks and monastic centers as the repository of Tibetan culture. That Tibetans will seek funds to construct a stupa or gompa rather flight. In I960, the Indian Government agreed to allow the Lhasa-kachis exile. However, they were not allowed to enter as 'refugees' but rather as Indian citizens. This group of about 1,000 people was sent to Strinagar, Kashmir, in northern India, and the center of Muslim activity. There, on the outskirts of the city, the Lhasa-kachi are nearly-forgotten people. Without refugee status, they were 'unknown' to helping agencies—even in the initial resettlement, and they were excluded from any rehabilitation schemes which were organized for a host of other Tibetan refugees. The Partition was not so far in the past, and anti-Muslim sentiments combined with an historical distaste for Asian-looking people made India's decision to accept Tibetan Muslims extremely difficult. See also, Louise Holburn. Refugees: A Problem of Our Time, Vol. I. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1975, p. xviii. 8 Edward Buehrig, The UN and Palestinian Refugees: A Study in Nonterritorial Administration. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971, p. 125. sDawa Norbu, "Tibetan Refugees and Tibetan Culture," Gesar Volume IV, #4, Winter 1978, p. 44. FRAMING REFUGEES AS CLIENTS 93 than a school still upsets westerners whose appreciation of religious ritual as the integrating practice in Tibetan daily life is often minimal. Rather, the helpers express concern that the funds are being used frivolously. In India, where the Tibetan lives in exile, the Department of Rehabilitation, Indian security agents, local police, and middle-level bureaucrats continue to monitor the settlements and activities of Tibetans in the name of rehabilitation—a covert element of control. The justification for this policy is that the refugees are incapable of managing their own affairs. Tibetans are told that they cannot be managers until they "stand on their own feet". Yet in being overseen, they haven 't the chance to actualize their personal and community power for their own lives and livelihood. The Tibetan family, having reliquished some of its usual socialization functions and roles to social welfare systems in the immediate aftermath of the flight, have been unable to reclaim them. It is not unusual to hear a middle-aged mother bemoan the slippage of the traditions in her children, at the same time that she requests sponsorship for another of her children ' s schooling. Dependence begins when the refugees try to develop behaviors they perceive as expected of them as clients in order to continue the flow of rewards or aid. This form of self-estrangement contributes to the refugee's sense of powerlessness. There is the constant fear of being " summoned before a bar ", found guilty or inadequate. Indeed, the victim gets blamed for having the problem and not collaborating to solve it. So, the Tibetans, for instance, have learned to ask for sponsorship, to "see" their problem in the same way the helpers define it, and to seek the same solutions. After twenty years of such a relationship, Tibetans who do not " adapt" to the way things work in exile express a fear of personal failure in the new terms. Their young continually compete for the attention of aid organizations. To be connected with westerners has become a kind of status in itself, despite resentment of the foreignness it brings to the heart of the community. It may be that the fear of failure or doing something wrong plays on another anxiety of being abandoned by those outsiders who somehow once promised salvation with their support. It may be for this reason that Tibetans will defer to the experts, their benefactors, and do not even insist that they have a voice in the social organization of their own lives. Their silence confirms to aid organizations that these refugees are still inept at handling their own affairs and are not to be trusted. Again, the counterfeit nurturance bind appears in which neither party has a chance to carry on its role. A dynamic of the political culture in transitional nations, or, one might add, among transitional people such as refugees, is a profound distrust of innovation, of new forms of organizing their lives, since these 94 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW are challenges to the expressive meaning of both personality and structural traditions. As with nation-builders, refugees have little choice but to enter a demeaning relationship with great disbelief that the help is sincere. Again, if the world is essentially victims and victimizers, then those helpers must have a motive other than self-interest, for they certainly deny the essential, individual character of the victims by denying the inner power of a person to survive; by tampering with personal identity; and by making the person dependent upon the institution. Adding to this negative psychological relationship is the observed operation of counterfeit nurturance in the political culture of developing nations. Since aid to refugees usually comes from wealthy modern nations, it often carries with it social change or development in the Third World country. Refugee aid combines development with relief. There is a legitimate excuse for intervention. What is done with the refugees in the name of relief aid is to put new ideas into their framework for thinking and doing. The organization of refugees into refugee life must make sense to the interventionists who may measure successful rehabilitation of refugees in terms of successfully-met criteria of development, such as a certain income level. While this may play into a refugee ' s need to achieve, these new conventions often run contrary to accepted cultural mores and are the cause of much anxiety and pain for the refugee. Venturing this far in the analysis of a conventional conceptualization of the social problem of refugees, it should be clear that while dealing with refugees as victims, immigrants, and clients may help to define them, that definition does not necessarily reflect and often denies the reality of who refugees are and what constitutes problems for social concern. The formal or expert theory and fact has it one way; the folk or refugee, another. Part III: Policy Responses Voluntary Agencies and Government Policy This article examines the role of the voluntary agencies as intermediary between government policy and refugee assistance. This is explored through the four facets of assistance: advocacy; education; program initiatives; and policy implementation. Throughout the thirty years of the International Catholic Migration Commission 's experience in the field of refugee work, the voluntary sector has maintained a unique and indispensable role in the development and implementation of governmental policy in refugee matters—unique because neither government nor isolated individuals can act for refugee relief or resettlement yet remain free from bureaucratic rigidity as can the voluntary agency. Without the participation of the voluntary sector, refugee programs would be stalled in the conceptual stage, the majority of resettlement opportunities would be left unutilized and much potential good will and selfless service would remain dormant. The voluntary agency acts as an intermediary between government and individuals, enabling citizens to coordinate their efforts and achieve a goal. As a channel of good will and positive motivation, the voluntary agency helps to influence governments to establish and carry out comprehensive and humane refugee policy; the voluntary agency may also act as an instrument of implementation of that policy. The voluntary organization is institutionalized to the extent of being able to plan and carry out a program to achieve a purpose. The organization is relatively nonbureaucratic in nature when compared with government or intergovernmental agencies, and therefore exhibits a certain flexibility unknown to highly bureau cratized structures. The need for such an intermediary function in refugee work became evident after World War II, when hundreds of thousands of persons were left homeless. Neither the governments concerned nor the newly reorganized international bodies had the means or leverage to resolve the situation. Many voluntary agencies came into being in those postwar IMR Volume 15 No. 1 95 Elizabeth Winkler 96 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW years to help tackle the seemingly insurmountable problems of the , displaced persons. The agencies themselves have endured, as refugee problems have continued to multiply, but the locus of work has moved from Europe to the Third World where the majority of refugees are located. ICMC was created in the postwar years to be the official Catholic body for immigration and migration affairs. Working through national affiliates in approximately fifty nations, ICMC is available in both first asylum and resettlement countries. Cooperation, aimed at influencing governments to promote humane, comprehensive refugee policies, falls into four categories: advocacy; education; program initiatives and policy implementation. Essentially, the ICMC network of refugee agencies seeks to create the conditions for a humane refugee policy and then acts to realize this policy through concrete means. ADVOCACY Advocacy for aiding and accepting specific refugee groups and for adopting a coherent refugee policy is the first step available to a voluntary agency eager to influence governmental refugee policy. ICMC affiliates have testified in government hearings and have intervened legislatively and bureaucratically to address the needs of specific refugee groups. The Migration and Refugee Services (MRS) of the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) has pressed for the recognition and admission of numerous refugee groups, including the Iraqis in Greece and, more recently, Cubans. MRS has also lobbied successfully for financial support for unaccompanied minor refugees from Vietnam and encouraged speedy government action for the admission of these youths. In Canada, the Catholic community pressed for the admission of Chilean refugees and advocated increased admissions of Southeast Asians. This agency has also maintained that family reunion should be part of official policy. The French affiliate, Secours Catholique, has urged increased admissions quotas for the Southeast Asian refugees and for other groups, especially from Africa. Argentinean bishops have expressed hope for the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees and West German bishops have issued a comprehensive statement on the legal and social aspects of refugee asylum in the Federal Republic, encouraging both church and government to clarify the uneasy situation of the asylum seeker. In calling upon governments and individuals to respond to the needs of specific refugee groups, ICMC affiliates urge governments to adopt comprehensive refugee policies to avoid ad hoc and often unsatisfactory solutions. Recently, legislation with a comprehensive approach has been passed in Canada and the U.S., with the result that all parties concerned VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 97 know what the expected total of refugee admissions will be for the year and can plan accordingly. However, preplanning efficiency is not the primary goal of ICMC advocacy in refugee policy. Of far more importance is the recognition of humanitarian ideals, especially if policy making is not to be reduced to self-interest. The independence of the voluntary organizations and their loyalty to humanitarian values assures that the role they play will be to challenge governments to act in a just manner. EDUCATION Education is the second task of the voluntary sector. The decision of governments to act in favor of refugees depends not only on the will of legislators and other elected or appointed officials, but also upon the desires of the people of a nation. Good will does not occur automatically; it must be engendered and encouraged. Public education can be accomplished through various media: the press; films; printed information; and selective use of television and radio. ICMC affiliates have used and continue to use these methods to stimulate public awareness and concern. In addition, the particular networks available to the Catholic community, specifically the parishes and the Catholic press, have been useful instruments for public education. In the midst of the Vietnamese boat refugee crisis, bishops in both first asylum and resettlement countries called upon governments, churches and individuals to greet, shelter and resettle those refugees. These proclamations set the tone and direction of the Catholic community action. In certain countries the ICMC affiliate or Bishops' Conference intensifies its efforts in public education with the publication of brochures, circulation of slide presentations and by making experienced speakers available to community and church groups. 1 POLICY INITIATIVES Policy initiatives are the third way in which voluntary agencies can influence governments through pilot projects and experimental programs which demonstrate the legitimacy and worth of such efforts for refugees. In this sense, the voluntary sector can forge a path that may later become government policy. ICMC affiliates in the Philippines and the United States are cooperating in a pilot project for language education for Southeast Asian refugees in the Bataan Holding Center in the Philip-^CMC's American affiliate, the Migration and Refugee Services of the USCC, has produced a slide presentation on refugee resettlement portraying the steps of integration. Canadian bishops published a booklet in which the new Canadian refugee law was explained. 98 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW pines. Convinced that pre-resettlement language training is necessary for successful integration into a country of final destination, ICMC affiliates decided to launch such a program although government funding was not immediately forthcoming. Reports of the program's success have encouraged the governments and intergovernmental agencies concerned to negotiate for a substantial increase in the scope of the project so that thousands more may receive language training. The utility of such pilot projects has been demonstrated in Australia as well. In that country, primary responsibility for resettlement of the Southeast Asian refugees rests with the government, but this has not been a problem-free solution. Refugees tended to develop a dependency syndrome after receiving state aid and had a difficult time in making a complete adjustment to their new community and country. Recently a pilot project of direct resettlement into rural communities with support from parishes was begun in Australia. The initial results indicate fewer problems of dependency. A revolving fund has been created to facilitate this form of resettlement and now parish resettlement is an option in Australia 's refugee policy. Here, the churches ' initiative has become an option in refugee policy, with the result that this policy itself is more flexible and responsive to the needs of the refugees. IMPLEMENTA TION The final and most concrete aspect of voluntary agency influence on public policy is in the area of implementation of policy. Paradoxically, it is in implementing government policy that the voluntary sector may have the most effect on policy, for the government will orient its policy depending on the success or failure of government and voluntary agency cooperation. If not helped to carry this burden, the government may declare the problem unsolvable and refuse to admit or aid refugees. Although these four aspects of voluntary agency influence on government policy have been described and analyzed separately, together they comprise a logical, interdependent whole. Advocacy for admitting and aiding refugees would not be honest if guarantees of resettlement were hot forthcoming. The aim of public education is to foster action in favor of refugees. Pilot projects of new refugee programs are created for realization on a larger scale through government and private support. The ability to implement government policy is based on successful efforts in advocacy, education and policy initiatives. All of these efforts of voluntary sector and governmental cooperation have as their goal the improvement of the lot of the refugee. Because of its flexibility and small-scale, the voluntary agency mobilizes an essential network through which nationals help refugees become citizens. Immigration Policies and Refugees in Australia An examination of immigration policies shows that Australia modified its White Australia Policy of 1901-1958 to meet the needs of displaced persons and refugees during the past thirty years. Before World War II Australia had no refugee policy. Refugees were simply admitted if they met the ordinary migration requirements and rejected if they did not. Voluntary societies or private organizations might help with the passage costs and settlement expenses of those eligible, but the Australian government rarely assisted. Not even the Evian conference of 1938, when Australia agreed to consider the problem of refugees from Nazi Germany (and somewhat reluctantly consented to accept 15,000) was sufficient to persuade the Australian government to accept responsibility. During these dacades Australia was spared the problem of refugees from contiguous nations and transportation to the "Island Continent" was costly. During World War II, however, several hundred non-Europeans were admitted to Australia as asylees: Chinese businessmen evacuated from New Guinea, the Solomons and other Pacific islands before the Japanese blocked further movements; and many Filipino, Chinese, Malay and Indonesian crewmen and fishermen. In the rush of wartime conditions these few were permitted to land or stay in Australia without going through the business of seeking and obtaining a certificate of exemption from the dictation test. 1 During the war years some of these refugees established businesses—restaurants, carpentry shops and mechanical repair shops—and there was some intermarriage with Australians. When hostilities ended most refugees returned home except for about a thousand. The Labor government, headed on this issue by Prime Minister Chifley and Minister of Immigration Calwell, was wedded to the White Australia viewpoint and made arrangements to deport these final thousand. Legal challenges and the need for special legislation so delayed ^rom 1901-1958 the White Australia Policy was enforced by means of an education test superficially designed to ensure a high level of education among immigrants, but in practice a device to exclude non-European settlers by administering a dictation test in a language the immigration officer felt sure the immigrant did not know and by granting a certificate of temporary exemption to Japanese wool-buyers, Chinese merchants, Asian students and other persons whose temporary residence was acceptable to the Australian authorities. IMR Volume 15 No. 1 99 Charles Price 100 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW things that the deportations had not been effected by the time the Liberal Party under Menzies defeated Labor in 1949 and permitted the refugees to remain. Although it was a somewhat unenthusiastic permission, those concerned received a special refugee status that entitled them to work and live wherever they wished but not to become naturalized or bring in wives, children or assistants. The Liberals also granted a similar status to about 600 Chinese students and business assistants, admitted on temporary permits, who refused to return to China after the communist government came to power in 1949. When Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore then refused these refugees, the Australian government decided to permit them to remain on the same terms as the wartime refugees, with the title of "Liberal-Attitude Status". In 1956 and in 1966, both of these refugee groups received full rights to become naturalized and sponsor families and relatives. This remained the position until asylum problems arose in 1975 with the Timorese and Vietnamese. Labor 's postwar population policy was based on the premise that, for reasons of defense and development, the Australian population should increase by some two percent a year—one percent by natural increase and one percent by net migration (nine-tenths of which should be British). It quickly became clear, However, that not only were insufficient Britons available but that those ready to come were prevented by inadequate transportation. At this point Immigration Minister Calwell visited some camps for displaced persons; there he determined that many refugees were suitable for Australian developmental programs and that American shipping was available for rapid transport. Subsequently he persuaded his Cabinet colleagues to make an agreement with the International Relief Organization whereby Australia not only contributed to shipping costs but provided initial accommodation, which included either employment or the provision of maintenance for two years. Under this scheme over 170,000 displaced persons arrived, during 1947-52, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe. These groups proved so successful that the Liberal government continued this and similar programs until 1972. The Australian government, both Labor and Liberal, continued the earlier system whereby voluntary societies could bring in refugees, either on their own account or else on behalf of relatives, provided they guaranteed accommodation and either jobs or maintenance. Some were well established societies—Red Cross, Catholic Immigration, World Council of Chruches, Lutheran World Federation and Jewish Welfarebut others were newer ethnic organizations such as the Russian, Serbian, Armenian communities of Sydney or Melbourne. Largely, the voluntary societies concentrated on those refugees who did not meet the high standards required by the government programs: the aged, the ill and physically handicapped, those with occupational skills not required by IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND REFUGEES IN AUSTRALIA 101 government schemes, widows, single mothers and separated families. They helped certain categories of persons not central to government programs, notably the survivors of the prewar refugee groups: Jewish victims of concentration camps; Armenians and Assyrians; White Russians seeking to leave communist China; and so on. At times the Australian government gave more than simple permission to enteroccasional accommodation in government hostels; allowances and pensions; and grants for old people 's homes. It is against this background that we should assess the criticism leveled at Australia by members of the I.R.O. and various humanitarian persons in Australia—that Australia was less interested in helping the unfortunate than in finding healthy and industrious "factory fodder " for its population and development programs. This criticism reached new heights during the World Refugee Year, 1959-60, and the Australian government offered to take 20 handicapped families. Later, when it became known Norway had offered to take 100 individuals and New Zealand 140, the Australian government raised its offer to 67. Although not at all generous, this has to be set against its permission for voluntary societies to take many more hardship cases. All in all, between 1946 and 1976, Australia received for settlement well over 350,000 refugees. It also received numerous victims of upheavals who were not in such circumstances as to win international refugee status. The challenge to admit Asian refugees—as distinct from granting some kind of status to those admitted as visitors but claiming asylum later—had come to the dying Liberal government in the early seventies via Idi Amin 's expulsion of Indians from Uganda. The Liberal government refused to make any concession, simply agreeing to admit a few (about 200 in all) under the strict migration criteria applying to non-Europeans. The Whitlam Labor government coming to power in late 1972 increased this number somewhat, but was slow to react to the Chilean crisis and even slower to the Vietnamese and Timorese crises of 1975. When over 1,700 Timorese arrived by small boats in northern Australia, the government allowed them to stay pro tern but could not decide how to treat them and kept them on a special temporary status. With the Vietnamese, the government delayed a long time, partly because it was strongly opposed to U.S. policy in Indochina and had spent a long time forging amicable relations with Hanoi. Eventually, just before Saigon fell, Australia agreed to admit a few persons, such as relatives of Vietnamese already in Australia, and after Hanoi occupied the south agreed to help the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with refugees in Hong Kong, Singapore and other areas outside American influence. Some 500 were selected and brought to 102 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Australia at government expense, installed in government hostels, and given the maintenance benefits and English training facilities normally available to European immigrants coming under government auspices. Yet, even at this time, no clear refugee policy was announced. The Fraser Liberal government, succeeding Labor late in 1975, decided to grasp the refugee nettle more firmly. The new Minister for Immigration, Michael Mackellar, quickly gave permanent status to the Timorese, announced special concessions for Lebanese visitors in Australia anxious about returning to civil war conditions, appointed a special interdepartmental committee to work with voluntary agencies on refugee matters, and decided to formulate a clear-cut refugee policy, especially in relation to the Indochinese. In 1976 the Indochinese situation was simpler to assess and cope with than later. There were in Thailand, and other Asian countries, still many Vietnamese who had fled their country when Saigon fell, and a number of Kampucheans and Laotians. The numbers were not enormous and the Australian government felt it could comfortably continue Labor 's policy of working gently with UNHCR; it therefore agreed in January 1976 to take another 800 refugees and yet another 550 in November; these were to be mainly Vietnamese, Laotians and Kampucheans from Thailand, to be brought to Australia at government expense and settled initially in government hostels. At this time the government was not unduly bothered by the asylum problem; the first small boat arrived in Darwin in April 1976 with only five persons and then no others until late in the year when two more boatloads arrived with 106. These were not excessive numbers so the government held them for preliminary medical checks in the Darwin quarantine station and then flew most of them to Wacol migrant hostel in Brisbane to decide who wanted to join relatives in the U.S. or France and who wanted permanent residence in Australia. At the hostel they received government maintenance and special training in English. Similarly, when two more boatloads of Vietnamese were found off the northwest coast in May 1977 the 25 persons were taken to the small port of Broome for health and customs checks and then sent south to the Graylands immigrant hostel in Perth and later granted permanent status. Nevertheless, the boat problem had dangerous possibilities. Thus Mackellar warned various groups against sponsoring boat arrivals on a large scale and in his long awaited policy statement in May 1977 made it plain that the Australian government alone had the right to decide who should enter and in what numbers. At the same time he made it clear that Australia was committed to an ongoing refugee program: he reminded Australians that their country had ratified the Convention on the Status of Refugees; was a strong supporter and executive member of the UNHCR; and was giving that body considerable funds to repatriate and resettle IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND REFUGEES IN AUSTRALIA 103 refugees overseas; adding that the government would not only encourage voluntary societies in their work with refugees and quasi-refugees, but would itself continue to bring in numbers of Indochinese refugees. To facilitate all this the Refugee Unit of his Department would be strengthened, selection officers would be posted in Thailand and elsewhere in Asia, and regular reviews made to assess how many Indochinese could be admitted "consistent with our capacity as a community to resettle them". This statement gave no clue as to numbers—clearly hoping they would not be too numerous, but events soon forced a change. First, the boat movement direct to northern Australia increased dramatically. They came a few at a time in small boats, arousing much public interest and media activity, provoking active protests from wharf-laborers in Darwin, leaders of the Labor Party, Australians concerned about unemployment and from those worried about Australia ' s northern defenses. Though 1977 was an election year thie government kept cool, allowed the unauthorized arrivals to stay and have the benefits of government hostels and services, but withheld permanent residence status and issued warnings over Radio Australia to this effect. This continued until May 1978, the peak time for unauthorized boat arrivals. What in fact was happening was that Malaysia and Indonesia, receiving most of the boat refugees from Vietnam, were becoming impatient at the slowness of major countries of resettlement to help them with their rapidly growing camp populations; they therefore allowed some boats to refuel and resupply, and then press on to northern Australia. The Australian government did its best to involve other countries of resettlement, with some success, but the price paid was an Australian agreement to take specified numbers of refugees, less now from Thailand than from Indonesia and Malaysia. In May 1978 Mackellar, having reminded everyone that Australia had already accepted some 9,000 Indochinese refugees since April 1975, announced Australia would accept another 9,000 in the fiscal year 1978/9; after the Geneva meeting in December 1978 he raised this to 10,500 and after the Geneva meeting of July 1979 still further to 14,000, for the year 1979/80. In fact, arrivals were somewhat above target so that by June 1980 Australia had received over 37,000 Indochinese refugees and promised to take 14,000 more in 1980/81. Leaving aside China, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Indonesia, the major countries of first asylum, these figures put Australia fourth on the list of receiving countries, after the U.S., France and Canada. The figures also appeased Malaysia and Indonesia and this, plus the restraint after July 1979 of Vietnam in forcing citizens out, has reduced the number of unauthorized boat arrivals to nearly zero. The only aggrieved bodies are Thailand, and the Laotian and Kampuchean communities in Australia, who feel Australia is doing too much to help Vietnamese and not enough 104 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW for the Laotian and Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. The approximate division of those arriving is 32,000 Vietnamese, many being ethnic Chinese, 4,300 Laotians and 1,200 Kampucheans, totaling 37,500. In handling this Indochinese intake the Australian government has kept firm control, allowing voluntary agencies to nominate and resettle some of the 5,000 or so other refugees coming each year but, with the Indochinese, it has kept all the selection process, and most of the resettlement, firmly in its own hands (except for family reunion cases where refugees, once settled in Australia, can themselves nominate close relatives under the general family reunion arrangements). The government has not been nearly so hard-pressed as in 1948-51 when handling 170,000 displaced persons under the Australia-1.R.O. agreement. By the mid-seventies the migrant hostels were very different from the old camp huts: pleasant brick buildings in all capital cities (except Hobart and Canberra) with family bedrooms and facilities; a large communal dining hall; properly equipped playgrounds and preschool centers for children; classrooms for English and other courses; medical, dental and counseling services; rooms for housing and employment officers charged with helping newcomers find permanent homes and jobs; and all these services are subsidized so that newcomers can live adequately on maintenance grants roughly equivalent to unemployment benefits. These hostels serve all immigrants coming to Australia under direct government auspices, although there is a tendency to put Indochinese in certain hostels partly because it is easier to concentrate suitable interpreters and teachers in one place. Refugees are expected to stay in these hostels for at least three months, for intensive courses in the English language and in Australian institutions, customs and lifestyles. To help with the move from hostel to community after about three months, the government has enlisted the support of voluntary organizations; these provide " hosting " or" friendship " groups to help the refugee family not only with jobs and accommodation but also with settling into suburbia, getting to know local facilities, joining neighborhood activies and making friends. Under grant-in-aid schemes voluntary agencies offer social work services and certain ethnic and church organizations receiving some public monies are asked to help Indochinese families. Additionally, the voluntary agencies have agreed to operate a loan scheme whereby they collectively receive a block grant from the government which they lend to refugee families leaving the hostels to cover costs of furnishings and the like. The government provides "continuation" classes whereby refugees living outside the hostels can attend courses in more advanced English through classes or home tutors. In mid 1979, when humanitarian persons and institutions were urging the government to accept still more refugees, and pressure from Malaysia IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND REFUGEES IN AUSTRALIA 105 and Indonesia was very strong, Mackellar decided to challenge the voluntary organizations. He felt that considerable government resources were going into the settlement of Indochinese refugees—indeed earlier refugee and immigrant peoples, such as those from Lebanon and Turkey, were sometimes indignant at the care "lavished" on the Indochinese compared with what they themselves had received a few years earlier—and he felt that if the voluntary organizations were more involved there might well be both a wider spread of refugee families and more Australians knowledgeable, interested and sympathetic. This was one of the factors in mind when he agreed to raise refugee intake from 10,500 to 14,000 a year in July 1979. An experimental scheme was launched in the Australian Capital Territory when the Catholic Church and the Indochinese Refugee Association (ICRA) received permission to settle 65 families. The government selected and transported them, paid an initial maintenance grant, but the two voluntary societies took full financial and other responsibility for the housing, furniture and clothing. They ensured that the family went to English and orientation classes, if held in a near enough center, and helped the family settle in and find jobs. Under this particular scheme there were one or two host families designated to provide most of the faceto-face contact and guidance; a support group was responsible for the finances; and the main organization was responsible for ensuring that the host and support groups were operating efficiently and replaced them if they were not. This experiment worked sufficiently well, both in Canberra and in several farming villages in the region, for the government to launch, late in 1979, the Community Refugee Resettlement Scheme. Churches and other voluntary societies were invited to cooperate and the regional Migrant Settlement Councils (small bodies of public servants and interested individuals charged with supervising the initial settlement process) asked to distribute applications. The guidelines stressed the importance of having adequate English teaching resources available and of avoiding loneliness, i.e., ensuring sufficient Vietnamese, Laotians, Kampucheans, and so on, in the general area to provide friendship and companionship for the newcomers. Some of the " professional " migrant welfare groups and others have been concerned lest refugees be exploited by their hosts. As a result it has started somewhat slowly, but by June 1980, in addition to the 65 families in the Canberra region (270 persons), some 81 families (300 persons) had been brought in under the scheme and settled in urban and rural areas some distance from the capital city hostels. The third element in the resettlement program is family reunion. For ordinary migrants family reunion requires the sponsor to be wellestablished in Australia and to arrange for accommodation and mainte- 106 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW nance or a job. Refugees, however, may sponsor close relatives who are themselves refugees and take advantage of government hostels and services, or of Community Resettlement Scheme sponsors. As more refugees come to Australia it could well be that a large proportion of the refugee quota will go to such persons, in which case the Vietnamese will have more advantage and the Laotian and Kampuchean groupings will fall still further behind. Herein lies one advantage of the Community Resettlement Scheme, especially if it helps the government go over the target number to select refugees with no connections in Australia. Currently, the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs is reviewing the Community Resettlement Scheme and the whole process of refugee resettlement. It appears that adequate satisfactory accommodation is available, both in hostels and in the community. Some complain that the Indochinese from hostels tend to find housing in suburbs near their hostel—because these are the areas they first explore—and that consequently Indochinese concentrations are building up which at times cause ill-feeling and even a white backlash. This applies less to Indochinese coming under the Community Resettlement Scheme, which encourages dispersal from the beginning, and to other refugees such as Jews from Russia, Assyrians from Iraq, White Russians from China; these are both fewer in number and are cared for by friends or voluntary societies. Likewise it seems clear that the on-arrival English and orientation classes are working reasonably well; newcomers who go through the intensive three month course are usually able to perform unskilled or semiskilled jobs, to manage with Australian shops, services and officials, and generally begin to find their way in Australian society. Those seeking skilled or professional jobs need assistance and there are complaints that continuation classes are too few, not sufficiently advertised, and at times inadequately staffed. Others say that the on-arrival courses are insufficiently oriented to practical needs. There is usually some substance to such complaints but much work has gone, and is still going, into devising courses which best meet the general need while the government is increasing funds for teaching. The hosting and friendship schemes are more difficult to assess. Some groups work very well and others take their responsibilities lightly while many refugees move out of hostels without any group to look after them, except their own compatriots. This problem is less serious than that of unemployment, the main difficulty. Though Indochinese, in particular, are well-known for their determination to find jobs, even less pleasant ones, the high Australian level of unemployment makes finding work difficult. About two-thirds of those Indochinese refugees who have been in Australia a year or more are thought to have employment, though this does not hold generally. Similarly the unemployment rate is higher in IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND REFUGEES IN AUSTRALIA 107 Perth and Canberra than in Sydney or Melbourne. Those without work survive on unemployment benefits and subsidized housing and, if wise, spend their spare time at continuation English classes. Though the refugees find unemployment depressing, they agree that their conditions are infinitely better than when in flight or in the refugee camps of Asia. It is also clear that they are not the only ones who suffer. Young Lebanese and Turks in particular are finding it very hard to find work, despite the help provided by the employment agencies. It is very largely the unemployment postion which troubles many Australians and from time to time their unease comes through in the media, wall slogans and political debate. Many wish to eliminate the whole refugee program until Australian citizens have more work, and this will unquestionably be an issue at the forthcoming federal election. It is significant that the Australian Labor Party's June statement on immigration makes almost no reference to refugees; it concentrates on improving services to immigrants and extending family reunion. To date the Liberal government (since December 1979 with lan McPhee as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs) has said it intends to maintain the refugee program, partly for humanitarian reasons and partly because it feels Australia will emerge more quickly from the economic doldrums if it maintains some population increase by immigration, and therefore growing markets and more economic confidence. At this point we must set the refugee program in the general immigration context. During the last year, and in the plans for 1980/81, the total settler immigration of 90,000 or so a year has been divided into four principal components: family reunion, about 25,000 or 28 percent; net migration gain from New Zealand, about 22,000 or 24 percent; general eligibility or national need immigration (under a points system stressing skills in short supply and ability to speak English and adapt to Australian conditions) about 23,000 or 26 percent; and refugee immigration, about 20,000 or 22 percent. These 20,000 refugees, some 14,000 of whom will be Indochinese, does not in fact cover all refugees entering the country: some earn sufficient points on skill, adaptability and English to enter in the general eligibility category while others may enter in the general family reunion category as distinct from the refugee reunion category. It is difficult to say how many refugees or quasi-refugees do this, maybe three or four thousand a year, although these are usually persons in less difficult conditions, whose resettlement is less urgent. However many they may be, such persons do not make any difference to the basic fact that Australia can substantially increase its refugee intake only by lifting its total settler intake or by expanding the refugee category at the expense of the other categories. New Zealand migration is difficult to touch as this would mean breaking the long-standing agreement 108 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW allowing Australian and New Zealand residents free movement across the Tasman Sea. Family reunion is too sensitive an area to touch, especially when earlier immigrants, somewhat resentful of the favorable treatment extended to Indochinese, are still trying to bring their own families and relatives to Australia. The general eligibility category is the obvious one to cut—as the Labor Party intends to do if returned to power at the general election—but this would mean reducing the number of those whose skills are needed in Australia and whose ability to speak English and adapt to Australian conditions (migrants from Britain and North America, for instance) allows them to settle with very little claim on public funds and services. The total intake may be difficult to raise much further given Labor Party hostility to large-scale immigration and public unease concerning unemployment; even now a 90,000 new settler intake represents a net gain of some 70,000 or 0.5 percent annually. On the other hand, particularly if Vietnam restarts its policy of forcing out unwanted citizens, Australia may have no alternative but to increase its Indochinese intake even further. In the meantime two things are clear. First, Australia is, even if somewhat reluctantly, making a substantial contribution towards resolving the refugee problem in Southeastern Asia—the 37,700 refugees taken so far represent 0.26 percent of total population, compared with the Canadian intake of 0.23 percent and the U.S. intake of 0.17 percent. Second, Australia has moved a long way from its prewar policy on refugees. Not only has the practice of keeping out non-European refugees gone completely but the government has moved firmly into the refugee business, covering transport costs, providing initial accommodation and maintenance, and making available expensive welfare and lanaguage training services. Though voluntary organizations and private persons are still involved, the government has unquestionably taken the lead. At least two thirds of current refugee intake is under government auspices and at public expense; this pattern, a far cry from that of earlier days, is likely to remain for quite some time. Documentary Note Australia's Settlers: The Galbally Report Leslie F. Claydon The 1970s constituted a period of review and readjustment of attitudes toward migrants in Australia. Matheson (1975) noted that the Labor Party Conference of 1971 declared a party platform which eschewed, <( . . . discrimination on any grounds of race or color of skin or nationality". One year later the ruling Liberal Party lauded the fact that half the increase in the Australian work force was attributable to migrant workers. The socioeconomic situation of migrants became a matter for critical scrutiny by the dominant culture during this period. Hollingworth (1970), among many others, made strong representation about the lack of interpreter services in the courts and hospitals. The word "multiculturalism " began to gain currency and particular attention was accorded to the relation between migrants and the schools. In 1973 the report of the Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission recommended detailed investigation into the educational problems of migrant children. 1 The newly created Commissioner for Community Relations took up precisely that recommendation. His first report, published in 1976, stated that the primary schools of Australia were drastically ill-equipped to cope with the reality "that about 700,000 Australian children begin school with a first language other than English ". 2 Notably, an appraisal and modification of educational services became the principal institutional sign of heightened consciousness of cultural diversity during this period. 3 The extreme end of the 1970s saw momentous events in Southeast interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission, Schools in Australia. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1973. 2 Commissioner for Community Relations. First Annual Report. Canberra: Australian Government Printer, 1976. P. 32. 3 The Publications and Stock List of the Clearing House on Migration Issues of the Ecumenical Migration Center issued in 1980 featured 120 entries on the topic Children and Education with publication dates between 1973 and 1978. Between the same dates there were ten published items on Settlement and twelve on Migrant Welfare. I MR Volume 15 No. 1 109 110 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Asia. In Australia, a decade or more of cultural correcting did much to maintain the national regard for immigration and settlement issues. It is plausible to suggest that this was perhaps what produced the comparatively rapid governmental response to the new refugee situation which was heralded by the arrival of the first of the " boat people " in Darwin. 4 On the first of September, 1977, a four person committee was instructed by Parliament to conduct a. revie^v of Pos t-Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants. Its chairman was Frank Galbally Q.C. The committee's report was presented on the 27th of April, 1978, accepted and fully endorsed. The government consequently announced an expenditure of more than fifty million dollars above current levels to implement recommendations from the report. Provisions included a program of initial settlement, 5 part of which were special intensive courses in English and formal orientation courses on housing, education, employment and other areas of need. The program would be carried out within or from Settlement Centers. Special financial assistance equivalent to unemployment benefit would be granted to those engaged in the six to twelve week course. A similar provision was accorded those who did not take up residence in a Center upon arrival but, instead, joined relatives and friends in the general community. Special provision was made to instruct the children of incoming migrants in knowledge of English. 6 Further courses for adults would be developed in extension of the initial courses in the English language mentioned above. The courses would have specific relevance to certain employment needs. Accompanying this recommendation in the Galbally Report there is explicit mention of the fact that; a) "between 1967/8 and 1976/7 about 400,000 adult migrants had arrived from non-English speaking countries " about seventy-five percent of whom would have needed special English language instruction but ". . . many have had no ... (such) . . . instruction ..." and b) "different levels of education . . . require flexibility in the range of educational provision ". 7 The Government provisions also recommended extended interpreter services in areas such as health, law and education; the establishment of ^rant sugges ts that the first boat to arrive was the Kein Gang, KG. 4435. It carried five young men and landed April 26, 1976. commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Papers. Government Initiatives in Post-arrival Programs and Services to Migrants. Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1978. ®In the State of New South Wales this has been centered in existing schools near the Settlement Centers. In the State of Victoria special Language Centers have been created, sometimes within the precincts of the Settlement Centers and sometimes in buildings near to them. ^t was stated that only 21,035 of these had attended full-time courses in English language. AUSTRALIA' S SETTLERS: THE GALBALLY REPORT 111 Multicultural Resource Centers to provide a focus for welfare and selfhelp activities for migrants; 8 small scale project funding to encourage ethnic and voluntary agencies; the creation of an Institute of Multicultural Affairs; and the creation of Multicultural Television Service. Plainly all this provides a marked contrast to the institutional framework which pertained in the 1950s in Australia. It is, of course, early to say just how different it will be in its effects if, indeed, one can ever overcome the formidable methodological difficulties which face anyone attempting that enterprise. On the other hand, and with this in mind, it is legitimate to make some observations. To date movement out of the Settlement Centers, in Melbourne at least, has predominantly been either into one inner suburb which contains a number of associations and resource centers geared to Southeast Asian refugees, 9 or into the districts immediately surrounding the Settlement Centers themselves (Table 1). The indicators are that there will be further movement of these groups outward from the areas of initial post-center settlement once dependence upon subsidized housing lessens and the need for guidance in everyday matters is less frequent. This has obvious implications for schooling. At present the more distant suburbs have comparatively little contact with the new immigrants and few material resources or specialized personnel to make particular educational treatment for them possible. Considerable attention and provision has been provided in the schools in districts where initial post-center settlement has been heavy. Employment patterns are not easy to trace. Agencies such as the Commonwealth Employment Service seek to preserve the confidentiality of their dealings and, in any case, are insufficiently staffed to undertake complex analyses of job careers. Of four refugee intakes into one Settlement Center between June 18 and September 28, 1979 (a total of 141 TABLE 1 MOVEMENT FROM SETTLEMENT CENTERS JULY-DECEMBER 1979 Number of Persons Into Adjacent Into Inner-City Leaving Suburbs Suburb Center A 390 145 56 Center B 158 51 36 Totals 548 196 92 8 An example is that of the Geelong Multicultural Center in the State of Victoria. ^ndo-China Refugee Association (ICRA) 112 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW adults), slightly more than a quarter had received only a primary education and eleven percent had received some form of tertiary education. Of the stated heads of families (mainly male) and single persons within the group (N = 86) approximately one-third could not speak English on arrival but twenty-two percent spoke fair to good English. The range of past occupations in the entire group ran from button-maker and fisherman to computer programmer and doctor. The effectiveness of the English language and general orientation course structure is presently being researched by a Commonwealth funded team from the University of Sydney. The parameters of the task are again wide. The program concerned embraces a comprehensive age range,10 diverse educational backgrounds and a great range of innate abilities. Plainly further and later research will be needed before it can sensibly be judged whether or not the timing and duration of these courses has been appropriate for all ages, backgrounds and abilities.11 It may perhaps be argued that Australia, in respect to the Southeast Asian refugee incursion, does not completely exemplify the approach that Stein describes as the usual mode of action, namely <( . . . the ad hoc, emergency, reactive approach ".12 Certainly, the Galbally Report embodies recommendations designed to avoid such an approach entirely. 10 Age is not a factor so far as the provision of orientation and language courses upon entry into Australia is concerned. "It is fair, I think, to say that what exists at present does not adequately meet the requirements of flexibility in dealing with the different levels of education that the Galbally Report lays down. 12 B. Stein, The Refugee Experience: An Overview of Refugee Research. Paper presented at a conference on The Refugee Experience at the Royal Anthropological Institute and the Minority Rights Group. London, England, February 22-24, 1980. Canada's Response to Refugees This paper traces types and numbers of refugees to Canada since World War II. As policy and practices have evolved considerably in that period a brief review of key developments precedes the discussion of Canada's response to the current refugee situation. Throughout Canadian history, since colonization by France, immigrants have arrived in Canada for political reasons. With curious irony, however, a policy of refugee intake, per se, has existed formally only since the Immigration Act of 1976. Prior to that time, Canada 's continuing and sometimes intense involvement with persons who immigrate as refugees required special action of the federal government and the Cabinet. Such political urgencies were considered as non-recurring issues. That a government should establish a policy within which refugee intake would be accommodated was a proposition which dawned only after the waves of post World War II displacements. Political action slowly but inexorably occurred thereafter (cf. Dirks, 1977). The term " refugee " itself remained a flexible category until the implicit adoption of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Convention relating to the status of Refugees of 1951. Despite easily recognizable distinctions in social status, the official status of " refugee " was absent in Canadian legislation (cf. Dirks: 1977, Ch. III). Even large blocs of refugees immediately after the close of World War II required ad hoc measures of Orders-in-Council for admission to Canada. Yet, this cumbersome procedure resulted in Canada' s first massive immigration (some 40,000 displaced persons by the end of 1948) in recent history (Dirks: 1977, 154-5). Efforts in the creation of any coordinated policy on refugees, per se, were halting, despite the creation of a Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1946. That department was unable to accede to the provisions of the UNHCR Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951; rather, it remained an implicit set of ^he writer is indebted to members of Refugee Task Force and Refugee Policy Division of the Department of Employment and Immigration, especially Michael Molloy, C. Thorlakson and T. Falsetto for invaluable information and data. Joan Brown, of the Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation, also provided many of the data sets. None of these persons or departments bears any responsibility for errors or interpretations herein. Support for this work was given by the Faculty of Arts, York University. IMR Volume 15 No. 1 113 C. Michael Lanphier 114 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW « working definitions for the Canadian government until final ratification of the Convention in 1969 (Dirks: 1977, 181-2, 232). This movement from a nation-centered to an internationally-centered commitment developed gradually since World War II, but little change would have been noted, had political upheavals not aroused the attention of Western nations in unrelieved succession in the past two decades. Of signal importance have been the uprisings in Eastern Europe which have resulted in infrequent but large undulations of political refugees. The first such crisis to demand Canada's participation in the international resettlement effort occurred in 1956 in Hungary. Upon the launching of a campaign in the mass media and by pressure groups portraying the refugees as" freedom fighters", just over 37,000 Hungarian refugees landed in Canada within the two-year period ending in 1957 (Dirks: 1977, Ch. IX). This massive undertaking involved federal and voluntary organizations in an accelerated coordination effort, as the availability of sponsors and delivery of services to refugees depended largely on the nongovernmental sector (Dirks: 1977, 202^., Department of Manpower and Immigration 1974a, 119). Canada's subsequent efforts at the time lay in the less visible but structurally significant attentions to rights accorded to immigrants, especially refugees. The establishment of the Immigrant Appeals Board provided a judicial body empowered to quash deportation orders if the country of origination were likely to subject the (would-be) deportee to serious reprisal or recriminations. Nonetheless, significant undertakings of refugee resettlement occurred immediately after the Czech upheaval of 1968, that in Uganda in 1972, as well as a small but important resettlement of Tibetans contemporaneously. As indicated in Table 2, the some 12,000 Czech refugees represented a large enough number to indicate an affirmative response of Canada to an unambiguous political crisis. The refugees accepted by Canada showed a rather high socioeconomic profile: household heads were disproportionately young, well-educated and skilled: some 70 percent of the household heads fell in the 15-44 age range; 19 percent having more than 12 years formal education; and some 33 percent being either skilled or professional (Dirks: 233; Employment and Immigration, 1975). A longitudinal study indicated that after three years the unemployment rate of just below 10 percent was somewhat above the national average, and a certain but only moderate occupational deflection had occurred in comparison with jobs held in Czechoslovakia. The proportions in professional and technical occupations were rather high although the level may be accounted for through response biased from low returns (Canada Department of Employment and Immigration, 1975). CANADA S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 115 Ugandan Asians, who followed some four years later in 1972, had an even higher profile: about half had 12 years formal education or greater; more than half of the prospective workers oriented to commercial or sales jobs (Dirks: 244; Employment and Immigration, 1977). The Ugandan rate of entry into the labor force was rapid and extensive: after one year some 85 percent of the adults (male and female) were participating. Unemployment rates were moderately higher than average—an overall of 10 percent unemployed. The job profile included 24 percent in professional/managerial/technical jobs, and another 36 percent in clerical and sales occupations (Employment and Immigration, 1977). Canada 's first experience in receiving refugees from Asian origins occurred in 1970, when the federal government sponsored a group of refugees from Tibet, of whom 228 persons finally arrived. Despite uncertainty in religious and cultural requirements, theTibetans arrived only to encounter problems of social adaptation different mainly in degree from those encountered among refugees from other origins. They experienced a rather prolonged adjustment period, being isolated from other Canadians to a greater extent than desired either by the refugees themselves or by their government sponsors (Smith, 1976). The job profile after about two years indicated a 65 percent participation rate (male and female) and a 12 per cent unemployment rate. The job types centered toward operative blue-collar positions with wage rates generally above the prevailing minimal levels (Smith, 1976). The experience of the early seventies provided initial affirmative answers to two disparate but cardinal questions: 1) Do selected refugees adapt well to Canadian society within a relatively short period of resettlement? and 2) Is there a need for a policy initiative especially for refugee assistance? As for the first, it was apparent that not only persons from European origins, but also those from Asiatic and African origins showed initial signs of adaptation similar to those of other immigrants to Canada. In other words, ethnic origin has little or no direct effect on speed or degree of refugee adaptation in Canada. The affirmative answer to the second question relating to refugee policy remained rather complicated in light of existing practices. Breadwinners were selected on the basis of their youth and education or occupational training, including language facility in English or French. This consistent practice served as a functional equivalent to policy, as these guidelines or operating procedures yielded a type of selectivity of refugees in each cohort. Yet, such practices were not necessarily part of a more broadly articulated plan with regard to numbers and mix of refugees to other immigrants and the population already resident in Canada. The need for a more clearly articulated policy was manifest. Operating 116 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW procedures, however standardized over time, remained to be applied in an ad hoc manner on each occasion in which comprehensive aid to political refugees was required. EVOLUTION OF REFUGEE POLICY The evolution of refugee policy in Canada has developed in increasingly broad and detailed ways in recent years. This evolution may be highlighted by the following four points: 1) Adoption of the UN definition of Convention refugee; 2) Differentiation in legislation of refugees into Convention and other " Designated Classes "; 3) Development of methods of sponsorship for refugees in both Convention and Designated Classes; and 4) Formulation of annual refugee plans. Adoption of Convention Refugee Status Canada did not sign the UN Refugee Convention upon its formulation in 1951. Rather it opted to use the definition as an operating guideline for identifying refugees. Decisions regarding the admission of refugees fell squarely, according to the government of the day, within the terms of national sovereignty (Dirks, 1977, Ch. VIII). The formal adoption of the Convention refugee definition in 1969 implicated Canada in an international commitment, however tenuous, to assist such refugees as a continuing, rather than ad hoc, undertaking. Correspondingly, the government has responded, since 1969, to ten refugee movements of differing sizes, in comparison with three (very large) movements in the two decades prior. 2 These responses stand largely outside the legal frame of the UNHCR Convention, as they relate to activities undertaken abroad, whereas the Convention specifications relate to rights and privileges of refugees within the bounds of the country. Differentiation of "Designated Classes" from Convention Refugees The specific requirements which conform to the Convention Refugee status cannot be met in every situation in which large numbers of persons experience or perceive political retribution in their home country. As a result, the Immigration Act of 1976 enabled the government to establish ^he recent movemen ts are the Tibetan (1970), Ugandan Asian (1972-73), Special South American (1973-79), Cypriots (1975), Special Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-78), Iraq Kurdish (1976), Angola/Mozambique (1976-77), Lebanese (1976-79), Argentine political prisoners (1978) and Indochinese (1979-present). CANADA' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 117 " Designated Classes" for persons whose collective situation placed them in a de facto refugee situation, even if the Convention criteria might not all be met. The use of "Designated Classes " overcomes the brittleness of a single definition, so that definitions used by Canadian visa officers can more closely fit the characteristics of the particular group of displaced or persecuted persons. Refugees under "Designated Class " specifications are examined individually as to whether they meet the specifications for eligibility and admissibility. If both are affirmative, they can be issued a visa as" Landed Immigrant"—the same status as other immigrants to Canada. Currently there are three different " Designated Classes " in vigor for a two-year period: 1) Indochinese (citizens and residents of Kampuchea, Laos, Vietnam, leaving after April 30, 1975); 2) Latin American (citizens of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay still residing there); and 3) Self-exiled (citizens and residents of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, applying outside Eastern Europe). The categories differ among themselves in specifications. Persons from Indochina and East Europe, for example, need not demonstrate fear of political reprisal but must be residing outside their home country (and for East Europeans, outside the bloc of countries so included). To qualify as Latin American designated class on the other hand, citizens must be residing within their home country and demonstrate fear of some reprisal if they remained. In any case, the specifications are adapted to the particular political exigencies which, in turn, depart from strict Convention refugee terms. In effect, a second stream of refugees can be defined at the pleasure of the government so that total number of refugees is augmented while the conditions for eligibility vary from time to time. The number of eligible persons of Designated Class would exceed the disposition of Canada to accept them all. In selection of refugees, for admissibility, the government officers use a criterion of likely adaptability to Canadian life measured in a far less precise or exacting way than when applied to ordinary immigrants to Canada. The latter are selected under a system which tests ability to establish successfully in relation to labor market conditions, with points awarded on a series of social and economic indicators. In the case of refugees, the immigration officer must take them into account. Yet, the additional assistance available to refugees by government, sponsors and voluntary agencies mitigate adaptation difficulties. Admissibility, therefore, involves a certain amount of 118 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW discretion, even though the ultimate criterion remains the potential success of establishment in Canada. Development of Sponsorship Arrangements Over and above the intake of Convention and Designated Class refugees planned by the federal government, the legislation has included provisions enabling groups of individuals and organizations to sponsor refugee individuals or families. Groups of five or more persons or a corporation may undertake support of the refugee and dependents for a period of one year. In addition national organizations may sign "master agreements" with the federal government enabling their constituent groups (in the case of a church, its local parishes or congregations) to sign sponsorship undertakings with minimal formalities. Policy development has therefore encouraged participation of the private and organizational sectors in sponsorship while maintaining the centralized procedure of admissions. Numbers of refugees admitted to Canada may thereby vary not only with international political conditions but also the level of participation of the private sector within Canada, as private sponsorships are supplementary. Formulation of Annual Refugee Plans With the development of attention to refugees as a separate category of immigrants, has come the annual planning exercise specifically addressed to the Canadian commitment to refugee intake in the following year. In the first instance the planning endeavor is conducted independently of other immigration concerns. Assessments are made of prior commitments, their possible extension, and new sources of refugees given the world situation. Quotas for anticipated refugees are attached to each category. The plan announced in early 1979 specified the following for the refugee intake of that year: Indochinese 5,000 East Europeans 2,300 Latin America 500 Convention Refugees (elsewhere) 200 Contingency reserve 2,000 Total 10,000 (Employment and Immigration, Annual Report, 1980) This plan was revised upwards during summer, 1979, to include 23,000 Indochinese refugees, by absorption of the contingency reserve and an increased ceiling on the quota. CANADA ' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 119 The planning exercise is complicated administratively as it must be related to overall immigration policy, governmental fiscal year planning, and international developments. The levels of overall immigration result from a negotiated plan involving provincial economic and social concerns as well as from forecasts of natural replacement and net immigration. To date, refugees have been considered as one component of net immigration upon augmentation of the refugee intake, as in 1979, the ceilings of immigrants to be received rises correspondingly. A number of demands, sometimes conflicting, bear upon the determination of the annual refugee plan. The planned intake represents a commitment both internally to Canadian provincial governments and the voluntary sector and externally to the UNHCR. Its budgetary implications have to be secured. Finally, infrastructure has to be arranged both abroad and for resettlement in Canada. Yet, in light of current estimates of numbers of refugees in the world of over 8 million, scattered temporarily in more than 40 countries, the existence of a"contingency reserve" provides latitude only for small if effective reaction to emergencies. Few other alternatives, however, appear immediately obvious for a Western nation. Doubtless policy revision will become as commonplace an exercise as formulation of an annual refugee plan. REFUGEES ADMITTED TO CANADA In terms of numbers of refugees admitted to Canada, Canada lacks a continuous record of data all of which are classified according to similar characteristics. Table 1 presents in aggregate form the waves of refugees and displaced persons arriving in Canada for the period 1947-1967, inclusive. Clearly Canada's more vigorous resettlement occurred in the decade immediately succeeding World War II, when a near quarter million persons arrived as refugees, if not officially so described. They were almost entirely of Eastern European origin, although the specific reasons for the movement of each group and wave was preceded by particular political circumstances. The large number of Hungarian refugees in that period has two distinct origins. Some five thousand were political refugees immediately after World War II. The largest proportion, more than 37,000 refugees, arrived in the two year period, 1956-1957, following the Hungarian uprising during that time. Canada received comparatively few refugees in the second near-decade, 1959-1967. Most camps of displaced persons had been cleared, with some difficulty, by that time. Only a substantial influx of refugees of Yugoslavian origin intervened before the political events in Czechoslovakia accelerated intake activity in 1968; thereupon, some 12,000 Czech refugees 120 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW TABLE 1 REFUGEES, DISPLACED PERSONS AND STATELESS IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA, 1947-1967, BY ETHNIC ORIGIN 1947-1958 1959-1967 1947-1967 Hungarian 42,987 2,640 45,627 Polish 42,533 1,211 43,744 Russian 32,925 491 33,416 German 20,610 204 20,814 Yugoslav 19,613 11,320 30,933 Jewish 17,406 574 17,980 Other E. Europe 3 39,346 1,565 40,911 Other W. Europe 13 7,502 354 7,856 AllOthers 0 377 554 931 Total 223,299 18,913 242,212 SOURCE: Canada: Department of Employment and Immigration, 1974, Table 3.6 NOTES: ^banian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, Estonian, Finnish, Lettish, Lithuanian, Romanian, Turkish. Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swiss. c Chinese, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian and all others. entered by the end of 1969. These data are specifically detailed, along with refugees through successive years until the present, in Table 2. These data are classified more precisely and allow a year-by-year account of refugee intake over the past decade. It will be noted that until 1975 one refugee cohort per period predominated the intake of refugees, with relatively small additions from various origins. The period 1970-71 witnessed relatively low refugee movement to Canada. With the expulsion of ethnic Asians from Uganda early in 1972, however, the intake resumed its increasingly undulating yearly pattern, followed in 1973 by the beginning of reception of Chilean refugees—a flow which has waxed until the present. The ascending totals of refugees from 1975 onwards is attributable to multiple movements from Chile, Indochina (especially Vietnam), Lebanon and Mozambique. Not until early 1979, however, did the movement from Indochina assume its presently predominating influence as a source of refugees. The figure in 1979 of 19,818 refugees from Vietnam represents the largest intake of people from any single country to Canada since 1976, when immigrants from Great Britain totaled over 21,000 persons. Since World War II Canada has received some 324,660 immigrants as refugees, displaced persons, or" Designated Classes". The largest proportion, 79 percent, were from Central and Eastern Europe, especially immediately postwar. Refugees from Asia accounted for 10 percent of the CANADA' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 121 total; with the exception of Tibetans, they were all very recent arrivals. Africa and South America accounted for 3 and 2 percent respectively, with the remainder, 6 percent from various aother parts of the world. REFUGEES AND DESTINATION IN CANADA The destination of refugees and "Designated Class" immigrants to Canada is partly the result of agreements struck between the various provinces and the federal government and partly a matter of the wishes of the immigrant. Quebec, in particular, has a Ministry of Immigration which sets policies and quotas for reception of refugees. In the case of other provinces, the policy is pronounced by the federal government after formal consultations with the provinces. Overall, Table 3 indicates that the proportions of refugees received by the province follow the rank, but not proportionate level, of population in the province. Proportionally, Ontario receives a larger share of refugees than its present proportion of total population, although its share of all immigrants arriving in 1979 is even higher. Of the various origins only refugees from Latin America are mostly concentrated in regions-other than Ontario. Quebec has received the second largest proportion of refugees. These refugees form a larger part of the total number of immigrants received than in most other provinces. Latin American refugees are more heavily represented while those from Eastern Europe are less heavily represented in Quebec. Alberta ranks third in proportion of refugees arriving in 1979 while British Columbia ranks closely behind Alberta, with largest proportions arriving from Indochinese origins. All other regions received refugees more or less in proportion with their population and number of immigrants in total. SOCIAL PROFILE AND INDOCHINESE REFUGEES As a result of priority selection of families with children, Indochinese refugees arriving in Canada in 1979 clustered in the younger age ranges, with about 15 percent being under school age and another quarter of school age (6-17 years inclusive). On the other end of the age continuum, only two percent was age 60 or over. A dependency ratio, number of young and old as a fraction of those eligible for the work force, of .72 represents a high proportion of dependents. As one-half the males and about three-fifths of the females age 18 and over are married (although the partners may not have both arrived in Canada in some cases), it can be estimated that couples average more than two dependents each. 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J ' ^ ^O tOOO co t^. tOtrs ^ '^ tOOCO^O tOCO '^ ^ COt^. t^.^D cOT-l <' •"g'3 T-lT-lOO^DOtOT^ pQ 0 T-1 T-l T-l T-^ I I ^ "^ I § 111.1 .h Illii 1 ^ ^ S o o a ET ^ ^ M u h ^ & S S3 I I I ^ 0 § Ji'1 N '^ x£ •I S3 ^ -8 R e3 ^\ ^ I § '^ 1 i ri i l ^i I § s-i a II la i ^^ ' " § ^'° § ' s :a § . "''§ > " a. B S w Q § ^-§"^0 5-iiS |-§ §§ '^ s >^ »» t^ (^ '" rt ^i^-iiz V ( 3 fl 1) ^ S r^ §' " ell I' 8 I l-s^^i ^fcS^Sg'-'S ., • ' ^ si-S § a H»S-Sg"2" I s •g •a ^ ^ I 1^^"-"M 2 124 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW with responsibility mainly for themselves, even though they may be part of an extended family group. While educational background of Indochinese refugees appears low in the overall, a certain amount of those having no formal education experience may be attributable to the unusually young age profile. Thus the data on educational background in Table 4 are classified separately for "principal" arrivals (heads of households and unaccompanied adults) to adjust for the age disparity. Nearly all "principals " have elementary education, with a median of nine years. Roughly about one in five of the "principals" has some trade or (para-) professional education. About one in eight have some university education. By birthplace, the profile for persons born in Vietnam is similar to that discussed above, as refugees from that origin constitute the largest number of refugees to date. Among those from Kampuchea, their numbers are concentrated in the secondary-or-less category, with trade or university training being rare. The profile for persons born in Laos differs in that a greater proportion have taken trade or (para-) professional training. Information about occupation is derived from responses on visa applications. Correspondence between these intentions and occupations which refugees will have obtained either in launching or later on in their careers in Canada is unknown. Yet the data in Table 4 indicate availability and a first approximation as to status levels to which refugees may orient themselves in the Canadian labor market. Overall, only 27 percent of the 1979 arrivals indicated an occupational intention which was codable according to the codes normally used in occupational classification in Canada. Among "principals " this codability reaches a level of only 54 percent. Thus a substantial majority of persons destined for labor force participation and a majority of other refugees have no prima facie orientation in terms of the Canadian occupational structure. Among the refugees who indicated an occupational intention, bluecollar occupations, especially relating to repairing and manufacturing, predominate. By contrast, only small minorities indicated either whitecollar or middle level occupational intentions. By far the largest uncodable category among "principals " was that of "new worker", a category indicating intention to join the labor force but with insufficient training or work experience to provide an occupational orientation. Variation in intended occupational orientation by birthplace is only slight. The Vietnamese profile corresponds to that noted above. By comparison, Kampucheans are " new workers" in greater proportion. Similarly, among Laotians, the largest single category is that of " new CANADA ' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 125 TABLE 4 EDUCATION, INTENDED OCCUPATION AND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE CAPABILITY INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, 197 9 & (%) Education (%) Sec. Trade Number None or Less School Univer. Total Cases Principal 11 3 74 11 12 100 10,512 Total 27 62 6 5 100 24,573 Intended Occupation (%) White Mid Blue Number Collar 0 Range d Collar e New f Other 8 Total Cases Principal 6 8 40 29 17 100 10,512 Total 3 4 20 17 56 100 24,573 Official Language Capability (%) Eng. & Neither Number English French French Eng. nor Fr. Total Cases Principal 12 6 4 78 100 10,512 Total 632 89 100 24,573 SOURCE: Department of Employment and Immigration, Special Tabulations. NOTES: arrivals January 1, 1979—January 5, 1980 ^eads of families or single, unaccompanied adult Managerial, professional clerical, sales Service, manual, repair ^o previous job ; no stated intention ^Students, housewives, nonworkers worker ", with proportionally more cases than average falling into bluecollar manufacturing. Refugees who indicated a substantive occupational intention were reflecting a moderate-to-considerable number of years of workforce experience. If "new workers " are excluded, only 11 percent of the prospective labor force entrants had no prior formal work experience. Rather, some 42 percent of them had more than five years work experience, with only slight variation in that proportion by birthplace. Thus there is only a loose and very much ad hoc "fit" between the profile of occupational intentions expressed by refugees and the present structure of occupations in Canada. The implications of this disjuncture are somewhat mitigated by the significant proportions of "new workers " many of whom are young entrants to the labor force. In practical terms, however, the urgency both of occupational training and counseling is 126 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW paramount. The orientations of the recently-arrived Indochinese refugees appear vague and labile. The resolution into a clearer profile of occupational intentions remains one of the greatest challenges in the resettlement process in Canada. Most refugees face the work world as yet another new experience to encounter. In terms of language abilities, only about 12 percent of all immigrants could communicate with even minimal proficiency in either of Canada 's official languages, English and French. Data in Table 4 indicate that the low levels of knowledge of English or French characterized not only dependents, but also to a lesser extent, the "principals ". As only 22 percent of the "principals " could express themselves with any degree of fluency in either of those languages, mainly English, the need for training in either English or French has surfaced as one of the immediate requirements. In all practical terms, all arrivals of school age and beyond were candidates for language classes. 3 SPONSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE As previously indicated, Canada 's refugee assistance for Indochinese refugees especially represents a mix of governmental and private sponsorship. Although such a combination has occurred in response to earlier refugee movements, notably the Hungarian movement in 1956-57, the present arrangements appear more broadly based both geographically and organizationally. Not only have local groups, religions and voluntary organizations undertaken individual initiatives of sponsorship of refugee families, but they have provided a network of services to sponsors and families over and above that offered from governmental sources. Collaboration with federal, provincial, and local governments has been close enough to coordinate delivery of services with minimal or no overlap; it although services in Cantonese are widely available in Canada, services in Vietnamese were initially available only in larger metropolitan areas. They were quickly diffused as the year progressed. Services in Khmer, Mandarin and Lao were diffused in the larger metropolitan areas only late in the year. Gaps in coverage remain. The Government of Canada was prepared tor provision of English or French classes to refugees upon arrival through a combination of subsidized language classes, special classes in regular schools and some supplementation through volunteers. The Government of Quebec established its own network of French language classes for all immigrants. Private sponsors were assisted in finding these classes both through voluntary organizations and the branches of the Department of Employment and Immigration. They were advised categorically to insist that all adults and school-age children be enrolled in such programs. Refugees who were sponsored by the Government of Canada risked losing their subsidy if they failed to attend language classes regularly. CANADA' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 127 has been distant enough to permit criticism of policy (Adelman, et al., 1980)4 The processing of refugees in camps and until arrival at the final destination is identical for all refugees unless the sponsor has nominated a particular individual or family. Most private sponsors, however, have requested a family group of a certain size with the option of accepting or rejecting any particular refugee family group so matched. The response of the private sector to sponsorship of Indochinese refugees commenced in quantity midway through 1979, after active encouragement by the federal government, including the agreement which committed the government to sponsor one refugee for each one privately sponsored, as discussed above. Through March, 1980 some 36,000 requests for sponsorship were made by private groups. By the end of December, 1979, some 13,400 privately sponsored refugees had arrived in addition to another 11,200 under governmental sponsorship auspices. As the time lapse between initiation of sponsorship request and arrival has varied from three weeks to five months or more, it is not possible to reconcile numbers of requests with numbers of arrivals even in an approximate fashion. 5 While the private sponsorship system was widely diffused throughout all provinces of Canada, the proportions of requests follow population size. A month-by-month analysis of applications indicates, however, a definite wave moving from West to East in a period of six months. Requests in 1979 from sponsors in the Prairies and the West were proportionally heavier through June. The wave of sponsorship requests moved easterly within two months, so that Ontario sponsors predominated in the third quarter of 1979. By September the rate of applications had grown considerably in Quebec. Applications from private sponsors in the Atlantic regions increased in turn during the fourth quarter. In the first quarter of 1980, the sheer number of sponsorship applications dropped noticably but evenly across provinces. Presently, the provinces with the higher rates of private sponsorship are those with large metropolitan areas. In overall numbers of private sponsorship applications it appears that they have superceded even the upwardly revised expectations 4 Organizations were vociferous, for example, when the federal government announced in November, 1979, a veritable curtailment of its own sponsorship of refugees on a matching basis with the private sector. This curtailment was rescinded and the governmental sponsorship program augmented in April, 1980, after a federal election brought a change in political party in power. In any case the voluntary organizational sector spearheaded the resistance at the risk of losing a certain margin of popular support (Adelman, 1980). technically, it has not been possible to obtain a "flow" table which traces the cases from initiation through interview, visa and arrival in Canada to date. 120 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW of the federal government. By December, 1980, the private sector will have sponsored more than one half of an expected total of 60,000 Indochinese refugees. With two exceptions, the distribution of privately and go vernmen tally sponsored refugees corresponds closely in each province. The heavier volume of applications for private sponsorship by groups in Ontario (and to a lesser extent British Columbia and Manitoba) resulted in a somewhat lighter distribution of governmentally sponsored refugees in those provinces. 6 Privately sponsored refugees arrived in Quebec late in 1979. Yet the Quebec provincial government has planned to augment the provincial intake for 1980, possibly up to 10,000 additional cases (Adelman, et al., 1980). The wave of public enthusiasm was accompanied by a certain backlash of organizational consequence. Advertisements began to appear in Canadian dailies in August, 1979 warning the public of a possible geometric expansion of Indochinese immigration as high as a 15-to-one ratio of current refugee intake (Toronto Globe and Mail, Aug. 24, Sept. 12, 1980). 7 Polls on public reaction to the refugee aid activities taken about the same period revealed mildly negative sentiments on the part of nearly two-thirds of the nationwide sample (Toronto Star, May 21,1980). In recent months public reaction appears to have dimmed. Likewise, publicity about the refugee aid programs from both governmental and private sectors have deflated to low profile. Thus the activity on refugee assistance appears to proceed more smoothly when the matter does not appear as an issue of wide-scale public concern. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Canada ' s response to refugee problems has oscillated both in level of intake and in degree of organization of activity since World War II. Positive responses to refugee movements from Central and Eastern Europe following the cessation of hostilites and subsequent political upheavals represented a series of ad hoc responses yet with substantial numbers received. ''Yet services of professional counselors of the federal Department of Employment and Immigration are concentrated in the more heavily urbanized metropolitan areas (Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg), so that it is mutually advantageous for governmentally sponsored refugees to be located there. ^he new ly-appointed Minister of Employment and Immigration announced the increased level of Indochinese refugees intake at the Edmonton refugee reception center in April, 1980, when only a small contingent of the national press corps was present. Newspaper accounts were brief and short-lived. CANADA' S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 129 The notion of refugee as defined by the UNHCR Convention was adopted only in 1969 by Canada, although it had been used implicitly since 1951. Two implications followed from this ambivalence. First, Canada as a government appeared reticent to assume responsibility for refugees as an international commitment, above and beyond national goals, until late in the sixties. Secondly, and more important, the definition was somewhat maladaptive if used exclusively. Canada adopted a broader if more complex position. Eligibility may be determined either strictly as a Convention refugee or as a member of a "designated" class—the latter category may relax or set aside entirely the Convention definition and provide an alternative definition appropriate to tthe circumstances of the group in question. Recent legislation has accommodated both Convention refugees and Designated Class provisions as general categories. The existence of the definition of three different " Designated Classes ": Indochinese, Latin American, and Self-Exile (East European), each with differing specifications, indicates a distinctly innovative and flexible governmental approach in determining eligibility for selection under relaxed refugee admissibility criteria. The approach of determining admissibility of refugees who satisfy one of the above criteria falls more closely under policies of national interest and sovereignty. It follows levels of population growth adopted as yearly policy statements. As refugee movements occur independently of national policy, the degree of fit is uncertain during periods of substantial pressure for refugee intake. Recent developments indicate that overall levels set on a yearly basis have adapted to changing conditions by repeated midcourse adjustment. These adjustments have represented flexibility and responsiveness; they have in turn made the relation between refugee intake, immigration in general, and population levels considerably more fluid. Analysis of a series of refugee movements during the past decade indicates that success in adaptation, if measured in terms of socioeconomic adjustment, varies somewhat independently of particular cultural background. Rather, "success" of adaptation depends on a substantial provision of services to refugee arrivals, including language instruction and prolonged, if informal, supervision by sponsors. More recently, both public and governmental attention has concentrated on Indochinese refugee aid. The arrival of nearly 25,000 refugees in 1979, three-quarters of whom were Vietnamese origin, is the largest yearly refugee intake in recent history. Compared with immigration of persons from all other countries to Canada in the same year, it is the largest identifiable group. While an Indochinese intake of slightly higher level (over 30,000 130 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW arrivals to a total of 60,000 refugees) has been established for 1980, the responsiveness in future years has yet to be determined but will probably be lower. While specific refugee movements wax and wane, the numbers and diversity of refugees in the developing world have augmented dramatically. Which refugee groups will be better served by resettlement in Western nations than in neighboring areas of first asylum remains a much debated question. In that perspective, even an innovative and broadened policy appears woefully ethnocentric and restricted in an international perspective of ffrowinff demand for resettlement. Documentary Note Indochinese Refugees in Canada Sponsorship and Adjustment In July 1979, the government of Canada issued a new policy which raised the quota of Indochinese refugees to 50,000 and introduced the one-to-one matching formula between privately and government sponsored refugees. 1 Since the admission of the total target number of refugees was made dependent upon the prior initiative of civic groups to sponsor their share of 25,000, the private sector was, in effect, invited to enter into partnership with the government in the settlement of refugees. The new policy met with overwhelming success; private sponsorship groups were formed across Canada overnight. In addition, volunteer organizations, such as Project 4,000 in Ottawa, were set up in several cities with the explicit objective of assisting Canadians in the formation of sponsorship groups and providing them with whatever services they could muster. By the end of August 1979, 1,420 groups across Canada had applied to sponsor refugees; by the end of January 1980 the number of sponsorship groups came to 5,457. Under the new policy, the refugees' introduction to, and initial settlement experiences in, Canadian society will differ significantly depending on whether they are government or privately sponsored. Government sponsored refugees are aided in their settlement by local Employment Centers and traditional Immigrant Service Organizations. The former provides the refugees with financial assistance during the six months full-time language training and until they can place them in available jobs. The latter conduct orientation programs in which refugees are acquainted with basic aspects of the Canadian urban way of life and ^he government made use of a little known provision in The New Immigration Act of 1978 which made it possible for local groups of at least five Canadian citizens (or permanent residents) and local legally incorporated organizations to sponsor refugees. The Act also enabled national organizations with humanitarian traditions to enter comprehensive sponsorship agreements with the federal government in order to underwrite the commitment of their local member groups. Up to summer 1979 several church organizations had already signed so-called umbrella agreements with the government. JMR Volume 15 No. 1 131 Gertrud Neuwirth Lynn dark \62, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW which are available for any other services the refugees may require, such as assistance in finding housing or enrolling children in schools. Privately sponsored refugees are placed, upon arrival, in the care of a sponsorship group which assumes "financial and moral responsibility " for them during their first year of residence in Canada. The sponsorship group usually finds accommodation before the refugee has arrived and provides clothing and furniture. If it is decided that the refugees should be enrolled in the official language training program the sponsors support them financially during this period and continue to do so, in all cases, until the refugees find work or the sponsorship year expires. The refugees learn about the Canadian way of life directly from their informal interactions with sponsors; rarely, if ever, are any agencies involved in this orientation. THE "CAREER" OF SIXTEEN SPONSORSHIP GROUPS AND REFUGEES In the first phase of this study,2 sixteen sponsorship groups and their respective refugee families were closely studied and monitored since the beginning of August 1979. All of these groups were scheduled to receive "their" refugees on August 6, 1979, on the only direct flight from Hong Kong to Ottawa. 3 Owing to the small number of cases, the findings concerning the facilitating role of sponsors and the initial resettlement experience of refugees can only be tentative; they are, however, supported by interviews with additional sponsors and refugees. By and large the sixteen sponsorship groups included the range of characteristics which are normally found among sponsorship groups in general, particularly as far as the loci of group formation, the group's size, resources and division of labor are concerned. Generally speaking three different loci or bases of group formation can be distinguished. First, groups can be organizationally affiliated, that is, formed among members of established organizations, such as churches; second, groups without organizational affiliation can be recruited at their place of work; or, third, groups can be formed on the basis of residential propinquity. Of the sixteen groups under study, seven were church-based ^his phase of the study was made possible by a contract from the Ethnic and Cultural Relations Program of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. 3 Of the sixteen groups, fourteen indeed received the refugees as scheduled and the remaining two a few weeks later. The contact person of most of these groups was interviewed three times and the head of household of the refugee's family once. The first interview with sponsors was conducted in most cases a few days before the refugees arrived, the second interview about three weeks after their arrival and the third, four to five months later. Refugees were interviewed roughly at the same time as the third interview with sponsors was conducted. INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN CANADA: SPONSORSHIP AND ADJUSTMENT 133 groups, five were generated from the work place and four were residentially-based groups. The sixteen groups ranged in size from the minimum of five persons to seventy or more members. Naturally, groups that are larger have greater potential to generate human and financial resources. However, there is no consistent relationship between the size of the group and the money they have at their disposal (e.g., one group of seventeen and another group of sixty members each had the same financial resources of $9,000). Larger groups tended to meet regularly and have a more strictly defined division of labor. Members were typically organized into committees with specific responsibilities such as finding accommodation for the refugees or looking after their medical and educational needs. Highly organized groups tended to be more cohesive than less organized groups; members of the former met regularly and enjoyed frequent social contact with other group members, while in the latter group meetings tended to be infrequent. The locvs or basis of group formation appears to be an important characteristic, since it is related to other group attributes as well. Organizationally affiliated church groups, not unexpectedly, were large, had considerable human and financial resources and were highly organized and cohesive. Work-based groups, on the other hand, were small, had few human and limited financial resources, a looser organizational structure and little cohesion. Residen dally based groups varied in size; however, they seemed to have made certain they had the human and financial resources to accomplish their task. They tended to be well organized and, with one exception, were quite cohesive. It is interesting to note that groups with the fewest financial and human resources, the least organization and cohesion (work-friends groups) tended to take responsibility for larger families. In other words, they over-extended themselves from the beginning. However, it should be emphasized that in some instances groups were asked to take and accepted larger families than had they originally applied for; thus the strain on their resources was aggravated. In all groups a core group of " special friends " took the leading role in orienting the refugees to the new society. They interacted frequently, in the beginning almost daily with the refugees, identified problems which had to be dealt with and had a major voice in decision-making concerning refugees. Interviews with core group members revealed some consistency in their social background. Most had university education, and most had combined family incomes of over $25,000 per year. 4 It is also in-4 However, this finding should not be generalized to the other members of the group who show considerable variation in terms of income and occupation. Uniformity of socioeconomic status only seems to apply to those sponsors who act, as it were, as the spokesperson for the group as a whole. Data concerning the socioeconomic composition of members of sponsorship groups will be obtained by a short mailed questionnaire. 134 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW teresting to note that the majority had either worked in or traveled to other countries. The sponsorship program generally appeared to have tapped a desire in people to experience personal involvement. However, the sponsors differed somewhat in terms of how this desire was articulated. Some regarded their involvement as a spontaneous act of compassion, e.g., "I'm doing it out of love, gratitude and compassion ". Others emphasized the active role the sponsorship program enabled them to fulfill. As one respondent noted, "It' s available, an opportunity, and I don 't have to fight the system". The same respondent compared involvement with refugees to involvement in the plight of Native Canadians and said " There' s not much I can do about them ". A few con tact people expressed their motivation for sponsoring in terms of personal growth saying "I thought it would be a good experience ". Some individuals characterized their sponsorship as a moral imperative, e.g., "We have an obligation to do what we can, even though we can't solve the world ' s problems". Although our preliminary findings are tentative, it appears that those individuals who sponsor out of spontaneous goodwill or reasons of personal growth are much less likely to follow through on their responsibilities than those who sponsor from a feeling of moral obligation based on religious or humanitarian principles. The refugees sponsored by the sixteen groups were somewhat atypical in several respects. The proportion of white collar workers was higher than that of refugees as a whole; in fact, they were equally divided between white and blue-collar workers. As far as the country of origin and ethnic background are concerned, eleven escaped from North and five from South Vietnam, twelve were ethnic Chinese and four ethnic Vietnamese, although of the latter not all came from South Vietnam. The number of dependents in their families ranged from two to nine, with an average family size of about six. In the absence of any specific guidelines concerning the sponsors ' obligations, 5 it should come as no surprise that sponsorship groups differ greatly in how they defined their role as social facilitators, that is, the way they discharged their material obligations and introduced the refugees into Canadian society. Monthly allowances ranged from $33 to $117.00 per person. However, the actual allowance given did not appear to be related to the financial ^n a paper issued by Employment and Imm igration, Canada, sponsors were told that they had to provide material assistance, such as furnished accommodation and household effects, food, clothing and incidental expenses for one year. It was only recommended that a group set aside at least $1,200 per refugee but no specific guidelines were given as to the amount of financial assistance a family, depending on its size or composition, should receive per week or month. INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN CANADA: SPONSORSHIP AND ADJUSTMENT 135 resources of the group. While most refugees found their allowances to be sufficient and some were even able to save a little, those refugees in particular whose money for food was near the lower end of the range expressed difficulties in making ends meet and stressed the need to budget very carefully. Nearly all the refugees compared the allowance and other kinds of assistance they received from their sponsors with other refugeesindeed this seemed to be a frequent topic of conversation among refugees attending language classes. Although quite a few of them admitted that they were getting less than others they knew or had heard of, they were not necessarily dissatisfied and often stress that their sponsors were not very affluent themselves. Several refugees also seemed to place a high value on the kindness of, and social contact with, sponsors which, in their opinion, compensated for the comparatively lower level of material assistance they received. One respondent, however, remarked: "We wish all the sponsoring groups would get together and agree on the same amount. That would prevent ill-feeling among the refugees." It is also worth noting that the dissatisfaction which the few refugees expressed was not necessarily related to the actual amount received but, not surprisingly, to their previous social status in Vietnam. As far as English language training is concerned, the sponsors discharged their function well. The heads of household of all sixteen families were eventually placed in English Secondary Language Training (E.S.L.). Women with children, who, by their own account, were potential wage earners could not take the regular full-time E.S.L. program because of the difficulty of finding child care. 6 Those refugees who had completed their language training were, by and large, satisfied with the progress they made, particularly since they stressed that upon arrival they did not know any English. However, when they were asked whether they knew enough English to get by in everyday life, they were equally emphatic that their knowledge of English was still really insufficient. They could, at best, make themselves understood when they went shopping and in turn were able to understand simple sentences when they were spoken slowly. They were also acutely aware that their occupational mobility was limited unless they improved their linguistic skills. Women, who as a rule had much less formal education than their husbands, did not seem to be able to cope with learning a new language. Sponsorship groups were also divided whether to encourage refugees to work while in language training. Furthermore, considering the low earning capacity of those in full and part-time work, sponsors had difficulty in reaching a consensus as to whether they should adjust the refugee ' s allowance once employed. In some groups, one dollar was 6 Since they are privately sponsored, women are not eligible for any kind of day care subsidies and the cost of day care is prohibitive even for sponsors. 136 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW deducted for every two dollars earned; in others no adjustment was made. Of the refugees who completed English language training, none is now unemployed, although one works part-time. Moreover, with one exception, sponsors were instrumental in finding them jobs. Only three groups, however, were able to find jobs which were related to the refugee 's previous occupation and these refugees earn approximately $4 per hour. The others found employment as dishwashers or other unskilled work at a rate of $3 to $3.50 per hour. It is significant to note that the few wives who were able to work part-time, because their children were at school, earned more money per hour than did their husbands. As a rule, sponsors continued paying the rent after the refugee held a full-time job but, with few exceptions, they no longer did so once the year of sponsorship was ended. Many refugees with large families expressed spontaneously their anxiety that their present income would not be sufficient to cover the rent as well. Project 4,000 encouraged sponsors to find accommodations in their own neighborhood to facilitate the refugees ' integration process. As a result, only four families were initially placed in the low rent district of Centretown where yearly leases are not required. Refugee families who lived close to the sponsors' residences were introduced to accommodations which were not only beyond their perception of what they required but also beyond their projected earning capacity once they would become totally self-supporting. Thus, at the end of their first year of residence in Canada many families would be likely to relocate to Centretown and a second exodus from the suburbs could well occur. The situation may be further aggravated by the fact that refugees saw their future housing as a potential source of cutting down expenses. They would like to move into smaller and simpler quarters or share a larger apartment with another family. However, the prevalent social definition of what constitutes adequate housing and, more importantly, an acceptable occupancy ratio, will prevent them from making any substantial savings in this regard. In their role as social facilitators, sponsors, with few exceptions, adopted a strictly instrumental and short-term approach. They tried to make the refugees self-sufficient as soon as language training was completed and helped them in locating whatever work happened to be available, sometimes with the promise to look for better paying jobs. Only two sponsorship groups, neither organizationally affiliated, have planned for the long range. One group insisted that the refugee, a white collar worker, enroll in a second language course to become proficient in English as a prerequisite for finding a job^ relat ed to his previous occupation. Members of the second group found the refugee employment where he could get on the job training in the former occupation and INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN CANADA: SPONSORSHIP AND ADJUSTMENT 137 enrolled the refugee in a night class to upgrade technical skills. 7 The few other sponsors who investigated the possibilities for retraining and upgrading were discouraged by the fact that, with their present level of English, refugees could not qualify for retraining, even if the sponsors could support them during this period. Employment Center officials have similarly suggested to sponsors that occupational training is "premature at this point". Thus, refugees were caught in a double bind. They needed to improve their knowledge of English; yet, considering the type of jobs they were holding and the hours they work, the chances of doing so either at work or in night courses were slim. Without qualifying for any retraining or skill upgrading programs, these refugees would not be able to raise their present occupational status and would remain in marginal jobs. The exception was three watchmakers, who, as members of a traditional craft, could readily transfer their skills and even found it much easier to repair watches in the West than in their own country. As expected, upgrading of skills may be more easily achieved in the case of blue collar than in the case of white collar workers. For blue collar workers such upgrading may be essentially confined to improving their skills and technological knowledge. All of them reported that they had acquired their skills in Vietnam by having been trained on the job or by simply observing others; they also admitted, without exception, that they did not have the necessary technical skills to resume their old occupation in Canada. White collar workers constituted a rather heterogeneous category ranging from businessmen and managers to teacher and middlelevel administrator. The two businessmen—one a peddler of watches and the other a former owner of a small restaurant—had limited education and, according to North American criteria, did not belong in this category at all. Since they also had no technical skills, at present they .could only accept unskilled work and hope for some occupational training in the future. Of the four plant managers only one appeared to be an expert in his craft and would be able to qualify as a skilled worker in the same industry if such a job were available. The remaining three had limited technical qualifications and were bound to remain occupationally downwardly mobile. The former administrator was realistic enough to hope for some occupational training as a skilled worker which would give him a steady income, while the teacher would have liked to have been able to use his knowledge of mathematics once proficient in English. 7 It is worth noting that after he had been certified as "being capable of working in an automechanic's job", the refugee started work in a garage for $3.50 an hour, but received a raise to $4.00 three days later and was promised further increases in the future. 138 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Findings concerning the social adjustment of refugees as perceived by sponsors and refugees themselves were rather complex and required extremely careful interpretation. The definition of what constitutes successful adjustment was vague among sponsors; their understanding of it was influenced by an implicit model of integration which ranged from assimilation to adaptation. We asked sponsors, "In your opinion, which of the family members has made the best adjustment"? The responses were quite consistent. Younger children were preceived to have made the best adjustment, followed by older children, fathers and, lastly, mothers. The very ranking and reasons given for it suggest that adjustment is assessed on two dimensions, language proficiency and an implicit model of assimmilation. The two dimensions are associated, but at this point cannot be isolated conceptually and empirically. For instance, the high ranking of children and the low ranking of mothers is based, as sponsors admit, on their respective level of English. Yet, mothers are also seen as being unwilling not only to learn English but to integrate into the larger society as well; in addition, they are most frequently reported to have emotional and health problems. While sponsors were worried about the wife 's adjustment and had some sympathy for her situation, they also expressed surprise and a little resentment at what they perceived to be her powerful position within the family and her unwillingness to make an effort to adjust. 8 However, sponsors clearly had an assimilation model in mind in regard to the children. Sponsors often mention the children as being the most gratifying and enduring benefit of sponsorship. As one sponsor put it, "The children integrate so quickly; in a couple of months they' ll be like normal Canadian kids". It seems that children are the focus of sponsors ' efforts in a large part because their rapid assimilation is " rewarding ". Sponsors tended to act in loco parentis at schools, at social functions and on outings in the community. Thus sponsors may inadvertently contribute to the intergenerational conflict of refugees which is an inevitable consequence of tension between preserving cultural identity and the pressure to assimilate into the larger society. 9 Refugees did not 8 Sponsors were told in orientation sessions that the head of household acts as spokesman for his family and that the wife and children have a subordinate position. The finding as to the role of the wife within the family is at this point difficult to interpret; however, the fact that in Vietnam all women contributed to the family income by working mostly as street peddlers and fruit and fish vendors may be related to it. 9 Among others, See, S.N. Eisenstadt's The Absorption of Immigrants, 1954, F.L.K. Hsu, The Challenge of the American Dream: The Chinese in The United States, 1971, S.W. Kung, Chinese in American Life, 1975. INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN CANADA: SPONSORSHIP AND ADJUSTMENT 139 feel any resentment against the attention their children received by the sponsors, particularly since most had already transferred their hopes and aspirations to them and expected little for themselves. Differences in models of integration held by the sponsors were clearly discernable in reply to the question as to how they would feel about the development of a Vietnamese community in Ottawa. Some sponsors with an assimilationist approach were remarkably candid in their responses: "They ' re not at home anymore, they shouldn 't segregate themselves from us", or "I'd rather see refugees merging in with the rest of the community ". Others simply stated that they had not given any thought to the development of an ethnic community since they defined their own task as resocializing the refugee family. However, it appears that in some groups sponsors suspended the assimilationist model for the older generation, since they saw a role for the ethnic community in the short-term. Thus, depending on their implicit integration model, they saw moral support as a task to be shared with the ethnic communities, and felt that these communities and particularly other refugees could give subtler kinds of emotional support which sponsors could not provide because of language barriers and cultural differences. In the sponsor's words: "Refugees need the support of their own group ... to facilitate adjustment... in that way they are less of a burden on the sponsors " and "on the general society". Although we did not ask the refugees directly how they view their own adjustment process, replies to other questions showed that they have not yet found their social anchorage in Canadian society; in view of their relatively short stay in Canada this should not be surprising. North Vietnamese, particularly, seem to be overwhelmed by the high standard of living and material wealth in Canada compared to their home country, and all of them have difficulty in adjusting to the cold climate in winter. Many mention that their time is consumed with learning English or making enough money to support their families and as a result they had little time for finding out more about the Canadian way of life. Sponsors act, as it were, as the direct representatives of the new society; apart from providing material help, they, ideally, should also guide the refugees in their initial social and cultural adjustment. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the refugees ' ability or willingness to integrate will depend, to a significant extent, on the nature of their interaction with sponsors. We asked refugees to characterize their relationship with sponsors as "adopted parents, relatives, friends, or acquaintances they have to get along with for a year ". In most cases refugees saw their sponsors as either adopted parents or friends and expressed satisfaction with the amount of social contact. The few sponsors who were seen by 140 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees as "acquaintances" belonged to work and residentially based groups. These refugees also reported that their contact with sponsors was infrequent and irregular. In other words, the majority of refugees viewed their sponsors as persons whom they could trust, and, more importantly, as equals in their social interaction. This finding would suggest that, despite cultural differences and communication problems, sponsors were able to prevent or overcome any feeling of personal dependence and hence of social inferiority on the part of the refugees which the very nature of sponsorship can easily give rise to. Since our last interviews were conducted midway through the sponsorship year and the number of groups studied was small, any findings concerning sponsorship groups and refugees have to be cautiously interpreted. For instance, it would seem that organizationally affiliated groups, by virtue of their high level of organization and cohesion, are more successful in fulfilling their obligations. However, we cannot say as yet which of the structural characteristics are more important contributing factors as far as this success is concerned: the locus of group formation or the group members' ability to develop a well defined division of labor and social cohesion among them regardless of whether the group was formed within or outside an organizational context. Moreover, the fact that, irrespective of their structural characteristics, sponsorship groups on the whole have adopted a strictly instrumental, short-term approach toward refugees may defeat the very purpose of facilitating the refugees' social adjustment. Most of the refugees have been placed in unskilled, deadend and low paying jobs. As a rule sponsors also have not made any provisions to further improve or upgrade the refugees ' linguistic and occupational skills. In absolute terms the refugees' occupational downward mobility is less than it would be if they had been professionals in Vietnam; however, they seem to feel their status loss keenly, particularly since all of them had high occupational aspirations when they first came to Canada, the preferred employment being "work in the electronics industry ". We cannot say at this stage to what extent these high expectations have inadvertently been fostered by the refugees ' exposure to the middle class way of life of their sponsors. We can also only conjecture that in some cases this exposure may ultimately become a source of frustration once they realize that such a way of life is beyond their reach. These questions can only be answered by a comparative study of government and privately sponsored refugees after they have been in Canada for a longer period of time. It is hoped that the main project will produce findings which will give us greater confidence in the viability of the conjectures and inferences raised by the preliminary results discussed in this paper. Refugee Act of 1980 This article traces the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980, identifies the goals Congress intended to achieve, discusses its implementation in relation to the recent influx of Cuban refugees and shows how it can be utilized beneficially in the future. On March 4, 1980, Congress completed final action on "The Refugee Act of 1980"—the first major reform of the refugee provisions of American immigration law in nearly three decades. On March 17th, President Carter signed the bill into law, 1 culminating an intensive year and a half effort by Congress and the Executive Branch to move this important reform legislation through some very difficult times. Yet, the ink was hardly dry on this historic reform when the new law faced its first test: the massive influx of Cuban refugees to the United States, which began a few weeks after the Act became effective on April 1, 1980. At the outset of the Cuban crisis, the Carter Administration used the new authorities of the law by invoking the emergency provisions contained in Section 207(b). However, as the Cuban exodus increased—and faced with the uncontrolled arrival of over 114,000 Cubans in Floridathe Administration abandoned use of the Act in favor of an ad hoc, shortterm solution: temporary use of the so-called "parole authority ". 2 This decision simply delayed a solution to the problem and a resolution of the ultimate immigration status of the Cubans. The resettlement costs involved in dealing with the problem were largely dumped upon the states, local communities and voluntary agencies. All of these undesirable consequences could have been avoided by continuing to use the 1980 Act. The National Law Journal concluded in a headline: " Carter Helps Refugee Law Flunk 1st Test." 3 The decision to ignore the new law poses some troubling questions about the future of the Act. Congress worked many years to achieve the ^he "parole authority" is contained in Section 212(d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, this was the authority utilized to admit large groups of refugees beyond the 17,400 admissible under the former seventh preference. ^he Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, approved March 17, 1980. ^A. Klement, "Carter Helps Refugee Law Flunk 1st Test", The National Law J ournal, July 7, 1980, p. 1. IMR Volume 15 No. 1 141 Edward M. Kennedy 142 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugee reforms contained in the new law, and to many, it was discouraging to see the new tools available to the government ignored. The Administration 's decision was based largely upon fiscal concerns and the assumption that the costs of dealing with the Cubans under the Refugee Act would be too high; but Congress subsequently enacted special legislation providing full funding for the costs. There was also the concern that admitting the Cubans as" refugees" under the Act would establish a precedent inviting millions more to come directly to the United States. Yet, accepting the Cubans under the parole authority was hardly less of an invitation. The subsequent legislation offered by the Administration to adjust the status and to assist the Cubans simply made them 75 percent refugees instead of 100 percent refugees under the terms of the Refugee Act. 4 The challenge ahead will be to implement the new law as it was intended to be used, and not allow the Cuban crisis to establish an unfortunate precedent. The legislative history of the Act clearly reveals the goals Congress intended to achieve. With a better understanding of the Act, we can lay the groundwork for more effective use of the Act in the future. GOALS OF REFUGEE ACT Not since 1952 had the laws on admission and resettlement of refugees been fundamentally reformed. In the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress gave new statutory authority to the United States' longstanding commitment to human rights and its traditional humanitarian concern for the plight of refugees around the world. But it was also attempting to assure greater equity in the treatment of refugees and more effective procedures in dealing with them. The Act also sought to assure full and adequate federal support for refugee resettlement programs by authorizing permanent funding for state, local and voluntary agency projects. These basic goals were stated succinctly in Title I of the Act: SEC. 101. (a) The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas, efforts to promote opportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid for necessary transportation and processing, admission to this country of ^S. 3013, A bill to create a Cuban/Haitian Entrant Status, U.S. Senate, August 5, 1980, Congressional Record, p. S10825. REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 143 refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and transitional assistance to refugees in the United States. The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to encourage all nations to provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible. (b) The objectives of this Act are to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted. The Refugee Act accomplishes six basic objectives: 1) It repeals the previous law 's discriminatory treatment of refugees by providing a new definition of a refugee. The new definition no longer applies only to refugees "from communism" or certain areas of the Middle East; it now applies to all who meet the test of the United Nations Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 2) It raises the annual limitation on regular refugee admissions from 17,400 to 50,000 each fiscal year. 3) It provides for an orderly but flexible procedure to deal with emergencies if refugees of "special humanitarian concern" to the United States cannot be resettled within the regular ceiling. 4) It replaces the use of the " parole authority " with new statutory language asserting Congressional control over the entire process of admitting refugees. 5) It establishes an explicit asylum provision in the immigration law for the first time. 6) It provides a full range of federal programs to assist in the resettlement process, and creates the Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Office of Refugee Resettlement to monitor, coordinate and implement refugee resettlement programs. Together, these provisions are designed to enable the United States to meet any refugee situation, anywhere in the world, and to deal with it effectively and efficiently. The new law is intended to end years of ad hoc programs and different policies for different refugees by putting the U.S. refugee programs on a firm basis. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY The origins of the Refugee Act of 1980 date from hearings conducted during 1965-68 by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, which I served as chairman. These hearings culminated in a bill and a 144 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW report submitted to the Senate in 1969 entitled U.S. Assistance to Refugees Throughout the World. 5 Some of the recommendations in this 1969 report found early support and were implemented. But the crucial recommendation—that " Congress actively consider pending legislation providing for a worldwide asylum policy and a more flexible authority in our basic immigration statute for the admission of refugees in reasonable numbers "—did not find full expression until a decade later. In part, the delay was due to the inaction of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, to which the bill was referred. Following the major 1965 immigration reforms, this Subcommittee held no public hearings for 10 years, and it reported no general immigration legislation. Refugee and other immigration bills died within the Subcommittee during every Congress. This cycle of inaction was finally broken in mid-1978 when it became clear that I would have the opportunity to become chairman of the full Judiciary Committee at the beginning of the 96th Congress in 1979. On September 11, 1978, I wrote to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the Attorney General and the Chairman of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies ' Committee on Migration and Refugees, urging that we begin a joint effort to shape a new national policy on refugees. 6 My proposals followed the general outlines of a bill I had introduced earlier that year in the Senate (S. 2751), and bills introduced in the House of Representatives. These bills sought to bring long overdue reform to our laws dealing with refugees, ending what many Members of Congress saw as the misuse of the Attorney General ' s parole authority in admitting large groups of refugees. Intensive consultations began in November 1978 through February 1979 between the Congressional Committee staffs and officials in the Executive Branch in an effort to draft consensus legislation. The initial approach of the Carter Administration largely reflected the conservative and restrictionist bills introduced by Congressman Joshua Eilberg (H.R. 2056 and H.R. 7175 in the 95th Congress), rather than my broader bill (S. 2751). After repeated negotiations and redrafts, and continuing pressure from the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, an acceptable Administration draft was submitted to Congress by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 5 U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, "U.S. Assistance to Refugees Throughout the World: Findings and Recommendations", November 3, 1969, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 71-73. ®Text of Senator Edward M. Kennedy's letter appears in Senate Report 96-256, The Refugee Act of 1979, July 23, 1979, pp. 2-3. REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 145 On March 9, 1979, the proposed Refugee Act was introduced in the Senate by myself (S. 643), and in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2816) by Chairman Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee and Chairwoman Elizabeth Holtzman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. The cooperative spirit and the strong desire to move on this long overdue reform legislation, was clearly reflected in the statements of the sponsors. 7 On March 14, when hearings opened on the new legislation, former Senator Dick dark—the newly appointed United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs—articulated the need for permanent and systematic procedures governing the admission of refugees. He testified that: Until now, we have carried out our refugee programs through what is essentially a patchwork of different programs that evolved in response to specific crises. The resulting legislative framework is inadequate to cope with the refugee problem we face today. It was originally designed to deal with people fleeing Communist regimes in Eastern Europe or repressive governments in the Middle East in the immediate post-war period and the early cold war years. This framework still assumes that most refugees admitted to the United States come from these two geographic areas, or from Communist-dominated countries. The current law assumes that refugee problems are extraordinary occurrences. It provides for only a very limited number of refugees to enter the United States each year, on a conditional basis. But it also recognizes the Attorney General's power to parole additional individuals into the United States in case of unusually urgent humanitarian circumstances. 8 These statements and accompanying background information clarified the legislative goals of the Committees and the Executive Branch. The reforms and efficiencies to be achieved were considered important enough to risk the possible negative or restrictionist amendments that might be attached as the bill worked its way through Congress. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION The political climate at the time the Refugee Act was introduced worked for and against it. On one hand, the dramatic plight of the " boat people " captured the attention and concern of millions of Americans in 1979. But 7 See, remarks of Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Congressional Record, House of Representatives, March 13, 1979, pp. H1308-1309. Also see, Remarks of Elizabeth Holtzman, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, March 13, 1979, pp. H 1310-1312 and remarks of Edward M. Kennedy, Congressional Record, United States Senate, March 13, 1979, pp. S2630-2634. bearing, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, "The Refugee Act of 1979", March 14, 1979, p. 9. 146 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW the same year also saw the greatest need for the resettlement of refugees from around the world—over 200,000 would come to the United States during the year, mainly Indochinese refugees and Soviet Jews. These numbers dramatized the need for a new law to deal with refugee resettlement in a more efficient manner, but the numbers also alarmed many in Congress who had not previously paid attention to our refugee programs. One of the key arguments in gaining Congressional acceptance of the refugee bill was that we were already admitting refugees in large numbers. Most were being admitted under direct Congressional action, such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment encouraging Soviet Jewish emigration or the authorization for Indochinese refugees in 1975. Congress agreed that new legislation would accommodate this influx in a rational, effective manner and in a less costly way. Another concern in Congress was the use of the Attorney General 's "parole authority ". I felt that Congress had provided ample approval and constitutional justification for the authority. However, many disagreed, and the issue was of deep concern to many in Congress, especially in the House of Representatives. One of the principal arguments for the Act was that it would bring the admission of refugees under greater Congressional and statutory control and eliminate the need to use the parole authority. However, in doing so we needed to provide flexibility similar to the Attorney General 's parole authority. The goal of the Act was to codify that authority by writing into law what we were doing by custom and practice. To avoid crippling the parole authority and the ability to respond to emergencies, the Act needed emergency provisions similar to the parole authority. Since many in Congress viewed the Act as limiting the parole authority, the codification of the authority required a great deal of consensus building. The proponents of the bill also had to address the concerns that surrounded the issue of admitting large numbers of refugees. A major concern was the " flood gate" issue—the fear that the new legislation would somehow open the " floodgates " to millions of refugees around the world. Proponents answered that under current law there were no real statutory limits or Congressional controls on the admission of refugees. The new Act would establish a normal ceiling of 50,000 refugees a year, based on the average refugee flowJnto the United States over the past two decades. The Act also created statutory procedures controlling the admission of refugees during emergencies. These procedures were justified as essential restrictions on the existing parole authority and its potential abuses. Proponents of the Act also pointed put that in the per capita acceptance of refugees, other nations were far ahead of the United States. The REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 147 ceiling of 50,000 refugees would represent less than 10 percent of the total annual immigration flow to the U.S., or one refugee for every 4,000 Americans. By comparison Canada, France and Australia, among others, exceed this per capita figure. Nevertheless, many feared that the United States was being too generous compared to other countries. Repeatedly the question was asked:" What are others doing to help refugees? " An effective answer came in part from an international conference on Indochinese refugees in Geneva in July 1979. The Conference was convened by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldhiem and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling, and it dealt with the principal refugee problem confronting the United States and the international community at that time. The success of the conference, which was attended by Congressional observers, answered the concerns of many in Congress. Earlier, Senator Strom Thurmond, the ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had blocked the bill in the Committee, pending the results of the Geneva Conference. Two days after the conference he enthusiastically urged favorable consideration of the bill. When it was reported on July 23rd, Senator Thurmond reflected a widely held view in Congress: I rise today to express my favorable reaction to the action taken by the United Nations Conference on Refugees in Geneva, Switzerland . . . The Nations of the world have responded well to the plight of the 'boat people' of Vietnam and the 'land people' from Laos and Cambodia. 9 After the Geneva conference, most participating countries doubled the number of Indochinese refugees they were prepared to admit. Japan increased its financial contribution to cover 50 percent of the total budget of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Southeast Asia. As a result, the United States was able to reduce our contribution to less than a quarter of the total cost, and Australia and France surpassed this country in per capita resettlement of Indochinese refugees. These facts were reassuring to Congress and helped to facilitate enactment of the new law. A separate concern was the potential cost of resettlement of refugees. However, the average cost of resettling an Indochinese refugee was approximately $4,000. Statistics were also available to show that within a short time the vast majority of refugees were working and earning their way in local communities. Indeed, preliminary statistics indicated that after a few years, most Indochinese have paid back in federal income taxes 9 Remarks of Strom Thurmond, Congressional Record, United States Senate, July 23, 1979, p. S10391. 148 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW more than the cost to the federal government of resettling them in this country. Of course, it is impossible to put a dollar value on saving the life of a refugee. The humanitarian concern for refugees goes beyond economic statistics or cost-benefit ratios. Those figures are impressive for most refugee groups. But, far more important, refugees and all migrants bring other benefits to the United States—richness in culture and diversity, new economic vitality, and other themes as old as the country 's history. America 's immigrant heritage, more than any other factor, was responsible for successful Congressional action on the refugee bill. On September 6, 1979, the bill was adopted by the Senate by a unanimous vote of 85-0. No destructive or crippling amendments were adopted. The bill emerged from the Senate essentially intact. Three months later, the House of Representatives acted on a substantially different version of the refugee bill, as recommended by the House Judiciary Committee. On December 20th, the House adopted that bill by a vote of 328-47, after many difficult moments on the House floor. While the Senate had been able to resolve many contentious amendments prior to floor action, the House had to deal with fourteen separate floor amendments, many of them controversial. As reported by the House Judiciary Committee, the House bill differed on a number of substantive points from the Senate bill, especially the issue of domestic resettlement assistance; here, the Senate provided a general and flexible authority compared to the detailed and structured authority suggested by the House Committee. In addition, the Senate limited 100 percent federal assistance for medical and welfare payments to two years, whereas the House Committee accepted a longer four year commitment. Of the fourteen amendments on the House floor only three were considered destructive by the House sponsors of the bill and were defeated on voice votes or division votes. Under the leadership of Chairman Rodino, Congresswoman Holtzman and Congressman Hamilton Fish, the bill emerged relatively unscathed. Efforts to cripple the emergency admission provisions of the bill were defeated; an attempt to subtract the number of refugees admitted beyond the normal flow of 50,000 from the annual immigration ceiling was also defeated. Also, a proposal to take family reunion visas away from persons standing in line around the world whenever the United States admitted a refugee was also soundly defeated. Although a one-House veto over emergency refugee admissions was accepted by the House, it was later dropped in Conference. The two versions of the bill differed on some important points, but they were similar enough—and there was sufficient goodwill and cooperation on both sides—to assure that the differences could be easily resolved REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 149 by a Conference Committee. In fact, this resolution was achieved in only two afternoon meetings, following extensive staff consultations. At my request, Senator Dennis DeConcini led the Senate Conferees. Congresswoman Holtzman was elected to chair the Conference Committee when it met in February 1980. The Committee resolved 21 substantive differences between the two bills. On February 26th, the Senate adopted the Conference Report, followed by the House of Representatives on March 4th. President Carter signed it into law on March 17th. FINAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT: CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ACTIONS The House-Senate Conferees on S. 643 faced eight general areas of disagreement. The other differences had been resolved through staff negotiations, in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, the voluntary agencies, and others. The following paragraphs summarize the Conference Committee' s actions and the key provisions of the Act as finally adopted. Definition of Refugee The first area of disagreement between the two bills dealt with the definition of " refugee ". The Senate bill incorporated the internationally-accepted definition contained in the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. It also covered persons displaced in their own country by military or civil disturbances, or uprooted by arbitrary detention and unable to return to their homes. The House bill incorporated the U.N. definition. It also included presiden dally-specified persons who are being persecuted or who fear persecution in their own country. The House specifically excluded persons who themselves have engaged in persecution. The conferees adopted the House provision. It provides for situations such as the Saigon evacuation in 1975, where refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States were directly evacuated from their country. In addition, the legislative history is clear that the definition also applies to people in detention who may be permitted to leave their country if accepted by other governments—such as the " state of siege " detainees in Argentina or the recent Cuban political prisoner release program. Admission of Refugees For the first time in over three decades, the new Act establishes realistic provisions governing the admission of refugees—both "normal flow" 150 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees and those admitted under emergency situations. The conferees agreed on a normal flow of 50,000 a year until 1983; thereafter, the limitation would be decided by Congress. The limit can be increased by the President after consultations with Congress, prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. In an emergency situation, the President may admit additional refugees after appropriate consultations with Congress. Admission Status of Refugees The Senate bill ended years of admitting refugees as"conditional entrants" or" parolees ". Instead, it treated refugees like other immigrants, as permanent resident aliens. However, the conferees concluded that a one year "conditional entry" status as a" refugee " would be desirable until the new system and procedures under the Act were implemented. Therefore, the conferees established a new admission status for refugees, different from the previous " conditional entry " or" parolee " status. The new status would end after one year, after which the refugee could adjust to permanent resident status. The one year status would be counted in the five year period required for naturalization. More important, however, the new Act does not require an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to process all refugee applications. Consular officers in United States Embassies, as well as INS officers, are authorized to process refugee applications. Arrangements between the Attorney General and Secretary of State are needed to carry out this provision and to avoid unnecessary duplication of work between INS and Department of State personnel. In Bangkok, Thailand, for example, Embassy officials complete the interviewing and screening of Indochinese refugee applicants; but INS officers now fly in, on expensive temporary duty, to review the exhaustive paperwork and processing already completed by State Department personnel. The Act is intended to end this waste and duplication. In areas of the world where no INS offices are located, consular officers should be permitted to process refugee applications. Asylum Provisions For the first time, the new Act establishes a clearly defined asylum provision in United States immigration law. The conferees agreed that up to 5,000 numbers may be used to grant permanent residence to persons within the United States or reaching our shores who can claim to be refugees. This provision explicitly conforms the immigration law to our international treaty obligations under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The conferees also directed the Attorney General to create a uniform procedure for the treatment of asylum claims filed in the United States or at ports of entry. REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 151 Limitation on Parole The conferees wrote into the new law the clear legislative intent of both Houses that the parole authority of the old law can no longer be used to admit groups of refugees. The provisions of the new Act provide ample authority and flexibility to deal with emergencies. However, Section 212(d) (5) of the old law remains intact. The limitation in the House bill applies to individuals or groups of aliens who are deemed not to be refugees under the Act; this exception was used to accommodate the influx of Cubans in April and May 1980. Domestic Resettlement Assistance The widest difference between the Senate and House versions of the Act was on domestic resettlement assistance. Because the admission of refugees is a federal decision and lies outside normal immigration procedures, the federal government has a clear responsibility to assist communities in resettling refugees and helping them to become selfsupporting. The basic issues here were the length of time of federal responsibility and the method of its administration. State and local agencies were insistent that federal assistance must continue long enough to assure that local citizens will not be taxed for programs they did not initiate and for which they were not responsible. As originally proposed by the Administration, the bill contained a two year limitation on most resettlement programs. However, both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees felt that the limitation was too brief in light of the long-term resettlement needs of many refugees. The Senate Committee amended the bill to remove all limitations on social service and training programs and on special projects. On the Senate floor, the bill was further amended to provide a one year transition period for all refugees, followed by a two year limitation on reimbursement for cash and medical payments. The House approved a two year transition period, followed by a four year limitation. The conferees compromised on a one and a half year transition and a three year limitation. This compromise, coupled with other authorities in the Act with no time limitation, adequately fulfills the federal responsibility in helping to resettle refugees. The Act also authorizes $200 million annually for discretionary grants and contracts for special projects, programs and services for refugees. The conferees intended these funds to be administered entirely by public and private nonprofit agencies, including state and local government agencies, private voluntary agencies, post-secondary educational institutions and other qualified private nonprofit agencies. Helping individual refugees adapt to new lives in new communities is an area where voluntary and community agencies have historically served best. The new Act 152 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW emphasizes this principle, while strengthening the ability of the federal government to support these efforts. Administration of Refugee Programs The House bill contained highly specific provisions on the administration of refugee programs. It created a new Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human Services, and established a United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs in the Executive Office of the President. The Senate bill provided the flexibility for such offices, but did not mandate their creation. The conferees' agreement reflects the goals of both bills: flexible authority, but clearer instructions from Congress on the need for coordination and better management. The Act establishes a United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; previously, the Coordinator' s office was created by Executive Order. The Act gives the President the discretion to locate the Coordinator in the most appropriate agency. However, it was the view of most of the conferees that the President should move the Coordinator to the Executive Office, to give the Coordinator the government-wide authority the office needs. The Act also establishes the Office of Refugee Resettlement to work " in consultation with and under the general policy guidance of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs ". IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT: THE CUBAN CRISIS The Cuban boat exodus of April and May 1980 was the first test of the new Act. The chaos surrounding the flight of the refugees, the uncontrolled character of their movement and the public perception that no one was in charge generated a public backlash against the Cubans and refugees generally. Rather than dealing directly with the Cuban influx—as President Johnson did in 1965 in a similar situation, or as President Ford did in 1975 with respect to Indochinese refugees—the Administration acted in inconsistent ways. Cuban Americans traveling to Cuba to seek relatives were threatened with criminal action by the Coast Guard. Yet President Carter declared that we have "open arms and open hearts" for the Cuban refugees. Eventually, the Administration settled on a policy of officially considering the Cubans as "illegal " entrants. Boat captains were threatened with fines or imprisonment for bringing refugees to Florida. But many Cuban Americans did not regard the flight as illegal; Cuban boat refugees had been landing in Florida legally, as individuals or in groups, for two REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 153 decades and had always been welcomed and treated as refugees. Others felt that if the Cubans were not to be accepted as refugees, the United States should take international action, or use diplomacy more energetically, to halt or control the flow. At the outset of the Cuban refugee flow, the Administration had considered the Cubans as bonafide refugees under the law. On April 14th, President Carter signed an Executive Order10 invoking the emergency provisions of the new Refugee Act for the first time in response to an international appeal on behalf of 12,000 Cuban refugees in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The United States agreed to participate in an international resettlement effort by accepting up to 3,500 Cubans from the Embassy for admission to the United States. On April 17th, the Senate Judiciary Committee held the first hearing and consultation under the terms of the new Act. The principal issues involved the President's request to use the emergency provisions of the Act for the Cubans and the annual level of admission of refugees for the remainder of the fiscal year. The Senate Committee acted promptly in support of the President's request, as did the House Committee a week later. But within ten days, the orderly international resettlement program for the Peruvian Embassy refugees was superseded by a public quarrel between Cuba and the United States, during which more than 115,000 Cubans reached Florida by boat. The Administration abandoned the use of the Refugee Act and refused to consider any Cubans as refugees. As I wrote in a detailed letter to former President Carter on May 20th,11 many in Congress felt that this situation could have been handled under the Act. After the President's Executive Order on April 14th, the Senate Judiciary Committee arranged for expeditious consultations. Senator Thurmond and I supported the Administration 's decision to admit the Cubans under Section 207(b) of the Act, which states: If the President determines, after appropriate consultation, that 1) an unforeseen emergency refugee situation exists, 2) the admission of certain refugees in response to the emergency refugee situation is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest, and 3) the admission to the United States of these refugees cannot be accomplished under subsection (1), the President may fix a number of refugees to be admitted to the United States during the succeeding period (not to exceed 12 months). . . Although the character of the refugee situation in Havana changed ^Hearing, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, "U.S. Refugee Programs", April 17, 1980, p. 148. n Hearing, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, "Caribbean Refugee Crisis: Cubans and Haitians", May 11, 1980, pp. 62-65. 154 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW after the President's initial finding under this section, the basic emergency situation, as defined in the law, remained the same. Although the Cuban government suddenly shifted course and stimulated a sealift of Cubans to the United States, these developments did not create a new refugee situation under the terms of the Act; rather, they created a changed refugee situation. Cubans leaving Havana after April 14th were part of a single "foreign refugee situation " which the President had properly deemed "an unforeseen emergency refugee situation ", for which admission was "justified by grave humanitarian concerns" and "otherwise in the national interest". These changed circumstances could have been met by amending the original Executive Order and consulting again with the Judiciary Committees. The Administration refused to take this course. Officials asserted that Congress never intended the Act to accommodate large numbers of refugees arriving directly on our shores. The Administration cited the asylum provisions of Section 208 of the Act, which authorized only 5,000 asylum cases each year, for persons already in the United States who were unable to return to their native countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution. But the Cuban refugee flow was initiated under Section 207 of the Act. It was originally considered to be a"foreign refugee situation" by the Administration itself. Although the circumstances of the refugees ' movement shifted, and they began to arrive directly on our shores, the situation itself remained a "foreign refugee situation ". A similar case would have existed if Vietnamese "boat people" had reached Guam or Hawaii. Surely they would have been treated as refugees under the Indochinese refugee program, as authorized under Section 207 of the Act. Indeed, contingency plans were developed in 1978 and 1979 to accept Vietnamese refugees reaching our shores. These plans were similar to those we had urged Malaysia or Hong Kong to accept—providing a safe-haven for refugees under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner until third country resettlement opportunities could be arranged in the United States or elsewhere. Not all Cubans who arrived in the United States were refugees. Those who reach America 's shores are not necessarily entitled for resettlement, even if they are bona fide refugees under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. As a signatory to the United Nations Protocol, the government is required only to provide a safe-haven until the refugees are lawfully admitted to the United States. The Administration's decision to ignore the Refugee Act of 1980 prompted deep concern by many Senators at a May 12, 1980 hearing of the Judiciary Committee.12 Repeatedly, members of the Committee urged ^Ibid. REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 155 Administration officials to see both the wisdom and benefit of using the Act. By amending the Executive Order of April 14th and consulting again on a second, more realistic ceiling for the admission of Cuban refugees, the Administration could have utilized the tools made available by the Act. After two months, the Administration announced on June 20, 1980, an additional ad hoc response to the Cuban crisis by exercising parole authority for six months and seeking special legislation to adjust the status of the refugees and provide resettlement assistance. A new temporary status was created:"Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending) ".13 On August 5, 1980, the Administration 's Cuban/Haitian entrant bill was introduced in both Houses (S. 3013 and H.R. 7978). I submitted a substitute amendment that simply declared that the Cubans and Haitians were" refugees " under the terms of the Refugee Act. Early Congressional action was doubtful, leaving both the Cubans and Haitians in limbo. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT: THE FUTURE There are millions of refugees in the world today. In the future, as in the past, the United States will be able to accept only a small fraction of those refugees who wish to settle in this country. In virtually all cases, the United States will join with other countries in providing humanitarian assistance. Some refugees will require immediate food and others relief to sustain life. Others will need local settlement assistance. Still others will need temporary safehaven. A few will seek voluntary repatriation to their homelands. But many will require third country resettlement. Among refugees seeking third country resettlement, the United States is likely to accept only those for whom the American people feel a special concern. Under the Refugee Act of 1980 the test is whether their admission "is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest". There are over 13 million persons in the world today who meet the United Nations definition of a refugee, and therefore the definition in our law. But how many are to be admitted for resettlement in the United States is still a decision to be made in accordance with the Act. What the Refugee Act provides is a permanent, effective and fair framework for making that decision. It provides federal assistance to help those admitted to resettle and to normalize their lives in local communi-^The Haitian refugee crisis had been building for many years and differed from the Cuban situation. Most Haitians had arrived prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act and were not eligible under its provisions. Also, many cases were involved in prior litigation. In a letter to the Attorney General on November 13, 1979,1 had urged the Administration to use the spirit of the forthcoming refugee legislation to dispense with all pending Haitian cases and to institute fairer procedures to handle future cases. The Administration's failure to resolve the Haitian issue compounded their problems in dealing with the Cuban refugees. 156 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW ties across the land. The admission of refugees is a national policy, decided in partnership between the Executive Branch and Congress. It is clear that refugees pose critical foreign policy issues for the United States and the international community. We know from recent history that massive refugee movements can unbalance peace and international stability. Threats to the peace do not come only from an arms race or a political or military confrontation. The Refugee Act is an instrument of policy to meet the needs of the homeless around the world. But it will be an effective instrument only if U.S. leaders use it wisely. If they do, it will serve the country 's humanitarian traditions well, and it will also serve the cause of peace. Part IV: Resettlement Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees In almost all of the countries in the world which offer permanent resettlement to refugees, resettlement is accomplished through some combination of the efforts of government and voluntary agencies. This article identifies the elements of resettlement, and the various distributions of responsibility for its accomplishment. By focusing on the Southeast Asian refugee movement to the United States, current and evolving relationships among government and voluntary agencies are illustrated. In nearly all of the fifteen to twenty countries in the world which give permanent resettlement to refugees, resettlement is accomplished through some combination of the efforts of government and voluntary agencies. Voluntary agencies individually and collectively, through international consortia, act as advocates for the solution of worldwide refugee problems. The participation of the voluntary agencies in resettlement may range from the very peripheral, in such countries as Sweden and Norway where the national governments not only finance but also carry out the resettlements, to the very central role played by the voluntary sector in Switzerland where, under government financing, the voluntary agencies take complete responsibility for refugee resettlement. The methods used in resettlement vary as widely as the combinations of government and private activity, ranging from long periods in hostels in such countries as Norway, Australia and Switzerland, to direct immersion into the general population in the United States and Canada. The methods of resettlement in each country and the relative participation of the voluntary sector undoubtedly results from a large variety of circumstances. To identify the elements of resettlement and the many possible distributions of responsibility for their accomplishment, it might be helpful to focus on a single country, the United States, and a single refugee movement, the Southeast Asian, which illustrates current and evolving government and voluntary agencies relationships. IMR Volume 15 No. 1 157 Robert G. Wright 158 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Currently, most refugee resettlement in the United States is carried out by eleven voluntary agencies (VOLAG), six religiously affiliated and five non-sectarian or ethnically-related. These eleven agencies are: American Council for Nationalities Service (ACNS), American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (AFCR), Church World Service (CWS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Hebrew Immigrant Aid and Sheltering Society of New York (HIAS), Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS), Polish American Immigration and Relief Committee (PAIRC), the Tolstoy Foundation (TF), United States Catholic Conference (USCC), World Relief Refugee Service (WRRS), and the Young Men ' s Christian Association (YMCA). In addition to the VOLAGS, a number of other groups have contracted with the federal government to resettle Indochinese refugees. In the first wave of the refugee migration, for instance, six states and several private agencies participated in resettlement. Currently, Iowa and Idaho have contracts to resettle refugees. Only Iowa has been active in the Incochinese program from the beginning. The VOLAGS are all national organizations. Each has its own methods of resettlement and represents a different constituency. However, they share the basic goals of helping all refugees, regardless of ethnic and religious background, to achieve self-sufficiency in American society as quickly as possible. In some cases these goals can be accomplished rapidly, in others it may take years. HISTORY The first agency to offer formal services to immigrants was the Hebrew Immigrant Aid and Sheltering Society of New York (HIAS) which began assisting arrivals at Ellis Island in 1870. Between 1933 and 1935, when the Nazis began the elimination program of Jews and other non-Aryans from the economic and social life of Germany, approximately 75,000 persons, including 9,000 Jews, fled to other countries. HIAS, by this time a national agency, coordinated the resettlement of m^ny thousands of these refugees, as did the International Rescue Committee (IRC), founded in 1932. In 1934, the Protestant churches created the American Committee for Christian German Refugees to provide services for Protestant refugees from Nazism. In 1936, the National Catholic Welfare Conference established the Catholic Committee for refugee victims of Nazi persecution. The Catholic organization also provided services to immigrants at Ellis Island and along the Mexican border where, in the 1930s, migrants and immigrants included refugees fom religious persecution in Mexico. The American Fund for Czechoslovak Relief, the Tolstoy Foundation VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 159 and the Polish American Immigration and Refugee Committee were all organized in the wake of World War II. The American Council for Nationalities Service, in existence since the 1920s as an association of local institutes providing services to immigrants and refugees, became involved in 1975 as a national agency in refugee resettlement. The World Relief organization, a branch of a national organization of Evangelical Churches, first undertook refugee resettlement in its own right in 1979, as did the YMCA. The latter, along with the Salvation Army and other voluntary relief agencies, had provided outstanding service in the Southeast Asian camps in 1975. VOLAG-GOVERN MENTAL RELATIONS The relations between the federal government and the VOLAGS have never been well formulated. Despite the fact that they had resettled all of the almost two million refugees admitted to the U.S., not until the Refugee Act of 1980 were the voluntary resettlement agencies ever mentioned in the Immigration and Nationality Act as having any role at all in the refugee field. In both their overseas processing of refugees as well as their reception and placement of refugees in the U.S., the voluntary resettlement agencies have dealt primarily with the Department of State. When refugees reached our shores as a country of first asylum or when placement has led to long term resettlement efforts on behalf of refugees, the VOLAGS have dealt with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW, now HHS). The Cuban refugee program of the 1960s, for example, was funded entirely by HEW, as resettlement was initiated only after the refugees had arrived in the U.S. All of the resettlement agencies are members of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service (ACVA) under whose auspices they meet at least weekly to discuss a myriad of issues related to resettlement. Until recent years the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM) in the Department of State was always a stepchild. When no refugee crisis existed it dwindled nearly to inanition with frequent turnover of personnel. When the Indochinese crisis erupted in April 1975, despite the threatening rumblings that had sounded in the area in previous months, ORM, having apparently made no contingency plans, was swept completely aside. A task force was created, staffed largely by State Department and Agency for International Development (AID) personnel; some were experienced in refugee movements in Indochina, but were lacking familiarity with the traditional methods of resettlement in the United States The Task Force was in existence and had been operating for a full ten days when Senator Edward Kennedy, learning at a Congressional hearing 160 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW that the VOLAGS had not even been contacted by the Task Force, arranged to have them involved immediately. Undoubtedly, the Task Force, preoccupied with the logistical problems of setting up camps and transporting refugees from Guam, Wake and the Philippines, would have eventually discovered the VOLAGS on its own, but much valuable time was lost unnecessarily. It is difficult to understand why the federal government and the VOLAGS fail to profit from their experiences by constructing a relationship and system for handling the next inevitable crisis. One likely factor is the constant reassignment of State Department personnel. Perhaps the VOLAGS are either too preoccupied with the residual problem of each resettlement program or too depleted between refugee movements to put great effort into planning for the next. This problem has certainly not escaped their attention, as the need to plan for future movements was the first recommendation made in an ACVA-sponsored study of the camp phase of the Indochinese program. This is a key issue which will have to be addressed. The Refugee Act of 1980 keeps the responsibility for contracting with VOLAGS in the State Department during a trial period, after which it is to be decided whether to give the responsibility to the new Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on a permanent basis. Thus, it is likely that relations between the VOLAGS and the government will get some attention in the future. OBJECTIVES OF RESETTLEMENT One of the recurrent questions in resettlement concerns its objectives and defining when the goals have been met. Should we be content merely to rescue the refugee and plant him or her in a new, safe environment, or should we immediately provide him or her with opportunities for upward mobility, or something in between? The importance of the answer for the future of refugee resettlement can hardly be exaggerated. Because the resources the country is willing to devote to refugee resettlement are surely limited, it is likely that as resettlement becomes more costly, fewer refugees will be admitted. Historically, refugee resettlement was carried out by the VOLAGS as voluntary undertakings at their own expense. Their objective was simply to bring the refugees to economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. The refugees being resettled generally had ethnic ties to established communities in the U.S. The agencies were concerned primarily with promoting the reception of refugees by ethnic groups, leaving their integration and interim support lamely to these groups. Even when a VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 161 group of refugees was sent for resettlement to an area where it had no ethnic base, resettlement consisted of finding homes and jobs. This simple undertaking has been complicated today by a serious housing shortage, occupancy regulations; regulation of skills and professions and transportation problems. While bringing refugees rapidly to economic self-sufficiency remains the objective of the voluntary resettlement agencies, two important changes have taken place that have significantly affected resettlement: 1) the growth of the welfare state, which has sought to raise the standard of living of those at the bottom of American society, and 2) a change in the type of refugee being resettled. RISING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT Although refugee resettlement programs were originally privately supported, with the massive influx of refugees and displaced persons after World War II, the federal government first loaned the VOLAGS monies to establish revolving loan funds for the transportation of refugees. Small per capita resettlement grants were made for the first time with the Cuban refugee movement through the 1960s. The grants reached $300 per capita, a quantum jump, for the small Ugandan Asian program in the early 1970s, and $500 per capita in the initial Indochinese program. Grants for the resettlement of Indochinese refugees dropped to $350 and rose again in stages to the current $500 per capita. Until 1977, no grants were extended for the resettlement of the regular flow of non-Southeast Asian, non-Cuban refugees. However, in 1976, to provide more equal treatment for refugee groups and to help the VOLAGS with rising numbers and costs, the State Department began granting the VOLAGS $250 per capita for at least some part of the annual refugee admissions and later raised that to $350. Initially, all the grants were conceived of as grants-in-aid to the agencies to enable them to continue what they had been doing independently. It was understood that the cost of resettlement was borne largely at the locale of resettlement and was much greater than the grant, which went to the agencies at the national level to be used to keep the system functioning. As all of the agencies have different structures and methods of resettlement, funds, too, are used differently—some agencies pass funds directly to the refugees on a uniform basis, others use a kind of needs test, others subcontract with local agencies with varying policies, and others establish loans funds. Some refugees, well aware of the grants, have misunderstood their purpose and, since they were given on a per capita 162 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW basis, have concluded that the funds were necessarily to be passed on to them. Although it has abated somewhat in the latest refugee movements, the refugees ' misunderstanding of the purpose of the grant monies has plagued the government and the VOLAGS since the beginning of the Southeast Asian program. Even with the help provided by the grants, not every refugee can be brought quickly to economic self-sufficiency. Under the present system, the refugee has a choice of seeking English language or other training, rather than seeking immediate self-sufficiency through employment. The newly arrived refugee is not always immediately faced, as in earlier times, with extreme alternatives. Our present system of resettlement not only makes the entire welfare system available to the refugee, but in recognition of his or her special needs, makes significant exceptions to the rules. This was also the case with the Cuban refugees who, at the insistence of the states where they were relocated, became a federal responsibility. Benefits such as public assistance, medical care and social services were made available to them through Social Security, with the states being reimbursed 100 percent of their costs. When the Southeast Asian program began, it was again decided to use the Social Security welfare-medicaid system to meet refugees' financial and medical needs. However, the resources of the VOLAGS and a limited sum appropriated for "special projects" were intended to cover auxiliarly resettlement services such as ESL (English as a Second Language), employment counseling and other social services. It did not take some of the states long to realize that the refugees were eligible for many special services provided under State Title XX (Social Security Act) plans. HEW was quick to accommodate to this by making the state portion of these matching programs 100 percent reimbursable from Indochinese refugee program funds. Thus, three uncoordinated sources of service to the Southeast Asian refugees resulted: those provided by the VOLAGS; those available under Title XX; and those funded under special projects. This is not to mention language programs available under educational grant programs, nor CETA programs. Not all VOLAGS provided the same services, and there were great disparities in the range of services provided under Title XX programs; HEW did its best to achieve some balance with its "special projects" funds. However, as such funds were limited, the services available to refugees in different areas of the country varied widely. Some refugees were awash in benefits, while others got little. The Social Security system provides a variety of benefits capable, when fully utilized, of covering nearly every conceivable need of low income and dependent Americans. To make the system applicable to the needs of refugees, a number of significant exceptions had to be made. Among them VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 163 was the waiver of the requirement that to receive medicaid, a refugee must be on welfare. However, the bureaucracy frequently persisted; when refugees went in to sign up for medicaid alone, they were often signed up for cash assistance as well. A waiver of the family composition rules for Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) was also authorized. This made it possible for single refugees and childless couples to receive public assistance in states where normally only families with children qualify for such assistance. Also waived were rules limiting the number of hours a welfare recipient could work and to some extent the amount he or she could earn. This has led to cases in which refugees can earn respectable incomes and still receive some cash assistance. The lack of a clear set of objectives in resettlement has led, in the view of the VOLAGS, to some abuse of the welfare system. Welfare offices have been overwhelmed with new applications. Since refugees' welfare costs the states nothing, once refugees are placed on cash assistance, often there is little time and less incentive to follow up on the refugees. And, despite regulations to the contrary, many refugees have been able to study full time on cash assistance. The VOLAGS themselves are not without fault on this issue. Some of their representatives feel that the refugees should seek access to any benefits available from which they might profit. At times, when a sudden influx of refugees taxes the resettlement system beyond its capacity, despite the risks involved, VOLAGS are sometimes forced to put refugees temporarily on public assistance until they can cope with them. While many of these welfare programs are necessary, and beneficial if properly used, they often give the refugee an opportunity to postpone entry into the real world. They also raise the overall cost of the programs enormously, and may possibly limit the number of refugees who will be allowed admission. Many of the refugees are ambitious and seek to enter the work force at the same level they occupied in their former society or at an even higher level. In practice, the current system allows them to pursue this objective and may even encourage it. Any discussion of the need for cash assistance, medicaid and other benefits must take into consideration the types of refugees now being resettled. Traditionally, refugee groups entering this country were, for the most part, from developed areas of the world and often possessed superior skills. This is still true of many refugees from Eastern Europe. The Cuban movement of the 1960s represented a cross section of the educated strata of Cuban society. The first wave of refugees from Southeast Asia comprised largely the upper and middle classes of the fallen regimes of Indochina. Nearly all of these refugees were resettled relatively easily, primarily by 164 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW finding them homes and jobs, and by providing ESL and some supportive social services. Relatively few of them had to resort to public assistance before becoming economically self-sufficient. Since 1975, especially in the past year or two, the refugee system has included rural Khmer and many of the Lao tribes, the Thai Dam, Lao Theung, the Mien (Yao) and primarily the Hmong. While, in terms of our government's obligation to refugees the Hmong have a stronger claim than most, their resettlement in a modern technological society, undoubtedly a wrenching experience for them, poses unprecedented problems for our system of resettlement. Many of them are unlettered in their own languages. Most have engaged in slash and burn agriculture and military operations all of their lives. Few have held jobs in our sense of the term. Few have been exposed to the amenities of our Western dwellings, nor could many of them have any more appreciation of our culture than we do of theirs. The risk of creating dependency on the part of this group of refugees is increased by the fact that, in many parts of the country, the benefits available under the welfare system enable them to live at a level higher than they have experienced in their homeland. They may be unaware of or insensitive to such pressures and sanctions as exist among the dominant population to prevent the gross abuse of the welfare system. Countervailing these lacks, however, is their general willingness to follow the counsel of their tribal leaders who are usually better informed of conditions here. Through the period required to bring them to self-sufficiency, however, and despite the risks of creating dependency, public assistance is often necessary. In view of the allure of the welfare system and the dangers of creating dependency among refugees, there is urgent need to establish clear principles as well as a mechanism for applying them to the use of resettlement. These principles would help determine whether a refugee should go immediately to work or use public assistance while in ESL or job training. A parallel effort is needed for refugees now on welfare. There may be some relief in sight since the Refugee Assistance section of the Refugee Act of 1980, which is already in effect, makes it unmistakably clear that a refugee must take " appropriate" employment if it is offered to him before he can be.considered eligible for public assistance. Heretofore, even when a suitable job might have been available to a refugee, welfare eligibility workers were fearful of denying a refugee applicant his "right" to public assistance. It remains to be seen how regulations to implement the new law will develop. MATCHING GRANT PROGRAMS As has been noted, three separate but unequal refugee resettlement VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 165 programs have developed: 1) the traditional program to resettle refugees from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and China which involves no special federal programs; 2) a highly developed program funded by HEW of 100 percent federal reimbursement to states for costs incurred in providing services to Cuban refugees, with limited grants to VOLAGS engaged in resettling Cuban refugees out of Miami; and 3) the Indochina program in which HEW provides a program similar to that available to Cubans, with the Volags receiving $500 per capita resettlement grants from the Department of State. As there were no special government programs available to non-Cuban, non-Southeast Asian refugees, most of the benefits they received were provided by the VOLAGS through their own resources. However, as the number of such refugees increased dramatically, HEW decided to supplement the VOLAG efforts on a matching basis. Twenty million dollars a year was made available in 1979 and 1980 with a maximum of $1,000 in matching funds per refugee, for all needs, including financial assistance. The program is run entirely by the participating VOLAGS and provides a unified control over the resettlement process that is sorely lacking in the Southeast Asian program. VOLAG ROLE IN U.S. RESETTLEMENT OVERSEAS In certain countries of first asylum in Europe and in Hong Kong, a refugee seeking entry to the U.S. can go into the voluntary agency office of his choice, either a branch or an affiliate of a U.S. VOLAG, and ask for assistance in preparing an application for admission to the U.S. as a refugee. The VOLAG representative prepares the application and presents it to an official of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) who alone has the authority to determine refugee admissibility. The overseas VOLAG representative sends a biographical form to his U.S. counterpart, who finds a sponsor or otherwise makes preparation for resettlement. If the application is approved by the INS and sponsorship assured by the VOLAG, the case is referred to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), which arranges transportation on a loan basis using funds provided primarily by the U.S. and several European countries. The loans are to be collected by the U.S. VOLAG that conducts the resettlement. Refugees were similarly allowed to choose their voluntary resettlement agency in those movements in which refugees were brought to camps in the U.S., as in the Hungarian, Cuban and initial Southeast Asian programs, where interested VOLAGS set up registration offices in the camps. However, because of the immense logistical problems involved in offering this choice to subsequent waves of Southeast Asian refugees 166 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW scattered through numerous camps in Thailand and in large and small concentrations in nearly every country in Asia, it was decided that the only feasible way of registering them for movement to the U.S. was to establish an office in each country of first asylum which would jointly represent all of the VOLAGS. Incidentally, to reach all of the refugees, especially the boat refugees, the Joint VOLAG Representatives (JVR) were forced to build large and resourceful staffs who had to endure often very primitive living arrangements and resort to all forms of land, sea and air transportation. Most of the cost involved in registering overseas refugees is covered by contracts with the Department of State. Because refugees in the Indochinese program register with a Joint VOLAG Representative rather than a single resettlement agency, another system of VOLAG selection had to be devised. To serve this function, a processing center was established at the headquarters of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies in New York and a committee comprising representatives of all the VOLAGS was formed to distribute the cases among them. The committee follows certain guidelines in its distribution. First, it assigns family reunification cases, which now account for nearly 80 percent of the movement, to the VOLAG which resettled the anchor, or original relative in the U.S. The remainder of cases are assigned according to a number of other criteria. If relatives are discovered after allocation, cases are transferred among the agencies. By mid-1980 this system had processed nearly 200,000 refugees for resettlement in the United States. The process of selecting and transporting a refugee from Southeast Asia to the U.S. for resettlement is a surprisingly complicated undertaking. Selection for the U.S. program requires coordination with the selection processes of other countries resettling Southeast Asians, primarily Australia, Canada and France. Coordination of selecting by the various countries is accomplished, where possible, by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In the course of time, the U.S. system for selecting Southeast Asian refugees has developed into a preference and residual program. In its preferential aspect, the U.S. first admits those refugees wishing to come to the U.S., who have close relatives here, who had close connections with U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia, or who would be in jeopardy in countries of first asylum because of connections with the former regimes of their homelands. In addition to these refugees, to prevent countries of first asylum from turning refugee boats back to sea or forcibly repatriating land refugees, it is understood the U.S. has agreed to take the residue of refugees not taken by other countries. Only those not offered asylum elsewhere are eligible for the U.S. program. Until the Refugee Act of 1980, the actual number of refugees admitted under the U.S. Southeast Asian program was governed by erratic and undependable authorizations made VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 167 by the Attorney General. Ever since regular and relatively long range admission quotas were instituted in mid-1979, frequent crises brought about by sudden buildups of refugees in various countries, or a change of policy of a country of first asylum necessitated the frequent abandonment of planned movement schedules. Of refugees thought ready for transportation from camps, 20 to 40 percent of the cases were found ineligible on medical grounds for immediate movement. The complexity of this system is cited to show the source of the many difficulties the VOLAGS face in planning arrivals and resettlement. To keep the flow moving necessitates a veritable torrent of comunications exchanged among the field, VOLAG headquarters and the sponsors. These processing problems do not include the additional problems that arise from the vagaries of the weather, equipment breakdowns, strikes and other hazards involved in trying to move refugees halfway around the world from camps in Southeast Asia to their places of resettlement in the U.S. PRE-ARRIVAL IN U.S. When a VOLAG accepts a case for resettlement, its first effort is to ensure that when the refugee arrives that person is met, has adequate food, clothing and shelter and that his or her other immediate health needs are cared for. Additional resources must be available soon after arrival. Where to resettle the refugee is predetermined in about 80 percent of the cases by the location of the relative the refugee has indicated in his or her biographical form as the person he or she hopes to join in the U.S. While every agency operates somewhat differently, most agencies communicate with the relative and ascertain that person 's interest in having the refugee resettled nearby, and if so, whether he or she can contribute to the resettlement. In most cases the relative accepts readily. However, in many instances, only assistance in kind, such as temporary shelter and orientation to the community is offered. Normally the VOLAG has to make arrangements, possibly with a church or other group, to supplement these efforts. It is when the refugee has no relative in the U.S., or relatives either cannot be found or cannot help, that the VOLAGS differ somewhat in their approach to resettlement. In most cases, church affiliated agencies find a parish or congregation to take full responsibility for the resettlement. Nonsectarian agencies may have local community groups sponsor their non-relative cases. Usually churches and other groups prefer to work with refugee families rather than individuals. Generally, for Southeast Asians there have been more offers from churches and other groups to 168 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW resettle nonrelative cases than there have been such refugees available for resettlement. To place a refugee with a church or other group requires some orientation of both the refugee and the sponsors. The VOLAGS have had much more success with providing pre-arrival orientation to the sponsoring groups than to the refugees, although refugee orientation programs overseas are being improved. Fortunately, many of the sponsoring groups, both religious and non-sectarian, are now sufficiently experienced in resettling Southeast Asian refugees. In addition to the parish and group sponsors, most of the church and nonsectarian VOLAGS have paid professional staff across the country who supplement relative sponsorships and in many cases sponsor individual refugees. In mid-1980, the VOLAGS engaged in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees were operating through the following network of offices and affiliates: HI AS American Fund for Czechoslovak National Office Refugees, Inc. Local Offices & Affiliates—52 National Office ^L z, T.T/ 77 c • Regional Offices—3 Church, World Service National Office Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Officer Contact List—17 Refugee Service Tolstoy Foundation National Office National Office LIRS Regional Consultants—38 Regional &; Field Offices—7 rr o ^ .7 r ^ r U.S. Catholic Conference International Rescue Committee National Offices—2 National Office Regional Offices—4 Resettlement Offices—15 USCC Diocesan Resettlement YMCA Offices-184 National Office World Relief Refugee Services 20 Local Active Affiliates National Office Major Affiliates-4 Regional Offices-5 American Council for Cooperating Agencies—6 Nationalities Service National Office Resettlement Agencies—22 Local Affiliated Agencies—4 There are many advantages in encouraging church and group sponsorships, not the least of which is that the sponsors become interested in VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 169 the entire refugee problem and tend to support the overall program. However, there are often too many refugees joining relatives in the same location, overwhelming the available churches and groups. For the same reason it is not always possible to use church or group sponsorships even for nonrelative cases. Experience has shown that it is advisable to resettle refugees, especially tribal refugees, in clusters rather than scattering them as single families in isolated communities. It has been found that such singlyplaced families will either relocate rapidly to join their own ethnic group elsewhere, or may become depressed and cease to function effectively. Thus, if church groups had to be relied upon exclusively, the VOLAGS would either have to place some refugees where they would not stay or would be unable to provide resettlement for large flows of refugees rapidly. There are also problems involved in resettling refugees in areas using solely local VOLAG staff. Aside from the obvious expense involved in adequately staffing the many locations in which refugees must be resettled, the changing ethnic nature of the movement from largely Vietnamese to largely Chinese Vietnamese, Lao Hmong and Cambodian and, to a certain extent, back to a combination of all of these, has complicated staffing requirements. It cannot be assumed that a number of one of the ethnic groups can always successfully resettle members of another, nor can the agencies either afford staff from each group in every location or change staff as the caseload changes. Sometimes agencies have been fortunate in finding those rare refugees who speak several Indochinese languages, but most often they have had to depend upon a great deal of good will and adaptability. POST ARRIVAL When a refugee actually arrives in a community, he or she must be met at the airport and taken to his or her initial lodging. Arrangements must have been made for food, clothing, health needs and possibly furniture. As soon as this person is settled, general orientation must be provided, a social security card obtained, children enrolled in school, a health checkup or medical follow-up arranged for and opportunities sought out for English language training. If the refugee is employable, arrangements must be made to assess work skills and appropriate employment must be sought. Through all of this, transportation and usually interpreter services are required and must be provided. Frequently, when a sponsoring church or group is involved, one member of the sponsoring group will have had an employment opportunity in mind even before the 170 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugee has arrived. In fact, the availability of employment may have been an essential factor in the decision to sponsor. There will be many refugees who, for health or other reasons, will not be employable immediately, or perhaps, ever. Rather than utilize the limited resources of a VOLAG or church sponsor to sustain a refugee who cannot become self-sufficient within a reasonable period, the refugee might be registered for financial assistance as early as possible. In many areas the financial assistance offices are so understaffed and overwhelmed by the refugee influx that they are running months behind in their work. In some cases the VOLAGS compound the problem by registering many incoming refugees upon arrival to insure that benefits will be available if and when they are needed. DIFFICULTY OF PLANNING One of the great problems of the South east Asian resettlement program as well as the Soviet program has been the piecemeal approach taken by the federal government both in authorizing admissions and in providing necessary funds. Since the admission of the initial wave of some 140,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians who fled their countries in the spring of 1975, there have been no fewer than eleven separate parole authorizations for Southeast Asian refugees. Congress was either so parsimonious with admissions or so lacking in faith in the domino theory that it had failed to include Laotians in the original appropriations language, an omission that soon had to be corrected. Refugee movements after World War II have tended to occur in the form of a large initial flood followed by a steady trickle. This apparently has led observers to conclude that refugee phenomena are one time problems that can be effectively dealt with by ad hoc solutions. The Southeast Asian refugee exodus, however, has become a recurring problem requiring recurrent solutions. Unfortunately, each time the problem has had to reach life-endangering, crisis proportions in order to build a consensus sufficient to bring forth a solution. And when a solution has come in the form of additional refugee admissions, a parallel crisis has usually developed on the home front concerning the funding for transportation and resettlement. In these uncertain circumstances, VOLAG officials have been faced with a constant struggle to maintain sufficient staff to handle additional resettlement when further admissions have been authorized. Fortunately, most of the VOLAGS, having committed themselves to serving refugees for two to five years, have been able to retain minimal staff and maintain financial stability. Only in the summer of 1979 when President Carter, in response to the VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 171 sudden boat exodus, raised the level of admissions from 7,000 to 14,000 per month did the resettlement movement admit of some planning. The welcomed guaranteed level of admissions provided an immediate challenge to the entire system. Doubling the number of admissions was a greater jolt to the system than the numbers indicate. Although the 7,000 per month figure had been authorized several months earlier, requisite funding had not been provided and refugee admissions had never exceeded 4,000 per month. Despite the expressed doubts of the Department of State and even some of their own members, the VOLAGS succeeded in quickly moving from resettling 4,000 per month to 14,000 and even more, and have been able to sustain that rate for more than a year. Even more remarkable is the fact that the relatively difficult to resettle Laotian and Cambodian refugees comprise a high percentage of the increased movement. This is not to say that this great increase has been taken in stride or that the quality of resettlement has not been affected. The impact, in fact, has been felt throughout the country, and there has been much talk of backlash, resettlement placement strategies to reduce the impact on certain areas, crisis intervention and so forth. In fact, so noticeable has the impact become that several foundations, notably the Field and American Public Welfare Foundations, wishing to help, have financed an Indochina Refugee Action Center (IRAC) to identify some of the problems being created and to make proposals for their solution. Some of the concerns about the impact of the Indochinese movement have recently been overshadowed by concerns over the sudden massive influx of refugees from Cuba. There is hope that the problems raised by the lack of planning for both the movement of refugees and for the financing of such movements may be alleviated by the Refugee Act of 1980 which provides for setting the number of refugees to be admitted annually before the beginning of each fiscal year. ADVANTAGES OF VOLAGS As refugee resettlement gets more elaborate and long term, and involves more of the welfare state mechanism at the local and state levels, the VOLAGS are becoming increasingly dependent on grants provided by the government. The question therefore must arise as to why, apart from the fact that they pioneered and currently occupy the field, the VOLAGS should continue to be the agencies for placing refugees into the U.S. social system. The VOLAGS ' system of resettlement continues to offer significant advantages as the vehicle for resettlement. First, it is a far less expensive 172 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW means of resettlement than a federal or state bureaucracy. It has been estimated that the government's assuming a function of the private sector doubles its cost. In view of all of the overtime, night and weekend work, urgent demands, etc., of refugee resettlement work, much of which is quietly done by volunteers, it is likely the cost would be quadrupled rather than doubled. This is to say nothing of the VOLAGS' abilities to obtain gifts of cash, shelter, clothing, food, furniture, medical and dental care, transportation and other essential goods and services which would not likely be available in a program funded entirely by the U.S. government. People are often quite willing to do things gratis if they know there are no funds otherwise available. The VOLAGS as a group represent and draw on most elements of American society, involving them and eliciting their interest in acceptance of and support for refugee movements. VOLAGS in other countries of refugee resettlement have found that their constituencies are anxious to get involved in refugee resettlement and that their interest makes the whole public more supportive of refugee admissions. The VOLAGS are all national in scope and can offer services to refugees who may leave one state and move to another. Among the most significant advantages the VOLAGS offer are flexibility and responsiveness. The VOLAGS can find resettlement opportunities for hundreds or even thousands of refugees on very short notice. They have been called upon to arrange the resettlement of emergency medical cases ranging from women about to give birth or terminal cancer victims, to paraplegics and in one case the resettlement of nearly 40 minors already en route. Because they know where responsive and resourceful resettlement structures can be found, they can respond very quickly. Had it not been for the VOLAG management of their end of the program, often using government provided funds, many federally funded state and local programs of service to the refugees would have had to shut down and start up again and again because of discontinuities in federal funding. And because of the inherent inflexibility of federally funded programs, Title XX and other such programs are often either unable to meet the real needs or refugees or, simply because funds are available for one purpose but not another, may provide costly but marginal services. These issues are brought up not to demonstrate the superior virtue of the VOLAGS over the bureaucracies, but to point out the benefit of using a more flexible and responsive mechanism when needed, as in the case of refugee movements, which originate in crises. The relationship the VOLAGS develop with the refugees provides important moral support and continuity during their first years in the U.S. Under their grant agreement with the government, the VOLAGS are required to provide some follow-up on services to refugees for a one year VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES 173 period, but in many cases the relationship with the VOLAG lasts much longer. Sometimes the refugee turns to the VOLAG for help in bringing in other family members or in obtaining permanent resident status or citizenship. The VOLAG keeps in touch with the refugee for repayment of travel or other loans. There is always a danger that refugees entering the welfare system will simply be forgotten, so it is advantageous to have an outside agency following up the case. It would be misleading to argue that there are no problems involved in using the VOLAGS to resettle refugees. The very number and variety of resettlement agencies causes problems. Their failure to form a single entity to deal with the outside world and with their common problems has been a source of difficulty. Their differing methods of resettlement and frequent failure to coordinate activities at the local level are confusing to both the refugees and to Americans not familiar with resettlement. Since the government began giving grants to the agencies there have been continuous expressions of concern about the lack of accountability required of them. Some of the problems which have emerged under the present system can be resolved. The VOLAGS are organizing under the American Council of Voluntary Agencies to help deal with their common problems. They are also taking steps to coordinate the efforts of their representatives at the local level. A new State Department-VOLAG grant agreement prescribes a minimum set of services which must be provided by VOLAGS to the refugees they resettle, thus resulting in basic standards of treatment of refugees. The differing methods by which the VOLAGS meet their obligations and in which they handle the grant monies are not likely to be standardized soon, but there is probably more equality of result even in this area than is often recognized. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE As has been noted previously, the Refugee Act of 1980 legislates solutions to a number of long standing problems that affect resettlement. The Act: 1) provides some basis for resettlement planning by requiring set quotas for both the number and source of refugee admissions at the beginning of each fiscal year; 2) establishes an overall U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs as well as a Director of Refugee Assistance in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); 3) authorizes funds for needed assistance and services to refugees for specific periods of time; 4) requires as a condition for reimbursement of expenditures on 174 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees that States appoint a State Refugee Coordinator to organize state activities on behalf of refugees, to insure that the objectives of the Act are being met; 5) enunciates a resettlement philosophy of economic self-sufficiency through employment, consistent with the VOLAG philosophy; 6) Mandates the equal availability of public assistance as well as language and other training and social services to all refugees; 7) allows the federal agencies a great deal of flexibility, including the utilization of the private sector in meeting all of the needs of the refugees; 8) clarifies legal responsibilities and procedures for handling unaccompanied refugee minors and authorizes support for them through their majorities. Considering the accomplishments of the very complex and seemingly disorganized system being used in the United States for the resettlement of refugees, one is moved to paraphrase Churchill ' s comment on the democratic form of government, that ours is the worst possible system of resettlement, except for all the others. Refugee Dynamics: Angolans in Zambia 1966 to 1972 The following study of Angolan refugees in Zambia examines the decision-making dynamics of refugee movements, documents a case of extensive self-settlement, describes the background to the refugee movement, and briefly compares the welfare of self-settling refugees and those who are in government schemes. It is difficult if not impossible to determine the number of refugees in Africa, because of inadequate baseline census data, rapidly changing situations, extensive unreported self-settlement and repatriation, governmental efforts to conceal or exaggerate movements, and varying definitions of who should be considered a refugee. The label "refugee " is sometimes applied in general to many types of migrants, but in the more restricted political and legal sense followed in this article, a refugee is someone who flees from his or her country, or refuses to return if already outside, because the person realistically fears persecution or death for religious, racial or political reasons (UNHCR, 1978). Thus, the more restrictive usage specifies international travel and certain causes (civil unrest, war, or persecution). Even with these criteria, the actual assignment of refugee status is often a subjective decision, as Walker (1978) points out for educational refugees in Swaziland and Lesotho. With these qualifications in mind, the following statistics (Table 1) are offered as a guide to the distribution of refugees in Africa and the magnitude of the problem. As of the beginning of 1980, 2,657,000 Africans from 14 countries were refugees in 22 African and three non-African host countries (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1980). This represents a dramatic increase in numbers since Gould 's (1974) earlier survey when slightly more than a million people in tropical Africa were refugees. Even more significant, however, is the fact that Africa 's refugees are now overwhelmingly a consequence of wars among Africans rather than anticolonial wars against Europeans or European powers. In the 1972 statistics used by Gould, 50 percent of all refugees were from wars of national liberation against the Portuguese in Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique. The major wars today are internal ones in which Africans fight Africans. Ethiopia produces more than half (58%) of Africa' s refugees, while IMR Volume 15 No. 1 175 Art T-Tanspn 176 w ^ n IW;L S3U)UHOQ ireouJv-^N ssLUunoQ ireouJV snouT2 ^\ V\C[UIV^ SJr ez ^pu^S f^ ^IU^ZU^J^ irepns •er^emo^ anbiqui^zo^ uoq^Q unoqi(Q UOOJSIireQ ipunJng TSUKMSlOg qoSuy ^uaS ^v !-!.§ u w 6' 9 S' S^ (S o INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONREVIEW 1 00 »0 CT» t00» t^.t0 0t^-^tO O^t^. t^.t0 •^CM.C^t^. t0•^0^0-^ ^ CM ^ ( ^ ID £ ^ •^-^ CM 0 T^I•.—i CSI CM t a " irt K-> s en CM -dipQUMM h-l Z P^ > </3 c^^NN will < •g ^ f i^ lit 111 g^l ir>''e;>- si^ 2-6 & 11 § 2 ^ S c^.§ S ^ •HI III fit's ^1 i »^£ I- 8 ! 11^ si^ v c *-» ill ^ § § 2 § § ^ t3 6 .S§£g S 73 -o oT ?<'u 'o u << s c - 6 ° § ^ ^ § c c^ .2 - ~ C o ^H^' i ? ^^ s ^-g e^ 5 o §1 ^ 2 s i§ s^ ^ s .§" ^ tlJ^ ^i 8 llti ii ^^ ^ j 8 -] sjii ^ 3 K) 0 M • 2 ^ .^ g u ^ c ^i fc g ^ ^ s g 5^11(3 REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 177 Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa only account for 10 percent altogether. During 1980 many Zimbabweans were returning to their independent country, while Ethiopia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Chad and Angola continue to war, and hundreds of thousands of Africans from earlier intra-African wars and civil persecutions (Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire) continued to live as refugees. African national populations are predominantly rural, and this characteristic is accentuated in most refugee populations because of the rural location of most African wars. One estimate for 1976 reported that only 4 percent of recognized African refugees were urban (Table 2 from Chambers, 1979). Rural populations in general are older than national averages with a higher percentage of women since people in their prime working years, especially men, have often gone to the cities to work. These features are common in most refugee populations, also, and are sometimes exaggerated by the siphoning off of younger men as guerrillas. The Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, by far the largest refugee population in modern African history, demonstrate this common demographic picture—women, children, and a few old men are seen in the camps; the younger men are either fighting or tending the livestock somewhere else. Another important feature of African movements is the frequency with which refugees settle themselves among villagers and townsfolk near the international border instead of being settled by the government in camps or schemes. The Pan African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, held in Arusha in May 1979, reported that "more than 60 percent of rural refugees live outside organized settlement schemes" (UNHCR, 1979). Another estimate, this time for refugees in 1976, is shown in Table 2 (from Chambers, 1979): 75 percent self-settled, 40 percent of whom receive no direct assistance. Accepting either estimate means that more than half of all Africa 's refugees are self-settled, frequently in ignorance or defiance of the host country and Organization of African Unity policies that dictate no refugee settlement near the border and encourage or require refugees to live in separately administered settlements. Chambers (1979) has observed, "if individual human beings are of equal importance, more refugees matter more than fewer ". In official and scientific attention, however, this is not true. Rural self-settled refugees are, to a great extent, an unseen and unknown majority. They receive little direct assistance from host governments and international agencies, and most scientific (and popular) reports concentrate on the tiny minority of urban and educated refugees and the larger minority of rural people in officially designated locations (Gould, 1974; Chambers, 1979). In the absence of much data about self-settled refugees, two divergent hypotheses have evolved concerning their welfare and impact. First is the positive viewpoint which considers the refugees and their local hosts to be 178 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW TABLE 2 NUMBERS OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA (1976)' 1 Not Receiving Receiving Assistance Assistance b Total Percentage Urban refugees 4,000 10,000 14,000 1.2 Rural refugees in organized settlements and camps 170,000 110,000 280,000 24 Self-settled rural refugees, not in organized settlements or camps ' 520,000° 350,000 870,000 75 Totals 694,000 470,000 1,164,000 100 SOURCE: Chambers, 1979 NOTES: excluding Guinean refugees in West Africa ^ut formerly assisted c Of these, some 480,000 were Angolans from Zaire, some of whom were receiving some marginal assistance. The total volume of assistance to this category was small compared with the volume to the others. successfully and harmoniously coping with the situation. There is no need for outside interference. Based on the fact that national boundaries often bisect ethnic territories., and the presumed humanitarian and generous characteristics of village society, this perspective sees the refugees being welcomed by their co-ethnics and relatives who share available food and land and help the newcomers rapidly re-establish a normal village way of life. The second hypothesis presents a negative viewpoint and fears that refugees and many hosts are severely disadvantaged by selfsettlement. Here, the failure to intervene by national and international agencies is seen as a dereliction of responsibility. Emphasizing the widespread scarcity of good agricultural land, earlier adaptations due to population pressures, numbers of rural Africans already dependent to varying degrees on wage labor, and existing inequalities and dominancedependency relationships within rural societies; this perspective sees the following consequences of self-settlement: powerful residents take advantage of refugees for cheap labor, which depresses wage rates and opportunities, and refugee demands increase the cost of food and land. Refugees remain vulnerable and insecure. All of this increases the difficulties of the poorest residents who also depend on wage labor for survival, and the increased demand for food and land results in the erosion and degradation of the already strained environment (UNHCR, 1979; Chambers, 1979). The following study of Angolan refugees in Zambia documents a case of extensive self-settlement, describes the background to the refugee REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 179 movement, and briefly compares the welfare of self-settling refugees and those who are in government schemes. Both of the opposing hypotheses are seen to be partially true in this case. While the positive viewpoint bases itself on the existence of social relationships and institutionalized means of absorbing immigrant kinsfolk into village society, the negative perspective is less social than ecological, stressing the effects of population growth and the consequent suffering of those with the fewest political and material resources. All of these are true in the case of Angolan refugees in Zambia. The question of welfare is more complex. Refugees in schemes are obviously better off materially than those in villages. Food, land, clothing, tools and infrastructural supports are provided in the schemes, whereas village-living refugees must struggle for years to reach a standard of living rapidly attained with government assistance. Why, then, do most of the refugees live in the villages when admission to the schemes is easy and, in fact, often obligatory? What are the "definite social and psychological advantages" of self-settlement (UNHCR, 1979) that dominate the obvious economic and other advantages of schemes? Seeking the answers to these questions involves examining the dynamics of flight and settlement and the interplay of welfare and power. This article attempts to illuminate some inadequately understood and conceptualized dimensions of the African refugee experience. ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA Migration, Matrilineality and Mobility Long before the 1966 influx of refugees, there existed patterns of international migration in this region. The territories of the Luvale-speaking and related peoples were splintered by the colonial borders established by the British (Zambia), Belgians (Zaire), and Portuguese (Angola) in the early 1900s, but people continued to travel back and forth within their ethnic territories, and there developed during this century a strong migratory drift out of Angola into Zambia. Although Luvale-speaking chiefs lived in this part of Zambia before 1820 (White, 1962; Hansen and Papstein, 1979), the majority of the Luvale and related peoples in Zambia (often called Balovale peoples by the British) before 1966 were first and second generation immigrants and earlier refugees from Angola between the early 1910s and 1930s (Hansen, 1977). These earlier migrants provided both direction and welcome to many of the refugees after 1965. At the same time previous immigration had led to deforestation, erosion, loss of soil fertility—prompting a stabilization of previously shifting cultivation near the border as wood- 180 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Figure I STATES a land was exhausted—and aggravated tensions between ethnic groups as immigration changed the local balance of power more and more toward the Luvale (Hansen, 1977; Hudson, 1935). In 1914 the region that is now the Zambezi and Kabompo Districts of Zambia had a population of 10,405 and a density of 0.8 people per square mile. The average annual growth rate between 1914 and 1930 was 8.2; the 1930 population density was 5.6; and the 1963 density was 6.8 people. This population growth is almost totally attributable to immigration since the fertility rates of these Balovale peoples during the 1900s had been very low, only capable of maintaining not increasing the population (Mitchell, 1965; Spring, 1972, 1976), and the annual population growth rate due to natural factors that was calculated in 1972 from censuses in the border villages was only 1.1 percent {See, Table 3). The Luvale-speaking and related peoples are matrilineal (related REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 181 TABLE 3 SHIFTS IN VILLAGE POPULATION 1971 TO 1972 Reason Frequency Continuously present 1971-1972 1006 Births 42 Deaths 28 Wife joined husband (virilocal marriage) 42 Woman divorced or widowed 55 Child moved to accompany parent 64 Child moved to a relative's house 67 Other, primarily adult moving for economic reasons 123 No information 13 Total censused persons 1440 through women). Lineages and clans are not localized; their members are scattered within (and, to a lesser degree, outside) the ethnic territory. Members of the same clan are not allowed to marry. Marriage within the ethnic group is encouraged, although intermarriage of Luvale-speaking and related peoples is common, the children belonging to the lineage, clan, and ethnicity of the mother. Upon marriage, the wife goes to live in the husband 's village. When a woman is widowed or divorced she rejoins her brothers or other matrilineal kin in their village. Small children travel with their mother; older children often visit various relatives for months or years at a time. Villages are usually small, 81 percent of the border villages surveyed having 20 or fewer people, the smallest being only a husband and wife. Larger villages have a core of matrilineal ly related men (brothers, mothers ' brothers, sisters' sons, etc.) and their unmarried (at present) sisters. Villagers do not believe in charity to strangers, but they do recognize and practice obligations and responsibility among relatives. Throughout their life these people are mobile, visiting relatives, shifting fields and village sites, traveling on long fishing trips or trading missions, and migrating to work in the European mines and farms. The geographic dispersion of lineages and clans facilitates travel since travelers may expect some hospitality from relatives along the way. Chain migration to rural and urban areas is common, and one of the first items of conversation among strange newcomers and residents is clan and lineage membership to determine if the newcomer is related to anyone locally. The extent of normal mobility is attested by a set of surveys conducted in Zambian border villages. In 1971 and, one year later, in 1972 the same 117 matrilineal villages were censused. These contiguous villages under 182 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW three political headmen constitute half of one rural settlement. Each year the population totalled 1,223, but that coincidence camouflaged the fact that 217 people (18%) from the 1971 population had left during the year to be replaced by another 217 newcomers. The 434 people who entered or left included 42 births and 28 deaths (1.1% annual growth rate) and 364 travelers (See, Table 3). Only 19 (11% of the immigrants) were refugees from Angola. All other immigrants came from other Zambian locales (urban and rural). The small number of refugees reflected the fact that major influxes into this border region were over by 1972. Perhaps the high level of mobility (18%) is exaggerated from peacetime norms by shifts of refugees from village to village within Zambia, but the reasons given are customary and the levels were treated by informants as normal. Primarily economic reasons, better farmland, fishing sites, or employment, motivated 123 adults to come or go (34% of travelers). Marriages, divorces, and widowing caused 97 adult women (27% of travelers) to join their husbands or brothers, respectively, and 131 children (36%) moved with their parents or to stay with other relatives. This normal mobility is not readily apparent to the casual observer because the same villages remain. Some new villages appear but most newcomers merge into existing villages and houses, and migration intermingles on the road with casual traffic. Another facet of rural migration experience is labor migration, a permanent feature of life for many African men who leave their rural homes to travel to mines, cities, or large farms to work for one or more years. Extensive labor migration is seen in rural areas by the disproportionately small number of working-age men, who are away working, and the large numbers of women and aged. Table 4 shows these features for 1963 for Zambian rural areas in general and the specific border locality of TABLE 4 1963 AGE-SEX DISTRIBUTION (PERCENTAGES) MALES / FEMALES Under 21 Years 21 to 45 Years Over 45 Years Total mmmm All Zambia 27.6/27.8 15.9/17.3 6.1/5.3 49.6/50.4 Both Sexes 55.4 33.2 11.4 100 Zambian Rural 27.8/28.3 12.8/17.7 6.9/6.6 47.5/52.6 Both Sexes 56.1 30.5 13.5 100 Border Locality 19.5/18.6 16.5/24.5 10.2/10.7 46.2/53.8 Both Sexes 38.1 41 20.9 100 SOURCES: Ministry of Finance, Government of the Republic of Zambia, Second Report of the May/ June 1963 Census of Africans in Northern Rhodesia Central Statistical Office, Government of the Republic of Zambia, May/June 1963 Census of Africans, Village Populations: District: Balouale. REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 183 8,400 people where refugee research was later conducted. In the border area the low fertility noted above for Balovale peoples depresses the under 21 category, but the other characteristics are evident, particularly the wide disparity between men (16.5%) and women (24.5%) of the 21 to 45 year category. Many men remain away working until they are old, at which time the lack of adequate retirement programs in the cities induces their return to the villages, where they increase the number of over 45 year olds. Although comparable statistics are not available for the Angolan border regions, there men were also involved in labor migration, and the routes to South African, Zimbabwean, and Zambian mines, farms and cities all led through the border regions of Zambia. Many Angolans who later came as refugees had previously passed through as labor migrants, an opportunity that allowed men to identify and locate relatives in border villages who had migrated to Zambia earlier. Thus, migratory drift, normal patterns of back and forth mobility, and labor migration routes all helped connect border residents in Zambia with relatives in Angola before the war broke out in 1966. War, Refugees and the Dynamics of Flight The war for Angolan national liberation began in 1961 in the northwest and in the capital. In early 1966 two liberation movements (UNITA and MPLA) began organizing villagers and townsfolk in Moxico and Cuando Cubango districts (adjacent to the border) from bases in Zambia. Almost immediately ambushes and other incidents began, and people were caught in the cross-fire of assassinations, bombings and retaliation. Rural Angolans had five choices: 1) join the freedom fighters; 2) move to fortified villages (aldeamentos) under Portuguese protection; 3) flee to Zambia, Zaire, or as-yet-unaffected areas of Angola; 4) move deeper into the bush and build new villages; or 5) remain in their villages and be killed by one side or another. Exact statistics will never be available, but massive suffering and dislocations obviously occurred. Niddrie (1974) reports that 26 percent of the population of the Eastern Zone were relocated away from critical border areas into aldeamentos. About 4,000 people fled into Zambia in 1966, rising to a total of 22,000 by 1973. As the war reached deeper into Angola, more areas were immediately affected, and more villagers were faced with the need to choose one of the alternatives. The extent of refugee movement into Zambia from 1966 to 1973 is shown in Table 5. These estimates were provided by the Zambian government to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The statistics show major jumps in 1972 and 1973, but those are revisions from earlier lower estimates and reflect, I believe, a delayed awareness of the 184 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW TABLE 5 ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA (YEAR-END TOTALS) Total In Camps 1966 3,800 3,800 1967 6,200 5,800 1968 7,900 5,200 1969 8,200 5,000 1970 9,900 6,200 1971 11,000 7,000 1972 P . OOO' 1 7,300 1973 22,000 a 8,600 SOURCE: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees NOTE: a These statistics have been revised by the Government of Zambia. Earlier estimates were lower. I think that the upward revisions reflect a belated recognition of the large existing village refugee population rather than new refugee influxes. extent of earlier self-settlement rather than actual immigration during 1972 and 1973. My own estimate is that about 20,000 Angolan refugees were living in Zambia in 1972, approximately 6,000 of whom were selfsettled in villages along the northern border of Zambezi District where my studies were conducted (Hansen, 1977). The Dynamics of Settlement All or almost all of the first wave of refugees were picked up by the government and housed in two rapidly established settlements, one in Zambezi District and one in Western Province. Government policies at that time were that all refugees were to live in official settlements, none in border villages, and all would return to Angola after that country became independent. In later years, however, an increasing majority of refugees settled themselves in border villages, and a few hundred had fled in 1966-67 from the official settlements to the villages or, perhaps, to return to Angola. What distinguished those refugees who went to government settlements from those who settled themselves in villages? One variable is time of arrival. Apparently all refugees arriving in 1966 were picked up by the government, which was very concerned at this transborder movement. Incoming refugees, arriving en masse, were readily visible. In later years the newcomers arrived in smaller groups and attracted less attention to themselves. Kunz (1973) divided refugee movements into anticipatory and acute: these later movements might be labeled post-acute to show that they occurred as a secondary reponse, often delayed several years, to the outbreak of war. Post-acute waves became largely self-settled. REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 185 Another variable is point of entry. Decisions made by local ethnic authorities varied from one location to another. Established migration pathways parallel rivers and streams that flow into Zambia from Angola to join the Zambezi River. Refugees who crossed Zambezi District 's western border entered an area of strong chiefs who ordered all refugees reported. Those who crossed the northern border either continued south, where the chiefs reported them, or stayed along the northern border, where local chiefs and (where there were no chiefs) headmen usually did not report them to the government. The political strength and prestige of chiefs and headmen is proportional to the number of their followers, exemplified by the Luvale saying, mutondo watela mafwo mwangana atela vatu (a stick without leaves is not a tree; a person without followers is not a chief). Those political leaders who did not report the refugees in their villages gained followers, while those leaders with more respect or allegiance to the national government did report. The third major variable is the refugee 's social identity and relationships. Refugee chiefs were always reported because chiefs are reputed to possess charms and powers as sorcerers, and residents were afraid to allow them to remain. For ordinary people (not chiefs) the issue was whether or not they had resident relatives, the strength of the kinship bond, and the wealth and status of the Zambian relative. Without actual matrilineal realtives to welcome him or her, village settlement was very difficult, both economically and sociopolitically. Kin hospitality (a place to live, gifts of food) was important because refugees were poorer than normal migrants; the war and the necessities of hiding and fleeing had stripped them of resources such as money (not readily convertible in Zambia during the war) or livestock (too risky to drive because of the threat of bombing) that migrants usually carried to ease the transition in a new community (Hansen, 1979a). Kin also provided sociopolitical shelter, introducing and sponsoring refugees to the local political leader (headman or chief) who would grant or refuse them permission to stay, and socially protecting refugees from the jealously or spite of neighbors who might report them to the police. The interaction of these three variables lay behind the choice of settlement. Refugees who either came in 1966, entered along the western border, were chiefs, or had few or no relatives in the villages (or whose relatives were unpopular) were very likely to end up in a government scheme. Post-1966 refugees who stayed along the northern border (or moved east of the Zambezi River), were not chiefs, and had some host relatives were very likely to self-settle. By the end of 1972 probably 65 percent of Angolan refugees were self-settled; most of the rest were in the large Meheba scheme that was created in 1971 to replace the earlier scheme in Zambezi District and reduce overcrowding in the Western 186 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Province location. In the Northern border areas in Zambezi District the estimated 6,000 refugees in 1972 meant that 25 percent to 35 percent of the local people were refugees (Hansen, 1977, 1979b). Within the immediate vicinity of my research, the migratory background was ascertained for 76 percent of the 1,440 people censused in 1971 and 1972 (Table 6). The majority (54.9%) of those whose background was known were first generation immigrants into the 200 square mile locality (27.4%) or refugees (27.5%), while the smallest category (21.0%) consisted of those people who were born within the locality. Most of this third category were under 15 years of age (Table 7) and were children of immigrants or refugees. If the unknowns were not counted, 72.3 percent of those with known backgrounds had moved into the locality during their lifetime (36.2% as refugees). This demonstrates that refugees are settling among people who have personal experience of migration and settlement and clarifies why kinship and local political institutions are oriented toward the absorption of newcomers. Migratory status is correlated with age and sex in Table 7 for the 1,223 people censused in 1972. Almost all of the adults (15 years of age and older) with a known background are first generation immigrants and refugees. The nonrefugee immigrant category is divided in Table 7 into early arrivals (coming before 1960) and later arrivals (after 1960). One hundred ten people had immigrated after 1960, some arriving during the 1971-1972 field research, so refugees and nonrefugee immigrants were arriving during the same period and undergoing side by side the processes of social and economic absorption. Both of these subpopulations are of both sexes and all ages, although the refugees, on the whole, are older than the later arrivals. This demonstrates a significant difference between nonforced and forced migration. Older people are more established and less desirous, under normal conditions, of moving. Nonforced movements are generally of younger people, while forced movements include all ages. A critical factor of how these refugees settled and established themselves in the villages was host relative hospitality. If the refugee found relatives, they would provide a house to live in (many refugees originally TABLE 6 MIGRATION STATUS OF SETTLEMENT POPULATION (1971 AND 1972) Nonrefugee Born No Refugee Immigrant Locally Information Total Number 390 395 303 346 1440 Percentage 27.5 27.4 21.0 24.0 100 REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 187 TABLE 7 MEN AND WOMEN * PRESENT IN 1972 CENSUS BY AGE GROUPS AND MIGRATION STATUS NO Born Early Later Informa-Age Groups Locally Arrival Arrival Refugee tion Total Men 0-14 years 115 0 17 27 38 197 15-29 10 4 10 18 16 58 30-44 3 17 12 35 19 86 45-59 3 34 12 28 18 95 60 + 1 44 6 32 4 87 Age Unknown O 0 2 9 10 21 Total Men 132 99 59 149 105 544 Women 0-14 120 0 12 43 35 210 15-29 0 17 13 56 41 136 30-44 1 42 16 26 40 125 45-59 0 43 7 29 28 107 60 + 0 38 3 18 24 83 Age Unknown O 0 0 0 15 15 Total Women 130 140 51 172 183 676 Men and Women* Total a 262 239 110 321 288 1223 Percentage 21.4 19.6 9.0 26.3 23.6 100* Percentage of Known (N == 932) Population 28.1 25.6 11.8 34.4 0 100 NOTE: The sex of 3 persons is unknown, so subpercentages are based on N = 1,220. stayed in relatives' kitchens), food to eat and sometimes land to farm (occasionally even planted fields). The fortunate refugees with close ties to generous hosts rapidly re-established a normal living standard with their own house, planted fields, and secured a food supply. Unfortunately, most refugees only received shelter and some initial gifts of food and had to begin almost immediately to work to earn their food. Those without host relatives started immediately to earn food by working and trading their personal belongings. Refugees primarily worked as agricultural laborers, earning ten ngwee (14 U.S. cents) a morning, only enough for each day ' s subsistence diet (Hansen, 1979a). Other ways to earn money included gathering food items (caterpillers, termites, honey) and construction materials from the bush. Refugee women brewed beers and helped other 188 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW women process food, while men hired out to carry goods for fish traders and peddlers and worked as artisans. It was a true hand to mouth existence for most refugees, only generating enough income for food items (including village beers). Some refugees were reduced to making their own salt from plant ash. Even the almost obligatory new cloth or dress that a husband should give his wife every year became impossible, and, upon divorce (a common occurrence among Central African matrilineal peoples), the man was often unable to generate enough money as bride wealth to remarry, leaving a number of refugee men without wives (Spring, 1979). Only over a period of several years were most refugees able to move into more profitable occupations and establish a better standard of living (Hansen, 1977, 1979a). Approximately five years were required before a normal village standard was attained, including self-sufficiency in the production of the staple cassava (a highly valued characteristic in village society), and the refugees had successfully shifted into work more befitting their status as independent adults. Particularly disadvantaged refugees (especially the old with few or poor hosts) only achieved a poor, below-normal standard even after five or more years. Settling in a government camp or settlement scheme, on the other hand, was a very different process than self-settlement. The obvious comparison with the village conditions described above is with the government establishment in the same district that opened in 1966 and closed in 1971. Although that location did not turn out to be viable for long-term settlement, and its inhabitants were removed to another scheme ('Meheba) in 1971, the process and environment in which the local scheme-settled refugees lived during those first five years were what nearby self-settled refugees perceived as life in an administered settlement. Life in the governmental location turned out to have many material advantages: the Zambian government and international agencies acted as the most hospitable of village relatives in providing shelter, food, land to farm and other facilities (Betts, 1980). There were some early difficulties apparently, but refugees in the location received free full rations of corn, dried fish, and cooking oil during all five years. Free clothing, blankets, soap, and salt were given away to new arrivals, and clothing, blankets and food were also given out periodically in exchange for work on location projects. Children continually received milk rations; free land, seeds, fertilizer, and tools were provided for farming. Almost immediately, therefore, allowing for some irregularity in transportation and distribution of supplies, location refugees were given an above-subsistence level of food and other necessities and were able to spend some time on more profitable business ventures, some of which (carpentry, mechanical and artisan workshops) were financially underwritten by the location administration. Thus, REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 189 except for the most fortunate of self-settled refugees, there is no question but that the level of welfare received and the resultant material standard of living were much higher for location refugees. WELFARE, POWER AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE Voting with the Feet During village interviews it became obvious that self-settled refugees considered their decision to have been correct/and the results of " voting with the feet" were clear—65 percent of refugees in 1972 were self-settled. They could have entered the government settlement at any time and, in fact, they were obliged to go there by government order. A few undoubtedly found life in the villages too difficult and did voluntarily report themselves (reported more frequently for Western Province), but most of those from Zambezi District only left the villages under duress, and the tension among refugees interviewed in the villages was attributed by them to their concern that enemies or envious neighbors might report them to the police or immigration, after which those refugees would be taken to the government settlement. This did happen in 1972 to some of my village informants, whom I later reinterviewed in 1979 in the Meheba scheme. Why do people choose to live in the villages under trying economic conditions rather than go to the government settlement? The intent here is to go beyond the refugees ' specific reason for rejecting the material welfare that was freely offered them and find more general explanations that encompass more than one case. Village refugees did offer some specific reasons why they avoided the government scheme: a reputation for disease and death, the fear of forced repatriation, and restrictions on social and residential patterns and mobility (Hansen 1977, 1979a, 1979b; Betts 1980), but the more general explanations deal, ultimately, with the ebb and flow of power and self-control in the refugee experience. Power, Dynamics, and the Decision to Become a Refugee: Flight and a degree of powerlessness are the essential elements that define refugee status and channel refugee behavior. These two elements are why refugees are classed as forced or involuntary migrants and portrayed as moving in spite of their original desires to remain. The "absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere" and "the reluctance to uproot" (Kunz, 1973:130) characterize the refugee. People become refugees because changes in the sociopolitical environment detrimental to the individual or group trigger the decision to leave. These changes affect the costs of staying, and people who would have remained in the earlier environment are now confronted with new, more dangerous 190 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW conditions. The decision to flee obviously reflects the individual ' s belief that his or her power over others and self-control are now inadequate to protect the self from insult, injury, imprisonment or death at the behest of others who oppose the self. Thus, flight represents the perceived inadequacy (a subjective judgment about relative strength) and an attempt to utilize whatever power, control and mobility the person still possesses to escape from a threatening situation to safety. It must be kept in mind that refugees are people who choose to leave and are successful in doing so. Their flight is neither automatic nor inevitable. Probably in every situation that produces refugees there are people who choose to stay and take their chances (Prins, 1955). Studies of refugees are studies of only part of the original population. The Angolan situation described above shows how some stayed to fight; others moved only far enough to escape detection; and others moved to fortified villages or towns under Protuguese protection. There are, in other words, a number of alternatives to becoming a refugee. Some choose flight into another country, while others do not. Although some people flee in blind panic or without any forethought, my assumption is that, to most refugees, flight and the destination are chosen as the result of more deliberation. This element of thoughtful choice is sometimes overlooked or unduly minimized by observers, as when Kunz (1973), in a footnote to an otherwise balanced analysis, overstates that An inner self-propelling force ... is singularly absent from the movement of refugees. Their progress more often than not resembles the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction their path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction and the vectors of outside forces applied on them (1973:131). This wholly kinetic interpretation appears to deny the importance of decision-making on the part of people who become refugees and, instead, to assert that flight expresses absolute powerlessness and blind flight, i.e., refugees lack all control over their own movement, which is mere reaction rather than action. On the contrary, I believe that both refugees and regular migrants make their moves because of decisions that compare alternatives, although the refugee is orginally opposed to moving and is repelled or pushed by the negative or threatening changes in his or her place of origin rather than attracted by the inherent positive aspects of the destination. The Loss of Power and Control During Flight: Changes in the sociopolitical environment of their original residence REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 191 diminish people 's power and self-control even before they become refugees. The processes associated with flight further reduce the individual 's power and control. The extent to which refugees actually suffer as a result of their uprooting and migration varies from one situation and individual to another, but for almost everyone the process of becoming a refugee is a transition from relative security and prosperity to uncertainty and poverty. Some starve; many become undernourished. Illness, exhaustion and accident accompany many on their journey and await many refugees after the rigors of the trip. Political sponsorship is abandoned in that the refugee rejects the protection of the only government under which he or she has the rights of a citizen or resident. Material wealth is lost or abandoned, and the refugee is also stripped of an important means to generate more wealth, the access to recources that is an aspect of the political and social relationships that are abandoned or destroyed. Many of the people who politically and socially surrounded and supported the refugee before his or her flight are dead or left behindstripping away emotional attachments, role relationships, and networks of kinship and association. The personal set of statuses, or social identity, is diminished in number and complexity (Eisenstadt, 1954; Bar-Yosef, 1968). Knowledge and skills that were useful in the former society may be inapplicable or inappropriate in the new society, and the refugee may be forced to learn a new language and new norms for behavior. To the extent that all of these changes in identity and social knowledge occur, the person is increasingly desocialized (Eisenstadt, 1954). Though an adult, the person is socially reduced to the level of a child who must be (re)socialized. The resocialization may involve learning the basic social values and beliefs that underlie social action in the host society, learning about its sociopolitical institutions and establishing a social identity through learning and performing roles and other behavior appropriate to the host society. The extent to which individual refugees or groups of refugees actually experience desocialization depends on several variables, the most important of which are: 1) the degree of similarity between the roles, norms and values of the original and host societies; 2) the degree to which the statuses, skills and experience are transferable from one locality to another; 3) the degree to which the refugee is welcomed and personally recognized by members of the host society; and 4) whether there is a camp experience, the duration of internment and the quality of the experience (Murphy, 1955; Eisenstadt, 1954; Fried, 1970; Zwingmann and Pfister-Ammende, 1973). The fortunate refugees, in terms of undergoing minimal desocialization, are those whose flight ends in a society identical to their old one after a short time in transit, whose normal life includes traveling, whose statuses are applicable to the host society and are 19^ INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW accepted by members of the host society, who are personally welcomed and sheltered by people they know from before the flight and who are permitted to immediately resume playing their accustomed roles. Settlement, Power, and Anxiety Settlement occurs in a context of deprivation and anxiety. The refugees have suffered a series of losses (physical, social, political and economic) and become aware that they are living in danger. Flight seemed to be the best available option, but it also exacted a cost. When the refugees arrive in the first host country village, there is the chance to rest and plan the next actions. From their perspective, the decision to stay in the villages is completely understandable. The village world is a known one; the problems and processes of absorption and re-establishment are familiar from personal and popular experience. Further risk and uncertainty are minimized if the refugees can manage to continue in that known environment. At the same time, village life minimizes desocialization and maximizes the transfer or maintenance of previous rank, status and prestige. Although material wealth is greatly reduced in flight, the refugee continues to live in a place where his or her experience, skills and acquired knowledge may be put to use to rebuild. This conservative response to the deprivation and anxiety of resettlement is a widespread phenomenon (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1981). Scudder (1973) notes, "people adopt a security orientation. . . . clinging to old behavioral patterns, old institutions and old goals " (1973:50). Although human societies are usually open-ended to cope with whatever changes come along, during a period of relocation people tend to withdraw and "behave as if a society was a closed system" (Scudder, 1973:50). "In clinging to the familiar, relocatees attempt to move the shortest distance not only in space. . . . but also in terms of the psychological and sociocultural context " (Scudder and Colson, 1981). These are all means by which people attempt to conserve and strengthen their contol by minimizing the opportunity for more changes. These dynamics are at work with all the refugees, even those who have no known relatives in the villages to act as hosts. Self-settlement is even more attractive to those with host relatives, and a common theme through many refugees ' histories was that they had directed their flight to arrive where their kinfolk lived. Being received by kin, and staying among them, means that the refugee maintains more of his or her previously established social identity, and those kinship relationships with their reciprocal rights and obligations mean that the refugee retains more power over other people and, thus, more stability and control over his or her own life. As Colson (1971) remarks in her study of another resettled population: REFUGEE DYNAMICS: ANGOLANS IN ZAMBIA 1966 TO 1972 193 It is a truism that kinship comes into its own in times of trouble, when people turn to those with whom they feel a bond based on something stronger than congeniality or economic interest. The dogma of kinship solidarity was reinforced throughout the resettlement period as men turned to kinsmen. . . . When they felt threatened with extinction, or with the extinction of their humanity through being pushed into the bush to become like animals, they clung to known kinsmen who shared with them the responsibility for the perpetuation of their lineage and clan (1971:70). Self-settlement may be seen, therefore, as a conservative tactic by which refugees minimize losses and anxiety, especially when they are able to unite themselves with kinfolk, and this conservative aspect may be sufficient in many cases to explain the popularity of self-settlement among refugees in Africa. In the specific case of Angolans in Zambia, however, village settlement was also believed to be more permanent, reinforcing its desirability. Murphy (1955) notes that true settlement " begins when the refugee ceases to regard his state of life as a purely temporary one and begins to plan for a future based on his present environment" (1955:91). Only in the villages was that planning possible since, during those early years, the scheme was designed and intended for temporary use (Holborn, 1975; Betts, 1980). The Zambian government's policy for several years after 1966 was that all Angolans would return (or be returned) to their own country on its independence. Although many refugees were willing or eager to return if conditions there were peaceful, they feared being forced to go back whenever the government decided. The fear of forced repatriation (refoulement) was universal. Self-settled refugees believed that all refugees whose identities were known to the Zambian authorities would be repatriated sooner or later, whether they wished to return or not. This meant that all refugees in the government settlement would be repatriated, whereas self-settled refugees who were not reported would retain their freedom of choice. In actuality, of course, the Zambian government eventually changed its mind and reversed its original policy of universal repatriation (Holborn, 1975; Hansen, 1976b; Betts, 1980), but this top-level decision was never adequately transmitted to or understood by people in the villages. CONCLUSION Most of the andcolonial wars against Europeans are over, but Africa's refugee population continues to grow. The majority of these several million refugees are rural people, many of whom settle themselves among the host country population rather than live in government administered locations. In the examination of self-settled refugees, it becomes clear that 194 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW kinship and previous patterns of mobility, migration, and ethnic boundaries are significant factors. When these Africans become refugees, they utilize paths and processes that are familiar. To understand their reluctance to take advantage of government welfare in the scheme, it is necessary to expand the concept of welfare to include more than material subsistence. As the concept of welfare or wellbeing is expanded, the importance of personal power and self-control becomes more apparent. Power and control are not parameters of the refugee existence; they are variables; and the ebb and flow of power and control underlie the dynamics of flight and settlement. The refugees are not powerless nor their flight and destination wholly kinetic. Flight is a demonstration of people making a decision to leave a place that is too dangerous. The refugees in this case flee toward people and places they know. Once the running stops, the refugees adopt conservative coping strategies, a common response by people to threatening situations such as relocation. Self-settlement is a means to minimize losses incurred in becoming a refugee and maximize the refugee 's power and self-control. Africa's Resettlement Strategies This paper examines the options for African asylum states in their attempts to support large refugee communities, given the limited resources that most have at their disposal. Involuntary migration is not a new phenomenon to Africa. In precolonial times, tribal warfare frequently resulted in population displacements, and during the colonial era forced migrations were a common consequence of European alienation of African lands as well as of forced labor policies. Frequent natural catastrophes further contributed to the number of reluctant migrants. However, what distinguishes contemporary refugee movements from these earlier migrations is the sheer magnitude of modern movements, as well as the fact that they are occurring simultaneously in so many regions within the continent (Rubin, 1974; Gould, 1974). Figure I summarizes the scale and directions of refugee flows in Africa as of mid-1979. Not included on the map are earlier refugee movements which have since been repatriated, such as the southern Sudanese who found asylum in all the adjacent states, the Mozambiquans in Tanzania or the Guinea-Bissauans in neighboring Senegal. Moreover, since data for the map are drawn from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees that are not recognized as such by the international community are also excluded. These include sizeable intranational displacees in countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding these omissions, the map clearly illustrates the frequency and scale of refugee movements in Africa. Moreover, it also shows that the continent's burden of asylum of displacees falls inordinantly heavily upon a few countries. West Africa' s role in both creating and receiving refugees has been relatively passive compared to most of central, southern and eastern Africa. This has given rise to a call within the Organization for African Unity for a greater sharing of the continent's refugee burden by all the member states (UNHCR, 1979). To date, the greater burden of asylum has been borne by as few as twelve states, of which four, Zaire, Tanzania, Sudan and Uganda, have been supporting very large refugee communities for well over a decade. For many asylum states, the specter of further refugee influx persists, and even with substantial infusions of international assistance, the needs of refugees IMR Volume 15 No. 1 195 John R. Rogge 196 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW Figure I ORIGIN AND DESTINATION OF AFRICA'S REFUGEES: 1979 place enormous demands upon the already over-extended economies of host countries. Not only do refugees converge upon a few countries, they also tend to concentrate in border regions within those countries. Figure II shows the extent to which refugees are localized within asylum states. In many cases, ethnic and linguistic regions straddle international boundaries, and refugees are able to find asylum among their kin across the border. While such affinity may sometimes facilitate refugees ' integration into local AFRICA ' S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES 197 Figure II ' - \ ^ -^ T' - ' -i- - ''' ^" / r 4 v"' - "X A I < ^ r\^ ^ ./  •"• ' •; , , -, . ^ ^AA^-' -'-^/ - V..Y J^ / PAST AND PRESENT ^ ^ffc REFUGEE CONCENTRATIONS) / ' IN BORDER AREAS ) (1960-1980)/ . ^ SHOWS DIRECTION FROM WHICH REFUGEES ORIGINATE communities, in most cases the concentration of refugees places severe strains on existing infrastructures, and creates land scarcity, food shortages and increased unemployment. The majority of Africa ' s refugees are rural to rural migrants. Few are equipped with skills other than those applicable in a rural milieu, and thus there is little or no opportunity for their effective absorption in urban centers. Moreover, since most of the continent' s cities experience serious problems of unemployment, governments of asylum states are naturally reluctant to have their rural refugees migrate to urban areas. Therefore, in most cases refugees have no option but to remain concentrated in rural locations within border regions. The possibility for resettlement in third countries of permanent asylum is also limited by the rural background of most of the refugees. Resettlement in countries which have traditionally provided haven for 198 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW refugees does not appear to be an option for Africa's refugees. Only a very few, better educated refugees have been fortunate enough to find permanent asylum outside Africa. Refugees from Southern Africa, who also tend to be from urban backgrounds, have frequently found asylum in third countries within Africa, such as Tanzania or Nigeria, and a limited number of Muslim refugees have been relocated to labor deficient states in the Arab World. However, the greater majority of Africa ' s refugees, unlike most of their counterparts from Europe, Latin America or even Southeast Asia, are destined to remain permanently in their initial country of asylum. Solutions to their dilemma must therefore be locally derived. THE OPTIONS Of the various options open to asylum states when dealing with their refugee population, repatriation is clearly the most desirable. It is an option, moreover, that has been available to several countries where the cause of refugee exodus was anticolonial war. With the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique for example, virtually all refugees repatriated from Senegal and Tanzania respectively. Currently, a similar repatriation is underway following Zimbabwe 's independence. In the case of Angola, however, repatriation did not occur on independence due to the protracted civil war that followed the departure of Portuguese colonialism. One other significant example of refugee repatriation was that of southern Sudan, where virtually all refugees returned from neighboring countries within eighteen months of the conclusion of the seventeen year long civil-war. Altogether some 500,000 refugees have returned voluntarily to their country of origin over the last decade; had Angola not slumped into civil war on independence, this figure would clearly be twice as large. For the rest of the continent's refugees however, there seems little probability that repatriation will become a viable option. Indeed, there have been several cases where governments have attempted to woo back their refugees by granting general amnesty, only to have refugees refusing to participate in repatriation. Zairans have been especially reluctant to repatriate despite repeated invitations by the Mobutu government. No serious cases of forcible repatriation, as has become common in parts of Southeast Asia, have yet occurred in Africa, nor have borders ever been closed to potential refugees. Notwithstanding this hitherto open door attitude to refugees, there are several areas where border closure or forcible repatriation may become a necessary option if they become inundated with refugees far beyond their ability or willingness to absorb them at even the most basic levels of support. As the conflict in southern AFRICA ' S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES 199 Africa intensifies for example, the specter of massive refugee flows inundating such small states as Lesotho or Swaziland, cannot rule out the option of forcible repatriation or border closure to refugee migrants becoming a reality in the future. In most other refugee generating areas there is little likelihood that conditions which have created refugees will radically change in the near future, and thus repatriation is unlikely. Rwandan and Burundi refugees are destined to remain in their countries of asylum, as are most Zairans. The Eritrean civil war will likely remain in a state of impasse, and attempts to resolve the Western Saharan conflict are deadlocked. The Somali-Ethiopian dispute over the Ogaden holds out little hope of immediate resolution. Repatriation of refugees remains therefore a desirable solution, and indeed one that is periodically possible, yet, for the majority of the continent's refugees is not a viable option as a solution of their problem. The spontaneous settlement of refugees, either in their country of initial asylum or alternatively in a third country of resettlement, was the strategy adopted with respect to most of Europe's refugees following World War II. Similarly, most refugees from Latin America, as well as a sizeable proportion of Southeast Asia 's refugees have also benefited from this type of solution. In Africa, however, spontaneous settlement has been more a product of government inactivity or ineffectiveness rather than an instrument of official policy in the asylum country. At the Pan African Conference on Refugees in 1979 (UNHCR, 1979), it was suggested that as much as 60 percent of Africa 's rural refugee population is living outside organized settlements, and hence is forced to fend for itself as best as possible. Little is known about these refugees, or about the difficulties they face in their endeavors to survive in asylum regions. While a few are clearly able to integrate with their ethnic kin living in the host country, the majority of these refugees remain as the least fortunate of Africa 's displaced population. Only a trickle of international assistance for refugees finds its way into the hands of such refugees. All too often they remain unseen and remote, preferring to keep a low profile for fear of harassment or even forcible repatriation by their hosts (Chambers, 1979). In general, it can be said that while the majority of Africa 's asylum states discourage the spontaneous settlement of refugees, not all come up with effective alternate strategies, and hence many refugees have little alternative but to self-settle. Certainly this has been the case with the majority of Angolans in Zaire, and currently well one-half of Somalia's refugees are spontaneously integrating rather than facing the bleak prospects of existence in "holding camps". The antipathy most governments have toward spontaneous integration of refugees stems from one or more of the following reasons. Firstly, 200 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW by preventing refugees ' dispersal, relief anch rehabilitation efforts can be concentrated to minimize costs. Secondly, dispersed refugees, especially when remaining in border regions, frequently become politically active against their home government, and when such activity translates into guerrilla warfare, it becomes embarrassing to the asylum state. Thirdly, since few host states regard their acceptance of refugees as a permanent event, they prefer to keep refugees together to facilitate their eventual repatriation. Finally, faced with ever growing unemployment of the indigenous urban proletariat, host governments are reluctant to add to their urban problems by having refugees migrate to the cities in search of work. Rural settlement schemes have therefore been adopted whenever possible as solutions to the accommodation of rural refugees. Countries such as Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda have been especially successful in resettling their refugees on schemes that have become largely selfsupporting. In contrast, government inactivity in Zaire resulted in most of its refugees having to fend for themselves. Only in Senegal did government strategy actively encourage Guinea-Bissauan refugees to self-settle among indigenous rural populace in the Casamance. Two basic types of refugee settlements are discernable in Africa. First, there are those where the principal objective is to provide aid and relief to refugees. These are little more than " holding camps", where food and medicine is dispensed until such time as a more permanent solution for refugees is arrived at. Holding camps have, however, a tendency to become permanent solutions, as the Palestinian experience has bitterly demonstrated. In Africa similar situations could easily arise with respect to Western Saharan refugees in Algeria, or with the Ogaden Somali and Galla, who now find themselves housed in more than thirty over-extended and critically underserviced camps scattered in five regions throughout Somalia. A second, and clearly much more desirable form of refugee settlement, is one where the settlers are provided with a means of becoming self-sufficient. Such settlements become essentially rural development schemes for refugees, and although costly to initiate, in the longterm pay for themselves if effectively implemented. Many asylum states have opted for this type of solution. Some, such as Tanzania or Botswana have been especially successful, while others, as in Sudan, have faced considerable frustration and setbacks. SOME PREREQUISITES FOR RURAL SETTLEMENT SCHEMES Ever since the international community commenced provision of aid for Africa's refugees, emphasis has been primarily on establishing selfsufficient settlement schemes. UNHCR's commitment to Africa erew ^ CO D i ^ i^ Q Z LU CL X LU rapidly during the latter half of the 1960s, and by 1973, Africa received close to three quarters of the total budget for assistance (Figure III). In that year, as has been the case throughout most of UNHCR ' s activity in Africa, rural settlement received the bulk of funding. As Table 1 illustrates, while rural settlement accounted for seventy percent of the annual program expenditure, repatriation and third-country resettlement accounted for as little as nine percent. While the proportions of funding allocated to each of these categories of expenditure have fluctuated during the 1970s, and especially as emergency aid requirements increased drama-300 200 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 90 10 9 8 7 6 5 AFRICA S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES 201 Figure III UNHCR TOTAL EXPENDITURE AND EXPENDITURE IN AFRICA 1963 - 80 WORLD AFRICA * Estimated A Projected 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Source: UNHCR 202 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW tically, rural settlement remains to this day the principal component of UNHCR assistance. As a long-term solution for rural refugees, settlement schemes offer a number of distinct advantages. By providing means for refugees to become self-sufficient, settlement schemes greatly reduce maintenance costs of refugees for the host country. Indeed, direct benefits may accrue to the asylum state when such schemes are located in underused yet potentially productive areas. Also, by providing refugees with livelihoods akin to their traditional economic way of life, such schemes help to prevent refugees from developing attitudes of total dependence. Moreover, by stressing rural development and^self-sufficiency, settlement schemes receive priority in the disposition of international aid. A number of prerequisites are necessary if rural settlement schemes are to be successfully implemented. These include realistic planning, availability of suitable land, adequate water supplies, sufficient capital, organizational and administrative skills, and a sympathetic settler population which will cooperate in the settlement venture. Deficiency in one or more of these prerequisites will clearly prejudice the successful execution of schemes. The experience with rural settlement schemes in Africa in postcolonial times has been a mixture of successes and failures. Many earlier postindependence ventures were fraught with frustrations or indeed ended as outright failures. There has been ample documentation of the settlement scheme experience in Africa (de Wilde, 1967; Chambers, 1969). In view of the general difficulties settlement schemes have had, it is not surprising that those specifically designed for refugees, with their additional inherent problems of an involuntary settler population, have met with more than their share of disappointments and setbacks. While many schemes look adequate at the planning stage, the realization of plans is frequently frustrated by a variety of unforeseen factors or circumstances. Therefore it is useful to examine in more detail the prerequisites for successful implementation of settlement ventures, and to elaborate upon some of the social, economic or environmental factors that have periodically thwarted their outright success. Availability of Land Rural settlement schemes require large tracts of land. So far, sufficient land has generally been available is asylum countries. However, there have also been some notable exceptions to this rule. Both Rwanda and Burundi, which already have the highest rural population density among continental African states, had considerable difficulty finding sufficient suitable land for refugee settlements and, were they to receive more refugees, would be unlikely to come up with additional settlement lands. Similarly, neither Lesotho nor Swaziland would be in a position to AFRICA ' S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES 203 establish substantial land settlement projects should their refugee population from South Africa rise significantly. Hence, the question of whether sufficient land will be available in Africa in future years for refugee settlements is being increasingly raised (Chambers, 1979). Traditional attitudes to land tenure are also changing, and as rural population pressures increase everywhere, governments may find it increasingly more difficult to justify large land grants for refugee settlement to their indigenous land hungry populace. More important than the question of quantity of available land is that of quality of land. No matter how well a scheme is designed or executed, it cannot succeed if the quality of the land is inadequate. Countries of asylum like Djibouti, Somalia or Algeria have plenty of unused land, but it is totally unsuited for any form of agricultural enterprise. On the other hand, Tanzania and Zambia have so far had little difficulty in furnishing adequate areas for rural refugee settlement. Even when tracts of suitable land lie unused or underused, their assignment to refugees by host governments may create local conflict. Land in Africa, whether or not it is actually used, generally belongs to a specific community. Therefore, its allocation by government to aliens may be seen by local populations as arbitrary or illegal, stimulating political agitation and possibly outright resistance and hostility. In eastern Sudan, for example, lands developed for Eritrean refugees were dry season pasture for local nomadic communities, and consequently the government experienced considerable resistance to the implementation of the settlement scheme. This problem has since been compounded by further schemes being implemented in the same region. Clearly, therefore, as local demand for land intensifies, it will become increasingly more difficult to promote rural settlements for refugees. Availability of Water This factor is closely associated with the previous one. Settlement schemes must have water, and in much of Africa water is a scarce commodity. A sizeable component of international aid for rural refugee settlement has therefore been deployed in the provision of water. The Qala en Nahal scheme in eastern Sudan was totally dependent upon the construction of an elaborate pump and storage system which absorbed the greater part of the scheme's funding. Moreover, when poor maintenance caused pumps to break down, the scheme was threatened with abandonment. The further development of schemes for Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan, who now number well over quarter of a million, has been retarded primarily by lack of adequate water rather than scarcity of good farm land. In Somalia, the problem is even more acute. Four of the five areas which contain the thirty-one refugee camps have critical water deficiency. 204 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW In all four areas, there is virtually no opportunity to introduce even the most rudimentary self-support programs because of absence of water. Even in the fifth area, around Corioli in the Shebele lowlands, water availability permits little more than simple gardens. Consequently it is highly questionable whether Somalia will ever have its 800,000 camp refugees contribute significantly to their own subsistence. Availability of Capital No African asylum state has the necessary surplus capital resources to invest in refugee settlement schemes. Thus, an infusion of external aid is an absolute prerequisite for any such developments. It is in this role. that the UNHCR, together with a large number of international and national nongovernmental agencies, play their most significant roles in refugee assistance. Virtually every settlement scheme has had a major UNHCR capital component. As Table 1 illustrated, UNHCR expenditure for rural settlement ventures ran as high as 80 percent of total budget in many asylum states. It is doubtful if any of these schemes would have materialized had this assistance not been available. Capital infusion is especially necessary for such needs as water supply, schools, medical facilities and for farm machinery. Regrettably, such capital outlay is all too often limited to initial investment, with no consideration of maintenance or long-term upkeep costs. The consequence of this is that when external funding is severed, it is not uncommon for scheme facilities to grind to a halt if local funding is inadequate or totally lacking. This was well illustrated by the Qala en Nahal scheme in eastern Sudan where conditions shifted rapidly from being a potentially successful venture while adequate UNHCR funding was available (Rogge, 1975), to one of severe financial difficulties once the settlement was turned over to local government authorities. Indeed, overcapitalization at Qala en Nahal created an inordinantly heavy burden for the already impoverished local government to bear, and since it felt no responsibility for a settlement for " foreigners", it diverted little or no money to the scheme. Planning and Administrative Skills Plans for settlement schemes have ranged from highly elaborate, integrated and institutionalized ventures to simple, largely unstructured and self-help dependent undertakings. Clearly the levels of organizational skills need to reflect the complexity of plans. Refugee settlement schemes, even more so than their counterparts for indigenous settlers, have had a tendency to incorporate a top-heavy administrative framework. Perhaps because the settler community is there involuntarily, or because their S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES •<t< 0400 V) Of Of V) y) 0 10 00OOtOOt^OOOOiO-^0 i-f i0tOt^OOt^^t^O^-'-it^-'i Cs|1-1 t^ 04 -^ 10 i0 t^ i0 0 10<^ 0^ 0 •^ 00 • ^ 0 0 i0 00 •^ •^^ 0) 00 W •^ C^ •^ •^ •4< ' <M t^OO•'-ft ^'^ O^ iOtO C^O^-^ o t^ od o •^ •^ c^ ^ id 10 •^ •^ .•^f.tO.t^iOOOO^OO.-'-i •00•iD ' -tO-^iOCOOO^ 10<M •^ •^ .. . 10 •^ l0 c<-) . t>» S2 5 2 ? S " S ••-• 04 04 00..OO'^. iO-^t^OOlO O* <M 1I C^I c^il OO•^<^•4< ' 0 IT) •^1 i0..C^O^.'^-i iO O^O^OO 0*^-^-I*-^-<004t ^ T-i -^-« ^ ^ o ••-•.10- ^ .(^•^-• •^-fcn c^ in 060 l c^I t^ l oooood i0 -^ , 10 t ^ .t^ OO O^ •^0 ••^t^ '•^O^^C404 V) i-t•^-f O^ iO O^^W •4< ' t^OOOOCMO^CMO'^OOOt 0004OO't^COiOO^ OOOO C^t^OC i0 00 t0 10 •'-•04 S tOtOiric^OO^OiOlO 0004^0000 •4< 0^ 4 < •4 < •^ 04 €<•) •<t< ••-• i0 •<t< .s li^tig'li.l ^^gjg|§S>-a§ M^P^ KIME-i^NN 206 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW participation is reluctant, schemes have developed wholly institutionalized frameworks, where often the settler has little or no input into decision making. The consequence of this has been settler disillusionment and dissatisfaction. In other instances, where government and administration has been placed upon the settlers themselves, schemes have tended to fare more successfully. An all too common shortcoming of settlement schemes has been a deficiency in both number and competence of extension workers. Skills have been particularly lacking in areas where needs are greatest, such as when refugees are being introduced to completely new cropping systems or techniques, or are required to operate under new environmental constraints. To some extent, external agencies have been able to assist in meeting such manpower shortfalls; however, in most instances adequately qualified indigenous manpower would be much more preferable since communication in the vernacular is essential. Settler Cooperation One might suppose that refugees would be happy to cooperate in rural settlement where land and opportunity for self-sufficiency is offered. While in many cases this has been the case, in others, settlement schemes have met with considerable apathy or indeed outright resistance. As was intimated earlier in this article, most African refugees do not see their flight as permanent, and are thus suspicious of attempts to install them in what they perceive as long-term or permanent solutions. Such resistance may be further exacerbated when refugees are required to relocate from their initial place of asylum in border zones to settlements located some distance from the border. There have also been instances where refugees believe that the object of relocation is primarily to benefit the host country through bringing new land into production or settling thinly peopled regions. Yeld suggested, for example, that resettled Rwandans in Tanzania were initially frustrated by what they perceived to be strategies aimed at maximizing benefits for Tanzania rather than providing adequate solutions to the refugees ' problems (Yeld, 1968). Likewise, many Eritreans at the Qala en Nahal settlement scheme were reluctant settlers. Clearly settler resistance or apathy does not help to promote the effective implementation of settlement plans. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY SCHEMES The Development of Dependency Refugees that have lived in relief or holding camps for extended periods invariably become dependent upon provision of their day to day needs. By AFRICA ' S RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES 207 receiving food and housing without having to work, the idea that the world owes them a living becomes engrained. Resettlement of such refugees to agricultural schemes requires, therefore, a weaning away from this welfare syndrome. This is not necessarily an easy task. Having become accustomed to free food handouts on a regular basis, requirements to commence cultivation, and perhaps even land clearance, are not readily embraced by the refugees. A similar problem has also arisen where all initial settlement facilities, including housing, has been prepared for refugees prior to their settlement. Often this is necessitated by the fact that they are too emaciated as a result of their flight to undertake such tasks themselves. Nevertheless, a consequence of this has been a continuation of expectations that everything will be done for them. Again, the Qala en Nahal scheme in eastern Sudan can be cited as illustrating this phenomenon. In contrast, emphasis upon self-help has characterized Tanzania's refugee settlement policy, especially since the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Little or no distinction in rural development strategies is drawn between settlement projects for refugees and those for indigenous ujamaa villagerization programs. Burundi refugees were required to undertake virtually all aspects of settlement development themselves at the Ulyankulu and Katumba settlements, and while these settlements have not been without problems, their difficulties are not attributable to settler apathy or reluctance to participate. Insecurity of Tenure The problem of insecurity of land tenure is most serious for self-settling refugees, who are essentially dependent upon indigenous people allowing them to utilize unused lands. Insecurity of tenure however, may also extend to settlement scheme participants, even though the land has been granted to refugees by an asylum government. Imprecise demarcation of plots, or even failure to assign individual plots, prejudices settler initiative or investment in the land. Indeed, in extreme cases refugee settlers believed that they had become little more than underpaid laborers on government farms. The more institutionalized schemes become, the greater is the tendency for settlers not to identify individually with their land, and thus their enthusiasm for the scheme is minimal. Such problems are best avoided by the allocation of discreetly demarcated plots to individuals upon arrival in the settlement, as was done at the Ulyankulu and Katumba settlements in Tanzania. Another dimension to the problem of insecurity of tenure is the fear that hosts will take away rights to cultivate if and when possibilities for repatriation arise. Without land, refugees who might otherwise not wish to repatriate would have little or no alternative but to return home. 208 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW While such moves have yet to be made against settlement scheme participants, there have been many instances where self-settled refugees have been forced to repatriate after their land or businesses were taken over. This has been especially a problem in Zaire. Clearly, where refugees find asylum with reluctant hosts, the fear of losing lands that have been made temporarily available to them must always be in the back of their minds. Disparity between Refugees and Local Population Refugee settlements are usually located in marginal or thinly populated regions, where levels of infrastructural development are low. Consequently, when such schemes include schools, dispensaries, piped water or perhaps even improved access roads, they create a degree of disparity with the surrounding unimproved rural areas. A result of this may be that resentment toward the new population is created, especially when the land for the settlement scheme was allocated by government without the consent of the indigenous communities. Where refugees and indigenous people live in close proximity, such infrastructural developments may become shared and hence local people end up benefiting from a settlement scheme. However, most schemes are wholly dependent upon external aid for their capital projects, and since aid budgets are always strained, investments for services at a scale that can also serve local populations is seldom feasible, even if the intentions are there. In the case of Senegal, aid for services for refugees created facilities which also became available to indigenous residents, and relativel